

SELECTIONS
FROM THE
LETTERS, DESPATCHES, AND OTHER STATE PAPERS
PRESERVED IN
THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT
OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
1772—1785.

EDITED BY
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IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOLUME I.



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PREFACE.

THE object of these volumes is to trace by means of the records deposited in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, the history of our Indian Empire from 1772, the year Warren Hastings became Governor of Bengal, to the 1st of February 1785, the day on which he resigned the office of Governor-General. The story of the administration of Warren Hastings—one of the most important periods in the history of our Empire—is told by the letters and narratives, the dissents and discussions of the chief actors. These have been printed letter by letter exactly as they were entered day by day in the Secret Proceedings of the Select Committee of Council. These Proceedings contain, as Sir James Stephen remarks, the most interesting, authentic and curious collection of State papers in the world. The Government of the Company, as Burke pointed out, was a government of writing, a government of record, and they contrived that every proceeding in public council should be written—no debates merely verbal. “The arguments, first or last, are to be in writing and recorded. All other bodies, the House of Lords, Commons, Privy Council, Cabinet Council for secret State deliberations, enter only resolves, decisions, and final resolutions of affairs; the argument, the discussion, the dissent, does very rarely, if at all appear. But the Company has proceeded much further and done much more wisely, because they proceeded upon mercantile principles; and they have provided, either by orders or by course of office, that all shall be written—the proposition, the argument, the dissent.” By the study of the proposition, the argument, the dissent, the historical student is now enabled to form an independent judgment of events, and still more of the actors and their motives. In the case of Hastings and his administration, the world has not been sufficiently careful to test motives and actions, and has accepted without challenge the verdict of unscrupulous opponents and political partisans. The exaggerated charges of Burke against Hastings have left a stain, not only on the character of the man who founded our Empire, but on the nation whose minister he was. To the eloquence of Burke was first due the impression that our Indian dominion was founded by enormous crimes. This view was strengthened by the history of Mill, whose “excessive dryness and severity of style,” to use the words of Sir James Stephen, “produce an impression of accuracy and labour which a study of original authorities does not confirm.” Macaulay unfortunately accepted the statements of Mill without examination, and by his matchless style gave them wide circulation. The time however has come when the rash and indiscriminate judgments passed on Hastings and his work should be carefully revised by history, and the present volumes contain all the authentic documents necessary for the purposes of history. The value of these documents is too apparent to require observation. The ancient muniments of the Government of India now scattered among different offices contain the materials for that history of our

Empire which, for the honour of England, ought not to remain unwritten. In musty records, fast falling into decay, are chronicled the deeds of valour by which the Empire was won, and the acts of statesmanship by which it has been maintained. In them are preserved the lessons of wisdom which the times past afford the present.

The despatches of Sir Eyre Coote describing his victories, and those of Admiral Hughes giving graphic descriptions of his naval engagements against the French, printed in these volumes will be of interest to Englishmen as long as they reverence deeds of valour. The minutes of Francis and Hastings are not only of great interest as literary compositions but contain much that is valuable to the statesman and administrator. Hastings implored in his lifetime that his punctuation should not be altered, and I have respected his wishes. It is interesting and instructive to compare the style and punctuation of the two great opponents. The account of an interview between the English Envoy and Hyder Ally is an important historical document on account of the light it throws on the character of the Mysore Chief. Of less importance but not without interest is the letter written by George III to the Nawab of Arcot, dated Weymouth the 27th June 1770, informing him that he intended to bestow the Order of the Bath on Sir John Lindsay, Knight, and Eyre Coote, Esquire, Major-General of our forces in the East Indies, and asking the Nawab to "represent Our person upon this solemn occasion and that you will perform these functions for Us which We always perform ourselves when the circumstances permit."

In order to make the selections more intelligible to the general reader, I have thought it advisable to prefix to them an introduction showing the bearing of these new materials upon history. For the introduction I have consulted the Reports of the Parliamentary Committees on Indian Affairs published between 1772 and 1785; the History of the Trial of Hastings published by Debrett; the Trial of Nundcoomar published by sanction of the Supreme Court; Debates of the House of Lords on the events delivered in the Trial of Warren Hastings, printed by Debrett; Impeachment against Warren Hastings by Ralph Broome, Esq.; Memoirs relative to the state of India by Warren Hastings; Scott's Indian Tracts; and many other pamphlets published at the time of the Impeachment. I have also referred to a number of old books such as Hamilton's History of the Rohillas, the Life of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and the Seir Mutakherin, from which I have derived considerable assistance.

The introduction has no official character or authority.

It affords me much pleasure to acknowledge the valuable aid rendered me in the preparation of these volumes by Mr. Belletty of the Foreign Office. The index is entirely his work.

CALCUTTA,
8th March 1890.

G. W. FORREST.

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INTRODUCTION.

IN 1772 Warren Hastings was appointed by the Court of Directors "to ^{Warren Hastings' early career.} preside in their Council at Bengal." Twenty-two years previously he had landed at Calcutta as a writer in the Company's establishment and had spent the first seven years of his service in performing the duties of a merchant's clerk : appraising silks and muslins and copying invoices. While he was thus engaged Surajah Dowlah declared war against the English and Hastings was taken prisoner at Cossim Bazaar just before the tragedy of the Black Hole took place. After his release, which he owed to the kind offices of the Dutch, he joined the fugitives from Calcutta at Fulta and fought as a volunteer under Clive in the battle of Budge-Budge and the other engagements which led to the recapture of the capital of Bengal. The courage and political ability he displayed at that critical time won him the regard of Clive and gained for him the appointment of Resident at the Court of Meer Jaffir when that Prince was, after the battle of Plassey, proclaimed Nawab of Bengal. Three years after he became Member of Council and strenuously supported the Governor Mr. Vansittart against his corrupt Council.

In 1764 Hastings returned to England after fifteen years' service, a comparatively poor man. Macaulay writes—"It is certain that at this time he continued poor; and it is equally certain that by cruelty and dishonesty he might easily have become rich. It is certain that he was never charged with having borne a share in the worst abuses which then prevailed; and it is almost equally certain that, if he had borne a share in these abuses, his able and bitterest enemies who afterwards persecuted him would not have failed to discover and to proclaim his guilt." It was about the time of the return of Hastings to England that the affairs of the East India Company began seriously to attract the attention of Parliament, and in 1766 a Committee was appointed to inquire into the state of the Company's revenue, its relations with Indian Princes, and the general administration of its territory. Hastings was summoned to give evidence before the Committee, and the clear and strong view he expressed on the subject won for him both the regard and gratitude of his old masters. He had spent and lost the scanty fortune which he had brought home and was desirous of returning to India. His application to be restored to the service of the Company was favourably received, and in 1768 the Court of Directors announced to the Madras Government the appointment of Hastings to be second in Council in these handsome terms—"Mr. Warren Hastings, a gentleman who has served us many years upon the Bengal establishment with great ability and unblemished character, offering himself to be employed again in our service, we have, from a consideration of his just merits, and general knowledge of the Company's affairs, been induced to appoint him one of the Members of our Council at your Presidency and to station him next below Mr. Du Pré."

At Madras Hastings displayed such zeal and ability that he was selected ^{Governor of Benga...} by the Court of Directors to take charge of the Government of Bengal which at that time was specially in need of a strong man. The double Government established by Clive, by which the internal administration of the country had been placed in the hands of natives under the control of a few European supervisors, had proved a failure. The people grew poorer day by day and the native functionaries and zemindars richer. To

Arrest of Mahomed
Reza Khan.

remedy the evil, the Court of Directors determined to place the internal administration of Bengal and the collection of the revenue directly under their own European servants. They henceforward determined, to use their own words, "to start forth as Duan." At that time the head of the native administration of Bengal was Mahomed Reza Khan, the Nawab or Deputy Nawab of Bengal, resident at Moorshedabad, and the head of the native administration of Behar was Shitab Roy, the Deputy Nawab of Behar, resident at Patna. The first task imposed upon Warren Hastings when he took his seat as President of the Council on the 28th of April 1772 was to inform the Board that in consequence of orders received from the Secret Committee "he has sent instructions to Mr. Middleton to arrest the persons of Mahomed Reza Cawn and Raja Amrit Sing, his Dewan, and to send them under a guard to Calcutta; that he has received advice from Mr. Middleton, that the same has accordingly been put in execution." A discussion then ensued as to the manner in which Reza Khan should be received on his arrival at Calcutta, and it was resolved by the majority of the Board "that one of the Members be sent to intimate to him the cause of his seizure, and to inform His Excellency of the points on which the Honourable Company express their displeasure, and that they look to us to obtain satisfaction from him for the injuries which they conceive their affairs to have sustained by his mismanagement and corrupt administration."*—Hastings protested against the decision of the majority on the ground, "that any public show of respect to Mahomed Reza Cawn in his present circumstances will be inconsistent with the restraint which has been imposed upon him, and may counteract the end intended by it, in creating an opinion in the minds of the public that his power is but suspended, and thereby discouraging those who may have complaints to prefer against him by the fear of their falling hereafter under the effects of his resentment. He also thinks it very unbecoming the character and dignity of a member of this administration to be employed on a public deputation to a man who stands accused by the Court of Directors themselves of the most criminal conduct."†

A further conflict arose between Hastings and his colleagues as to the arrangements which he proposed should be made consequent on the deposition of Mahomed Reza Khan. Hastings proposed that Munny Begum, the widow of the Nawab Meer Jaffer, whom Clive had placed on the throne of Bengal, should be made superintendent of the Nawab's household and guardian of his person, and that Raja Goordas, the son of Nundcoomar, should assist her as Dewan. To the latter appointment a majority of the Committee objected on account of the notoriously bad character of the father, but they were not aware of the fact that in making the appointment Hastings was merely giving effect to a suggestion from the Court of Directors themselves that Nundcoomar's services should be acquired and encouraged.‡ In a letter to the Court, he states—"You directed 'that if the assistance and information of Nundcoomar should be serviceable to me in my investigating the conduct of Mahomed Reza Cawn, I should yield him such encouragements and reward as his trouble and the extent of his services may deserve.'§ There is no doubt that Nundcoomar is capable of affording me great services by his information and advice; but it is on his abilities, and on the activity of his ambition and hatred to Mahomed Reza Cawn that I depend for investigating the conduct of the latter and, by eradicating his influence, for confirming the authority which you have assumed in the administration of the affairs of this country. The reward which has been assigned him will put it fully in his power to answer those expectations, and will be an encouragement to him to exert all his abilities for the accomplishment of them. Had I not been guarded by the caution which you have been pleased to enjoin me, yet my own knowledge of the character of Nundcoomar would have restrained me from yielding him any trust or anything which could prove detrimental to the Company's interests."§ He further adds—"I hope I shall not appear to assume too much importance in speaking thus much of myself in justification of the motives which led to his recommendation; that I had no connexion with Nundcoomar or his family prior to the receipt of your letter

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 28th April 1772, Volume I, page 3.

† *Ibid*

page 5.

‡ Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 250.

§ *Ibid*

page 251.

by the *Lapwing*; that on the contrary, from the year 1759 to the time when I left Bengal in 1764, I was engaged in a continued opposition to the interests and designs of that man, because I judged him to be adverse to the welfare of my employers; and in the course of this contention I received sufficient indications of his ill-will to have made me an irreconcilable enemy if I could suffer my passions to supersede the duty which I owe to the Company.* Writing to a friend Hastings states—"The man never was a favourite of mine, and was engaged in doing me many ill offices for seven years together." But that Hastings could take an impartial view of the conduct of a bitter foe is apparent from the minute which he wrote regarding Nundcoomar. He tells his colleagues that he "does not take upon him to vindicate the moral character of Nundcoomar" but "nevertheless he thinks it but justice to make a distinction between the violation of a *trust* and an offence committed against our Government by a man who owed it no allegiance, nor was indebted to it for protection, but on the contrary was the actual servant and minister of a master whose interest naturally suggested that kind of policy which sought by foreign aids and the diminution of the powers of the Company to raise his own consequence and to re-establish his authority." Hastings proceeded to point out that Nundcoomar had never been charged with any instance of infidelity to the Sovereign to whom he owed allegiance, but that the high opinion which the Nawab Meer Jaffer himself entertained of the fidelity of Nundcoomar evidently appeared in the distinguished marks which he continued to shew him of his favour and confidence to the latest hour of his life. "His conduct in the succeeding administration appears not only to have been dictated by the same principles, but if we may be allowed to speak favourably of any measures which opposed the view of our Government and aimed at the support of an adverse interest, surely it was not only not culpable but even praiseworthy. He endeavoured (as appears by the extracts before us) to give consequence to his master, and to pave the way to his independence by obtaining a firman from the King for his appointment to the Subahship, and he opposed the promotion of Mahomed Reza Cawn because he looked upon it as a supersession of the rights and authority of the Nawab. He is now an absolute dependant and subject of the Company on whose favour he must rest all his hopes of future advancement."†

The Court of Directors expressed their approval of the course which Hastings adopted in the following terms—"Your choice of the Begum for guardian to the Nawab we entirely approve;‡ the use you intend making of Nundcoomar is very proper, and it affords us great satisfaction to find that you could at once determine to suppress all personal resentment when the public welfare seemed to clash with your private sentiments relative to Nundcoomar."§ Mahomed Reza Khan and Rajah Shitab Roy were both after a protracted trial acquitted of the charges brought against them, but their respective offices were abolished—a step which caused considerable annoyance and disappointment to the ambitious Nundcoomar, who had appeared as Reza Khan's accuser "and displayed both the art and the inveterate rancour which distinguished him." "Nundcoomar," writes Macaulay, "had proposed to destroy the Mussulman administration, and to rise on its ruin. Both his malevolence and his cupidity had been disappointed. Hastings had made him a tool, had used him for the purpose of accomplishing the transfer of the Government from Moorshedabad to Calcutta, from native to European hands. The rival, the enemy, so long envied, so implacably persecuted, had been dismissed unhurt. The situation so long and ardently desired had been abolished. It was natural that the Governor should be from that time an object of the most intense hatred to the vindictive Brahmin. As yet, however, it was necessary to suppress such feelings. The time was coming when that long animosity was to end in a desperate and deadly struggle."

* Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 262.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 6th August 1772, Volume I, pages 23 and 24.

‡ Burke in one of his speeches describes Munny Begum with characteristic ferocity—"But when I call this woman a dancing girl, I state something lower than Europeans have an idea of respecting that situation. She was born a slave, bred a dancing girl. Her dancing was not any of those noble and majestic movements which make part of the entertainment of the most wise, of the education of the most virtuous, which improve the manners without corrupting the morals of all civilised people and of which, among uncivilised people, the professors have their due share of admiration; but these dances were not decent to be seen, nor fit to be related. I shall pass them by. Your Lordships are to suppose the lowest degree of infamy and occupation and situation when I tell you that Munny Begum was a slave and dancing girl." (Burke's speeches on the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Volume I, page 265.)

§ Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 257.

Hastings' reforms.

Hastings saw that the time had come when the Company must accept the responsibility of the government of the kingdom which Clive had won for them in the groves of Plassey. He wrote to the Directors—"You must establish your own power, or you must hold it dependant on a superior which I deem to be impossible." The first step which Hastings took towards the establishment of the power of the Company was the removal of the Revenue office and the Superior Courts of Justice from Moorshedabad to Calcutta. "By these arrangements," he writes, "the whole power and government of the province will centre in Calcutta which may now be considered as the capital of Bengal.* He also looked forward to the time when it should become "the first city in Asia."† Having converted Calcutta into the capital of Bengal, the question which immediately demanded the attention of Hastings was the settlement of the revenue. "It was late in the season; the lands had suffered unheard-of depopulation by the famine and mortality of 1769. The collections violently kept up to their former standard had added to the distress of the country, and threatened a general decay of the revenue unless immediate remedies were applied to prevent it." To remedy the existing state of affairs Hastings appointed a committee of which he was President, and they proceeded on a tour through the province. "On the 3rd June," he writes, "I set out with the committee. We made the first visit to Kissennagur, the capital of Nuddea, and formed the settlement of that district, farming it in divisions for five years. We proceeded next to the city, where we arrived the last of the month. Here a variety of occupations detained me till the 15th of last month—two months and a half. This period was employed in settling the collections and the government of the districts dependant on Moorshedabad, which were large, very numerous, and intricate; in reducing the Nawab's stipend from thirty-two lacs to sixteen, a work which ought to have taken place in January last; in reducing his pension list and other expenses; in forming, recommending, and executing a new arrangement of his household; and in framing a new system for conducting the business of the Dewannee or revenue."‡

Civil and Criminal Courts established.

At the end of June Hastings returned to Calcutta, but the rest of the committee proceeded to visit the other districts. There was much work to be done by him at the capital. It was impossible to place the revenue administration on a sound footing without a thorough reform in the administration of justice, and the first step Hastings took towards accomplishing a reform was the establishment of a Criminal and Civil Court in every district. "The first consisted entirely of Mahomedans, and the latter of the principal officers of the revenue, assisted by the Judges of the Criminal Courts, and by the most learned pundits (or professors of Hindu law), in cases which depended on the peculiar usages or institutions of either faith."§ These Courts were made dependent on two Supreme Courts which were established in the city of Calcutta, one for ultimate reference in capital cases, the other for appeals. To give the people confidence in the new Courts and to enable the new tribunals to decide with certainty and despatch, Hastings caused a digest of the Hindu law to be prepared by ten of the most learned pundits in the province. He writes to Lord Mansfield: "This code they have written in their own language, the Sanscrit. A translation of it is begun under the inspection of one of their body into the Persian language, and from that into English. The two first chapters I have now the honour to present to Your Lordship with this, as a proof that the inhabitants of this land are not in the savage state in which they have been unfairly represented, and as a specimen of the principles which constitute the rights of property among them."

Hastings recognised the economic principle which Adam Smith put forward a few years later that the first interest of the sovereign of a people is that their wealth should increase as much as possible; and he was particularly impressed with the necessity for its application in a country like Bengal, where the revenue is chiefly derived from the land rent. When he became Governor, the foreign and domestic trade of the province had almost perished on account of the revival of the old trade abuses which Clive had destroy-

* Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Cleig, Volume I, page 263.

† Ibid page 285.

‡ Ibid page 260.

§ Ibid page 401.

ed. A chief part of the revenues consisted of duties imposed on the transit of goods, but the servants of the Company exempted themselves from paying them. Hastings formed a new plan for collecting the customs. He wrote—"It is simple, calculated for the freedom of trade, and liable to no abuses. All the petty chokeys of the country are withdrawn, and the distinction of the dustomuck, which (among other objections) pointed out to the rogues in office what boats they were to pass unmolested and what they might plunder with impunity, is abolished. The duty is fixed to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the prices of every article fixed and made public; and the duty paid the goods pass unmolested to the extremities of the province."* The servants of the Company had monopolized the trade to the ruin of the native traders and thousands of poor weavers.† Hastings determined therefore to establish the system of ready money purchases; and "to declare the weavers free to work for whom they will and to support them in that freedom." He wrote to a friend:—"The Company and their collectors and chiefs of factories are the only merchants of the country; they force advances of money on the weavers, and compel them to give cloths, in return, at an arbitrary valuation, which is often no more than the cost of the materials, so that the poor weaver only lives by running in debt to his employers, and thus becomes their slave for life. The collectors trade with the money which they get in the districts, which affects the circulation as well as commerce of the country. By the mode proposed the investment will be dearer, but the trade of the country will be restored, and indeed this country has wonderful resources for it. The remittances of the revenue will flow back in circulation, and in their customs or collections the Company will obtain an ample compensation for the difference which it will make in the price of their cloths. If they do not, they can better afford to pay dear for them than the Dutch or French can."‡

To preserve peace, Hastings informed the Court, was one of the great aims of his administration, and like all far-seeing statesmen he realised the fact that an efficient army was the best method of maintaining it. Owing to the weakness which seized the Mogul Empire after the death of Aurungzebe, India had become the prey not only of the Jat and the Mahratta, but of desperate adventurers of every race and sect. Bengal had been repeatedly devastated by bands of fanatics called Senassies.§ Hastings acted against them with vigour, and after some hard fighting they were driven across the borders. He also determined to relieve the province of Cooch Behar from the grasp of the Booteas. The task proved a difficult one. The Booteas, strong hardy mountaineers, fought with valour. They made a desperate defence of the fort of Cooch Behar which Captain Jones stormed and took with the loss of nearly one-fourth of his detachment killed and wounded. He writes—"I have lost good many sepoy and many more wounded. Lieutenant Dickson is wounded in the breast and knees. I have received a ball through my right arm. The sepoy behaved extremely well. I cannot sufficiently praise the bravery and resolution of the officers under my command."|| After some further fighting the Booteas were expelled and orderly government introduced into the district of Cooch Behar.

* Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 304.

† "A number of these weavers are generally also registered in the books of the Company's gomastahs thus not permitted to work for any others; being transferred from one to another as so many slaves subject to the tyranny and roguery of every succeeding gomastah. The cloth, when made, is collected in a warehouse for the purpose, called a khattah, where it is kept marked with the weaver's name, till it is convenient for the gomastah to hold a khattah, as the term is, for assorting and fixing the price of each piece: on which business is employed an officer called the Company's jachendar, or assorter. The roguery practised in this department is beyond imagination, but all terminates in the defrauding of the poor weaver, for the prices which the Company's gomastahs, and, in confederacy with them, the jachendars fix upon the goods, are in all places at least fifteen per cent. and in some even forty per cent. less than the goods so manufactured would sell for in the public bazaar, or market, upon a free sale. The weaver, therefore, desirous of obtaining the just price of his labour, frequently attempts to sell his cloth privately to others, particularly to the Dutch and French gomastahs, who are always ready to receive it. This occasions the English Company's gomastah to set his peons over the weaver to watch him, and not unfrequently to cut the piece out of the loom when nearly finished." (Consideration of Indian Affairs by William Bolts, London, MDCCXXII)

‡ Memoirs of Warren Hastings by Gleig, Volume I, page 305.

§ "The history of this people is curious. They inhabit, or rather possess, the country lying south of the hills of Tibet from Canbul to China. They go mostly naked. They have neither towns, houses, nor families, but rove continually from place to place, recruiting their numbers with the healthiest children they can steal in the countries through which they pass. Thus they are the stoutest and most active men in India. Many are merchants. They are all pilgrims, and held by all castes of Gentoos in great veneration. This infatuation prevents our obtaining any intelligence of their motions, or aid from the country against them, notwithstanding very rigid orders which have been published for these purposes, inasmuch that they often appear in the heart of the province as if they dropped from heaven. They are hardy, bold, and enthusiastic to a degree surpassing credit. Such are the Senassies, the gipsies of Hindostan."—(Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 303)

|| Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 17th February 1773, Volume I, page 29.

Hastings' Foreign
policy.

After introducing reforms into every branch of the administration and establishing peace and order in the province, Warren Hastings turned his attention to foreign affairs. England was then in a situation with regard to the Native powers very different from that which she held at the close of Hastings' splendid administration. Regarded with jealousy and suspicion by all, she was held in respect by none. She had bound herself by treaty to pay tribute to the Great Mogul, and she had made over to him the provinces of Corah and Allahabad in order that he might gather means to support the dignity of a crown whose splendour had once filled with amazement travellers from all quarters of the globe. But the Great Mogul had become only a tool in the hands of the Mahrattas, and to them he was compelled to transfer the provinces given to him by the English. Hastings saw that the presence of these marauders at our gate was a grave and menacing danger. Peace and prosperity in our own territory were an impossibility. He acted with his usual promptness and courage. He determined to pay no more tribute to a sovereign who was incapable of affording the English frontier protection. He also determined to restore the provinces of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier of Oude from whom they had been taken by Clive. James Mill in his *History of India* writes:—"The choice lay between preserving them for the Emperor and making them over to the Vizier. Generosity, had it any place in such arrangements, pleaded with almost unexampled strength in behalf of the forlorn Emperor, the nominal sovereign of so vast an Empire, the representative of so illustrious a race, who now possessed hardly a roof to protect him. Justice too, or something not easily distinguished from justice, spoke on the same side: considering that, in the first place, the Emperor had a right to the provinces, both by his quality of sovereign of India, and also by the peculiar concession and grant of the English Company, if not in express terms for, most certainly in consideration of, his not absolutely necessary but highly useful grant of the Dewanee of the three great and opulent provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa; and that, in the second place, he could not, by any fair construction, be deemed to have forfeited any right by the surrender of the provinces, an act which was in the highest degree involuntary and therefore not his own."* The choice lay, not between preserving them for the Emperor and making them over to the Vizier, but between allowing them to remain in the hands of the Mahrattas or restoring them to the Vizier to whom they once belonged. The Emperor's right to them was purely titular, the same right which he possessed over the whole kingdom of Oude, and this titular right he owed to the English. In the report which he laid before the Board regarding his negotiations with the Nawab Sujah-ul-Dowla at Benares whither he had gone in June 1773, Hastings writes as follows: "Had we restored these districts to the King, who so lately abandoned them, and who is confessedly unable by his own strength to maintain them, we should still have been burthened with the care of their defence, or we should have given them only nominally to the King, but in reality to the Mahrattas, the evil consequences of which it is needless to enumerate."† Mill is not quite accurate when he states that the surrender of the provinces to the Mahrattas was "an act which was in the highest degree involuntary and therefore not his own." In spite of the advice of the Council in Calcutta, who warned him of the danger of such a movement, the Emperor threw himself into the arms of the Mahrattas and was by them installed on the throne of Delhi. But, whether the act was voluntary or involuntary, the possession of the provinces by the Mahrattas was incompatible with the safety of our dominion. Regarding the allegation that the Emperor was unable to protect them, Mill writes—"But it is certainly true, that the Emperor was not less able at that time than he was at the time when they were first bestowed upon him; or than he was at any point of the time during which they had been left at his hands."‡ When they were bestowed upon him the Mahrattas had not recovered from their crushing defeat at Paniput; and had not equipped an army of fifty thousand horse and a large body of infantry, with a numerous artillery to recover their footing and renew their spoliations. The Emperor was not at that time, to use the words of Mill himself, "no better than an instrument in the

* Mill's *History of India*, Volume III, page 395.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th October 1773, Volume I, page 50. Marshall's *History of India*, page 172.

‡ Mill's *History of India*, Volume III, page 398.

hands of the Mahrattas." Mill says: "that the English strengthened their barrier, by giving to a crude native Government a vast frontier to defend, instead of combining against the Mahrattas the forces of the Rohillas, the Emperor and the Vizier, will hardly be affirmed by those who reflect how easily the balance among those persons might have been trimmed or who know the consequence of the arrangement that was formed. For a sum of money, Corah and Allahabad were tendered to the Vizier."* To combine the forces of the Rohillas, the Emperor, and the Vizier against the Mahrattas was an impossibility. All were jealous of the growing power of the English. The Emperor was now an instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas. An alliance between them and the Rohillas had already once been concluded, and negotiations were on foot for an alliance between them and the Vizier. All that Hastings could do was to make the alliance between the Vizier and the English as stable as possible, and it could only be made stable by making the power of the Vizier entirely dependent on English bayonets. As Hastings wrote to the Board—"By ceding them to the Vizier we strengthen our alliance with him, we make him more dependant upon us as he is more exposed to the hostilities of the Mahrattas; we render a junction between him and them, which has been some times apprehended, morally impossible, since their pretensions to Corah will be a constant source of animosity between them; we free ourselves from the expense and all the dangers attending either a remote property or a remote connection; we adhere literally to the limited system laid down by the Hon'ble Court of Directors; we are no longer under the necessity of exhausting the wealth of our own provinces in the pay and disbursements of our brigades employed at a distance beyond them; but by fixing the sum to be paid by the Vizier for their services at their whole expense, and by removing every possible cause for their passing our own borders but at his requisition and for his defence, we provide effectually for the protection of our frontier, and reduce the expenses of our army even in employing it; and lastly we acquire a net sum of 50 lacs of rupees most seasonably obtained for the relief of the Company's necessities, and the deficient circulation of the currency of the provinces." The plea put forward by Mill that the Emperor deserved more generous treatment on account of his having bestowed on the English the Dewannee of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, is met by the following remarks of Hastings—"Whatever policy suggested the first idea of the tribute, and whatever title he may be conceived to have had to the payment of it while he remained under our protection and united his fortune with ours, his late conduct has forfeited every claim to it, and made it even dangerous to allow it, even if the resources of Bengal and the exigencies of the Company could any longer admit of it. Our conduct towards him has certainly afforded matter of admiration to the whole people of Hindoostan, whether they construe it as the effect of a mistaken principle of duty, the just return of benefits received, or attribute it to some hidden cause. We have persevered with a fidelity unknown to them in an unshaken alliance to a pageant of our own creation, and lavished on him the wealth of this country, which is its blood, although not one of his own natural subjects has ever afforded him the least pledge of voluntary obedience, although our constituents have been compelled to withhold the legal claims of our own sovereign, although we have loaded them with an accumulated debt of a crore and a half of rupees, almost the exact amount of the sums remitted for the use of a man who in return has ungratefully deserted and since headed armies against us. It is unjust to argue, in support of his pretensions on the Company, that the tribute is no more than a reasonable acknowledgment for the favour which they received from him in the grant of the Dewannee. They gave him all. They received nothing from him, but a presumptuous gift of what was not his to give, but what they had already acquired by their own power, the same power to which he was indebted for his crown, and even for his existence."†

On the 24th June 1773 Hastings left Calcutta for Benares, where it ^{Rohilound} was arranged he should have an interview with the Vizier of Oude. Before his departure he had received letters from him complaining of the treachery and breach of faith of the Rohilla chiefs, and expressing a desire to invade and conquer their country. The situation of the Rohilla country which the

* Mill's History of India, Volume III, page 398.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th October 1773, Volume I, page 51.

Vizier proposed to conquer is described by Hastings as follows: "It lies open to the south. It is bounded on the west by the Ganges and on the north and east by the mountains of Tartary. It is to the province of Oudh, in respect both to its geographical and political relation, exactly what Scotland was to England before the reign of Queen Elizabeth."* In the earliest times the country bore the name of Kather and was peopled by a highly civilized Aryan race. In 1290 it was brought into subjection to the Musulman rule, and in the days of the Great Moghul Emperors it was ruled by a succession of Moghul Governors appointed from Delhi. About 1673 two brothers, named Shah Alum and Hussein Khan, adventurers from Afghanistan, settled in Kather† and obtained some small employments under the officers of the Moghul Government, but neither of them adopted the country as a permanent residence. Hussein Khan had a slave, Daud Khan, who, when his master returned to Afghanistan, was permitted to proceed to India to seek his fortune. Daud Khan was a man endowed with considerable military skill and bravery, and he quickly got around him a numerous band of Afghan followers. For the good service he rendered the Emperor in defeating a body of Mahrattas, he was granted a small district. The adventurer rewarded the Emperor's generosity by taking service with the Rajah of Kumaon, who was at war with the Empire. The Rajah, however, having grown suspicious of the fidelity of Daud, invited him to a friendly meeting, made him a prisoner, and killed him by cutting off his feet and extracting the sinews from the stump. Daud's adopted son at once took possession of his estates and placed himself at the head of his forces. He was at the time only a lad of fourteen years, but strength of character and ability compensated for lack of years. By birth he belonged to the Jat caste, but the Afghan adventurer during one of his campaigns finding him amongst some of his prisoners took a fancy to him, adopted him, made him a Musulman and named him Ali Muhammad.‡ Ali Muhammad on his accession turned his attention to the extension of his dominion, and by his skill and courage soon made himself supreme throughout the Kather region which henceforward was known by the name of Rohileund on account of the Afghans who followed the standard of Ali.§ After enjoying for five years the almost undisputed sovereignty of Rohileund, Ali Muhammad was besieged in the fortress of Bangarh, forced to surrender and carried a prisoner to Delhi. He had only been six months a prisoner when some five or six thousand Pathans appeared before the palace at Delhi and demanded his surrender. The capital being bare of troops the Emperor was compelled to yield. He appointed Ali to the governorship of a

* Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 358.

† Kather, shortly speaking, is the name of the North-Eastern portion of the modern Rohil and lying beyond the Ramganga.

‡ This account of Ali's origin is no doubt extremely distasteful to the Pathans themselves. That their hero should have been born of a by no means exalted Hindu caste, that he should have been a captive taken in petty war, and adopted son of a slave, grates on their feelings. They prefer to consider him the son of Shah Alam. But that he was what we have here described him is shown by the best contemporary authority as well as by a common saying of the Hindus themselves:—

"Aise se aise dekho Parbhu ke thāt,

Aonla kā rāja bhayo Bakauli ka Jat.

See from God's will what mighty changes spring,

Bakauli's Jat became great Aonla's King."—(Gazetteer, North-Western Provinces, volume V, Rohileund.)

"Hamilton in his History of the Rohilla Afghans, published in 1788, writes: Some accounts have said that Ali Muhammad was not the son of Daud, but by birth a Hindu, and adopted by him. This, however, is not only an incongruity (as a Hindu is seldom or ever known to be adopted by a Mussalman), but is moreover altogether unsupported in the original Persian manuscript, where he is positively mentioned as Daud's second son."

§ "The Rohillas or Ruhilas were Pathans, that is to say, men of Afghan or Baluchi extraction. Their name is said to mean, in some transmontane language, *hillmen*. Why it should have been applied to the Pathans of what is now called Rohileund, rather than to other adventurers of similar origin, it is difficult to say."—Gazetteer, North-Western Provinces, volume V, Rohileund. Mill in Volume II, p. 326, in a note writes as follows: "This district which gave its name to the Rohillas, a people considerable in the history of British India, is said by Major Stewart, on his Persian authorities, to have been the original seat of the Afghans, whose mountainous country (Roh signifies a mountainous country; and Rohillas, mountaineers or highlanders) extended, according to the same authority, in length from Sewad and Bijore to the town of Sui, in Bukharest, and in breadth, from Hussin to Rabul."—Stewart's Bengal, page 127. Mr. Horace Hayman Wilson in commenting on this passage writes:—"There is some curious blundering, either by Stewart or the authorities he has followed in these statements; and if the latter, it is extraordinary that he should have cited them without correction. What contiguity could Bukharest possibly have to any part of the Afghan country, and where are Hussin and Rabul? Ferishta furnishes a more accurate version. Roh extends in length, he says, from Swad and Bajour, to Sui, in the district of Bhukkur, and in breadth, from Hussin Abdal to Kabul. According to him Roh means mountain in the Afghan language, but no such term occurs in the list of Pushtu words collected by Mr. Elphinstone, nor in a Pushtu vocabulary, compiled by Mohabbet Khan, of which a manuscript is in the library of the East India Company; Roh is there explained to be the name of an extensive country, intermediate between Iran and Turan, bounded on the north by Kashkar, on the south by Baluchistan, on the west by Herat, and Kashmir on the east; being in fact the country of the Afghans. It may be doubted if this description is very accurate. Roh seems to offer traces of the older appellation of a district of more limited extent, or Arachosia. A town called Roh-kaj is noticed by Ibn Hakil, not far from Ghizni."—W.

district north of Delhi, but kept two of his sons as hostages. Shortly after this Ahmed Khan, the chief of the Abdalies, who, after the death of Nadir Shah, had united the Afghan States into one monarchy, invaded India. Ali took advantage of the embarrassment of the Empire to march into Rohileund and re-establish his sway over his own dominion; and when in the same year a new Emperor mounted the Imperial throne he procured an Imperial firman conferring on him almost the whole of Rohileund. He was busy establishing his authority on a firm basis when he was struck with a mortal illness. His elder sons were captives in Afghanistan, his younger sons were too young to take an active part in the administration. Summoning his chiefs around him Ali named his third son his successor as long as his elder brothers did not return, and appointed Rahmat Khan, the son of Shah Alum, to be protector or regent. He was to be assisted in the task of government by three principal chiefs. All swore on the Koran to be faithful to the interests of Ali's children and all betrayed their trust. The territory was divided among the children and chiefs, and Rahmat took the most important portion and became head of the Rohilla confederacy.

Hafiz Rahmat
Khan.

When war broke out between the English and the Vizier of Oude, Sujah-ul-dowla sought the aid of the Rohillas, and the son of Rahmat Khan was despatched with six thousand men to assist him. He was present at the battle of Patna when the Vizier's army was compelled to retire to Buxar. After the decisive victory of Buxar, Shuja-ul-dowla again sought the aid of Rahmat Khan to check the advance of the English. He joined the Vizier with three thousand men, and the two allies were in May 1765 defeated by General Carnac at Kura. Six years after this the Mahrattas invaded Rohileund and plundered and destroyed all before them. The Rohilla Chiefs retired into the dense forests of the Terai where they remained inactive in their intrenchments for four months. The Vizier fearing that the Mahrattas might invade his territory advanced with some English battalions under the command of General Sir Robert Barker, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal army, to the borders of Oude. Negotiations were opened with the Rohilla chiefs regarding the measures to be taken for the expulsion of the Mahrattas from Rohileund. Hafiz Ramat visited the camp of Sujah-ul-Dowla, and a treaty between the Vizier and himself on the part of the Rohilla sardars was agreed upon. To give greater validity and effect to the treaty in the minds of the contracting parties, it was executed and sworn to in the presence of the English Commander-in-Chief and countersigned by him (June 1773). It would be difficult to construct a document more simple and explicit. The Vizier undertook "either by peace or war" to drive the Mahrattas out of Rohileund, and to do so again if they again invaded the land after the "rainy season." In return the Rohilla sardars promised to pay the Vizier within a little over three years forty lakhs of rupees. The Mahrattas shortly after withdrew and the Rohillas emerged from their mountain fastness. *

Mahrattas invade
Rohileund.

Treaty between
the Vizier and the
Rohilla Sardars.

The treaty was signed in June, and in November, when the floods of the rainy season had subsided, the Mahrattas again advanced towards the Ganges with the intention of invading Rohileund. It was known that Rohileund was only regarded by them as the most accessible highway to Oudh, and an English brigade at the request of the Vizier occupied his kingdom. When news arrived that the Mahrattas were approaching Ramghat where the Ganges could easily be crossed, the Oudh and English troops marched to the borders of Rohileund to check their advance and surprised the Mahrattas just as they were on the point of crossing the river, at a ford five miles from Ramghat. Marching up the river they found a large body of the enemy encamped on the other bank who opened fire upon them with their heavy guns. The fire of the Mahrattas was quickly silenced, and with some haste they removed their camp to safer ground. The English crossed in pursuit but the chase was fruitless. On their return they found that Rahmat Khan had joined the Vizier. He had, in order to avoid paying the subsidy, been making overtures to the Mahrattas, but finding that, owing to the rapid and victorious movements of the English, treachery and procrastination were no longer possible, he joined Sujah-ul-Dowla. On the English fell the task of checking the further advance

* History of the Rohilla Afghans, by Hamilton.

of the Mahrattas and driving them from Rohilcund.* Shortly after they had been compelled by the united armies to retire beyond the borders of Rohilcund news reached them of disturbances at Poona, and the main body marched to the capital of the Deccan.

The Vizier now demanded from the Rohillas payment of the sum due under the treaty, but they shuffled and hesitated till at length Sujah-ul-Dowla determined to take possession of their country as a recompense for their breach of faith. At the interview which took place at Benares, the Vizier had broached this matter to Hastings, who makes the following mention of it in his report to the Board: "The Vizier," he writes, "was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English force to put him in possession of the Rohilla country lying north of his dominions and east of the Ganges. This has long been a favorite object of his wishes, and you will recollect that the first occasion of my late visit was furnished by a proposal of this kind. He had certainly just grounds of resentment against the chiefs of this nation, who had not only failed in their engagements to pay him forty lakhs of rupees for his protection against the Mahrattas, but had actually supplied them with money when they appeared in arms against him. He offered to make the Company a consideration for this service of forty lakhs of rupees besides the stipulated sum for the expenses of our troops, but he afterwards laid aside this design, fearing that it would disable him from fulfilling his engagements for Corah and Allahabad. I enclose for your observation No. 10, the original agreement of the Rohilla chiefs witnessed by General Barker; No. 11, a translation of the same; No. 12, a translation of a letter which I received from Hafiz Rahmat Cawn, in whose name the agreement was ratified; and No. 13, a translation of a narrative delivered to me by the Vizier in reply to it. The measures to be pursued for his security on that quarter must therefore be determined by future occurrences. I was pleased that he urged the scheme of this expedition no further, as it would have led our troops to a distance from our own borders which I would wish ever to avoid, although there are powerful arguments to recommend it."†

Hafiz Rahmat Khan in his letter makes statements totally at variance with the treaty which he signed, and puts forward a palpable falsehood when he states that the English General and the Vizier sent envoys to him "desiring that I would enter into no terms with the Mahrattas, and they would give me back my engagement for forty lakhs of rupees and do everything both for my present and future security."‡ He had the temerity to conclude as follows: "But at length they left everything unfinished, and, after temporizing for a long time with the Mahrattas, returned to their own homes, leaving me still a prey to the Mahrattas. You are no doubt acquainted with all these proceedings. It is a point which requires justice and consideration."§ The Nawab with much greater

* Intelligence of these movements quickened the action of the allies, and an English detachment was with all speed sent to check the further passage of the Mahrattas. A body of about 4,000 Mahratta horse were surprised in the act of crossing by a ferry some five miles below Ramghat; but on the appearance of the hostile force they retreated scatheless to the southern bank, and the English pursued their march up the river to Asadpur, thereby separating the division of Besaji from that of Holkar, which, as already mentioned, had started for the Moradabad district. On arriving at the bank of the Ganges near Asadpur the British were assailed by a cannonade from the Mahratta Artillery across the river. But our guns replied with such effect that those of the enemy were silenced, and the Mahrattas with some precipitation removed their camp to safer ground. On the following day Rahmat, finding further procrastination impossible, joined Shuja-ud-daula. It was now arranged that the English should account for the Mahrattas under Besaji, while the combined armies of Shuja-ud-daula and the Rohillas should pursue the force of Holkar. Sir Robert Barker's brigade crossed the Ganges at Ramghat, but Besaji avoided an action, and decamped with such speed that the English were able to re-cross over into the Budaun district on the following day.

Here they found that, owing to mutual suspicion, and perhaps to some quarrel about the subsidy, Shuja-ud-daula and Hafiz Rahmat had remained inactive. It was therefore left for General Barker to expel Holkar from Rohilkhand; and marching towards Sambhal he performed that operation without the least opposition (1773). (Gazetteer of Rohilkhand—Budaun, p. 113). Hamilton's Rohillas, pp. 194-195.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th October 1773, Volume I, page 51.

Mill's remarks concerning Rahmat Khan's breach of faith are a characteristic example of his special pleading and inaccuracy: "The unhappy Rohillas, it seems, procrastinated and evaded, with respect to the demand which was now violently made upon them for payment of the formerly stipulated price of defence—a payment which had not been earned, since they had never been defended; which they were not able to pay, since their country had been repeatedly ravaged and stripped; of which the exaction was in reality a fraud since the return for it was never intended to be made; which it was no wonder they were reluctant to pay to the man who was impatient to assail them, and whom the use of their money would only strengthen for their destruction." Mill loses sight of the fact that by the terms of the treaty it was agreed that the payment should be made if the Mahrattas were driven out "either by peace or war," and that they were driven out by the Vizier through the assistance of the English.

Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th October 1773, Volume I, page 60.

§

Ibid

page 61.

justice accuses Rahmat Khan of breach of faith and treachery. He writes: "I also called to me Hafiz Rahmat Cawn and the others who had taken protection under the hills, and replaced them on their former footing in the possession of their country. My friend General Barker is well acquainted with these circumstances, in whose presence they entered into an engagement for the payment of forty lakhs of rupees, and pledged their faith and religion for its performance. In the sequel they did not remain steady to this agreement, but in the height of the rains, antecedent to every other person, Zabitta Cawn first went and connected himself with the Mahrattas, and Hafiz Rahmat Cawn sent the holy Coran, which contains the religion of the Mussalmen, to the Mahrattas as a token of his friendship. He also gave them five lakhs of rupees and established a friendship and good understanding with them. The whole world are well acquainted that envoys from Hafiz Rahmat were with the Mahrattas, and treated with them in the above manner. Myself continuing firm and steady to my engagements, I proceeded in concert with the English troops from Fyzabad to the assistance of the Rohillas and arrived by successive marches to Rangaut. I previously acquainted Hafiz Rahmat Cawn that he should make preparation, and that I should shortly arrive and act in conjunction with him. As Hafiz Rahmat Cawn had entered into intrigues with the Mahrattas notwithstanding I was near him, and the Mahrattas at a considerable distance, he nevertheless under various pretensions and evasions drew near the Mahratta army to such a degree that the morning when I arrived with the English forces and came upon the Mahrattas, Hafiz Rahmat Cawn was within seven or eight coss of them, when from necessity only he came and waited on me. I am certain that if I had been four gurrries later with the English forces, he would have joined the Mahrattas and fallen upon me; and that only from my near approach he was compelled to come to me. Afterwards when the Mahrattas could not face the English forces and myself, and set out for the Deccan, Hafiz Rahmat Cawn did not pay me a single daam on account of the agreement executed in presence of the General as aforementioned: nor did he treat me with that respect or present me with the customary presents, which are used amongst mankind as marks of friendship and hospitality."*

Mill asserts that Hastings inserted the paragraph regarding the Rohillas in his report because "with a view to the future, it was politic to explain that the Vizier showed at first a desire to obtain English assistance for the seizure of the Rohilla country; it was politic also to state the pretexts by which the expediency of that assistance might best appear to be established." With regard to Hastings' remark that he was pleased that the Vizier urged the scheme of the expedition no further as it would have led our troops to a distance, Mill writes: "Yet we have it from his pen that he 'encouraged' the Vizier to the enterprise as what promised to be of the greatest advantage to the Company." Mill also states that "It was agreed between Hastings and the President that whenever the time convenient for the extirpation of the Rohillas should arrive, the assistance of the English should not be wanting, and that the agreement respecting the Rohillas which it had been settled between the President and Vizier might be conveniently kept out of the ostensible treaty was wholly suppressed."

The charge brought by Mill that Hastings had withheld from his colleagues information regarding his negotiations with the Vizier, and that the agreement made by him with the Nawab respecting the Rohillas was kept out of the treaty, was answered by Hastings when it was first brought against him by Francis—"I found him, [the Vizier]," he wrote to the Directors, "still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as I had before done, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success, but objecting with great force the orders of the Company restricting us from such remote schemes of conquest, to which therefore I could not assent without such conditions obtained in return for it as might obviate their displeasure and win their sanction to so hazardous and unauthorized a measure. I fear not to quote these expressions addressing myself to fair and unbiassed judges who will not infer my real sentiments from the style and argument of a poli-

Changes brought by Mill against Hastings respecting his negotiations with the Vizier.

tical negotiation.”* In commenting on a letter written by General Clavering, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis, Hastings wrote as follows :—

“I have already observed that I informed Messrs. Lawrell, Vansittart, and Lambert, who were deputed with me by the Board, of every circumstance that passed during the whole course of the negotiation, but it was unnecessary that these circumstances should be recorded, when they had become entirely foreign to the terms of the treaty. The Rohilla expedition *was laid aside*, or more properly, it had not been adopted, for the Vizier’s proposal on this subject had never been ratified. It is true an option remained with the Vizier to renew this subject, but an option also remained with the administration either to reject or assent to it. It so happened that he did renew the subject; but at the time of concluding the Benares Treaty, it appeared probable to me that he would not renew it; and where was the occasion for loading our records with the particulars of transactions which had been voluntarily laid aside by the Vizier who was the interested party in them, especially as they had been unreservedly communicated by myself and the members who had been with me to the other members of the administration in private intercourse. If he had renewed the proposal, it was then time enough to enter upon a public discussion of this matter, when it became a measure of administration and was decided upon by them. This is precisely the case with the measure in question. Advantages were drawn from the Vizier’s eagerness to pursue it which were happily retained by the Company, when the object of them had been struck out of the treaty. If he never had renewed it, these advantages would have remained with the Company; when he did renew it. I thought it but common justice to point out to the Board the concessions which this consideration had induced him to grant. There were no *positive engagements* entered into relative to this matter. It remained with the Board to determine what influence these circumstances should have in their decisions, and the question ‘whether the Vizier should or should not be assisted in attacking the Rohillas’ remained *open and entire* for the decision of the Board. If these circumstances had some weight in the judgment of the Board, it does not follow that they were *positive engagements*. The word *secret* is next used, surely not for candid purposes, and is applied to my having withheld from the Court of Directors’ information respecting the Rohilla expedition, when I had no information to communicate to them, but that the expedition was laid aside.”

“In the strictures which the gentlemen of the majority make upon past transactions, having a complete view of everything that has happened, they reason upon events respecting my conduct before they had taken place, and seem to condemn me for not having seen into futurity. When the Vizier, after being so eager to adopt the Rohilla expedition, all at once gave it up, although he had conceded part of the terms upon which it was to have been undertaken, it did not appear to me probable that he would have renewed the proposal or that future circumstances not lying within the reach of human foresight would happen to recommend it; but the gentlemen of the majority, knowing that the Rohilla expedition was afterwards adopted, accuse me for not having entered into a full discussion and explanation of that subject, at a time when I had little reason to expect it would ever take place. I certainly thought it possible, and this is the plain meaning of the words used in my report upon the subject, *viz.*, ‘that the measures to be pursued for his security in that quarter must be determined by future occurrences.’ That is, if the Rohilla would pay the forty lakhs due from them and join in a scheme of defensive alliance with the Vizier, the measure to be pursued for his security in that quarter would be to afford the Rohillas protection. If, on the contrary, they gave encouragement to the enemy or refused to pay the forty lakhs, the measures to be pursued for his security in that quarter would be to drive out the Rohillas and reduce the country occupied by them within the line of his dominion.”†

The Vizier proposes
to attack Hafiz
Rahmat Khan

Hastings was both surprised and mortified to receive, shortly after his return to Calcutta, a letter from the Nawab stating “I have now determined to take possession of the country on the Duabe which formerly belonged to the Rohillas and is now possessed by the Mahrattas. For this purpose I shall shortly despatch my army thither and shall also follow myself. Should I, therefore, have occasion for the assistance of the English forces to carry on my operations in that country, I desire to know what is your pleasure,—whether you will let me have those forces when I shall call for them, or you will not?”‡ A month later the Nawab wrote: “I have before written you several letters, which you may have received. I have now learnt that Hafiz Rahmat Cawn and other sardars have intentions of taking possession of Ettawah and the rest of the country belonging to the Mahrattas. I therefore write to inform you that if such is their intention, I will not put up with it, but shall undoubtedly undertake an expedition against them; for, in the first place, they have not made good a single daam of the forty lakhs of rupees, according to their agreement, and in the next they are now going to take possession of another country. This I will

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 8th December 1774, Volume I, page 143.

† *Ibid* 16th January 1775, „ page 178.

‡ *Ibid* 26th November 1773, „ page 76.

never submit to, and am therefore determined to punish them. During our interview at Benares we had some conversation on this subject, and it was then agreed on that I should pay to the Company the sum of forty lakhs of rupees after the expulsion of the Rohillas, and 2,10,000 rupees monthly on account of the English brigade during my operations in the Rohilla country; and that I should with the assistance of the English forces endeavour to punish and exterminate the Rohillas out of their country. If, therefore, these terms are agreeable to you, I desire to know whether you will assist me with the English forces, or you will not.”*

The Select Committee came to the conclusion “that should the Vizier persist in his intentions with respect to the Rohilla country, and determine to prosecute the enterprise with steadiness to a conclusion, this Government, considering the strict alliance and engagements which subsist between the Company and Shujah Dowla, and particularly what passed between the Vizier and the President at the conference at Benares, cannot on this occasion refuse him support and assistance; that the terms proposed by the Vizier appear highly advantageous to the Company, not only on account of the sum which is ultimately stipulated as a consideration for this service, but by immediately relieving them from the heavy expense of a large part of their army. Provided, therefore, full assurance and security can be obtained of the Vizier’s intention and ability to make good the many payments which will in this event be due to the Company. Resolved that the 2nd Brigade now quartered at Dinapore be ordered to march on the Vizier’s requisition.”†

The Select Committee agree to support the Vizier

The Committee also agreed that the President be requested to prepare an answer to the Vizier’s letters. Hastings in the answer informed the Nawab that with respect to the Duabe he was his own master to act in whatever manner he should deem most fitting for the advancement or security of his own affairs, but that the orders of the Company were peremptory that he should not suffer their arms to be carried beyond the line of their own boundary and those of His Excellency, their ally. “Concerning the country of the Rohillas,” Hastings wrote, “whatever was formerly proposed at Benares, that I am now equally ready to agree to—that is, the brigade which is now at Dinapore shall march whenever you require it, to join you, and proceed with you into the country of the Rohillas, which lies north of your dominions, to assist you in the entire reduction of it; and Your Excellency, on your part, will supply them monthly with the stipulated sum of Rs. 2,10,000 for their expenses, and, whenever the country shall be so far conquered that you shall remain in possession of it, although the enemy may lurk in the hills and jungles, or a few refractory zemindars, as is usual, may withhold their allegiance, and Your Excellency shall dismiss the brigade, you will, on its departure, pay forty lakhs of rupees to the Company as a consideration for that service. To prevent future misunderstanding I have been thus explicit. I must beg leave further to add that if the expedition shall be once undertaken, it will be absolutely necessary to persevere in it, until it shall be accomplished; you will therefore reflect whether it will be in your power to make the above payments punctually with others which are already due, and whether you can resolve on going through with the undertaking. If you are not certain of accomplishing these necessary points, I must request that you will suspend the execution of your undertaking till a more favourable time.”‡

Some doubts having arisen concerning the regularity of the issue by the Select Committee on their own sole authority of the order directing that the Second Brigade should march on the requisition of the Vizier it was agreed that their proceedings together with Hastings’ letter should be submitted to the whole Council. The President also laid before the Board a minute in which, after pointing out the greater probability of the Mahrattas and Rohillas joining in hostilities against the Vizier than that they should continue in war against one another, he discusses the advantage “which would result to the Vizier, the ally of the Company, and to the Company itself, from

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 26th November 1773, Volume I, page 76

† *Ibid* „ page 77.

‡ *Ibid* „ page 78.

his possession of that part of Rohilla which is the object of the expedition now proposed." "Our ally," he writes, "would obtain by this acquisition a complete compact state shut in effectually from foreign invasions by the Ganges, all the way from the frontiers of Bahar to the mountains of Thibet, while he would remain equally accessible to our forces from the above provinces either for hostilities or protection. It would give him wealth, of which we should partake, and give him security without any dangerous increase of power. It would undoubtedly, by bringing his frontier nearer to the Mahrattas, to whom singly he would be no match, render him more dependent on us and cement the union more firmly between us. I must further declare that I regard as none of the most inconsiderable benefits to the Company from this measure, besides the forty lakhs held out to us, the easing them immediately of the burthen of one-third of their whole army, while at the same time it is employed usefully for their interests and conveniently for keeping up its own discipline and practice in war."*

But though Hastings was convinced of the propriety of the expedition, he doubted its expediency at that particular time. He however confesses to the Board that he is greatly embarrassed in coming to a decision in consequence of what passed between the Vizier and himself at Benares. "The Board," he writes, "will recollect that this very country was included in the line of defensive operations which they thought fit to adopt last year in support of the Vizier, and it is now necessary to acquaint them more fully that the Vizier at the interview did propose this expedition to me, and earnestly solicited my assistance. That I regarded this request as a lucky circumstance in the negotiation; and availing myself of it as the means of purchasing the Vizier's compliance in the other measure which was the principal object of my commission, I consented to it, engaging to assist him in the enterprise on the conditions with which the Board are already acquainted. Afterwards from a suspicion of his own ability to make good so many pecuniary engagements at once as those he had come under, he himself made the proposal for suspending the Rohilla expedition, but the condition which took its rise from it, *viz*, that the future payment of the extra charges of the army sent at any time to his assistance should be fixed at R2,10,000 per month for a brigade, was still allowed to be made an article of the new treaty, and it was further agreed that the stipulation for Corah, which I had before raised with difficulty to forty-five lacks of rupees, should now be made fifty in consideration of his being exempted from the additional burthen of the projected campaign and better enabled to fulfil his other payments."† Hastings felt "that a direct refusal after what passed would have an unfriendly aspect, and might admit of the construction of artifice and insincerity in our dealings with him," and for this reason, he informs the Board, "he had in the letter expressed consent to the expedition in terms which, if he agrees to them, are most likely to secure the advantages hoped from it, but which are more likely to make him relinquish the design." The Board concurred heartily with the President "in wishing to avoid the expedition proposed; without entering into a discussion of the propriety of such an enterprise on general principles, the Board see in their full force all the circumstances of doubt as to its present expediency which the President has so clearly set forth, and they are also sensible of the embarrassment which he lies under from what passed on the subject between him and the Vizier at Benares. They are equally solicitous to save the honour of the Company and watch over its interests, and for that reason they approve of the letter now before them, which seems equally calculated to save both. The conditions, if accepted, would undoubtedly secure the greatest possible advantages from such enterprise, but they appear to them more calculated to drive the Vizier into a refusal, which is what they trust in, as its most probable and almost infallible consequence, and which they wish for as the proper result of this proposition in the present circumstances of affairs."‡ The only member of the Board, who did not concur in the above resolution, was Sir Robert Barker, the Commander-in-Chief, who was at that time engaged in a

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 26th November 1773, Volume I, page 80.

† *Ibid* „ page 80.

‡ *Ibid* „ page 81.

warm controversy with Hastings regarding military patronage. Sir Robert Barker objected to the resolution of the Board that "if the Vizier has the Rohilla country added to those of Oude and the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad, he will be in possession of a revenue of nearly two crores and a half per annum, a sum that, in some future day, might render an enterprising genius a very troublesome neighbour on the north-west frontiers of the Company's dominions; although we have no present occasion to suspect the sincerity of Sujah-ul-Daula's attachment to our interests, yet it must not be forgotten that he is an Hindustander, or that a successor might enter the Government with very different ideas and disposition."*

The letter which Hastings sent the Nawab did not, however, cause him to relinquish his design. He acknowledged "the receipt of the friendly letter informing him that the English brigade is either for the protection of my own dominions or to assist me in my operations against the Rohillas"† and he requested that a positive order should be sent to the Commander-in-Chief to march the forces to the borders of Oude. It was impossible to temporize any longer. On the 14th February 1774 orders were issued to Colonel Champion to take command of the brigade marching to Oude, but even up to the last moment Hastings evidently hoped that the expedition against the Rohillas would be postponed, for we read—"As the Vizier appears completely occupied at present in his expedition into the Do-auba for the recovery (in behalf of the King Shaw Allum) of the territory seized by the Mahrattas, we imagine he will hardly find time this season to attempt anything towards the conquest he meditates of the Rohilla country before described. We think it, however, necessary to suppose the possibility of such a service taking place in describing the line of your operations."‡

On the 24th of February the united forces entered the territory of the Vizier and on the 17th of April invaded the Rohilla dominions. On the 9th of May the President laid before the Board a letter from the Commander-in-Chief announcing a decisive victory over the enemy. The English Commander does justice to the bravery of the foe. "Hafiz," he writes, "and his army, consisting of about forty thousand shewed great bravery and resolution, annoying us with their artillery and rockets; they made repeated attempts to charge, but our guns being so much better served than theirs, kept so constant and galling a fire, that they could not advance, and where they were closest, there was the greatest slaughter; they gave proofs of a good share of military knowledge by showing inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time, and endeavouring to call off our attention by a brisk fire on our centre."§ Of the enemy about two thousand fell, many leading chiefs being amongst the number of the slain. "Standards," writes Colonel Champion, "we have taken without number, and above fifty pieces of cannon, but what renders the victory most decisive is the death of Hafiz Rahmut, who was killed whilst bravely rallying his people to battle; one of his sons was also killed, one taken prisoner, a third returned from flight to-day and is in the hands of Sujah."|| Thus fell the great Rohilla chief. He was endowed with great personal courage and considerable powers of statesmanship, but these qualities were neutralised by his extreme prudence and caution. His great fault was avarice, which being united to insincerity led him to be distrusted by his fellow chieftains and paved the way to his final ruin. He rose to power by betraying the solemn trust of his friend, and the only title he had to the kingdom of Rohilkund was the title of fraud. His character has been painted in glowing colours by the

The Rohilla war.

Death of Hafiz Rahmut Khan.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 26th November 1773, Volume I page 81.

MILL writes: "His abilities in making out a case, though singularly great, were unable to produce unanimity, and it was not till after a long debate, that a decision in favour of the expedition was obtained. The assistance was promised on the very terms concerted and settled between him and the Vizier; and yet this President had the art to persuade his colleagues, and joined with them in a declaration to their common masters, that these terms were so favourable to the English and so burdensome to the Vizier, as to render his acceptance of them improbable, and therefore to leave but little chance of their involving the English Government in a measure which the principal conductors of that Government were desirous to avoid." Vol. 3, page 571.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th January 1774, Volume I, page 91.

‡ *Ibid* " page 92.

Ibid 9th May 1774, " page 97.

§ *Ibid* " page 98.

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enemies of Hastings, but it is impossible to discover anything that would make him a hero or a benefactor.*

Criticism of Colonel
Champion on the
Nawab and his
troops.

In the letter which Colonel Champion sent to the Board announcing his victory he severely criticised the conduct of the Nawab and his troops during the engagement. He wrote—"No sooner was the enemy irrecoverably broke than they pushed after them and got much plunder in money, elephants, and camels, &c., &c., &c. Their camp equipage (which was all standing, and proves that we came on them by surprise) with whatever effects they could not carry off fell a sacrifice to the ravages of the Nabob's people, whilst the Company's troops in regular order in their ranks most justly observed, 'We have the honour of the day and these bandits the profit.'"[†] The Board, in their letter congratulating the Chief on his victory, remarked:—"So decisive an instance of the superiority of the Company's arms cannot fail of reviving in all its force the reputation they formerly acquired in Indus-tan, and which ten years of peace had doubtless in some degree weakened in the minds of the princes of the country." They complimented the troops on their valour, and the General on his skill and the order and discipline he had maintained among the troops. They expressed their special satisfaction that the General had "from the beginning opposed and at last obtained a stop to be put to the devastation of the Rohilla country by the army of the Vizier, a mistaken policy altogether incompatible with the design of the war and repugnant to humanity, and we have a sensible pleasure in testifying our entire approbation of your conduct in this respect."[‡]

The military conduct of the expedition was entirely left to the Commander-in-Chief, but the power of directing the services to be performed was left to the Vizier. This division of authority led to friction which rapidly grew into personal hostility between the two men. Every letter received from Colonel Champion was charged with complaints against the Nawab. He was stated to be avaricious, cowardly, and cruel, vices unfortunately common to most oriental despots. The Commander-in-Chief was "greatly afraid that the Vizier's behaviour to the family of the Nabob Hafiz Rahmut and to the inhabitants of his country will render our connection with him reproachful to us and tend to lessen that reputation of our justice which had heretofore prevailed in these countries."[§] This called forth a manly and vigorous rebuke from the Governor. Hastings wrote: "It never could have been suspected by the Board that their orders to you would have tied up your hands from protecting the miserable, stopped your ears to the cries of the widow and fatherless, or shut your eyes against the wanton display of oppression and cruelty. I am totally at a loss to distinguish wherein their orders have laid you under any greater restraint than your predecessors. No authority which the Board could have given could be capable of preventing the effects you mention since they could give you no control over the actions of the Vizier further than the weight and influence of your counsel and advice."^{||}

In a letter to Mr. Middleton, who had been appointed Resident at the Court of Oude, Hastings remarked:—

"Colonel Champion complains of the conduct of the Vizier in suffering, and even ordering his troops to ravage the country, and in his cruel treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmut. This is a subject on which I cannot write to the Vizier. It might widen the breach between him and the Commander-in-Chief, and probably influence the Nawab to some private revenge on the unhappy remains of Hafiz Rahmut's family. I desire, therefore, that you will take an immediate occasion to remonstrate with him against every act of cruelty or wanton violence. The country is his and the people his subjects. They claim by that relation his tenderest regard and unremitted protection. The family of Hafiz have never injured him, but

* How little the enemies of Hastings know about Hafiz Rahmut Khan is amusingly illustrated by the fact that they confounded him with Hafiz, the famous poet of Shiraz, who lived only four hundred years previously. In the Parliamentary Register there is the following passage:—

"Hafiz Rahmut, the most eminent of their Chiefs,—as famous throughout the East for the elegance of his literature and the spirit of his poetical compositions (by which he supported the name of Hafiz) as for his courage, was invaded," &c. &c. Parliamentary Register, No. LXXVI, page 205.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 9th May 1774, Volume I, page 97.

‡ *Ibid* " page 101.

§ *Ibid* 23rd May 1774, " page 104.

|| Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 425.

have a claim to his protection in default of that of which he has deprived them. Tell him that the English manners are abhorrent of every species of inhumanity and oppression, and enjoin the gentlest treatment of a vanquished enemy. Require and entreat his observance of this principle towards the family of Hafiz. Tell him my instructions to you generally, but urgently enforce the same maxims, and that no part of his conduct will operate so powerfully in winning the affections of the English as instances of benevolence and feeling for others. If these arguments don't prevail, you may inform him directly that you have my orders to insist upon a proper treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmat; since in our alliance with him our national character is involved in every act which subjects his own to reproach; that I shall publicly exculpate this Government from the imputation of assenting to such a procedure, and shall reserve it as an objection to any future engagements with him, when the present service shall have been accomplished."*

Colonel Champion, experienced in the tactics of war, unfortunately thought that he was also a master of the tactics of diplomacy. He entered into negotiations with Fyzoollah Khan, the only Rohilla Chief who had not surrendered, and who proposed to pay the Nawab twenty lakhs of rupees if he would reinstate him. He also offered a large sum of money to the Company if they would use their influence with the Vizier to grant him his request. But writes Colonel Champion: "His Excellency said he would not give him back a span of his country for a crore of rupees; that he had no objection to my protecting Fyzoollah Khan's person, but that the treasure must be considered as the property of His Excellency independent of the English."† Champion was desirous that Hastings should accept the money offered by Fyzoollah Khan, and should bring pressure to bear on the Vizier to restore his chief in Rohilkund. But Hastings, who has been so often accused of lending English troops to the Vizier merely for the sake of lucre, refused to assent to the proposals made on the broad ground "that they are diametrically opposite to the principle on which the Rohilla expedition was on our part undertaken, which was not merely on account of the pecuniary acquisition of forty lakhs of rupees to the Company, for although this might be an accessory argument it was by no means the chief object of the undertaking. We engaged to assist the Vizier in reducing the Rohilla country under his dominion, that the boundary of his possessions might be completed by the Ganges forming a barrier to cover them from the attacks and insults to which they are exposed by his enemies either possessing or having access to the Rohilla country. Thus our alliance with him, and the necessity for maintaining this alliance, so long as he or his successors shall deserve our protection, was rendered advantageous to the Company's interest, because the security of his possessions from invasion in that quarter is in fact the security of ours. But if the Rohilla country is delivered to Fyzoollah Khan, the advantages proposed from this alliance will be totally defeated."‡

Fyzoollah Khan was reputed to have, according to the most moderate computation, seventy-five lakhs of rupees in ready money, and Colonel Champion was greatly incensed at the Vizier's declaration that the treasure must be considered as his property. The express stipulation that the English troops should serve for a certain fixed sum had barred them from having a share of the booty captured. Colonel Champion considered this to be a wrong both to himself and his men. He wrote to the Board "By their gallantry they have reduced this country, and, of course, gained the Company half a million of money; they have, moreover, been the enrichers of Sujah-ul-Dowlah to an immense amount; before their faces he has seized these riches, and he has not even thanked them for their services. These matters, gentlemen, are in my opinion of the highest importance, and deserve your most serious consideration. The good temper and forbearance of your army under such temptation is matter of the greatest admiration, and a source of infinite satisfaction to me, but I must confess I am afraid that if some mark of favour and gratification for their services is not manifested, it may be somewhat dangerous ever to try an experiment of this kind again, or to put the temper and patience of any part of your troops so much to the proof."§ Hastings refused to consider the suggestion so skilfully conveyed. "The very idea," he states in a private letter to Champion, "of prize-

Champion's negotiations with Fyzoollah Khan.

Hastings refuses Champion's request for prize-money.

* Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 438.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 3rd June 1774, Volume I, page 107.

‡ Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, pages 433 & 434.

§ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 3rd June 1774, Volume I, page 107.

money suggests to my remembrance the former disorders which arose in our army from this service, and had almost proved fatal to it. Of this circumstance you must be sufficiently apprized, and of the necessity for discouraging every expectation of this kind among the troops. It is to be avoided like poison."* Champion never forgot the rebuke. It rankled in his mind long after and betrayed itself on more than one occasion.

Regulating Act,
1773.

The termination of the Rohilla war coincides with the close of Hastings' administration as Governor of Bengal. By an Act passed in the previous year the constitution of the Company had been greatly changed, and the Government of India had mainly passed into the hands of the ministers of the Crown. India was to be ruled by a Governor-General of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa and four Councillors. The Governor of Bengal was converted into a Governor-General in order to give emphasis to the fact that the other presidencies were made subordinate to Bengal. The first Governor-General and Councillors were, according to the Act, to be nominated by Parliament and to hold office for five years, but after that the patronage reverted to the Company subject to the approbation of the Crown. The Regulating Act of 1773 also empowered the King by Charters, or Letters Patent, to erect and establish a Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William to consist of a Chief Justice and three other Judges, the new Court to have authority over all civil, criminal, admiralty and ecclesiastical jurisdiction given to it by Charter. Warren Hastings was nominated by the Act the first Governor-General; Barwell, Clavering, Monson, and Philip Francis were the first four Councillors. Barwell had excellent parts which had been improved by long administrative experience; Clavering had neither ability nor tact and he never learnt the art of governing his temper. He owed his appointment entirely to parliamentary influences. Monson was a brave old soldier of no political capacity. The most remarkable member of the new Council was Philip Francis. His character has been sketched with skill and fidelity by Lord Macaulay. "Junius," he writes, "was a man clearly not destitute of real patriotism and magnanimity, a man whose vices were not of the sordid kind. But he must also have been a man in the highest degree arrogant and insolent: a man prone to malevolence, and prone to the error of mistaking his malevolence for public virtue! Doest thou well to be angry? was the question asked in old times of the Hebrew prophet. And he answered, 'I do well.' This was evidently the temper of Junius; and to this cause we attribute the savage cruelty which disgraced several of his letters. No man is so merciless as he who, under a strong delusion, confounds his antipathies with his duties. All this we believe might stand with scarcely any alteration for a character of Philip Francis." Had Macaulay studied the minutes and letters now printed he would have had no reason to correct or modify his judgment regarding Philip Francis. The minutes, like the letters of Junius, display the same art of assuming a great moral and political superiority and the same art of evading difficulties, insinuating unproved charges, and imputing unworthy motives. The minutes, like the letters of Junius, are distinguished for their clear and vivid style and are charged with envenomed and highly elaborated sarcasm. In them is displayed the art which Francis possessed to supreme perfection of giving the arguments on his side their simplest, clearest, and strongest expression, in disengaging them from all extraneous matter, and making them transparently evident to the most cursory reader.†

On the 26th October 1774 the new Council met for the first time and then commenced that long quarrel which after distracting British India was renewed in England, and in which all the most eminent statesmen and orators of the age took an active part. Hastings laid before his colleagues an able minute on the revenue and politics of the country. He explained the mode he adopt-

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th March 1775, Volume II, page 274.

† History of England in the Eighteenth Century, Lecky, Volume III, p. 236.

ed for the collection of the revenue. He earnestly offered his advice "for the continuation of this system with such alterations only as the late change in the Government has rendered indispensably necessary."* In discussing the political system he dwelt on the Benares treaty and the Rohilla war which he defended on the ground both of State policy and justice. His new colleagues, who had been only a week in India and had not had the time to master even the elements of Indian polity, condemned the treaty and denounced the war as impolitic and unjust. At the same time they professed their inability to arrive at any satisfactory conclusions respecting either on the mere minute of the Governor-General, and they formally demanded the correspondence which had passed between him and Mr. Middleton, the Resident at the Court of Oudh. As Hastings had requested Middleton to write to him without reserve, and the letters contained a great deal that was private and confidential, Hastings declined to produce them. But he freely consented to furnish his colleagues with every sentence in the letters which might throw light on the matter under discussion. His colleagues however declared that they had only discovered on landing that "the reduction of the Rohillas was completed, and that our army about the beginning of this month was stationed upon the skirts of the mountains of Tibet, at a place so distant from our frontier and so considerably to the north of Delhi, that it is not comprehended in any of the ordinary maps of Indostan, and in this situation other lights into the nature of the negociation and engagements with Sujah Dowla beyond any that we have yet received are undoubtedly necessary. * * * * We think a complete communication of the original correspondence between the late President and the Company's Resident at the Darbar and the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's troops now in the field indispensably requisite for the information of the Board."† Hastings adhered to his determination not to produce the letters, and in his minute to the Court of Directors, dated 3rd December 1774, he justified his action on the ground that there were few persons in the service of any considerable trust or rank with whom he had not had private correspondence, and that it would be a dishonourable breach of confidence to disclose the contents of these letters. He wrote: "My predecessors have ever followed the same rule, and I am persuaded would have thought it a dishonourable breach of confidence had they inserted on the records of the Company any letters which had been addressed to them as extra-official and private, without the consent of the writers of them. Lord Clive, Mr. Verelst, Mr. Cartier, General Smith, and General Sir Robert Barker are able to contradict me if I have misquoted their practice, and I shall be glad to appeal to them for the truth of it if there can be a doubt on the subject. A circumstance exactly in point to the present matter in dispute happened in the course of Colonel Smith's correspondence with the Select Committee in 1766, when by some mistake the subject of a private letter from the Colonel to the President was only alluded to in a letter from the Select Committee, upon which occasion the Colonel asserts his sentiments of the sacred rights of private correspondence in the following words: 'I have been made accountable to a public Board for an unprejudiced discussion of facts which ought never to have transpired beyond the breast of the right honourable person to whom, and whom only, they were addressed;' and the Select Committee, by their silence, acquiesced in those sentiments."‡ Hastings added: "One reason alleged by the majority for the demand which had with so much perseverance been made for Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's letters was that without them, and specially without those I withheld from them, their knowledge of the State and circumstances of the Rohilla War, which was to enable them to judge of the propriety of continuing the army in that quarter, or to determine its removal, would be incomplete, yet they had neither taken time to read the series of the former political reports which I had recommended for their perusal, nor the letters of Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, with which I had promised to furnish them, although these were surely as necessary for their information as the private letters addressed to me the contents of which they could not know, and I had declared

New Government
in Calcutta.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 26th October 1774 Volume I, page 115

† *Ibid* 28th October 1774, " " page 121

‡ *Ibid* 8th December 1774, " " page 152.

to them contained no information on the points on which they wanted it.”* In a letter to Lord North, Hastings wrote: “The immemorial usage of the service had left the whole correspondence with the country powers in the hands of the Governor, and Mr. Middleton in that light could only receive his orders from and address his letters to me. In the course of his correspondence I had encouraged him to speak his sentiments freely under the assurance of their never becoming the subject of public record in cases which I judged improper for such a communication. When therefore Mr. Monson moved for the whole being laid before the Board I could not consistently either with honour or good faith comply. I urged these reasons, but they were overruled, and Mr. Middleton was immediately called from his station, and thus a declaration made to all Indostan that my authority was extinct, and that new men and new measures would henceforth prevail. I do not know what use my opponents may make of my refusal to show those letters. I declare I have submitted every part to their perusal which was necessary for their information on public affairs, and as to those I have withheld, Your Lordship will, I hope, one day judge of the propriety of my conduct in this respect, it being my intention, as soon as Mr. Middleton arrives, to collect my entire correspondence with him, and to offer it for Your Lordship’s inspection.”†

Recall of Mr.
Middleton from
Lucknow.

On Hastings’ refusal to deliver up his private letters it was resolved by the majority, consisting of the new Councillors, that Mr. Middleton should be recalled, and that the negotiation with the Vizier should be committed to Colonel Champion or to the officer who on the receipt of the orders should chance to be first in command of the brigade in the field. Hastings protested against the resolution as “it proclaimed the annihilation of my authority in that branch of the Government in which the Company for obvious political reasons have ever thought it necessary to invest their Governor with the ostensible powers, and which in their very first orders to the new Administration they have directed should be continued to be conducted through him.”‡ The protest however fell on the ears of men who had made up their minds to follow a definite course of action. At the next meeting of the Board they resolved that the Commander-in-Chief should be ordered to demand from the Vizier the forty lakhs due for the service of our troops in the Rohilla campaign and all other sums which might be due upon his other engagements. If the Vizier was unable to comply with these demands the Commanding Officer might accept not less than twenty lakhs in partial payment, and securities for the remainder in twelve months. In case the Vizier should refuse to comply with these demands the Commanding Officer was within fourteen days after the receipt of these instructions to retire with the army under his command and withdraw it into the Company’s territories. It was also resolved “that further orders be sent to Colonel Champion or the Officer commanding the brigade that after having finished the negotiations for the money now due, he do immediately withdraw the whole of the forces under his command within the limits of the province of Oudh, and that unless the Vizier should require the continuance of the troops for the defence of his original dominions, with the provinces of Korah and Illahabad, he return with them to the cantonments of Dinapore.”§

Hastings regarded the immediate demand of payment as harsh and impolitic, and considered the sudden recall of the troops as a breach of treaty and a violation of the faith of the Company. He wrote to the Directors:— “They have disregarded the faith of our engagements which even in the most violent revolutions have ever been transmitted as sacred from one Government to that which has succeeded it; they have exposed the conquest which the British arms have acquired for the Vizier to be wrested from him, with the loss of our military reputation; they have risked the loss of the pecuniary resources which were stipulated for the Company as the fruits of their successes; and they have precipitately withdrawn the brigade from its station where its whole expense is borne by the Vizier, to become again a heavy and useless burthen upon ourselves.”||

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 8th December 1774, Volume I, page 154.

† Memoirs of Warren Hastings by Gleig, Volume I, pages 474 and 475.

‡ Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 8th December 1774, Volume I, page 156.

§ *Ibid* 28th October 1774, “ page 122.

|| *Ibid* 8th December 1774, “ page 156.

Not content with weakening the dignity and authority of Hastings by the recall of his representative in Oude, not content with endangering the safety of the kingdom of our ally by the recall of the troops, the majority proceeded to denounce the Rohilla War as impolitic and unjust, and ordered an enquiry to be instituted into the manner in which it had been conducted, in the hope of fastening upon Hastings the responsibility for every outrage perpetrated by the Vizier and his troops. The event proved very different to what they anticipated. It is instructive to compare the description of the state of Rohilkund at the close of the war as described by those who took a part in the campaign and the picture drawn by Macaulay. Few portions of his brilliant work have achieved a more successful notoriety. It is read wherever English letters have penetrated, and it may be said to be stereotyped in the English mind. It has created a deep and lasting prejudice against the great man who founded our Indian Empire, and to it is mainly due the charge so often brought by fervent politicians that India was acquired by enormous crimes. Macaulay in his essay on Warren Hastings writes—"Then the horrors of Indian war were let loose on the fair valleys and cities of Rohilkund. The whole country was in a blaze. More than a hundred thousand people fled from their homes to pestilential jungles, preferring famine and fever and the haunts of tigers to the tyranny of those to whom an English and a Christian Government had for shameful lucre sold their substance, and their blood, and the honour of their wives and daughters." Colonel Leslie, the first witness summoned before the Council, stated: "I would beg leave to distinguish between the real inhabitants and the acquired ones. By the acquired ones I mean the Rohillas or Afghans who conquered the country and became the masters of it. I believe the Gentoo inhabitants were not oppressed. The ryots have been as much cherished by him as they ever were under any former Government, except at the time of the march of the army through their country, but they returned to their plough immediately and seemed to be as happy as ever."* The witness admitted that a certain portion of the country was in flames—a very different matter to the whole country—and added: "The native inhabitants after I left Bissowly between that and Simbu were all at their habitations and had returned to their cultivation of the country; when I went down towards the banks of the Ganges it was highly cultivated, but about Puttergur which was the place of arms and retreat of the Rohillas before they retired to Loll Dang as their last resource, there was no cultivation but of sugar."†

Enquiry into the
Rohilla war.

Evidence of Colonel
Leslie.

Regarding the outrages committed by the Vizier, Colonel Leslie declared that he had heard many "vague reports regarding the matter and certain particular ones which were attended with such circumstances that I could scarce give any credit to from the situation of the parties. There was a particular one at Bissowly: one of the daughters of the Rohilla Chief of that place whom they said he had committed violence upon, and that she in consequence poisoned herself, and knowing the situation of the Vizier at that time I thought it almost impracticable, which made me give very little credit to the stories which I heard at the time of such a nature." On being cross-examined by General Clavering as to the treatment the Rohillas received at the hands of the Nawab, Colonel Leslie stated: "The prisoners who fell into the hands of the Vizier, which I believe to be very few, are now entertained in his service; there are some of the sons of Hafiz Rahmut, two particularly whom I know, and have often seen riding in his suite. He generally took one of these out with him all the time he was at Bissowly; their appearance was good, and I think the same of the rest of his cavalry, and they appeared contented, but no doubt he kept a watchful eye on them."‡

Mr. Francis then asked the witness the following question:—

Q.—"Did the Vizier make any suitable allowance for the maintenance of the families of the conquered chiefs, or were they abandoned to distress and misery for want of the common necessities of life at any time?"

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 19th December 1774, Volume I, page 162.

† *Ibid*

.. page 162.

‡ *Ibid*

.. pages 163-64.

A.—“The Vizier has I am told settled allowances, jaghirs upon most of them, but I believe not sufficient to keep them in that way of life they are brought up in; but upon my word I don't know what distresses they have been brought to as they are confined within forts, but the report of the world says they suffer great distress.”*

Evidence of Major Hannay.

Major Hannay was the next witness. In answer to the first question regarding the oppression stated to be exercised by the Vizier, he said: “To the best of my knowledge I saw no signs of oppression to the inhabitants of the new conquered country, but from particular enquiries which I had an opportunity of making of the country people, they said they had met with no treatment that they could complain of; that from the treatment they had met with they had no reason to fear greater severity from the Vizier than their former masters.”† This is a very different picture to that painted by Macaulay, who describes Hastings folding his arms and looking on while their villages were burned, their children butchered, and their women violated. The Rohillas were not, as Macaulay depicts them innocent men, fighting for their liberty, but military adventurers who only half a century previously had conquered the country. Major Hannay in his evidence stated: “I have learned from many people that it is only within fifty years that the Rohillas have become masters of the country to the north of the Ganges; that they were originally Afghans, came to Indostan under a sardar named Daud Cawn, and that they conquered that country from the Hindoos, and that since that time they have followed no other profession than that of arms, and the ancient Hindoos have cultivated the country.”‡ No doubt villages were burnt as they have been burnt in every war, but Major Hannay informed the Board that both the Vizier and the Rohillas were concerned in burning the villages. “I was informed that some days before our arrival at Shawbad, the Rohillas had burned some villages towards Mamdy in the Vizier's ancient dominions.”§ As to the country being reduced to a desert and a hundred thousand people flying to the jungles, Major Hannay stated: “At the time that I went upon an expedition from Bissowly to Sumbul, Meradabad, and Rampore, the country appeared to be in good cultivation, the inhabitants were employed in tilling it. It is in general one of the best cultivated countries I have seen in Indostan, and very well inhabited, and the people appeared to be busy at this time as if there had been a profound peace, and under no kind of apprehension from the conquerors.”||

In the course of his cross-examination by Francis Major Hannay was asked:—

Q.—“Do you know or believe that the Vizier entered the zenanas of the wives of any of the Rohilla Chiefs?”

A.—“It is impossible for me to answer with any degree of precision from the zenanas being spacious places consisting of many apartments many of which are not occupied by women. I never knew of his going into any of them at Pellybeet. I can positively say he did not, for he never went into the town of Pellybeet. At Bissowly I have heard that he went frequently into the zenana there, but to the best of my remembrance it was after the women were removed to camp, and that he was fitting up the zenanas for the reception of his own family during the time he was going to Puttergur.”¶

Regarding the Rohillas whose character has been painted in such glowing colours by Burke, Mill, and Macaulay, Major Hannay stated: “Their national character has in general been the want of sincerity, to elucidate which I beg leave to mention one instance. At the time that Mahomed Ally was their chief he prevailed upon the Almora Raja and the other hill Rajas to assist him in his rebellion against the King, Mahomed Shah; that they did assist him with 20,000 men, that upon the approach of the imperial army they found themselves so much inferior in point of strength that they judged it imprudent to give him battle and prevailed upon the Almora Raja to admit them into his country, the access to which is so strong, that a small number of troops may defend the pass against a very numerous army. They continued there till an invasion of the Mahrattas required

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 19th December 1774, Volume I, page 166.

† *Ibid* “ page 167.

‡ *Ibid* “ page 167.

§ *Ibid* “ page 167.

|| *Ibid* “ page 167.

¶ *Ibid* “ page 168.

that the army of the empire should be returned against them. As soon as ever the army of the empire quitted the Rohilla country, then the Rohillas seized the country of the Almora Raja, their ally, carried away most of the handsomest women of the country captives, amongst others the daughter of the Raja, whom Ally Mahomed took himself, and she was the mother of the present Fyzulla Cawn. This is mentioned as an instance of their insincerity; farther it is a proverb in Indostan that they pray with one hand and rob with the other. Their manner of making war is much the same as is practised all over Indostan; towards their conquered enemies they have generally been bloody; those whom they have saved they commonly made captives of; and in the late campaign I have been very well assured by many of the prisoners that their intentions towards us were very bloody, that they had orders to give no quarter.”*

The next witness called was Colonel Champion, the bitter foe of the Vizier and of Hastings. He described no burning villages, nor thousands of people flying from their homes to pestilential jungles, but he stated: “The native inhabitants are still remaining and the country is in a flourishing condition.” Colonel Champion on being asked whether he had heard the report that brutal outrages had been offered to the wives and daughters of the Rohillas of the highest rank, said: “I did hear such a report, but as to the grounds I have none sufficient to prove the accusation, but the report of it was made to me.”†

Evidence of Colonel
Champion.

The evidence of Colonel Leslie, Major Hannay, and Colonel Champion, a most hostile witness, removes what Macaulay stated to be “a lasting stain on the fame of Hastings and of England” It is no doubt a great crime to trample out a nationality, but of this crime in our conquest of India we are guiltless. In India we found men belonging to diverse races speaking diverse tongues fighting for the supremacy. We found no nation. The Musulman power was effete long before the battle of Plassey. Brave in battle, the followers of Mohammed were intolerant and proved themselves unfit to govern. All chance of Hindoo supremacy was lost on the field of Panipat. The Mahrattas were brave marauders but were destitute of the gifts with which nature has endowed the races meant to rule. The Rohillas were soldiers of fortune from Afghanistan who had only half a century before their defeat conquered the fair valleys and cities of Rohilkund. Hastings, in his minute to the Directors, states: “I must beg leave to take exception to the word *nation* applied to the Rohillas. They are a tribe of Afghans or Pathans, free-booters who conquered the country about sixty years ago, and have ever since lived upon the fruits of it, without contributing either to its cultivation or manufactures, or even mixing with the native inhabitants. The Rohillas are Mahometans, the natives Hindoos, and have only changed masters.”‡ Colonel Leslie in his evidence remarked that the Rohillas “made the inhabitants till the ground, left them a substance, and kept the rest to themselves.”§ And Major Hannay informed the Board that since the time the Rohillas conquered the country “they have followed no other profession than that of arms and the ancient Hindoos have cultivated the country.”||

The Rohilla war was no brave struggle of patriots fighting for their native land; it was a struggle of marauders fighting to maintain their supremacy over a people whom they were incapable of protecting from other marauders. The Mahrattas had laid waste the country and driven the Rohillas into their mountain fastnesses. At this grave crisis in their affairs the Rohilla chiefs appealed for assistance to the Nawab of Oude, the ally of England. The Nawab of Oude consented to lend his aid on the express condition that if the Mahrattas were compelled to retire from the country with or without war, the Rohillas should pay a certain sum of money. The treaty was signed and rati-

Review of the
Rohilla war.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 19th December 1774, Volume I, page 178.

† *Ibid* 28th December 1774, „ page 173.

Note.—Mill writes: “There can be no doubt that the Rohillas, whose troops were among the best and bravest of Hindustan, were a barrier against the Mahrattas.” He loses sight of the fact that the Mahrattas had twice defeated the Rohillas and devastated the country.

‡ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 16th January 1775, Volume I, page 177.

§ *Ibid* 19th December 1774, „ page 163.

|| *Ibid* „ page 167.

fied by the Commander-in-Chief of the English troops. The Mahrattas were compelled to retire, but they invaded the country next year and were again driven off by General Sir Robert Barker. The Vizier then demanded from the Rohilla chiefs the sum they had stipulated by treaty to pay. They resorted to evasions and excuses till his patience was exhausted and he resolved to annex their country as a punishment for their breach of faith. The Nawab determined to ask his ally to aid him in the enterprise. The first proposition of the Rohilla war came from the Vizier and General Barker, and Hastings was most unwilling to accede to it. But he and his colleagues after long and mature deliberations came to the conclusion that on the annexation of Rohilcund to Oude depended not only the tranquillity and safety of Oude but the tranquillity and safety of our own possessions. Rohilcund was the gate of Oude, and as Hastings wrote to the Directors: "if the Mahrattas either by the defeat, or which was as likely to happen by the desertion of the Rohillas to their cause, should gain a footing in that country, nothing could oppose their entering into the province of Oude and laying it waste, in spite of any attempts of our forces to prevent them. The map which accompanies this will demonstrate this truth more powerfully than any verbal argument. It was not to be supposed that the Mahrattas, whose ambition for some years past had aspired to universal conquest, and who had extended their arms from the centre of the Balaghaut to the northern extremity of Hindostan, should sit down contented when they had added Duab, Korah, and Allahabad to their dominions. On the contrary, there was every reason to apprehend, and it was publicly reported in their own camp, that they would next carry their operations into the country of the Vizier and even into the Company's own possessions."* Hastings held the opinion, and it was supported by the evidence of Colonel Leslie, Major Hannay, and Colonel Champion, that the Vizier's State joined to Rohilcund would form "*a complete compact State shut in effectually from foreign invasions.*"† He, however, clearly saw that convenience does not justify aggression, for he wrote to the Directors: "I own that the convenience of possessing the Rohilla country was not sufficient reason for invading it. I never said it was; but if they had afforded a just provocation for invading these countries, and we saw advantages in invading it, though neither cause was alone sufficient to produce that effect, yet both united would certainly justify it, and the most rigid speculators would approve so fair a conclusion."‡ A breach of a treaty has always been regarded by nations as a just provocation for war.

Hastings and his colleagues determined to aid the Vizier, and for the services of the English troops they agreed to accept a payment of forty lakhs. Macaulay observes: "England now descended far below the level even of these petty German princes who about the same time sold us troops to fight the Americans. The Hussar-mongers of Hesse and Anspach had at least the assurance that the expeditions on which their soldiers were to be employed would be conducted in conformity with the humane rules of civilised warfare. Was the Rohilla war likely to be so conducted? He well knew what Indian warfare was. He well knew that the power which he covenanted to put into Sujah Dowlah's hands would in all probability be atrociously abused: and he required no guarantee, no promise that it should not be so abused. He did not even reserve to himself the right of withdrawing his aid in case of abuse however gross."§ The German princes had no interest, direct or indirect, in the American war. The English lent their troops to an ally to punish certain chiefs for a breach of a treaty to which the English Commander-in-Chief had affixed his signature, and to annex a territory which these chiefs had gained possession of by the sword and could no longer defend from a foe whose ambition menaced the safety of our dominions. Hastings never concealed the fact that the payment of forty lakhs to the Company greatly influenced his decision. Writing to the Directors he said: "I shall be always ready to profess that I do reckon the probable acquisition of wealth among my reasons for taking up arms against my neighbours. I never in any period of my life, though long engaged in

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th December 1774, Volume I, page 141.

† *Ibid* 16th January 1775, " page 184.

‡ " *Ibid* " page 184.

§ Macaulay's Essay on Warren Hastings.

public affairs, gave my consent for taking up arms in an *unjust cause*, and I never shall but in cases of very notorious enormity give my consent to take up arms in an *unprofitable one*."* Regarding the charge first brought by Francis and repeated and embellished by Macaulay that Hastings took no guarantee from the Vizier that the war should be conducted in conformity with the humane rules of civilised warfare, Hastings at the time wrote—"It is a perversion of facts to say that 'the British arms and honour were absolutely at the Vizier's disposal,' that 'an absolute surrender has been made of the honour and interest of the Company.' We agreed to assist him in subduing the Rohillas. It was necessary to draw the line between the authority of the Vizier and our Commanding Officer. The service to be performed was entirely the Vizier's; it was therefore consistent and unavoidable that he should direct the objects of it; but the execution of military operations was expressly vested in our Commanding Officer; of course the safety of our army and the honour of the British name and arms were entirely confided to his conduct and discretion."†

It was the Commanding Officer, Colonel Champion, to whom, as Hastings pointed out, the honour of the British name and arms was entirely confided, who either through personal animosity or the desire of persuading the Board to grant him the power which he repeatedly solicited to entirely command the Vizier, first brought the graver charges against the Nawab which have tarnished the honour of the British name. The evidence however of Colonel Leslie and Major Hannay, strictly corroborated by the letters and depositions of Colonel Champion himself, proves that the Vizier was unjustly traduced in the reports which prevailed of the enormities committed by him in the course of the war. Macaulay, with the tendency to exaggerate which so seriously impairs the value of his work as a historian and critic, observes: "Their military resistance crushed, his (Hastings) duties ended; and he had then only to fold his arms and look on while their villages were burned, their children butchered." A certain number of villages were burned. This, as Hastings admits, was both barbaric and impolitic, but too much justified by the practice of war established among the nations of the East; and he might have added nations of the West. The statement made that children were butchered is absolutely due to the imagination of Macaulay and to his love of contrast. Macaulay also infers that a wholesale violation of the women took place by the soldiery. But the charge was never brought against the soldiery, it was brought against the Vizier himself, and respecting this Hastings wrote: "The only authority which the gentlemen of the majority had for this horrid accusation, at least I recollect no other, was a letter from Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, who mentioned it only as an instance of the falsehoods which had been propagated to injure the Vizier, adding that the unhappy victims of his brutal lust, who could not survive their shame, but had put a violent end to their own lives, were still living, and that the Vizier had never seen them."‡ History furnishes no more striking example of the growth and vitality of a slander. The Rohilla atrocities owe their birth to the malignity of Champion and Francis; their growth to the rhetoric of Burke; and their wide diffusion to the brilliancy and pellucid clearness of Macaulay's style. A close and minute study of the evidence demonstrates that a certain number of villages were burnt and that the prisoners were ill subsisted. A hundred thousand people did not fly to pestilential jungles, but about seventeen or eighteen hundred Rohillas with their families were expelled from Rohilcund,

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 16th January 1775, Volume I, page 184.

† *Ibid* " page 182.

Hamilton's History of the Rohilla Afghans, page 268. Mill lays considerable stress on the use of the word *exterminate* in the official correspondence. Regarding this Hastings wrote, "I am here charged with a concealed design formed in concert with the Vizier to *exterminate* the Rohillas; and much use is made of this discovery both by the majority in the letter before me, and by Colonel Champion in his vindication. The word in the original language of the letter which is here translated to *exterminate* means expel or remove. In another passage of the letter it is joined with a word which does literally express to *exterminate* or root out, and both passages mean no more than that it was the intention of the Vizier to expel or remove the Rohillas from the country which they occupied, without suffering the smallest vestige of their power to remain in it. In this sense I most certainly did agree to assist the Vizier, and so did the late President and Council, nor can I conceive how the war could have been undertaken with any other object. The majority know as well as myself that the Rohillas are not the people of the country, but a military tribe who conquered it, and quartered themselves upon the people without following any profession but that of arms, or mixing in any relation with the native inhabitants." (Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th March 1775, Volume II, page 268.)

‡ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 16th January 1775, Volume I, page 181. ..

and Hindu inhabitants, amounting to about seven hundred thousand, remained in possession of their patrimonial acres and were seen cultivating their fields in peace.

Death of Vizier of
Oude. Treaty with
his successor.

At a meeting of the Board on the 6th February 1775, a letter was read from the Resident at Oude announcing the death of the Vizier. The majority of the Council considered all the treaties made with the Nawab as purely personal, and consequently invalid on the death of one of the contracting parties. They therefore determined to make a heavier bargain with the Vizier's successor. At a meeting of the Board on the 3rd March it was discussed and determined what part of the Nawab's dominions should be included in the new treaty. Francis stated—"My opinion is that we may with propriety guarantee to the present Nawab of Oude for his life all the countries guaranteed to the late Vizier by the treaty of Illahabad, except the dominions of Chayt Sing. I think that this guarantee may be also conditionally, and *pro tempore*, extended to the countries of Oude and Illahabad, until we shall be informed whether the treaty of Benares be ratified or disproved by the Court of Directors. I do not think it safe or prudent to enter into any engagement that may eventually carry the Company's forces beyond the limits of the countries I have mentioned." Hastings observed: "My answer to the question is short, as it can be of no use; we ought in my judgment to guarantee to the Nawab of Oude the Subeldary of Oude, the districts of Korah and Illahabad, and the country lately conquered from the Rohillas, but no more. I do not wish to see the Company's forces carried within the line of the Rohilla country for its defences; I believe that an engagement to defend the country for him would render it unnecessary. I fear he may lose it. We shall in that case have a greater burden imposed upon us in the defence of the Nawab of Oude, and he be less furnished with means of discharging his engagements with us."* It was, however, "Resolved that the Board will agree to guarantee to the Nawab Mirza Amaunay, the Province of Oude and conditionally those of Korah and Illahabad until the pleasure of the Court of Directors on the Treaty of Benares be known."† The Governor-General then proposed the following question—"Whether it shall be made a condition of the new treaty that Raja Cheyt Singh shall exercise a free and independent authority in his own dominions, subject only to the payment of his tribute;"‡ and it was Resolved in the affirmative. The Governor-General then proposed—"Whether it shall be made an article in the treaty that, in consideration of the engagement to be entered into by this Government to guarantee the possessions of the Nawab of Oude as before resolved, he shall cede and make over to the Company the whole or any part of the tribute due from the zemindar of Gauzipore."§ Francis stated: "I consider the cession to the Company of the whole tribute paid by the zemindar of Gauzipore to the late Nawab as the first and most essential condition of a treaty with the present Nawab: the advantage gained by the zemindar will be also very considerable, as it has always been my opinion that his authority in his own Government should be left free and uncontrolled; as long as this advantage is preserved to him, he must consider it as his interest to be the tributary of the Company rather than of the Nawab."||

Colonel Monson and General Clavering, as was their wont, supported Francis, but Barwell strongly protested against the exaction. He observed: "The Company, it is obvious, never intended that upon the necessities of our allies we should grasp at any part of the territories they possessed. The son of a man with whom we were so lately intimately connected, upon a supposition of his

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 3rd March 1775, Volume II, pages 262-263.

†	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 264.
‡	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 264.
§	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 264.
	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 264.

standing in need of our assistance, ought not in my opinion to be stripped of any part of his paternal territory."* Hastings was of opinion "that a demand should be made of a moiety of the revenue paid by the zemindar of Gauzipore, but I do not think that we ought to insist on this article or that the Nawab's refusal to consent to it should prove an impediment to our proceeding on the treaty."† It was resolved "that the demand be made for the tribute of Gauzipore, but that it be not considered an absolute and indispensable article in the negociation with the Nawab." The Governor-General proposed the next question—"Whether the subsidy to be stipulated for the assistance of our troops to the Nawab of Oudh by the proposed treaty shall continue on the present footing of 2,10,000 rupees per month for a brigade, or what other sum shall be demanded." And he expressed an opinion that the present subsidy was sufficient and that it ought not to be increased. "I doubt," he stated, "whether a larger sum would in reality prove a gain to the Company." It was however "Resolved that an increase of the subsidy be demanded from the Nawab to make it equal to the expense of the troops."‡ Thus we find the statesman who has been branded as the violator of treaties and the oppressor of nations by extortions and exactions doing his utmost to prevent his colleagues from extorting any concession from a native prince inconsistent with a former treaty.

The majority of the Council, no longer content with attacking Hastings' public policy, now lent their aid to a grave imputation on his personal integrity. On the 11th March 1775 Francis informed "the Board that he this morning received a visit from Raja Nundcoomar, in which the Raja delivered to him a letter addressed to the Governor and Council and demanded of him, as a duty belonging to his office as a Councillor of this State, to lay it before the Board. Mr. Francis conceiving that he could not, consistently with his duty, refuse such a letter at the instance of a person of the Raja's rank, did accordingly receive it, and now lays it before the Board, declaring at the same time that he is unacquainted with the contents of it. Mr. Francis further begs leave to observe that he received this letter publicly in the presence of a considerable number of persons, and that the Raja's verbal request was interpreted to him by these different persons."§

Accusations against
Hastings by
Nundcoomar.

The letter laid before the Board professed to relate the connection of Nundcoomar with the Company. It was due to him, he stated, that Meer Jaffer had waged war against Meer Cassim after the massacre of Patna; and after the defeat of Meer Cassim and Sujah Dowlah at Buxar he had obtained "from His Majesty the King Shah Alam the Subahs (of Bengal, &c.) for the Nawab Jaffer Ally Cawn; during the Nawab's lifetime he had faithfully distributed the revenue; after the death of Meer Jaffer, he was deprived of his office by certain Englishmen who "for views of private advantage raised Mahomed Reza Cawn to the post;" he reminds the Board that for the space of seven years Mahomed Reza managed the affairs of the Subah of Bengal; "what the measures were which he pursued in the administration of the country, the balances which he fraudulently wrote off, his violence and oppressions upon his own masters and upon the ryots and his trade in grain, by all which his master's house and the whole country were desolated, are well known to all." Against Nundcoomar himself Mahomed Reza could bring no charge: "as nothing of the kind had been committed by me, he was able to produce nothing." It was Nundcoomar who assisted Hastings when he was appointed Governor in prosecuting Mahomed Reza Cawn and Shitab Roy, and drew an account of their embezzlements which showed that Mahomed Reza Cawn had appropriated upwards of 305 lakhs (£3,052,695) and Shitab Roy 90 lakhs (£900,000). Mahomed Reza Cawn offered 10 lakhs (£100,000) to Hastings and two lakhs (£20,000) to him (Nundcoomar), and Shitab Roy offered four lakhs (£40,000) to Hastings and one lakh to Nundcoomar. These offers he reported to Hastings who refused them. Soon after, he remarks, Hastings set Mahomed Reza at liberty and "entirely dropt the inquiry into his embezzlements and malpractices." "Why this extraordinary

favour was so suddenly shown, the Governor can best assign the reasons.”* Shitab Roy was reinstated in office. “The motives of these proceedings will best be understood from Mr. Hastings himself.”† After insinuating some other charges against Hastings, Nundcoomar adds: “Thus far I have written in general terms. I shall now beg leave to offer a more particular and circumstantial statement of facts.” He then states that at various times in the year 1772 Hastings had received the sum of three lakhs and fifty-four thousand rupees from himself and Munny Begum “for procuring Raja Goordass’s appointment to the Niabut and causing Munny Begum to be made the superior of the family.”‡ It is difficult to read the letter of Nundcoomar without agreeing with Lord Thurlow that “a more extraordinary or a more insolent production never appeared undoubtedly, nor one which carried falsehood upon the face of it more strongly.”

After the letter had been read through, Hastings observed—“As Mr. Francis has been pleased to inform the Board that he was unacquainted with the contents of the letter sent into the Board by Nundcoomar, that he thinks himself justified in carrying his curiosity further than he should have permitted himself without such a previous intimation, and therefore begs leave to ask Mr. Francis whether he was before this acquainted with Nundcoomar’s intention of bringing such charges against him before the Board.” Francis replied: “As a member of this Council, I do not deem myself obliged to answer any questions of mere curiosity. I am willing, however, to inform the Governor-General that I was totally unacquainted with the contents of the paper I have now delivered into the Board till I heard it read. I did apprehend in general that it contained some charge against him. It was this apprehension that made me so particularly cautious in the manner of receiving the Raja’s letter. I was not acquainted with Raja Nundcoomar’s intention of bringing in such charges as are mentioned in the letter.”§

At a meeting of the Board held on the 13th March 1775, a further letter from Nundcoomar was received and read. After referring to his former letter he states: “What is there written I mean not in the least to alter: far from it, I have the strongest written vouchers to produce in support of what I have advanced, and I wish and entreat for my honour’s sake that you will suffer me to appear before you to establish the fact by an additional incontestable evidence.”|| Nundcoomar was too well acquainted with official etiquette and oriental custom not to know that his request was an act of gross impertinence, and that to grant it would be an insult to the Governor-General and the death-blow to his prestige and authority in the eye of every native in Bengal. But Nundcoomar knew when he made the request that it would be pleasing to the majority and certain to be granted. He had been in intimate communication with Colonel Monson, and immediately after his letter had been read Colonel Monson proposed “that Raja Nundcoomar be called before the Board.” Hastings upon this proceeded to write a minute in which he declared that he would not suffer Nundcoomar to appear before the Board as his accuser. “I know what belongs to the dignity and character of the first member of this Administration. I will not sit at this Board in the character of a criminal, nor do I acknowledge the members of the Board to be my judges. I am induced on this occasion to make the declaration that I look upon General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis as my accusers. I cannot press this in the direct letter of the law, but in my conscience I regard them as such, and I will give my reasons for it.”¶ Hastings goes on to show that Nundcoomar was only a tool in the hands of the majority, “that he was guilty of great insolence and disrespect in the demand which he made of Mr. Francis, and that it was not a duty belonging to the office of a Councillor of this State to make himself the carrier of a letter which would have been much more properly committed to

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 11th March 1775, Volume II, page 300.

†	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 301.
‡	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 302.
§	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 303.
	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 304.
¶	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 305.

the hands of a peon, or hercarrab, or delivered by the writer of it to the Secretary himself.* "He points out that Francis acknowledged that it contained a charge against him but if the charge was false it was a libel."† "It might have been false for anything that Mr. Francis could know to the contrary, since he was unacquainted with the contents of it. In this instance therefore he incurred the hazard of presenting a libel to the Board. This was not a duty belonging to his office as a Councillor of this State." Hastings proceeds to inform the Board that he had been long acquainted with Nundcoomar's intention of making the attack upon him. He writes: "I was shown a paper containing many accusations against me, which I was told was carried by Nundcoomar to Colonel Monson, and that he himself was employed for some hours in private with Colonel Monson explaining the nature of these charges." He adds—"I do not mean to infer from what I have said that it makes any alteration in the nature of the charges were they delivered immediately from my ostensive accusers, or whether they came to the Board through the channel of patronage, but it is sufficient to authorise the conviction which I feel in my own mind that these gentlemen are parties in the accusation of which they assert the right of being the judge." Hastings closes the minute by stating his inflexible determination not to suffer the indignity of allowing Nundcoomar to accuse him before the governing body of which he was the head. "The Chief of this Administration, your superior, gentlemen, appointed by the Legislature itself, shall I sit at this Board to be arraigned in the presence of a wretch whom you all know to be one of the basest of mankind? I believe I need not mention his name, but it is Nundcoomar! Shall I sit to hear men collected from the dregs of the people give evidence at his dictating against my character and conduct? I will not. You may, if you please, form yourselves into a Committee for the investigation of these matters, in any manner which you may think proper, but I will repeat that I will not meet Nundcoomar at the Board nor suffer Nundcoomar to be examined at the Board; nor have you a right to it, nor can it answer any other purpose than that of vilifying and insulting me to insist upon it."‡

Monson requested that the Governor-General would inform the Board from whom he had his information respecting the visit Nundcoomar paid to him. Hastings refused to give up the name because he would not expose his informant to the vengeance of the majority. He added, however, that Barwell had received similar information at the same time. Barwell informed the Board "that he was apprized of it and received a copy of the same paper that the Governor laid before the Board." The paper was entered by the Board after the consultation. It is substantially the same as the letter laid before the Board by Francis, though in it Nundcoomar makes no mention of having himself bribed Hastings. Incorporated in the paper is a letter purporting to be written by Munny Begum which is identical with both the letters produced by Nundcoomar. Monson said: "As the Governor-General has not thought proper to acquaint the Board from whom he received the information with regard to my conversation with Nundcoomar, I shall take no further notice of it." He added, "I do hereby declare that the Governor and Mr. Barwell likewise have been totally misinformed, for I never heard nor saw any paper in Persian or any other country language which contained to the best of my knowledge any accusation against the Governor-General."§ This, Sir James Stephen remarks, admits by not denying a conversation with Nundcoomar, and suggests that Monson did "see or hear" a paper in English.

The motion of Monson to call in Nundcoomar being put to the Board Hastings again protested against it. He said, "I do not understand the question to be whether Nundcoomar shall be called before the Board, but whether I shall be confronted with him, since the same effect may be produced, as I have

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th March 1775, Volume II, page 305.

† *Ibid* " page 306.

‡ "The turn of the expression here is peculiar. It implies an admission that the charge was true, though it might have been false, but this can hardly have been the writer's meaning. I read it rather as an argument founded on a concession (for the sake of argument) that the charge was true." "The Story of Nundcoomar" by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Volume I, page 58.

§ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th March 1775, Volume II, page 306.

¶ *Ibid* " page 306.

The Governor-General.—“I declare the Council now dissolved and I do protest against any acts of it as a Council during my absence as illegal and unwarranted.”

The Governor-General.—I shall not answer your question, because I do not think it is sufficiently defined. I quit the Council.

Mr. Barwell withdraws from the Board.

Nundcoomar being asked if he possessed the original of the paper, produced what he said was the original of the translation. Mr. Auriol, the Assistant Secretary, being asked to look at the characters on the seal and inform the Board what they are: "he informs them the characters are Persian and express the name of Munny Begum." Sir John D'Oyly, the Acting Persian Translator, having now arrived was called in and shown the seal. "He also declares it to be Munny Begum's." This expression, as Sir James Stephen remarks shows how ill fitted the Council were for taking evidence. "D'Oyly's state-

† Ibid " page 308.

§ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th March 1775, Volume II, page 309.

ment goes much further than Auriol's, but the writer of the consultations seems to have considered them equivalent to each other." The moonshee to the Persian Translator being asked whether another letter from Munny Begum which was produced by Sir John D'Oyly from the Persian office was in the same handwriting as that delivered by Nundcoomar, replied that it was not, but "that the seal of the letter is Munny Begum's seal, and that the direction and body of the letter appear to be in the same hand. "It was observed by the Board" that the letter which has been given in by the Raja was written two and a half years ago, and that the letter produced by Sir John D'Oyly was written only a few days ago." The spirit shown by such a remark is noticeable. The Council, who had taken upon themselves judicial functions as soon as a difficulty appears in Nundcoomar's case, suggest an answer to it instead of inquiring into its weight.*

Nundcoomar, who had requested to be summoned before the Board because he had the strongest written vouchers to produce in support of what he advanced, on being asked if he had any more papers to produce, replied—"I have no more papers." He was then further questioned whether the Governor-General or any other person on the part of the Governor-General had attempted to obtain from him the original letter. He replied—"the Begum applied to me for it through Cantoo Baboo, the Governor's banyan. I gave it into Cantoo Baboo's hands. He refused the original, he desired that he might

must have been in previous collusion with the majority or some member of the majority for there was nothing to suggest it in his previous letters or statements. Its object was to furnish an excuse of offering a fresh insult

Council is complete, it is an indignity to this Board." Nundcoomar was further questioned whether he himself was present when the money was given to Hastings' servants, and he replied in the affirmative and stated that he was accompanied by certain servants of his own. All were present, he mentioned, in Calcutta, except one who was at Moorshedabad. On being questioned whether he was sure that the servants received the money on account of the Governor, he replied—"They undoubtedly took it for the Governor. I asked the Governor if it had reached him, and he said, it had." This closed the examination of Nundcoomar, an examination entirely conducted not to elicit

* The story of Nundcoomar by Sir James FitzJames Stephen, Vol. I, p. 58.

† The only questions put to Nundcoomar by the Council were either trivial or were questions which he must have suggested himself, though if they had allowed themselves time to study the letter said to be written by the Begum, and to compare it with the written accusation of Nundcoomar, the Council must have perceived that on several points there was urgent need of inquiry. The story told in the letters does not on its face agree with the charge made by Nundcoomar. Nundcoomar said he had given Hastings in gold 1,04,105 rupees, and that the Munny Begum had given him at Moorshedabad a lakh, and had caused Nur Singh, Cantoo Baboo's brother, at Cossimbazar, to pay him a lakh and half more, making in all 3,64,104 rupees.

The letter says that the Munny Begum was to pay two lakhs, and that she was raising one lakh to pay it to Hastings at Moorshedabad, and it begs Nundcoomar to pay the other lakh to Hastings at Calcutta, and promises to repay him.

Upon this Nundcoomar should have been asked whether he did what the Munny Begum asked him, and whether the 1,04,105 rupees which he said he gave in gold to Hastings at Calcutta was the lakh which the Munny Begum asked him to advance? If he said yes, his statement and the statement in the Begum's letter were in direct conflict; for, according to the letter, the total amount paid or caused to be paid by the Begum was two lakhs, and according to his statement the amount was three lakhs and a half. If he said no, two questions arose, namely, first on what consideration the 1,04,105 rupees in gold were paid, and, secondly, how the letter of the Begum could be reconciled with his accusation, the letter stating that the Begum was to pay one lakh at Moorshedabad and expressing a wish to borrow another from Nundcoomar to be paid at Calcutta, and the accusation stating that one lakh was paid at Moorshedabad, and another lakh and a half to Nur Singh at Cossimbazar, the suburb of Moorshedabad? I do not say that these questions might not have been satisfactorily answered, but I do say that they ought to have been asked, for they arise upon matters patent on the face of the document accepted by the Council. Apart from this the majority of the Council did not observe the most obvious and common precautions. They took no steps to ascertain the authenticity of the letter attributed to the Munny Begum beyond comparing the inscriptions on two seals. They did not even impound the alleged original, but returned it to Nundcoomar. They did not even send for the persons alleged by Nundcoomar to have delivered and received the bags of gold, nor did they ask Nundcoomar a single question as to the time when, and the place where, the gold was delivered, the persons from whom he got so large a sum, the books in which he had made entries about it, the place and time of his alleged conversation with Hastings on the subject, or any of the other obvious matters by which his truthfulness might be tested." ("Story of Nundcoomar" by Sir James FitzJames Stephen, Volume I, pages 60-62.)

‡ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th March 1775, Volume II, page 319.

truth but to extract answers damaging to the accused. The Board did not cross-examine Nundcoomar as to the time and place where the gold was delivered, the persons from whom he got so large a sum, the books in which he had made entries about it, the place and time of his alleged conversation with Hastings on the subject, or any of the other obvious matters by which his truthfulness might be justified. They did not examine Nundcoomar as to the grave discrepancies between his accusation and the letter of the Begum. But on the evidence of Nundcoomar, an avowed accomplice, who was known to be the bitter foe of Hastings, the Board came with indecent haste to the conclusion "that the several sums of money specified in Maharaja Nundcoomar's letter of the 8th March have been received by the Governor-General, and that the said sums of money do of right belong to the East India Company."* It was resolved "that the Governor-General be requested to pay into the Company's treasury the amount of those sums for the Company's use."

It was "ordered that the proceedings of the Board and all the papers relative to Maharaja Nundcoomar's charge against the Governor-General be delivered to the Company's attorney, that he may lay them before counsel for their opinion how to proceed in recovering for the Company's use the several sums of money which the Governor-General has received from Maharaja Nundcoomar or Munny Begum for services done them through his influence." The law officers of the Company in Bengal did not recommend any prosecution in India, but advised the Board to transmit all the documents and evidence to the Company, who might, if the matter was worthy of their notice, file a bill against Hastings and compel a discovery. "These documents," said Lord Thurlow, "arrived at a time when it certainly was the anxious wish of the Minister to take any fair and reasonable ground he could for the removal of Mr. Hastings. The papers were all submitted to the law officers of the Company, who declared that the information of Nundcoomar, even upon the *ex parte* case before them, could not possibly be true. The reasons for that belief were assigned at length. The Directors, though a majority of them were very well disposed to oblige the Minister, concurred with their law officers, and all that rubbish and trash remained unnoticed from 1776 to the year 1789; when, as Your Lordships know, it was repeatedly mentioned to you by the managers, as containing proofs of the corruption of Mr. Hastings, and it was very properly rejected by the Court. It was never pretended by the managers, that they had evidence to go a step beyond this rejected information of Nundcoomar."

The accusation brought against Hastings by Nundcoomar formed part of the seventh article of impeachment against him. The minute which he wrote at the table of the Board was regarded by his accusers as bearing marks of conscious guilt. The learned judge, whose statement of the case is a masterpiece of comprehensive exposition, writes—"It certainly bears marks of strong excitement, and though I should not go so far as Sir Gilbert Elliot and Burke in thinking it inconsistent with innocence, I think it suggests that there was something to explain." The matter which Hastings did not explain was the fact that of the three and a half lakhs Nundcoomar accused him of receiving from Munny Begum he had received one and a half lakhs as a sumptuary allowance which was entered in the public accounts of the Nawab's treasury. In the May following (1775) when the Board deputed Mr. Goring to examine the disbursements of various sums in several departments at Moorshedabad and to deprive Munny Begum of her office and authority, she was questioned regarding the transaction and declared that "every Governor coming to Moorshedabad received two thousand rupees a day in lieu of provisions, beyond that she had not given a single cowrie and every payment would appear on the record." At the trial of Warren Hastings the managers of the impeachment having summoned the auditor of the India Office, he read from a book of public accounts a statement of the allowance made at Moorshedabad to Lord Clive first and next to Mr. Verelst when they were Governors which confirmed the truth of the Begum's declaration that every Governor at Moorshedabad received the same allowance as Hastings. It would no doubt have been wiser if Hastings had stated in his minute that he had received a lakh and a half of rupees as

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 18th March 1775, Volume II, page 311.

a sumptuary allowance ; but the minute, it must be borne in mind, was written in the Council Chamber at a moment of great excitement. Hastings had to encounter the deliberate and guarded attacks of his enemies by the instant and unpremeditated impulse of his own judgment. "Do not," he writes to his masters, "wonder, therefore, Hon'ble Sirs, if my behaviour in any part of these disputes shall appear to you defective or improper. I am not yet conscious of any impropriety in it, but I think that on many occasions I could have provided myself with a much completer plan of defence, had I been allowed the same leisure and tranquillity to form it as my opponents possessed in concocting that of their attacks upon me."

Burke inveighed bitterly against Hastings for calling Nundcoomar a miscreant. "If therefore," he said, "Rajah Nundcoomar was a man who (it is not degrading to your Lordship to say) was equal in rank according to the idea of the country in which he lived to any peer in the house, as sacred as a bishop, of as much gravity and authority as a judge, and who was prime minister in the country in which he lived, with what face can Mr. Hastings call this man a wretch, and say that he will not suffer him to be brought before him." Hastings had better opportunities than Burke of forming an estimate of the character of Nundcoomar and had solid reasons for describing it in harsh language. Thirteen years before Nundcoomar brought his accusations against Hastings, Hastings had been employed in investigating a charge of forgery brought against Nundcoomar. Certain traitorous letters were intercepted and brought to Calcutta but they proved to be forgeries. Hastings was appointed to enquire into the matter and his report is now published for the first time.* He came to the following conclusion: "From several depositions and the circumstances herein presented the Board will judge on whom to fix the forgery of the letters in question. One observation it remains upon me to make, that a fact of this kind, in which the intervention of more than one person is not immediately required, can scarce ever admit of a positive and incontestable proof, though the several consequent and relative facts may be sufficiently proved, and point out in the most evident manner the main spring which set them in motion. In this light regarding the enquiry before us, I must give it as my opinion that it appears pretty clearly that there was a design on foot to compass the ruin of Ramchurn, that subsequent thereto the letters forged in his name were intercepted, that the man to whose charge they were entrusted was a servant of Nundcoomar's, and that Sudder-odin (a servant of Nundcoomar's) did foretell the disgrace of Ramchurn, and was (by his own declaration afterwards) privy to the forgery of the letters. I say from these circumstances already proved, I am of opinion that the letters were written and intercepted by the contrivance and direction of Nundcoomar, in order to fix the charge of a traitorous correspondence upon Ramchurn." When Hastings was first appointed Governor of Bengal, Nundcoomar sent letters to him at Madras in the names of the Nawab's uncle and Munny Begum. The letters were filled with invectives against Mohammad Reza Khan and recommendation of himself. Hastings afterwards found that Munny Begum had no knowledge of these letters, and she declared the letter stated to be written by her to be a forgery though it bore her seal. It was only natural after the experience of the past that Hastings should regard the letter produced by Nundcoomar as another forgery though like the letter forwarded to Madras it bore the Begum's seal. "I make no doubt of proving it," he wrote to a friend, "it bears most evident symptoms of it in the long tattling story told with such injunction of secrecy and a word to the wise pertinently added to the end of it, when the sole purpose of the letter was to order the payment of a lakh of rupees, and Nundcoomar's son and son-in-law were with the Begum and daily informing him of all that passed."†

But even if Nundcoomar had borne an unblemished character, Hastings would have been justified in refusing to submit to the disgrace and mortification of the head of a Government being accused in person during the sitting of the Council over which he presided. Such a procedure must have brought his office into contempt and injured the dignity of station which a man has interest

* This will be found in the Appendix, Volume III.

† Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Volume I, page 515.

to preserve. It moreover was unnecessary for the purpose either of eliciting truth or of promoting justice. A Committee of inquiry consisting of the Council without Hastings would have been equally efficacious for these purposes. Hastings did not dispute the right of his colleagues to make an inquiry into the charges of corruption brought against him, nor did he, as Mill states, "raise any pretences for stifling inquiry." He only pointed out the mode of conducting it which would be least injurious to the dignity and authority of the Government. As Hastings wrote to the Directors—"Had the majority been disposed to accept of my proposition of appointing a committee for prosecuting their inquiries either into these or the Banny's allegations, they might have obtained the same knowledge and all the satisfaction in this way that they could have expected from an inquisition taken by the Board at large, their proceedings would have had the appearance at least of regularity, and my credit would have been less affected by them. The only point which they could possibly gain by persisting in bringing such a subject before the Board was to gain a public triumph over me, and expose my place and person to insult."*

The animosity of the majority against Hastings and their desire to insult and degrade him in the most public manner was strikingly illustrated by their treatment of his secretary and agent, Cantoo Baboo. He was a man of high caste and good family and for many years had taken a leading part in the administration. As the secretary of the Governor-General he was "considered universally as the first native inhabitant of Calcutta."† Because, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, he did not appear at their first summons before the Board, it was proposed to place him in the stocks, a punishment, as Hastings remarked, "so disgraceful to a man of character and credit as would be an extension of rigour equal to death." General Clavering in proposing the motion observed that Hastings had said that if Clavering meant anything personal to him he would make him answer for it with his life. On this Hastings observed: "I said if he attempted anything in his own person and by his own authority, I would oppose it with my person, or personally oppose it at the peril of my life."‡ The discussion growing dangerously warm, Francis moved an adjournment of the Board, and it was agreed that the Board do adjourn accordingly.

On the 20th of April at a meeting of the Board, at which the majority only were present, a letter was received from Hastings in which he informed them that "as his attendance at a meeting of the justices at the house of Sir Elijah Impey was required, he requested General Clavering to take his place and direct the despatch of such business as may require it." The majority, after mentioning that they had heard from Mr. Fowke that a charge of conspiracy against that gentleman and his son was being investigated by the justices, stated, "we think it proper to acquaint you that we mean to continue in Council until we shall be apprized of the subject and issue of that inquiry, as we conceive that a conspiracy at the investigation of which you and Mr. Barwell think fit to attend while this Council is sitting must be of great moment if not interesting to the safety of the State. We flatter ourselves that you will be pleased to inform us, as soon as possible, of the circumstances and result of the enquiry in which you and Mr. Barwell are now engaged."§

Charge of conspiracy against Mr. Fowke and Nund-comar.

Hastings in reply wrote,—“Last night I received a letter signed by the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court, informing me that a charge had been exhibited upon oath before them against Messrs. Joseph and Francis Fowke, Maharaja Nundcomar and Radachurn for a conspiracy against me and others; that they had summoned the parties to appear this morning at ten o'clock at the house of Sir Elijah Impey, and requested my attendance. The like notification was also made to Mr. Barwell. In consequence of this intimation, we have both judged it indispensably incumbent upon us to give our attendance. I am sorry that you should have thought it necessary to continue in Council until you shall be informed of the subject and issue of this

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 22nd April 1775, Volume II, page 348.

† *Ibid* 20th March 1775, „ page 320.

‡ „ *Ibid* „ page 324.

§ „ *Ibid* 20th April 1775, „ page 341.

enquiry which I presume you will perceive to have no relation to the safety of the State, nor to any circumstance that requires your present attention.”*

The charge of conspiracy was due to some accusations brought against the accused by one Camal-ud-deen. The day previous this man had gone to Hastings and complained that Nundcoomar and Mr. Fowke had compelled him by threats to sign a petition stating that he had bribed Hastings and Barwell, and they had had also forced him to acknowledge the correctness of a certain account. Hastings referred Camal-ud-deen to the Chief Justice, and Sir Elijah Impey and the other Judges acting in the capacity of Justices of the Peace, summoned the parties and held an examination of the witnesses and defendants. They discharged the son of Fowke and asked Hastings, Barwell, and Vansittart if they meant to prosecute the others and gave them a night to come to a decision. On the 23rd Hastings, Barwell, and Vansittart declared their intention to prosecute Fowke, Nundcoomar, and Radachurn for conspiracy and bound themselves over to do so, the defendants being admitted to bail. Hastings resolved on the prosecution “because,” as he wrote to his friends, “in my heart and conscience I believe both Fowke and Nundcoomar to be guilty.” At the assizes all the defendants were acquitted of the charge of conspiracy against Hastings; Radachurn was acquitted, and Nundcoomar and Fowke were convicted on the charge of conspiracy against Barwell. The sentence on Fowke was fifty rupees fine. No sentence was passed on Nundcoomar because at the time he was lying in the common gaol under sentence of death, for having committed forgery.

Nundcoomar in the letter accusing Hastings of bribery which was read before the Board complained that “Mohun Pursaud is admitted by the Governor to private conferences both in town and at his gardens.” This Mohun Pursaud was attorney to a certain Bolakee Dass, a banker or native shroff, whose bond or deed Nundcoomar had been found guilty of uttering knowing it to be forged. The deed purported to be the acknowledgment of a debt due to Nundcoomar and contracted some years before by the shroff. The banker died in June 1769, and on the settlement of his affairs a few months after his decease, Nundcoomar’s bond was, with the other claims on the estate, settled by the executors. On the bond being paid Nundcoomar cancelled it by tearing it downwards at the top for a couple of inches. This document and others relating to the deceased banker were lodged in the Mayor’s Court as a Court of Record. In the year 1772 a suit was instituted in the Court of Kachari against Nundcoomar for more than a lakh of rupees said to be due to the estate of the banker on account of bonds of the Company. Nundcoomar was committed to prison for contempt of Court and released by Hastings. The Court recommended that the case should be referred to arbitration, but Nundcoomar at first refused to give his assent to this course being adopted, and when he did consent a dispute arose as to arbitration. Matters were in this condition when the Supreme Court of Judicature arrived in Bengal. About a month after their arrival Mr. Farrer who had arrived about the same time and had been admitted as an advocate of the Supreme Court was informed by Mr. Driver, an attorney, that he had advised a client to institute a criminal prosecution against Nundcoomar for forgery, and that his client had agreed to the advice. There was however an obstacle in their way. The original papers without which the forgery could not be established were lodged in the Mayor’s Court, and though the Court were willing to grant copies, the original could not be obtained. “He told me,” added Mr. Farrer, “that the Mayor’s Court had not been so entirely free from influence as could be wished when proceeding against men of a

Arrest of
Nundcoomar
on charge of
forgery.

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 20th April 1775, Vol. II, page 345.

* The prosecution of Nundcoomar for conspiracy was regarded by the Council, and was afterwards represented by Burke and Elliot, as a counterstroke to Nundcoomar’s attack upon him, and no doubt it was so, but why with Kamal’s evidence before him Hastings was not to take the matter into Court I cannot understand.” (Story of Nundcoomar, Vol. I, page 89.)

Impey stated before the House of Commons that “it was in evidence that Mr. Palk, Judge of the Adalat, had confined (Nundcoomar) and that it was notorious that Mr. Hastings had ordered him to be released. This of itself was sufficient to prevent any native inhabitant of Calcutta from commencing a prosecution against him.” On this Sir James Stephen remarks:—Palk’s evidence, if he gave any, is not in the report of the trial. The evidence of Farrer and Boughton Bouse given before the Impeachment Committee after Impey’s defence does not mention this and is hardly consistent with it. I think, therefore, that Impey must have been mistaken in his assertion.” Mr. Beveridge points out that though Palk did not give evidence, Kamaluddin did, and he was sufficient authority for Impey’s statement. “When was this?” “It was about two months before Mr. Palk confined the Maharajah.” The Trial of Maharajah Nundcoomar Bahadur for forgery published by authority of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Bengal, London: T. Cadell, MDCCCLXXVI, page 11.

certain description, such as Nundcoomar, but that, now that a more independent Court was come out, he should advise his client (Mohun Persaud) to authorise him (Driver) to instruct me to make the same motion before the Supreme Court of Judicature, to wit for the original papers, that he had himself made before without effect before the Mayor's Court." Mr. Farrer accordingly moved the Court for the papers six weeks before Nundcoomar's accusation was produced at the Board by Mr. Francis, and was obliged to repeat his application twice before he obtained them. Soon after this, on the 6th May 1775, Nundcoomar was charged with forgery before Mr. Justice LeMaistre who happened to be the sitting magistrate as at that time the Judges of the High Court were also the Justices of the Peace. "He requested the assistance of Mr. Justice Hyde who attended with him the whole day upon the examination which lasted from nine in the morning till near ten at night; when, *no doubt of his guilt remaining in the heart of either of us* upon the evidence on the part of the Crown, a commitment in the usual form was made out."*

Letter from
Nundcoomar to the
Board.

At a meeting of the Council on the 8th of March 1775 a letter was received from Nundcoomar in which, after recounting his past services, he stated—"My only intention in setting forth the services I have done, and the character I have to an advanced age supported, is to introduce my request that I might not suffer upon such a charge, from the bare accusation, a punishment equal to that of death, the violation of the most sacred duties of my religion. The Hon'ble President, I am well assured, is fully assured of the facts I allude to; it may be requisite to explain to the rest of the Hon'ble Members of the Board that the institutions of our religion enjoin a number of ablutions, prayers and other ceremonies to be performed by the sect of Brahmins before they can take any kind of food. Nothing of this can be performed in the place where I am now; and could even these obstacles be surmounted, the place itself, as being inhabited by men of a different religion, would prevent my receiving any sustenance, without breaking those rules which I have hitherto religiously observed. I therefore humbly request that I may be permitted to reside, under as strict a guard as may be judged requisite, in some place where these objections may be obviated."†

"Colonel Monson moved that the sheriff and his deputy be requested to attend the Board with the warrant of commitment for Nundcoomar's imprisonment. Hastings objected to the motion as an interference with the authority of the Judges of the Supreme Court."

"MR. FRANCIS,—I beg leave to inform the Board that I understand that Raja Nundcoomar, since his commitment to the common jail in consequence of the opinion of Mr. Justice LeMaistre exceeding the terms of the warrant of commitment, has taken no sustenance whatsoever, and that he cannot do it in his present situation without losing caste, which to a man of his high rank and sect is deemed a punishment worse than death. I think the motion made by Colonel Monson perfectly regular and necessary. We cannot take the prayer of the Raja's petition into consideration until we are regularly informed by what authority he is committed to the common jail. If it should appear that the warrant does not express a commitment to the common jail, but that such commitment has arisen solely from the extra judicial opinion of Mr. Justice LeMaistre, I then think it may be legally within the power of this Board to prevent the death of the Raja by relieving him from the vile confinement under which he has been placed in the same prison with all the felons of Calcutta, and securing him in some other manner under the safe custody of the sheriff. This I conceive may be done without any infringement of the authority of the Supreme Court of Judicature. At all events my endeavour shall not be wanting, as far as I shall think myself warranted by law, to prevent a man of his high rank perishing in a common jail for want of sustenance which he cannot take without forfeiting a religious rank and purity, which I presume from all that I have heard of the religious customs and prejudices of the Brahmins, to which sect he belongs, may be dearer to him than his life; the Raja has now, I believe, been confined upwards of forty hours, exclusive of the time taken up in his examination."

"THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,—I beg leave to observe that many things have been asserted which I presume Mr. Francis gives only from report. I have not heard myself that Nundcoomar is confined among common felons. I do not believe that by the principles of his religion his caste can be affected by any habitation that may be allotted him. This is a point of which the heads of the religion are only capable of judging. I understand by a note received this morning from Mr. Durham that the Judges are at this time assembled for the purpose of taking into consideration the plea of Nundcoomar in this particular, and that he was

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 10th August 1775, Vol. II, page 409.

† *Ibid*

8th May 1775, „ page 366.

desired by them to apply to me for proper persons to give them information concerning the effects which his confinement might produce on his caste, or some points of the like nature, and I in consequence directed the superintendent of the khalsa records to apply to such of the pundits as were in Calcutta and to desire them to give their attendance on the Judges."*

It was ordered that the sheriff and his deputy should be immediately summoned. On their attending and being asked for the original warrant for the commitment of Raja Nundcoomar for the inspection of the Board, they delivered it as follows:—

"To the Sheriff of the Town of Calcutta and Factory of Fort William in Bengal and to the Keeper of His Majesty's Prison at Calcutta. Warrant of commitment.

"Receive into your custody the body of Maharaja Nundcoomar herewith sent you charged before us on the oaths of Mohun Persaud, Cammaul-ud-deen Khan, and others with feloniously uttering as true a false and counterfeit writing obligatory knowing the same to be false and counterfeit in order to defraud the executors of Bollokee Dass, deceased, and him safely keep until he shall be discharged by due course of law.

"Given under our hands and seals this 6th day of May in the year of Our Lord 1775.

"S. C. LEMAISTRE.

"JOHN HYDE."†

Colonel Monson then asked the sheriff upon what authority he committed Nundcoomar to prison and he replied that he was not in town and did not execute the warrant. The Colonel then proceeded to question the deputy sheriff as follows

"Q.—Did you on this warrant commit Maharaja Nundcoomar to the jail of Calcutta?"

"A.—I did."

"Q.—Did you not subsequent to that warrant receive a note from Mr. Justice LeMaistre acquainting you that it was his opinion that Maharaja Nundcoomar should be committed to the common jail?"

"A.—On receiving the warrant from Mr. Justice LeMaistre and Mr. Justice Hyde, which has now been read, I was going to order it to be put into execution, but Mr. Jarrett, attorney for Nundcoomar, expressing a desire that he might be sent to some other place than the common jail, and delivering it as his opinion that he might as properly be confined in any other place, the Judges took it under consideration, and in answer to Mr. Jarrett's request told him that they were both of opinion he could be nowhere properly confined but in the common jail, but that for his satisfaction they would ask the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice to whose house they were then going. In consequence of this I detained Raja Nundcoomar till I knew the Lord Chief Justice's opinion and soon after received a note signed by Mr. Justice LeMaistre, which I beg leave to produce."

"Upon consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, we are all clearly of opinion that the sheriff ought to confine his prisoner in the common gaol upon this occasion."

S. C. LEMAISTRE."‡

Francis then asked the Sheriff whether "he knew what conveniences or accommodation Nundcoomar had in the jail" and the Sheriff replied—"He has a small room in which the Jailor used to sleep who removed his family on that account." The Deputy Sheriff added "that it was without the prison gate and had no communication with the other people in the jail."§ A motion was then put by Francis and carried that "the Sheriff and his Deputy be directed to wait on the Chief Justice on the part of this Board and to represent to him the situation of the Raja Nundcoomar whose religion, as he hath informed this Board, obliges him to deny himself sustenance in the particular circumstances of his present confinement, and to desire that the Chief Justice will consider of granting the prisoner such relief as may be consistent with the strict security of his person to answer to the charges brought against him."||

At the meeting of the Council next day, a letter was received from the Sheriff and Under-Sheriff, stating that in obedience to the commands of the Board Letter from Chief Justice to Board

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th May 1775, Vol. II, page 366.

† *Ibid* " page 367.

‡ *Ibid* " page 368.

§ "General Clavering to the Deputy Sheriff—

Q.—If it is without the gate, it is not in the prison.

A.—There are two gates to the prison. When I said it was detached from the place where felons and debtors were kept, I did not mean that it was not a part of the prison; the jailor's house is always considered as a part of the jail and adjoins it." Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th May 1775, Vol. II, page 370.

|| Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th May 1775, Vol. II, page 371.

they had waited on the Chief Justice, and laid the circumstances before him; and that he in answer had desired them to inform the Board "that Raja Nundcoomar was not committed by him, and that he has no authority to interfere in the affair, there being felony expressly charged in the warrant."* A letter was also received from the Chief Justice, intimating to the Board—that before he had received their message he "had been informed that Nundcoomar had on account of his religion refused to take sustenance, and that he had immediately sent his munshy to him to acquaint him that he had given strict orders to the keeper of the prison that his confinement should in every respect be made as easy as possible to him, and to know from him whence his scruples arose. The answer returned to me was—that he could not eat nor drink in a room where Christians or Mussulmans had been. I thought it not proper to refer his case to the Judges who committed him merely on his suggestion, and to ascertain the facts I sent for the Pundits, who are the keepers of the consciences and oracles of the Gentoos." The Pundits stated "that it is no easy matter to lose caste. A Brahmin must eat eight times of the meal of a Mussulman before he can lose his caste." The Pundits also informed the Chief Justice that they were "unanimously of opinion that if a straw shed was built in the inside of the prison-yard separate from any house, the Maharaja after a month's confinement would be obliged to pay Rs. 12 or thereabouts for the purpose of feasting the Pundits and Brahmins." Impey pointed out that should the claim of Nundcoomar be allowed "it would be a very heavy burden to the Sheriff should he be obliged to provide separate houses for each Brahmin whom it might be necessary to confine, and much more so to provide a sufficient number of officers to surround these houses to prevent escapes. Many Brahmins are now in the common gaol. Men of higher caste than the Maharaja have been confined there. None of them have lost their caste, and this is the first complaint of the kind." The Chief Justice also suggested that the Judges and not the Council were the proper persons to whom Nundcoomar ought to have applied. "I am happy in this instance that the Board has given me an opportunity of vindicating the Judges from any surmise of rigor or want of humanity; but must make it my request that the Maharaja may be acquainted by the Board that if he has any further application to make for relief that he must address himself immediately to the Judges, who will give all due attention to his representations, for, should he continue to address himself to the Board, that which will and can only be obtained from principles of justice may have the appearance of being obtained by the means of influence and authority, the peculiar turn of mind of the natives being to expect everything from power and little from justice. I know I shall be pardoned the observation, being clearly convinced that the Board would be as cautious in furnishing grounds for, as the Judges can be jealous of, incurring the imputation."†

The Board replied to Impey's letter as follows: "As the Government of the country is vested in us, we consider the natives of it as the immediate objects of our care and protection. Having received that petition from Maharaja Nundcoomar, of which we had the honour to send you an extract, we thought ourselves bound, not only by our official duty but by the obvious dictates of humanity, to communicate it as soon as possible to you. But in order to prevent that deception which you conceive we lay under, we examined the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff with respect to the circumstances of the Raja's confinement, and afterwards put questions to the persons who act as President of the Caste Cutcherry in this city, by all which we are confirmed in thinking that the facts represented by Raja Nundcoomar were true, and that his refusal to take sustenance was founded on a sincere religious prejudice. We cannot refuse to receive any petitions presented to us, and if they relate to the administration of justice we conceive we are bound by our duty to communicate them to the Judges."‡ Impey answered that "he did not question the authority of the Board in receiving petitions, but that he carefully restricted what he said to the individual prisoner. I

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 9th May 1775, Vol. II, page 373.

† Ibid " page 375.

‡ Ibid " page 377.

did not desire his petitions should not be received, but when received, if they were to require anything from the Judges of the Court, that the answer given to the petitions should be that he must apply himself directly to the Judge. This I did to avoid the imputation I there alluded to, which would be equally derogatory to the character of the Council as that of the Judges. The particular reason which called upon me in this case to make that requisition was the reports publicly circulated in this town that, if the Judges could not be prevailed upon to release the Maharaja he would be delivered by force. These reports I knew to be groundless; but was apprehensive of the effects of their gaining credit, especially in the infant state of the court, before its authority is sufficiently understood or established. It is not sufficient that Courts of Justice act independently; it is necessary for the good government of a country that they should be believed and known to be above all influence."*

The Council answered that the reports mentioned by the Chief Justice were wholly untrue, and enclosed an affidavit in which they denied that they ever entertained an intention to release Nundcoomar by force. Hastings declined to sign the affidavit, deeming it was unnecessary, but declared his "entire conviction and assurance that no Member of the Board ever conceived an intention of using force for the release of Maharaja Nundcoomar from his imprisonment."†

On the 8th of June the trial of Nundcoomar began before the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Chambers, Mr. Justice LeMaistre, Mr. Justice Hyde, and a jury consisting of the most respectable European inhabitants, some of whom had been long resident in the country and some born in it.‡ The prisoner had the privilege of challenging twenty on the panel, and exercised it in the cases of eighteen, reading their names out from a paper in his hand. Mr. Durham was counsel for the Crown, and Mr. Farrer, the ablest advocate at the bar, for the defence. After a trial which lasted continuously for seven days a verdict of guilty was returned. A week after the verdict, a motion in arrest of judgment was made by Farrer before the full bench, but refused, and sentence of death was passed. Farrer then got his junior to present to the Court a petition for leave to appeal, but this was also rejected, because it did not contain any specific reasons why an appeal should be allowed. The next step he took in his client's favour was to prepare a petition to the judges for the signature of the jury praying for a respite, but only one jurymen consented to sign it. Undaunted by want of success Farrer prepared another petition which was addressed by Nundcoomar to the Governor-General in Council, and he suggested that the Council should endorse this petition to the Court. But General Clavering and Colonel Monson refused to entertain the idea, the General assigning as a reason that "it had no relation whatever to the public concerns of the country, which alone he was sent out to transact, and that he would not make any application in favour of a man who had been found guilty of forgery; nor indeed did he think it would do any good." The day before he forwarded his petition to the Governor-General in Council Nundcoomar had sent a most piteous letter to Francis. He wrote: "All my hopes under God Almighty is in you, therefore most humbly entreat, in the name of God, you will be pleased to intercede for me and procure a respite till His Most Gracious Majesty's pleasure is known." He added: "As I entirely rely on Your Worship's endeavour to do me all the good you can, I shall not, according to the opinion of the Hindoos, accuse you in the day of judgment of neglecting to assist me in the extremity I am now in." But Francis took no steps to save the life of his suppliant, and on the 5th August 1775 Nundcoomar was hanged.§

Trial of
Nundcoomar.

Execution of
Nundcoomar.

* Sir James Fitzjames Stephen writes:—"I have not found the answer made by the Council to this letter."—*Story of Nundcoomar*, page 99.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 16th May 1775, Vol. II, page 378.

‡ Macaulay states: "Nundcoomar was brought before Sir *Elijah Impey* and a jury composed of Englishmen" Macaulay could never have read the trial or he would have known that Nundcoomar was tried before Sir *Elijah Impey* and three other judges, which makes a very material difference in forming an estimate of the case. Mr. *Elijah Impey* pointed out this fact in the *Memoirs of his Father*, but Macaulay had not the generosity to correct the error into which he was led by *Mill*. *Merivale* also makes no mention of Nundcoomar having been tried by four judges.

§ "But whilst he (Hastings) was exposing to publicity Nundcoomar's infamies and giving proof of most of them, or indeed of all, it came out that this man used to forge bills of exchange under the hands and seals of eminent men, and that after having imitated their seals exactly he kept them at home ready at all times for manufacturing, as

Proceedings in
Council regarding
Nundcoomar

At a meeting of the Council held on the 14th of August General Clavering informed the Board "that on the 4th of the month a person calling himself a servant of Nundcoomar came to his house and sent an open paper to him. As I imagined that the paper might contain some request that I should take some steps to intercede for him, and being resolved not to make any application whatever in his favour, I left the paper on my table until the 6th, which was the day after his execution, when I ordered it to be translated by my interpreter. As it appears to me that this paper contains several circumstances which it may be proper for the Court of Directors and Her Majesty's Ministers to be acquainted with, I have brought it with me here, and desire that the Board will instruct me what I am to do with it."* It was resolved after some discussion that the paper delivered by the servant of Nundcoomar to General Clavering be produced and read.

At a meeting of the Council held on the 16th August "the Persian translator sent in a correct translation of the document," and Hastings moved that as it "contained expressions reflecting on the character of the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court a copy might be sent to them."

"MR. FRANCIS,—I think that our sending a copy of the Raja Nundcoomar's address to this Board to the Chief Justice and the Judges would be giving it much more weight than it deserves. I consider the insinuations contained in it against them as wholly unsupported and of a libellous nature, and, if I am not irregular, in this place I would move that orders should be given to the Sheriff to cause the original to be burnt publicly by the hands of the common hangman."

"MR. BARWELL,—I have no objections to the paper being burnt by the hands of the common hangman, but I would deliver it to the Judges agreeably to the Governor's proposition."

"COLONEL MONSON,—I differ with Mr. Barwell in opinion. I think this Board cannot communicate the letter to the Judges; if they did, I think they might be liable to a prosecution for a libel; the paper I deem to have a libellous tendency, and the assertions contained in it are unsupported. I agree with Mr. Francis in opinion that the paper should be burnt under the inspection of the Sheriff by the hands of the common hangman."

"GENERAL CLAVERING,—I totally disapprove of sending to the Judges the paper, agreeably to the Governor-General's proposition, because I think it might make the members of the Board who sent it liable to a prosecution, and therefore agree with Mr. Francis that it should be delivered to the Sheriff to be burnt by the hands of the common hangman."

"THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,—I should have no objection to any act which should publish to the world the sense which this Board entertain of the paper in question, but it does not appear to me that such an effect will be produced by Mr. Francis's motion. The inhabitants of this settlement form but a very small class of that collective body commonly understood by that expression of the word. The petition itself stands upon our records, through which it will find its way to the Court of Directors, to His Majesty's Ministers, and in all probability will become public to the whole people of Britain. I do not however object to the motion of its being burnt."

"The Board do not agree to the motion for sending a copy of the address of Maharaja Nundcoomar to the Judges, but resolve that orders be sent to the Sheriff, with the original letter, to cause it to be burnt publicly by the hands of the common hangman, in a proper place for that purpose, on Monday next, declaring it to be a libel."

"MR. FRANCIS,—I beg leave to observe that by the same channel through which the Court of Directors and His Majesty's Ministers or the nation might be informed of the contents of the paper in question, they must also be informed of the reception it had met with, and the sentence passed upon it by this Board. I therefore hope that its being destroyed in the manner proposed will be sufficient to clear the characters of the Judges, so far as they appear to be attacked in that paper; and to prevent any possibility of the imputation indirectly thrown on the Judges from extending beyond this Board, I move that the entry of the address from Raja Nundcoomar entered on our proceedings of Monday last be expunged."†

occasion required, bills of exchange and bonds in any one's name and hand to be hereafter produced at his pleasure, by which iniquitous practice he used to keep everyone in awe of his displeasure; amongst these pieces of this manufactory he had forged an obligation bond in favour of Bolakendass, a banker, at all times of much credit, but who had acquired a great name in Mir Caffen-ghen's time: he had presented it to the Company's cash-keeper and had received the full amount, which he had kept to himself." * * * Nevertheless, the General's protection having proved of no avail against crimes that had been fully ascertained, Nundcoomar underwent his sentence in the manner stated, and on the seventeenth of Jemud of the year one thousand one hundred and eighty-nine he was drawn up and hanged by the neck. His money and effects were registered and then delivered to his son Raja Goordass. They say that the whole amounted to fifty-two lakhs of money and full as much more in effects and other property in his possession. Amongst other strange things found in his house there came out a small casket containing the forged seals of a number of persons of distinction. In consequence of this discovery his malicious acts were dragged to open light and they met with what they well deserved." Sair-ul-Mutakerin.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 14th August 1775, page 412.

†

Ibid

16th August 1775, page 413.

The Judges addressed the following letter to the Board :—

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor-General,
and the Gentlemen of the Council.

Letter from the
Judges.

"HON'BLE SIR AND SIRS,—A paper containing a false, scandalous, and malicious charge against the Judges of the Supreme Court, produced at your Board, having been by you declared a libel, and ordered to be burned by the hands of the common hangman, we return you our thanks for having shewn so due a sense of this outrage to public justice; but as we must be interested as well in the minutes introducing and condemning the paper, as in the paper itself, we find ourselves obliged to desire that you will furnish us with a copy of the libel, and of such minutes which relate to it, as stand on your Consultations, and must therefore be conveyed to England, that we may judge whether they contain any matters necessary for us to take notice of.

"Knowing the satisfaction His Majesty and his Ministers, as well as the Hon'ble East India Company, who were deeply interested in the due administration of justice, must receive from the high reputation which the Supreme Court has acquired in this country, we thought we owed it to ourselves and the State to transmit to you the enclosed papers that they may stand recorded on your Consultations, which we think peculiarly proper at this time, as by promulgating the universal sense of this settlement in relation to our conduct, they are a direct and public refutation of the libel, and corroborate such of your minutes as tend to vindicate our reputations."*

We are,

HON'BLE SIR & SIRS,

Your obedient humble Servants,

E. IMPEY.

ROBT. CHAMBERS.

S. C. LE MAISTRE.

JOHN HYDE."

"28th August 1775.

The papers which the Judges enclosed were no doubt the addresses presented to them approving of their conduct. The first was by the Grand Jury to Impey individually; the second also addressed to Impey personally was by the free merchants, free mariners and other inhabitants of the town of Calcutta, and was signed by eighty-four Europeans.† A third address to all the Judges was signed by forty-three Armenians, and a fourth was signed by about a hundred leading natives of Calcutta and the neighbourhood.

Francis objected to the addresses being entered, "because the libel to which the papers are said to contain a direct and public refutation has been expunged, the original burnt, and I do not believe a copy of it now exists.‡

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th September 1775, Vol. II, page 414.

† Mr. Beveridge states eight were members of the Jury.

"These addresses jar on the sentiment which condemns the praise of persons in power during their actual tenure of it; but I am by no means sure that they do not represent the actual state of feeling, both European and Native, in Calcutta at that time. That they represent European feeling there is no reason to doubt. The Europeans were quite independent of the Court, and not long afterwards bitterly attacked it. An address by natives is always open to suspicion, but the Council had at that time far greater influence over the natives than the Court, which indeed had none." *Story of Nundoomar* by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Vol. I, p. 228.

‡ Francis was mistaken. Impey produced it and read it in his defence. He said that Hastings "thought it no more than common justice to the Judges to give it to me, and as it was in the Secret Department of the Government he delivered it to me under an oath of secrecy not to disclose it in India except to the Judges. Except to them it has not been disclosed to this day, when it is called forth by necessity for my defence." *Story of Nundoomar* by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Volume II, page 95.

A facsimile of the petition is printed in Impey's *Memoirs*, page 417. The petition states—"For the fault of representing at this time a just fact which for the interest of the King and the relief of the people I in a small degree made known, many English gentlemen have become my enemies; and, having no other means to conceal their own actions, deeming my destruction of the utmost expediency for themselves, revived an old affair of Mohun Pursaud's which had formerly been repeatedly found to be false, and the Governor, knowing Mohun Pursaud to be a notorious liar, turned him out of his house, and themselves becoming his aiders and abettors, and Lord Impey and the other Justices have tried me by the English laws which are contrary to the customs of this country, in which there was never any such administration of justice before; and taking the evidence of my enemies in proof of my crime have condemned me to death. But by my death the King's justice will let the actions of no person remain concealed, and now that the hour of death approaches I shall not for the sake of this world be regardless of the next, but represent the truth to the gentlemen of the Council. The forgery of the bond, of which I am accused, never proceeded from me. Many principal people of this country, who were acquainted with my honesty, frequently requested of the Judges to suspend my execution till the King's pleasure should be known, but this they refused, and unjustly take away my life. For God's sake, gentlemen of the Council, you who are just, and whose words are truth, let me not undergo this injury, but wait the King's pleasure. If I am simply put to death I will with my family demand notice in the next life."

His Majesty's Ministers and the Hon'ble East India Company should be informed of the high reputation which the Supreme Court has acquired in this country." It was resolved by the majority "that the enclosures in the letter from the Supreme Court be not inserted on the records of the Board," and "that the Judges be not furnished with copies of the minutes upon the libel." A few months after Francis had borne evidence as to the high reputation which the Supreme Court had acquired in the country, and had moved that the petition of Nundcoomar be burnt on account of its being a libel on the Court, he began to make insinuations against the integrity of the Judges. In the Consultation of the 25th January will be found a minute signed by Clavering, Monson and Francis, but evidently written by the last, in which occur the following remarks:—

"After the death of Nundcoomar, the Governor, I believe, is well assured that no man who regards his own safety will venture to stand forth as his accuser. On a subject of this delicate nature it becomes us to leave every honest man to his reflections. It ought to be made known, however, to the English nation that the forgery of which the Raja was accused must have been committed several years ago; that in the interim he had been protected and employed by Mr. Hastings; that his son was appointed to one of the first offices in the Nabob's household with a salary of one lakh of rupees, and that the accusation which ended in his destruction was not produced until he came forward and brought a specific charge against the Governor of corruption in his office. If Mr. Hastings had been careful of his own honour, we think he would not have appeared himself as the prosecutor of his accuser, and that he would have exerted his influence with Mohun Persaud to suspend the other prosecution until he had proved the falsehood of the charges brought against himself by Nundcoomar. As things are now circumstanced the world may perhaps conclude that this man was too formidable a witness to be suffered to appear, and that any degree of odium or suspicions which the violent measures taken to destroy him might throw on the Governor's character, was not to be weighted against the danger of his proving the truth of his accusations."*

Hastings, as his correspondence with the Court of Directors clearly proves, made use of the services of Nundcoomar because he was commanded to do so by the Court of Directors, and he employed his son for the same reason. His prosecution of Nundcoomar for conspiracy was an act of legitimate self-defence, and it would have been an act of doubtful propriety for the Governor of a province to have used his influence to suspend the prosecution of a criminal charge. It is extremely probable, as Francis stated, that if Nundcoomar "had never stood forth in politics his other offences would not have hurt him." If he had not attacked Mohun Persaud before the majority who he believed were supreme in the state, Mohun Persaud might never have pressed the charge of forgery. But if the evidence of Farrer is trustworthy,† and it is the evidence of a hostile witness who was the advocate of Nundcoomar and a close friend of Francis, the criminal proceeding grew naturally out of the previous civil suit. There has never been produced a particle of evidence to connect Hastings with the forgery suit, but on the other hand we have his own solemn assertion that he had neither prompted nor encouraged it. He stated: "I have declared on oath before the Supreme Court of Justice that I neither advised nor encouraged the prosecution of Maharaja Nundcoomar. It would have ill become the first magistrate in the Settlement to have employed his influence either to promote or dissuade it."‡ For the death of Nundcoomar Hastings can in no way be held accountable, but Francis and his colleagues, who possessed supreme power, might have saved his life by asking the Supreme Court to grant his prayer that the execution of the sentence should be suspended pending a reference to England.§ Not on Hastings but on the triumvirate must rest the responsibility of the death of the culprit Nundcoomar.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 25th January 1776, Vol. II, page 476.

† Mr. Beveridge gives reasons for questioning Farrer's memory, but it seems highly improbable that an advocate who played so leading a part in so important a case should forget the circumstances connected with it.

‡ The motives of delicacy which Hastings averred he felt on the subject were wholly beyond the conception of Francis. To him it was only natural that Hastings should use his influence against Nundcoomar, because Francis argued that the more he disliked Hastings the wider his grounds of quarrel with him were, the more natural was it that he should be his assailant: and the reason for the House of Commons excluding him by their vote from a place among the managers surpassed the powers of comprehension. (Statesmen of the time of George III by Lord Brougham, page 89.)

§ "Francis gave as an excuse for not applying to the Court the complaint made by the Court that it was unconstitutional to address a Court of Justice on matters judicially before it by letter, and not by petition or motive in open Court. He must either have overlooked or wilfully refused to notice the broad distinction between writing a letter to the Court on a matter judicially before them, and writing on a matter in which they had to exercise an executive discretion. The latter is as natural and proper as the former is unconstitutional. The Home Secretary in England constantly corresponds with individual Judges as to applications for pardons. He would never dream of writing to a Judge as to the exercise of his judicial duties. Any such application would have to be made by Counsel in Court." (The Story of Nundcoomar by Sir FitzJames Stephen, Vol. I, page 236.)

Shortly after Nundcoomar had been committed for trial, a despatch arrived Mahratta affairs. from the Bombay Government announcing that they had made a treaty with Raghoba, the claimant to the throne of the Peshwa, by which he agreed to cede Salsette and Bassein to the English in consideration of being himself restored to Poona. Hastings pronounced the treaty unseasonable, impolitic, unjust, and unauthorised. "It is unseasonable because the treaty was formed with Raghoba at a time in which he appears to have been totally abandoned by his former adherents. It was impolitic because it threw the whole burthen of the war on the Company without a force at the command of the Presidency equal to the undertaking, without money or certain resources, and because it was undertaken without any regard to the general interest of the other settlements of the Company in India. It was unjust because they had received no injury from any part of the Mahratta State which could authorise their interfering in their mutual dissensions, nor were under any actual ties to assist Raghoba."* Though Hastings condemned the treaty, he took a statesman's view of the position, and felt that to withdraw abruptly after having entered into positive engagements with one party, and offended the other perhaps beyond hopes of reconciliation, might be attended with greater danger than prosecuting the original design and even with national dishonour. He therefore proposed that—"The President and Council of Bombay be peremptorily enjoined to cancel the treaty with Raghoba, and to withdraw the detachment immediately to their own possessions by whatever mean may be in their power, unless any of the following cases may have occurred"

"1st—That they shall have obtained any decisive advantage over the enemy ;"

"2nd—That the detachment shall have proceeded to such a distance, or be in such a situation, as to make it dangerous either to retreat or go on ;"

"3rd—That a negotiation shall have taken place between Raghoba and his opponents in consequence of the support afforded by this alliance."†

Francis entirely agreed "with the Governor-General in disapproving of the conduct of the Government of Bombay, and in protesting against all the consequences which may attend it ;"‡ but he added "I think that their engaging the Company's troops on distant inland expeditions, especially without any determinate object for their operations, or limitation of time for their services, ought not to receive the least countenance or authority from us ; and that we ought to insist upon their recalling the troops without any consideration but that of their safe retreat."§

It was agreed by the majority that "the troops be ordered to be recalled without any exception but the single consideration of their safety."||

The Bombay Government obeyed the commands of the Supreme Government and ordered the forces who had won the hard-fought battle of Arras into British territory, but the President wrote a dignified protest against their action. He declared that he and his colleagues considered the welfare of the Presidency entirely depended on their preventing the island of Salsette from again falling into the hands of the Portuguese, and "in this situation we are of opinion policy absolutely required that we should side with one of the contending parties in the Mahratta State, that it might be reconciled to our motives for that attack, and to our continuing in possession of that island. This necessity being allowed, justice doubtless required that we should take part with Raghoba, the Peshwa, and in duty to our employers we made this decision as advantageous to them as possible, as we think is evident from the

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 31st May 1775, Volume II, page 391.

† *Ibid* " page 392.

‡ *Ibid* " page 392.

§ *Ibid* " page 392.

|| *Ibid* " page 392.

treaty.”* They proceeded to inform the Governor-General that they had deputed Mr. William Taylor, “a member of our Board, to visit Calcutta in order, more fully than can be done by letter at so great a distance, to represent to your Honor and Council the motives for all our proceedings, the present situation of affairs, with the danger and discredit that must attend our treaty being cancelled, and Raghoba deserted?” Mr. Taylor on reaching Calcutta wrote a very full and able letter reviewing Mahratta affairs, but his arguments had no effect on the Supreme Government. They informed him that “after duly considering the representations which you have been pleased to deliver to us, we are confirmed in our opinion of the expediency of the Company’s troops being immediately recalled from the service of Raghoba to their own garrison?” They also declared their intention of deputing an agent of their own, Colonel Upton, to negotiate with the ruling ministerial party at Poona. At first the pretensions of the ministry at Poona were so great that it was impossible to make any settlement with them, and on the 7th March the Supreme Government, thinking that Colonel Upton’s negotiations had been entirely broken off, wrote to the Bombay Government to renew hostilities. They said—“We think it necessary to take the earliest opportunity to release you from the restrictions which we formerly laid upon your operations, and to provide every means in our power for carrying on the war in conjunction with Raghoba with vigour.” The treaty of Puraudhar however, to the disappointment of the Governor-General and the Bombay Government, had been signed before the letter was written. “The treaty of Purandhar,” writes Warren Hastings to a friend, “was executed the 1st March 1776. I disapproved of it?”

Treaty of Purandhar.

The treaty established peace between the British Government and the ministerial party, and dissolved the alliance with Raghoba. It proved, however, only a temporary and hollow truce. The Bombay Government continued to give protection to Raghoba, and the Mahrattas delayed and evaded the concessions they had made. It was impossible that any treaty which left Salsette in the hands of the English would meet with the approval of the patriot party in the capital of the Deccan. Two years passed in appeals from the Bombay and Poona authorities to the Governor-General in Council, and in ineffectual though earnest endeavours on their part to reconcile them. Then a new feature was added to the dispute by the arrival of the Chevalier de St. Lubin at Poona. Nana Fadanavis, the great Mahratta statesman who had strenuously obstructed the fulfilment of the treaty, immediately attached himself to the Chevalier. The British Envoy complained that “indeed in every respect they paid the greatest attention to the French?” And M. de St. Lubin was received with great pomp by the Peshwa when he delivered his credentials, “being letters from the King and Ministers of France.” The main object of the Chevalier was to establish a factory, supported by a military force, at Poona, and to obtain a seaport near Bombay.† If he had succeeded the French would have regained their former importance in India, and the English would have had to battle with them, supported by all the powers and resources of the Mahratta Empire, for supremacy in the East. The Bombay Government rightly remarked “if time is given to the French for the French Ministry to take their measure, and to supply Nana with a body of forces, we can expect nothing but a repetition of the scene of wars and intrigues formerly acted on the coast of Coromandel, which will certainly be fatal to the influence of the English on this coast, and may end in our total subversion.” At this critical time the rivalry between Sakaram Bapu, the aged premier, and his younger associate Nana Fadnavis created a division in the Poona Cabinet, and the former made overtures for the assistance of the Company to restore Raghoba to Poona. The Bombay Government resolved “that if a formal application were made it might certainly with the utmost justice be considered as an application from the Mahratta State and treated accordingly: as Sakaram Bapu is the Divan, or first officer of the Government, and the principal person with whom Colonel Upton concluded the late treaty on behalf of the State he being the Minister first named in the treaty.” It was also ordered that “the resolution be immediately forwarded to the Governor-General and Council, who, we flatter ourselves, will do

* Selections from the State Papers preserved in the Bombay Secretariat (Mahratta Series).

† The letters from J. Madgell and Mr. Farmer of the Bombay Civil Service, published in the Selections from the Bombay State Papers (Mahratta Series), pages 291 and 296, reveal in detail the exploits of M. St. Lubin.

justice to our motives, and afford their approbation and support to the step we have taken, and to the measures we may further pursue." The approbation and support of the Supreme Government were, after a stormy debate, gained only by the casting vote of Hastings, who owing to the death of General Clavering had recovered his ascendancy in Council. Francis and Wheeler condemned the resolution as illegal, unjust, and impolitic. They argued that it was illegal because it was taken without the sanction of the supreme authority; unjust because it was contrary to the treaty of Purandhar; and impolitic because it involved the English in the dangers and burdens of war. Hastings and Barwell argued that the emergency justified the illegality; that it was not contrary to the treaty because the principal person with whom the treaty had been made had proposed it; and that it was not impolitic because it would give the English permanent influence in the Mahratta Empire. After considerable discussion and after minutes of considerable ability and force had been dictated and read at the Council Board both by Francis and Hastings, the following main resolutions were adopted: that the President and Council of Bombay are warranted by the Treaty of Purandhar to join in a plan for conducting Raghunáthráo to Poona on the application of the ruling part of the administration of the Mahratta State; that a supply of money, to the amount of ten lakhs of rupees, be immediately granted to the President and Council of Bombay; that military assistance be sent to the Presidency. A force under Colonel Leslie was ordered to cross the Continent, and place itself under the orders of the Government of Bombay.

On the 8th June a letter reached the Board from Colonel Leslie informing them that he had met with some slight opposition from the Mahrattas, and Francis took advantage of the occurrence to propose, with the pertinacity which distinguished him, that "the expedition be absolutely countermanded, and Colonel Leslie's command of course dissolved as soon as he has quartered his troops on this side the Jumna in the best manner the season will permit."* Before the proposition could be discussed news of a very grave nature reached the Board. The Bombay Government wrote to them—"It is with much concern we acquaint you that by the *London Gazette* of the 16th December just received from Bassora, we learn that General Burgoyne with his whole army, consisting of 3,500 fighting men, was compelled to surrender to General Gates on the 14th of October on condition of being transported to England from Boston, and not to serve again in America during the war. General Howe remains in possession of Philadelphia with which place the fleet have in vain endeavoured to open a communication, and three of our ships have been destroyed in the attempts, *viz.*, the *Augusta*, of 64 guns, the *Roebuck*, of 44, and the *Merton* of 16. General Washington was encamped within a few miles from Philadelphia, and the Congress had removed to Lancaster. General Clinton with a small army had proceeded up the river of New York and had met with some success."† Francis requested his colleagues to consider "whether the unfortunate event in America ought not to have a general influence upon our measures here, whether this be a season for hazarding offensive operations of any kind, and whether policy and prudence do not plainly dictate to us that while the nation is so deeply engaged and pressed on one side, with everything to apprehend from the designs of France and Spain on the other, we should stand on our defence, and not weaken or divide the force on which the safety of Bengal may depend."‡ Hastings replied with the force and dignity which he could command when occasion required—"I hope that our affairs in America are not in the desperate situation in which they are described to be; but I see no connection between them and the concerns of this Government, much less can I agree that with such superior advantages as we possess over every power which can oppose us, we should act merely on the defensive and abruptly stop the operation of a measure of such importance to the national interests and to the national safety as that in which we have now decidedly engaged, with the eyes of all India turned upon it. On the contrary, if it be really true that the British arms and influence have suffered so severe a check in the Western world, it is the more incumbent on those who are charged with the interest

News of the
surrender of
General Burgoyne.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 11th June 1778, Volume II, page 623.

† *Ibid* 22nd June 1778, " page 630.

‡ *Ibid* " " page 632.

of Great Britain in the East to exert themselves for the retrieval of the national loss."*

Requisition on
Cheyt Sing.

On the 7th of July 1778, the Government "received intelligence, by way of Suez, that war was declared by the Court of France against England on the 30th of March last."† A Council was immediately held, and Hastings, after bringing forward various measures concerning the defence of the city and province, proposed that—"Raja Cheyt Sing be required in form to contribute his share of the burthen of the present war by consenting to the establishment of three regular battalions of sepoys, to be raised and maintained at his expense."‡ Francis acquiesced in the proposal, but suggested that Cheyt Sing "should be informed that this additional charge will not be imposed upon him beyond the continuance of the present war."§ Hastings remarked that "the qualification proposed was consonant to my intention on the question and implied in it;" but he could not agree to have any specific words added to the proposition as the matter involved a grave principle. "I agreed," he stated, "to add to the question the following words—'and to be disbanded at the end of the war;' but perceiving that the difference in our opinions upon this subject arises, not from a disagreement respecting the requisition simply considered by itself, but from a different understanding of the right of the Company to exact, under any pressure of affairs, more than the sum stipulated by the sunnud granted to Cheyt Sing and the kubbooliat given by him in return; I must therefore adhere to the question as it stands, wishing to avoid the question of right. If however we cannot agree upon this point, still, I would wish to have the requisition made in the words of the question, and leave the decision of future right to our superiors."|| At the close of the debate Hastings again reiterated his opinion as to the right of the paramount power to make the demand. His words were—"I agree to the question in the original terms of it, deeming it a right inherent in every Government to impose such assessment as it judges expedient for the common service and protection of all its subjects; and we are not precluded from it by any agreement subsisting between the Raja and this Government."¶ It was "resolved that the Raja Cheyt Sing be required in form to contribute his share of the burthen of the present war, by the establishment of three regular battalions of sepoys to be raised and maintained at his expense, and the Governor-General is requested to write to him to that effect."***

Capture of
Chandernagore.

Though no formal intimation of the war with the French had reached Bengal, Hastings determined, by a decisive stroke, to take possession of the French settlements in India. A force was immediately despatched to demand the surrender of Chandernagore, and on the 10th of July Colonel Dow wrote to the Board:—"In obedience to your demands, I took possession of the French Factory at Chandernagore this morning at 10 o'clock. As I found various pretensions of delay were made, not admissible by the tenor of my orders, I was under the necessity of ordering the Company's troops to advance within the barrier where a guard of sepoys was posted under the command of a French officer. On this occasion the enemy's guards of the barrier having fired by order of their officer, without effect, a platoon was returned which killed four sepoys and wounded three or more. This accident was unavoidable. The guard dispersed and the troops entered the town of Chandernagore, where everything was afterwards conducted with the greatest regularity."†† A letter was also received from Monsieur Hocquart, late Commandant of Chandernagore, demanding that the Board should accept certain specific articles of capitulation proposed by him, and expressing a hope that the inhabitants would be well treated. He also desired to be acquainted "with the reasons for the violence and force which you have used towards the French nation in whose name I

Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 22nd June 1778, Volume II, page 632.

†	<i>Ibid</i>	7th July 1778	page 637.
‡	<i>Ibid</i>	9th July 1778	page 638.
§	<i>Ibid</i>		page 638.
	<i>Ibid</i>		page 638.
¶	<i>Ibid</i>		page 639.
***	<i>Ibid</i>		page 639.
††	<i>Ibid</i>	11th July 1778	page 642.

“speak to you.”* To his letter the Board sent the following reply: “The instructions which we have given to Lieutenant-Colonel Dow being grounded on certain information that a war was declared by the Court of Great Britain against France on the 18th of last March, and by that of France against England on the 30th of the same month, we cannot depart from them. We beg leave, however, to acquaint you that it forms a part of our orders to Colonel Dow to treat the inhabitants of Chandernagore with all possible lenity and tenderness. We have no doubt he will attend to this injunction as far as may be consistent with their present situation and the usages of war in such cases.”† The French Commander in reply reminded the Council that they “make no manner of answer to the ten articles in my letter” and added—“I do not think that requiring of the inhabitants the keys of their godowns and warehouses where he himself goes to take inventories (a commission beneath the rank he holds) is a mark of mildness and attention.”‡ The Governor-General replied—“We did not think it necessary to answer specifically to the different articles which you had proposed to our consideration, because the circumstances under which the town of Chandernagore was surrendered did not appear to be those of a capitulation.”§

The merchants of Chandernagore also addressed an indignant remonstrance to the English Commandant. They put forward an ingenious and plausible argument that they should be unmolested because “the English settled in France have peaceably exerted their industry in times of war, and the same indulgence has been granted to the French settled in England.” “We think, Sir,” they wrote, “this latter situation with some exceptions to be nearly that which we have in Bengal. We have no other circulations than the moneys which your Government coin; we know no laws but those which you impose on us. Our Government, faithful to its treaties, has only established an administration at Chandernagore to give some sanction to our existence and to judge our differences according to our civil laws. If we had not thought, Sir, that such was our existence in Bengal, and if our interests, blended with those of the English, had not strengthened us in this opinion, we should never have abandoned ourselves to your discretion, in exercising our industry in a country at 60 leagues distance from the sea, and surrounded on all sides by your troops in which, making sacrifice of our properties, we have not even the hope of sheltering our liberty.”|| The English Commandant with graceful flattery was regarded as one “well acquainted with everything appertaining to history” and he was reminded of the generous treatment that an English ship of war received from the Governor of Havannah. “The history which relates this fact makes no mention of the Governor’s having been blamed by his Court, and all Europe admired the like conduct. So much is the law of nations superior to that of war.”¶

Colonel Dow forwarded the letter from the merchants to the Supreme Council, and they directed that all reasonable indulgence should “be shown to them in the full and free possession of their houses.”**

A despatch was sent to Madras announcing the war with the French, and desiring that immediate steps should be taken for the capture of Pondicherry and of Mahé. It must have reached its destination with unusual expedition, for according to a letter dated the 8th of August “the troops that had been encamped near Conjeveram, consisting of two battalions of Europeans, three companies of artillery, and six battalions of sepoys with sixteen six-pounders, encamped on the Red Hills, within 4 miles of Pondicherry, and were intended to prevent any succour being thrown into the fort.”†† More troops, battering cannon, and all sort of stores had however to be brought from Madras, Vellore, Tanjore, and Trichinopoly, and many days elapsed before anything could be done. “On the 31st August some cannon and stores being arrived, and the fort and its environs having been examined, it was resolved to carry on two

Capture of
Pondicherry and
Mahé.

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 11th July 1778, Volume II, page 646.

† *Ibid* „ page 647.

‡ *Ibid* „ page 647.

§ *Ibid* „ page 648.

|| *Ibid* 14th July 1778, Volume II, page 651.

¶ *Ibid* „ page 652.

** *Ibid* „ page 653.

† *Ibid* 30th November 1778, Volume II, page 668.

attacks. The one to the northward against the north-west bastion, the other to the southward against the bastion called Dauphin; a battery was begun to be erected this night on the south-west to enfilade their works, to contain four 24-pounders and some mortars. The enemy fired continually on this work, but on the 4th September the battery was completed." On the 6th September the besiegers "broke ground to the northward and in the night drew a parallel within six hundred yards of the town. **** On the morning of the 18th September all the batteries opened. The fire from the fort was very heavy on all sides, but towards the evening our batteries had apparently the advantage and the enemy's fire decreased greatly." The approaches both on the north and south side were carried forward with unremitting vigour, but the vigilance and fire of the enemy, and the violent rains retarded the progress of the operations. "On the 14th October the bridge of boats that was intended to be used for the passage of the ditch on the south attack being completed, and a float being prepared for the same purpose to the northward, it was intended to assault the place about 8 o'clock in the morning on the 15th. But about 11 in the forenoon the water forced itself into the gallery with such violence that it broke down and damaged some of the boats * * *

* * *. Though the assault could not take place yet an attack was made on the ravelin to the northward about 2 o'clock in the morning; the ravelin was surprised, and the enemy's party of 22 Europeans were mostly killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Some sepoys escaped, as did some Europeans. We spiked four cannon and four mortars, destroyed a good many arms, and a quantity of ammunition. The 16th the gallery was repaired, and it was resolved to assault the place next morning, and the necessary orders were to have been given to the troops in the evening, but about 11 in the forenoon Monsieur De Vellite, Aide-de-Camp to Major-General Bellecombe, came with a flag of truce from the fort."* The besiegers by the generosity of their terms bore witness to the gallantry of the besieged. The garrison were allowed to march out with all the honours of war; and at the request of General Bellecombe the regiment of Pondicherry was allowed to retain its colours. After a lapse of some months the fortifications were destroyed. The French now retained in India nothing but Mahé, and on the 13th May 1779 the Governor-General received a letter from Fort St. George announcing the surrender of that place. The Madras Government also enclosed a letter from Hyder Ali strongly protesting against an attack on a French factory situated in his dominions. He had a month previously written direct to the Governor-General as follows:—

"I see what you write concerning your intentions against the French factory of Mahé. In my country there are factories belonging to the English, Dutch, Portuguese, Danes, and French, and besides them there are many merchants here who are considered as my subjects; if any one entertains designs against those traders I will without doubt take the best and most considerate method to give them assistance. If you are not already acquainted with this, you may inform yourselves of those who have been long members of your Council."†

The growing hostility of Hyder threw a new and formidable difficulty in the way of Hastings: and the faction within the Council, as well as the exhaustion of the treasury, added bitterness to the miserable result of the war. The attempt to push into the heart of the Mahratta dominion with a small army had ended in disaster and disgrace. But the hour of danger is the opportunity of heroes. General Goddard, a soldier of courage and capacity, on hearing of the defeat of the Bombay troops, marched his detachment from Bundelcund to Surat, a distance of three hundred miles in twenty days, and by his timely arrival saved the Bombay Presidency from the grave danger which threatened it and restored the reputation of the British arms.‡ The Supreme Government, on hearing the news of the disgraceful Convention of Wargaum, which sacrificed all the acquisitions obtained since the first war and gave hostages to a victorious enemy, immediately disavowed it and directed General Goddard to open a fresh negotiation with the Ministers of the Mahratta State on the basis of the Treaty of Purandhar,

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 30th November 1778, Volume II, page 662.

† *Ibid* 23rd March 1779, " page 668.

‡ "What reward will our superiors bestow on the man who has been the happy instrument of retrieving the recent dishonor which has tarnished the English name? Let me receive my customary portion of censure for having projected the expedition; I expect it. But his conduct in the execution of it, which has no relation to the principles of its formation, must surely entitle him to universal applause." Letter to Lawrence Sullivan, 18th April 1779. *Memoirs of Warren Hastings* by Gleig Vol. II, page 273.

provided they would recede from the pretensions which they had acquired by the late convention and would agree not to admit any French force to their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any establishment on the Mahratta coast.* The Mahrattas would not make peace on these terms, and on the 1st of January 1780 the war was renewed.

. To divide the Mahratta strength and divert it from General Goddard, Hastings determined to despatch a small force to protect the territory of the Raja of Gohud lying on the Jumna, sixty miles south-east of Agra, from the encroachments of Sindia. The detachment under the command of Major Popham advanced in February, and after expelling the Mahrattas from Gohud assaulted and captured the fortress of Lahar. It was however felt that the force was too small to materially divert the Mahratta strength, and it was therefore proposed that a larger force under Major Carnac should be sent to invade Mahdajec Sindia's country and to attack his capital. This proposition was vigorously opposed by Francis and Wheeler in a minute dated 19th June 1780. They opposed it on the ground of expense, the time chosen, and because they considered that "a peace was indispensably necessary to save the India Company, and every interest connected with theirs, from the greatest distress if not certain ruin."† Hastings replied that "the rainy season is no impediment to our troops, but a great one to the Mahrattas, which consisted only of cavalry." The objection made to the expense," he admitted, "is a material one, but a vigorous assertion," he remarked, "cannot be made without expense, nor can the war either be concluded honourably or prosecuted successfully without such an exertion. Feeble measures and advances for peace will but add to the strength and presumption of our adversaries, discourage our friends, and perhaps induce them to become parties against us. The resources of this Government, exhausted as they are, and withheld from it by its internal imbecility, are yet equal to every probable contingency of the present war, if it is conducted on a consistent plan, and that not barred by desultory votes of Council on every measure for its prosecution."‡ As the main arguments of his opponents were drawn from the low state of the treasury and the inability of the Government to support the expense of the expedition, Hastings, after pointing out that the pay and batta of the troops would be the same whether they remained in their original quarters, or marched to the capital of Sindia, stated—"The contingencies of the detachment are therefore the only expense that can be reasonably charged to the expedition. These I rate far below two lakhs of rupees. That sum I offer to contribute to this disbursement. I have already deposited it within a small amount in the hands of the Sub-Treasurer, and I beg that the Board will permit it to be accepted for that service."§ Hastings communicated the fact of having advanced this money to his friend Sullivan in a letter dated 30th August 1780. He wrote—"Do not be surprised, nor misinterpret my intention. I had no secret view of catching the public applause by an ostentatious display of supererogatory virtue, and the temporary sacrifice of my own fortune in the hopes of future repayment; the money was not my own; it was a peace offering from the Raja of Benares, which he had deputed his most confidential servant to Calcutta to make to me, and to solicit my pardon for all his past offences. I gave the man assurances of my forgiveness, but refused to accept the money, and he was on the point of returning when these debates in our Council began. It occurred to me to convert it to a public use; I gave him an opportunity of repeating the offer, and accepted it, directing it to be delivered to Mr. Croftes, our Sub-Treasurer, and him to receive it as a deposit in my name. It has since been re-coined, and turns out about two lakhs of sicca rupees. I believe I shall communicate this fact to the Court of Directors; but if I do not, I give you permission to make what use of the above relation of it you think proper, declaring upon my honour that I never will reclaim the money, and that I disclaim any title to it as I should not have taken it, but for and on the occasion which induced me to receive it, or one similar to it." Hastings did communicate the fact to the Court of Directors. In a letter to

Progress of
Mahratta affair

* Selections from the Bombay State Papers, Mahratta Series, page 386.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 19th June 1780, Volume II, page 693.

‡ *Ibid* 26th June 1780, " page 700.

§ *Ibid* " page 701.

them, dated 29th of November 1780, he wrote—"The money was not my own, and I neither could, nor would have received it, but for your benefit."

The acceptance of this present was one of the charges of bribery brought against Hastings, but after the various and frank avowals which he made of having received it, it is impossible to believe that he could have had an idea of converting it to his own use. He ordered it to be deposited in his name because he was averse to his opponents in Council having any power over its disbursement, and for the same reason he worded his offer in such a manner as to lead them to suppose that he meant to give it from his own fortune. The perpetual dissensions in Council and the almost unremitted opposition made to the measures proposed by Hastings induced him to do many unconstitutional acts which he would not have done had he been free and unshackled. If he received sums of money without the consent of his colleagues, it must be borne in mind that he also expended sums of money without their participation or consent. He paid without their knowledge three lakhs of rupees for the uninterrupted passage of our army to the coast. Hastings had also often to spend sums of money on secret service which he had every reason to believe the majority would oppose. When Francis left India and the opposition ceased, the sums of money which Hastings received were carried to the public accounts without delay, and without any circuitous proceeding.

Opposition of Francis and Wheeler regarding the conduct of the war.

Francis and Wheeler persisted in their opposition to Hastings' proposals regarding the conduct of the war, and Francis wrote an able and comprehensive minute in which he attacked vigorously the whole war policy of Hastings. "The Governor-General," he writes, "talks of friends who may be discouraged, and who perhaps may be induced to become parties against us. We wish that the names of those friends had been mentioned. We do not know that this Government has a single friend or ally in India in the true sense of friendship and alliance, which supposes the power of giving assistance and a disposition to give it."* Francis did not deny that feeble measures and advances for peace may give strength and presumption to their adversaries, but he added—"We never meant to propose feeble measures, which necessarily defeat themselves: nor yet do we approve of vigorous measures, in the sense in which vigour has been hitherto understood, because we are convinced that this Government is unable to support them, and that if they could be supported a short time longer they would not bring us nearer to our object. Before the commencement of the war we foresaw and foretold the principal consequences that would attend it. We now judge of it by its effects, which we hope will be considered, though every other sort of argument should continue to be disregarded."†

Discussion regarding Barwell's intention to proceed to England.

The tone of the minute and the taunt of failure could not fail to rouse the wrath of Hastings. His anger was increased by the belief that Francis was guilty of a gross breach of faith. At a meeting of the Council held on the 25th January 1779 Hastings had delivered a minute in which he discussed the intimation given by Mr. Barwell of his intention to return to England. He stated it would be fatal to the success of the Mahratta war if it were known at Poona and Nagpur that the powers of the Government were "on the eve of devolving to two Members, who have invariably opposed in every stage of its progress the plan which has been publicly adopted for the support of the Company's interest on the western side of India, and who, it is universally believed, will seize the first means which are offered to them to defeat and annul it altogether." He added—"A Member of this Government entrusted with the guardianship of the Company's interests, and of the honour of the British name in India, has not scrupled to propose that we should make an abject submission to the honourable possessors of the feeble Government of Poona, acknowledging our past faults with a promise of amendment and humbly entreating their permission for the safe retreat of our army from Berar to its confines," and he supported this statement by quoting some remarks made by Francis in a recent minute. Hastings then in the most emphatic manner implored Barwell not to carry out his intention of proceeding to England. "I do therefore conjure Mr. Barwell, both by that zeal which he has hitherto so steadily manifested for the interests of our common masters, and even by the ties of a

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th July 1780, Volume II, page 706.

† *Ibid*

„ page 708.

friendship cemented by a participation of the same labour and sufferings for the public service, that he will not permit the measures in which he has a common and equal responsibility with myself to be exposed to the triumph of a party, but that he will both continue to afford the support of his presence and abilities to the present Government while it yet exists, and that he will suffer me to exact from him a declaration to that purpose, not only for my own satisfaction but for that of every man who has the Company's interests or the prosperity of this settlement, or the credit of his country at heart, and who, I presume to say, expects this sacrifice from him."* Barwell responded to the appeal of Hastings and declared that "the reasons that are assigned for it by the Governor-General require me absolutely to retract the intention. I have declared I admit the force of them, and with pleasure declare my determination to support his Government as long as the public measures of it shall require."† Francis remarked that he and the Governor-General differed greatly in their respective ideas of national honour. "I have no idea of national honour independent of justice. The projects of ambition are usually dangerous. If they are nothing but the projects of ambition, they are, in my judgment, always dishonourable. To revert to that pacific system which the Company have uniformly prescribed to us, to endeavour to conciliate the friendship, which we have unjustly or unwisely departed from, and to return, if it be possible, to the terms of a treaty which we ourselves have wantonly violated, are not acts, that will ever, as I think and as I feel, bring dishonour on the British name. I am sure they are the best means of preserving our strength and our real influence in India, and I have no doubt that they will meet with the highest approbation from home. As long as I am trusted with any share in the office of guardian of the British interests and honour in this country, these shall be the principles on which I will invariably act."‡

Five days after this acrimonious discussion had taken place in Council it is somewhat surprising to find Hastings writing to his friend Sullivan as follows:— "I have assented to an accommodation with Mr. Francis, the essential points of which are argued." In a letter dated the 4th March he again informed his friend of a reconciliation having taken place between himself and Francis, and quotes the conditions of the agreement. The first he gives in the following words:— "Mr. Francis will not oppose any measures which the Governor-General shall recommend for the prosecution of the war in which we are supposed to be engaged with the Mahrattas, or for the general support of the present political system of this Government. Neither will he himself either propose or vote with any other member who shall propose any measure which shall be contrary to the Governor-General's opinion in these points." § He proceeds to inform Sullivan that "Mr. Barwell, who was privy to the treaty in all stages of it, had determined to return to England in consequence with my free consent." He then speaks in the following handsome terms of the man who had been for the past five years his bitter foe, and had thwarted him in every political action: "In this instance I have proved the sincerity with which I have acted, and my reliance on Mr. Francis's faith and honour, and I must add in testimony of both, and in justification of my own discretion, that he has behaved so openly and with so little of the reserve and caution of a man actuated by indirect views that I am certain and venture to promise you that I shall suffer no loss of power or influence by Mr. Barwell's departure, though I shall miss and greatly regret the want of that aid which I might have derived from his friendship, his judgment, and his official resources had he stayed, and that I shall find Mr. Francis both true to his engagements and ready and willing to give me his support and assistance to the period destined for our acting together as joint members of this Administration; I am not the least fearful of the reverse."

Accommodation
between Hastings
and Francis.

What had lowered the pride of Hastings into an accommodation with Francis was the need of a united Government to meet the foreign and internal dangers

Dispute between
Hastings and
Francis regarding
the terms of their
agreement.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 25th January 1779, Volume II, pages 633-634.

† *Ibid* " pages 665-666.

‡ *Ibid* " page 637.

§ *Ibid* 20th July 1780, Volume II, page 712

see also Memoirs of Warren Hastings by Gleig, page 251.

which threatened the very existence of our dominion. The speedy and successful termination of the Mahratta War he considered essential to our safety, and it could only be conducted to a prosperous termination by vigorous and united action. To be free to act vigorously he condescended to make terms with his bitter foe, and he believed that Francis would be true to his engagement. But in a very short time he discovered the perfidiousness of his adversary. No sooner had the departure of Barwell again given power to Francis than concessions were demanded with arrogance and were granted. As long as they did not involve questions of foreign policy Hastings conquered his pride. Then Francis was rash enough to renew his tactics of obstruction with regard to the conduct of the war, and Hastings in firm but moderate language suggested that his action involved a breach of faith. He wrote—"If Mr. Francis (I am compelled to speak thus plainly) thinks that he can better and more effectually conduct the war, to the termination which we both profess to aim at; and that he can in honour deprive me of the right which I claim to dictate the means of accomplishing it, let him avowedly take the lead; but if I am to be charged with the consequences of it, or if the right which I claim be justly mine, let him allow me to possess and exercise it. It is impossible to combine the principles of enterprise and inaction in the same general measure; and as impossible for his sentiments and mine to be brought into agreement on the subject of the Mahratta War. I have in vain laboured to accommodate them by a studied attention to his opinions in every measure which I have ventured to propose in the course of the last 15 months, and have restrained myself from urging others which, however proper and necessary for the occasion exclusively considered, were inconsistent with the actual state and temper of this Government."* Francis replied by denouncing the entire conduct of the war and refusing to sanction any measure until a general outline of the whole campaign was submitted to him. Hastings felt the time for action had arrived. He, however, never allowed himself to act on impulse, or to be led by temper. He wrote to his friend—"I debated with myself a long time how I should act. I now saw plainly that Mr. Francis had deceived me, and that I had no alternative but to let him take the rule and laugh at my credulity, or make it a matter too serious for decision and to expose the fallacy which he had thus unworthily practised upon me. This I did in a very strong but deliberate and temperate charge which I had prepared for the next Council-day, which was Monday the 3rd July."† The charge was not laid before the Council till six weeks afterwards during which time negotiations were being conducted for both opponents to withdraw their respective minutes. On the 14th August, when Hastings saw that all attempts to arrive at a compromise were hopeless, he sent it to Francis with a private note,‡ and next day it was laid before the Council. It opens with the assumption that the minute signed by Francis and Wheeler attacking the war was written entirely by the former, and with an expression of disappointment that the hint conveyed by Hastings had not "awakened in the breast of Francis, if it were susceptible of such sensations, a consciousness of the faithless part he was acting towards him." §

"I have been disappointed, and must now assume a plainer style and a louder tone. In a word, my objections do not lie to the special matter of his minutes to which I shall separately reply, but to the spirit of opposition which dictated them. I have lately offered various plans for the operations of the war. These have been successively rejected, as I have successively amended and endeavoured to accommodate them to Mr. Francis's objections. I had a right to his implicit acquiescence. I have lastly proposed a service requiring immediate execution, and I have freed it from the only objection formally made to it."

"In answer he says that he adheres to the reasons which had before induced him to withhold his consent, and composedly invites me to lay before the Board a complete detail of the plan for conducting the war, a comparative statement of the whole of the object with the whole of the means of attaining it, and the final extent of my demands on the Mahrattas, or what concession I would make to them, and he promises to enter into the consideration of these points with the utmost candour. If his design in this enquiry was simply to gain information, I might refer him to the large and confidential discussions in which I have laid a

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 26th June 1780, Vol. II, page 701.

† Memoirs of Warren Hastings by Gleig, Vol. II, page 304.

‡ "Judging it unbecoming to surprise him with a minute at the Council table or send it first to the Secretary, I enclosed it in a note to him that evening." Memoirs of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Vol. I, page 307.

§ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 20th July 1780, Vol. II, page 711.

my views open to his, with all the grounds on which they were formed. If his purpose was to enable him to form a more clear or competent judgment of the plans which I have proposed, its object would be lost in the time required for the deliberation. But in truth, I do not trust to his promise of candour, convinced that he is incapable of it, and that his sole purpose and wish are to embarrass and defeat every measure which I may undertake, or which may tend even to promote the public interests, if my credit is connected with them. Such has been the tendency and such the manifest spirit of all his actions from the beginning. Almost every measure proposed by me has for that reason had his opposition to it. When carried against his opposition, and too far engaged to be withdrawn, yet even then and in every stage of it his labours to overcome it have been unremitted, every disappointment and misfortune have been aggravated by him, and every fabricated tale of armies devoted to famine, or to massacre have found their first and ready way to his office, where it was known they would meet the most welcome reception. To the same design may be attributed the annual computation of declining finances and an exhausted treasury. Computations which, though made in the time of abundance, must verge to truth at last, from the effect of a discordant Government, not a constitutional decay. To the same design shall I attribute the policy of accelerating the boded event, and creating an artificial want, by keeping up an useless hoard of treasure and withholding it from a temporary circulation."

"I am aware of the answer which will be made to these imputations, and I will anticipate it. Mr. Francis may safely deny them, for they are incapable of positive evidence. He may complain of the injustice and indecency of assuming the interpretation of his thoughts, and assigning intentions to him, upon the reality of which he alone can pronounce with certainty. He may claim an equal right to recriminate upon me, and to pass the same free judgment upon the motives which have influenced my public actions. Against such conclusions I trust that my character will be sufficient to defend me, unless some known instance or it can be produced as a warrant for them, and such I am certain does not exist, either known of or unknown."

"My authority for the opinion which I have declared concerning Mr. Francis depends upon facts which have passed within my own certain knowledge. I judge of his public conduct by my experience of his private, which I have found to be void of truth and honour. This is a sure charge, but temperately and deliberately made from the firm persuasion that I owe this justice to the public and to myself, as the only redress to both, for artifices of which I have been a victim, and which threaten to involve their interests with disgrace and ruin—the only redress for a fraud for which the law has made no provisions is the exposure of it."*

In support of this allegation Hastings proceeded to quote the first article of the agreement and he added—"By the sanction of this engagement and the liberal professions which accompanied it, I was induced to part with the friend to whose generous and honourable support steadfastly yielded in a course of six years I am indebted for the existence of the little power which I have ever possessed in that long and disgraceful period to throw myself on the mercy of Mr. Francis, and on the desperate hazard of his integrity. It was impossible to afford a stronger demonstration of the good faith with which I entered into this accommodation, nor of my confidence in his, than thus consenting to deprive myself of the means of breaking the engagement on my part, and of preventing the breach of it on his; and surely this difference in our relative situations ought to have impressed him with a sense of what he owed to the delicacy attending it, and have made him dread even an approach towards the precise line of his obligations by the slightest advantage taken of my inability to repel it, and how much more ought it to have restrained him from the direct transgression of it."†

After the Council had risen, Hastings received a challenge from Francis which was accepted. On the morning of the 17th August the duel took place, and Francis was shot through the body. On the 11th of September he again took his seat at the Council Board and delivered in a minute in answer to the charges brought against him by Hastings. In it he stated:—

"On the point in issue I can only declare, as I do now in the most solemn manner, that I never was party to the engagement stated by Mr. Hastings or had a thought of being bound by it. In one of our conversations in February last, he desired me to read a paper of memorandums, among which, I presume, this article was inserted. I returned it to him the minute I had read it with a declaration that I do not agree to, or hold myself bound by the contents of it, or to that effect. From that time I have never seen the paper."‡

After denying that he had bound himself to any agreement, Francis stated that "the agreement he meant to enter into with respect to the Mabratta war, was to prosecute the operations actually existing on the Malabar coast, which

Duel between
Hastings and
Francis.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 20th July 1780, Volume II, page 711.

• *Ibid* page 712.

‡ *Ibid* 11th September 1780, " page 715.

since the campaign has begun, and General Goddard had already taken the field, I thought should be pushed on as vigorously as possible.”*

To support this declaration he argued that at the time the Malwa expedition had never been even hinted to him, and there was—

“a strong presumption that up to that period the Governor-General had not had that measure in contemplation, or that he must then have abandoned all thoughts of it.”†

As to Mr. Barwell having gone home only on the strength of the agreement having been made he remarked :—

“I believe it, for instance, to be the opinion of many well-informed persons in this Settlement, as it is now firmly my own, that Mr. Barwell was determined to go home last season at all events, and that the *Swallow* was kept for several months on purpose for him. If so, Mr. Hastings gained something, and could lose nothing, by his agreement with me. * * * * * But as Mr. Barwell’s going home was never demanded by me, nor ever entered into the agreement, I have no concern in Mr. Hastings’ motives for consenting to it”‡

Barwell no doubt was most anxious to escape from the thralldom of a thankless office, but he had promised Hastings in the most public manner at the Council Board “to retract the intention of leaving.”§ He could not break the promise without the consent of Hastings, and it is extremely improbable that Hastings would have given his consent unless he had made an agreement with Francis. Months previous to the quarrel, Hastings wrote as follows to a friend: “Mr. Barwell on the strength of this negotiation has *half* taken his passage in the *Swallow* which will be despatched express to England as soon as this point is determined.” At least one well-informed person did not consider that Barwell, as Francis stated, was determined to go home at all events. Sir Elijah Impey in a letter dated the 18th August 1780, the very day the duel was fought between Hastings and Francis, wrote—“Mr. Barwell left this country on the strongest assurances that Mr. Francis would coincide with Mr. Hastings, or he would never have gone.”

Hastings did not reply to the minute of Francis for some time as “other cases of a stronger obligation have required and have engrossed the whole of my attention and I now revert to it with reluctance as to a necessary, yet unavailing duty.”|| He reaffirmed with the utmost earnestness that there was an engagement. “What that engagement was I have expressed in terms in my minute of the 3rd July. Mr. Francis in answer declares, and ‘in the most solemn manner, that he never was party to the engagement stated by me, or had a thought of being bound by it.’ What can I say to such a declaration but to declare on my part in as solemn a manner that Mr. Francis was a party to the engagement which I have stated? This I now do most solemnly declare, and may God be the judge between us.”¶ He asserted that it was Sir John Day who proposed to him an accommodation with Francis, and that he accepted the offer solely on the indispensable condition “that Mr. Francis should agree to depart from his opposition to the political measures proposed by me, and allow me, without exception or qualification, to prescribe the mode of conducting the Mahratta war. This point was a long time contested by Mr. Francis, but was at length adjusted finally in this manner, that Mr. Francis should not oppose me, nor yet charge himself with the responsibility of any proposal made by me which had any relation to the war, but support it by his vote as the result of a general measure which he had originally disapproved, and which he now left with the responsibility properly annexed to its original contriver.”***

Hastings proceeds—“This point being thus settled I drew it up in writing on a small piece of paper in the words which I have already quoted, with other propositions, of which some had, and some had not, received our final and mutual agreement. * * * * * This paper with some apology I shewed to Mr. Francis, desiring him to read it attentively, and to inform me whether he agreed to the conditions as I had expressed them, or to point out his exceptions. To the first article, which is that of the present question, he replied hastily, and with every appearance of satisfaction, that he entirely agreed to it, adding among other expressions, as I well remember, that his meaning plainly was not to avail himself of Mr. Barwell’s de-

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 11th September 1780, Volume II, page 715.

^	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 715.
	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 717.
	<i>Ibid</i>	25th January 1779,	„
	<i>Ibid</i>	13th November 1780,	„
	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 736.
	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 736.

parture from the Council to oppose me in any political point which he could not have carried had Mr. Barwell continued. The other articles received some variations and were all finally regulated at the same meeting. Of these, as they do not relate to the question before me, I shall take no further notice. For the truth of this narrative I appeal to Sir John Day, to whom I daily communicated what passed on this business, and to Mr. Barwell, to whom I in like manner related the daily progress of it. They will both attest that my relation of it at the time was exactly the same as I now repeat it. It is impossible to suggest a motive which I could have had to deceive them at such a time and on such a subject, and as impossible that I myself should be deceived when I took such means to ascertain it. Yet Mr. Francis affirms that 'he returned the paper to me the moment he had read it with a declaration that he did not agree to it, or held himself bound by the contents of it.'*

Hastings meets the statement of Francis, that the agreement which he meant to enter into with respect to the Mahrattas was limited to the operations on the Malabar coast, by quoting an article of a treaty with the Rana of Gohud which clearly proved that a diversion in the Province of Malwa formed a part of the measures projected and actually existing before the agreement was concluded. He added—"When I proposed the execution of it other circumstances had recently occurred. General Goddard had solicited us to make such a diversion in his favour, and the Commander-in-Chief had passionately recommended it as the only means of bringing the war to a speedy termination."† Francis replied: "In an argument of the kind the strictest precision of dates should be observed and the facts stated in the order in which they happened. On this principle I join issue with the Governor-General and affirm in his own terms that *when he proposed the execution of the measure (that is, on the 12th June last) General Goddard had not solicited us to make a diversion in his favour.* The fact, if it exists, is capable of immediate and direct proof."‡ Hastings supplied the immediate and direct proof by producing a letter from General Goddard, forwarded through the Commander-in-Chief, which contained the following words: "It would certainly be of advantage to the operations of the war on this side to cause a powerful diversion to be made on the other, which could not fail to distress and divide their attention exceedingly."§ With regard to the request of Francis that the strictest precision of dates should be observed Hastings remarked: "In compliance with the rule prescribed by Mr. Francis I have been careful to annex the dates to the preceding extracts and for greater precision will repeat them with the facts stated in the order in which they happened. General Goddard's letter to Sir Eyre Coote is dated the 28th March and was recorded in our Consultation of the 29th May. My minute which contained the first proposition of the expedition was dated the 12th June."|| Francis tried to escape from the dilemma in which he was placed by a petty quibble. He wrote: "In denying that General Goddard *had solicited us to make such a diversion in his favour,* I took the proposition literally as it was stated. I was perfectly sure that he had never addressed the Board to that effect, and that a request or opinion from him had never been urged in support of the motion of the 12th of June. Whether his letter to the Commander-in-Chief, recorded on the 29th of May, be equivalent to a solicitation to us to make a diversion in his favour, in the sense in which the fact was asserted and denied, I submit to judgment."¶ Hastings indignantly answered: "Mr. Francis may avail himself as he can of the distinction between a solicitation made by General Goddard through the channel of the Commander-in-Chief to the Board and one directly addressed to the Board. It is sufficient for me that it came regularly before us. I shall not waste my time nor his in such a discussion. I repeat that Mr. Francis's engagement was absolute and unqualified; that in his own explanation of it the measure in question made a part of it since it was found peculiar to it and existed at the time. The assertion that I might have abandoned it in February is no proof that I did. I did not. It was proposed, or, to use Mr. Francis's words, it 'was renewed' in June. My right to his concurrence in it remained the same notwithstanding any intermediate suspension of it."** Thus ended the long war between Hastings and Francis. No

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th November 1780, Volume II page 736.

† Ibid page 737.

‡ Ibid page 739.

§ Ibid page 743.

|| Ibid page 743.

¶ Ibid page 744.

** Ibid page 744.

Evil tidings from
Madras.

impartial judge can read the respective minutes of the two men without coming to the conclusion that Francis was guilty of a gross breach of faith.

Hastings had excused himself for delaying to answer the minute of Francis on the ground that matters of greater importance had engrossed his attention. The matter of greater importance was the preservation of the State from the formidable league formed for the destruction of it. News had reached the Council from Madras that Hyder had entered the Carnatic, destroyed an army, and driven Sir Hector Munro to the walls of Fort St. George. Sir Edward Hughes sent tidings of his having received undoubted intelligence that seven sail of the line and seven thousand land forces had left France and were intended to co-operate with the enemies of England in India. Thirty thousand Mahratta horse were encamped on the western frontier of Bengal; an invasion of Behar by the Mahrattas was also expected; the Nizam professed hostility; Nujiff Khan threatened Oudh and the forces of Mahdajee Sindia threatened Corah and Allahabad, while General Goddard was opposed by the whole power of Poona. Then the spirit, judgment, and decision of Hastings shone forth. At a meeting of the Council held on the 25th September 1780, he declared it was not a time "for either long deliberation at home or the formal and tedious process of negotiations abroad." The crisis demanded "the most instant, powerful, and even hazardous exertion of the Government to avert the event portended by so many concurrent difficulties."* He proposed, though his army was small and his treasury almost exhausted, that a considerable supply of treasure and a large body of troops should be sent to Madras, and that Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take the command of the Carnatic Army. His "military experience," he wrote, "and above all the high estimation in which his name is held by the world, and especially by that part of it where it was principally acquired, mark him as the only possible instrument to retrieve our past disgraces, or to preserve the British interests and possessions in the Carnatic from utter ruin. Our armies which have been so long formed to the habits of conquest will not easily recover from the impression of the dreadful reverse which has lately befallen them, nor be brought to act with their former confidence under unsuccessful commanders. The addition of numbers will not relieve their apprehensions, and will not but contribute to oppress the hands which have been already proved too weak to sustain the weight of an inferior charge."† To all the propositions except the motion respecting the Commander-in-Chief, Francis and Wheeler objected on the ground that Bengal was their first object, that the danger was at their door, and consequently they could spare no troops and not half the supply of treasure which Hastings proposed to send to Madras. Sir Eyre Coote concurred with the Governor-General and the casting vote of Hastings preserved India to Great Britain.

Departure of
Francis.

His opposition to the relief of our defeated army at Madras was the last important official act of Philip Francis. In November he set sail for England, a disappointed and baffled man. The two objects nearest to his heart, the humiliation of Hastings and the government of India, had eluded his grasp. "I am now," he wrote shortly after he landed, "I think on the road to be Governor of Bengal which I believe is the first situation in the world attainable by a subject"? But he had miscalculated the mental vigour and pertinacity of his opponent. The struggle between them for five years had been a severe one, and Francis left India defeated only to renew the war in England. With ceaseless vigilance and concentrated industry he worked to procure the recall of his enemy and to gain the coveted office. He enjoyed the triumph of seeing his foe impeached, and he endured the bitter disappointment of seeing him acquitted after a trial of seven years during which his activity to secure a conviction was unremitting to the end. The inveterate hostility which he displayed towards the accused created a profound prejudice against Francis, and so materially helped to deprive him of the great ambition of his life. "I will never be concerned," he said, in bitterness of soul, "in impeaching anybody. The impeachment of Mr. Hastings has cured me of that folly. I was tried and he was acquitted." But there was about his nature a pertinacity which nothing could subdue. Six and twenty years did he pursue with unwearied zeal and

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, September 1780, Volume II page 718.

Ibid

„ page 719.

industry his object. Then, when Pitt died and the Whig party came into office, he believed the prize to be within his grasp. The death of Cornwallis had left the Governor-Generalship of India once more vacant. But the new Ministers, as Lord Brougham said, could no more have obtained the East India Company's consent to the appointment of Francis than they could have transported the Himalaya mountains to Leadenhall Street.* The fixed ideas and ungovernable temper of the man must have brought ruin to their dominion. In one of the last speeches he ever delivered in the House of Commons, Francis denounced the second Mahratta war in the same vigorous terms in which he had denounced the first Mahratta war in the council chamber at Bengal. He regarded our successes in India in the same light that he regarded our successes in the Peninsula, as a series of mistakes, and Hastings and Wellington he considered to be both bunglers.† The appointment of Lord Minto to the Governor-Generalship put an end to the dream of his life.‡ He never recovered the disappointment and the bitter remembrance of failure accompanied him into retirement. On the 25th March 1807 he asked a few questions on the affairs of India including the mutiny of Vellore, and this was the last act of the long and active political career of Philip Francis.

At a consultation held on the 26th September 1780 Sir Eyre Coote presented Cheyt Sing. a plan for the defence of Bengal and Oudh which he had sketched at the desire of the Board. As an invasion of Behar was expected, Sir Eyre Coote proposed to station a large body of infantry in that province, together with two regiments of horse and one thousand or as many of Cheyt Sing's cavalry as they could procure. This was the origin of the demand for cavalry from Cheyt Sing. It was suggested by Eyre Coote and not by Hastings, who is accused by Macaulay of making the demand in order to fasten a quarrel on Cheyt Sing whom he had determined to plunder.§ On the 2nd November the attention of the Board was again drawn to the want of cavalry, and Hastings was requested to write to Cheyt Sing for such as he could spare. In December the Resident of Benares wrote to Hastings that he had repeatedly pressed the Raja on the subject of the cavalry but could obtain no answer. The next month he wrote that the Raja said he had but thirteen hundred in his service, and that all except two hundred and fifty were absolutely necessary for collecting the revenue. On the 21st May 1781 Hastings proposed to the Board that he should visit Oudh in order to have an interview with the Nawab whose province had fallen into a state of great disorder and confusion. He also stated that he hoped to take advantage of his visit to Oudh to conclude negotiations with the Raja of Benares. At this time the Council consisted only of two members, Wheler and Hastings—and as the latter had the casting vote the request was purely formal. Hastings proposed that his colleague should during his absence consider himself “as possessed of the full powers of the Governor-General and Council of this Government, as in effect he is by the Constitution, and he may be assured that if sanction and concurrence shall be or be deemed necessary for the confirmation of this measure, he shall receive them.”|| He also formally procured from the Council credentials which, besides granting to him power to make treaties with any of the Chiefs or Powers of Hindostan, also invested him “with full power and authority to form such arrangements with the Raja of Benares for the better government of the zemindary, and to perform such acts for the improvement of the interest which the Hon'ble Company possesses in it, as he shall think fit and consonant to the mutual relation and actual engagement subsisting between the Company and the Raja.”¶ Burke afterwards regarded this division of power as criminal.

* Statesmen of the time of George III. Brougham.

† Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis. Merivale, Vol. II, page 369.

‡ “On the death of Lord Cornwallis my right or claim to succeed him, though supported by His Royal Highness, was superseded by the coalition in 1806.” Memorandum written by Francis.

§ Macaulay writes:—“Hastings was determined to plunder Cheyt Sing and for that end to fasten a quarrel on him. Accordingly the Raja was now required to keep a body of cavalry for the service of Government.”

|| Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 3rd July 1781, Volume III page 765.

¶

Ibid

„ page 765.

It was argued that the word arrangements plainly implied that the Governor was to arrange such acts as he should think consonant to the mutual engagement subsisting between the Company and the Raja in an amicable way, and not in a hostile manner. Lord Thurlow in discussing the charge quoted the precedents of Vansittart, Clive, and Cornwallis to show that Hastings had a right to delegate and assume the powers of Government on great and emergent occasions.

Hastings's letter to
Cheyt Sing.

Before starting for Benares, Hastings informed Wheeler, his colleague, and others that he intended to fine Cheyt Sing fifty lakhs of rupees. He was assured that he had amassed a very large sum of money, and he regarded his reluctance to aid the sovereign power as an additional proof of his disaffection and a grave offence, "and he determined," as he said, "to make him pay largely for his pardon, to exact a severe vengeance for his delinquency, and to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distress." * On reaching Benares Hastings transmitted to the Raja a statement of his offences. He informed him that the danger to which the detachment of Major Carnac was exposed was due to his not paying the war subsidy of 1780 which he by letter had guaranteed to do.

"Relying on this agreement and promise I gave orders to Mr. Fowke, who was then Resident at this place, to receive money and remit it to Colonel Carnac for the pay of the army which had been ordered to march towards the Province of Malwa, and I made no other provision for it such was my confidence in your faith; but you deceived me, and after having made the first payment of a few rupees, either consulting the temper of the times, or conforming to a premeditated design, you by shifts and pretexts withheld the remainder until the army for whose use it was intended was reduced to the last state of distress. Many hundreds deserted, and had an enemy at that time appeared against them their total destruction had been inevitable. In all this time daily applications were made to you by the Resident, and I wrote repeated letters to you, but you paid no regard to either." He added—"Besides this, I required, in the name of the Governor-General and Council by letter, and ordered Mr. Fowke to repeat the requisition in person, that you should furnish a body of horse to assist and act with the armies of the Company, and when Mr. Markham succeeded Mr. Fowke I gave him orders to repeat the demand, which he did accordingly with frequent and almost daily importunity, limiting the number to 1,500 and afterwards to 1,000. To this demand you returned evasive answers, nor to this hour have you contributed a single horseman." *

Hastings closes the letter in the following emphatic manner:—

"I pass over the instances of your conduct in which through the means of your secret agents you have endeavoured to excite disorder in the Government on which you depend, and your neglect of the duty which you owe to it, and to the subjects of this zemindary, by suffering the daily perpetration of robberies and murders, even in the streets of the city of Benares itself, to the great and public scandal of the English name, and in violation of one of the conditions on which you received the confirmation of this zemindary. But as the two foregoing instances amount to a direct charge of disaffection and infidelity to the Government on which you depend, and happened at a time in which it was your duty most especially to have exerted yourself in the support of its interests, I have therefore judged it proper to state them to you thus fully in writing, and to require your answer to them, and this I expect immediately." †

To the charges brought against him by Hastings, the Raja replied, that he obeyed the orders "with the utmost readiness. **** I sent first one lack of rupees with an answer to your letter. Afterwards having paid to Mr. Fowke the sum of one lack and seventy thousand rupees, I sent a letter requesting a further allowance of time to make some preparations. To this I received no reply. It being no time to delay notwithstanding this I was not a moment inattentive to this concern, and as soon as my Buxey arrived I paid immediately the remaining part of the sum. The remitting of this to the army did not depend upon me; if any delay happened on this head I could not help it. If besides the payment of the money the remittance of it also to the army had rested with me, a delay of this kind should not have happened." ‡ The answer was false in all its parts. He did not pay the first lakh until the 5th August 1780, though the demand was made in the end of June, and then he refused to pay any further sum until he had got an answer to a letter he had written to Hastings requiring further time to dispose of his effects. To this representation the Raja said he received no reply, though a reply was immediately sent strongly expressive of the Board's displeasure at his excuses which they said they knew to be futile. This expression of displeasure

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th September 1781, Volume III page 782.

† *Ibid* " page 783.

‡ *Ibid* " page 785.

did not hasten the payment, which was not finally made until the 18th of October 1780, although the Raja promised it in the month of July. With regard to his not furnishing cavalry the Raja replied: "In compliance with your wishes I collected five hundred horses and a substitute for the remainder five hundred burkundasses, of which I sent you information, and I told Mr. Markham that they were ready to go to whatever place they should be sent. No answer, however, came from you in this head, and I remained astonished at the cause of it. Repeatedly I asked Mr. Markham about an answer to my letter about the horse, but he told me that he did not know the reason of no answer having been sent; I remained astonished."* The answer of Cheyt Sing well deserves the description given of it by Hastings; it was "not only unsatisfactory in substance but offensive in style."† It also afforded a strong indication of that spirit of independency which the Raja had for some years assumed. "Under these alarming appearances of the Raja's conduct and disposition," wrote Hastings, "I conceived myself indispensably obliged to form some immediate and decisive plan for obviating their consequences, and for the preservation of the Company's rights and interests in this zemindary. To have left him in the full exercise of powers which he had notoriously abused, and which it was to be apprehended he would employ to the most dangerous purposes, was totally inconsistent with the maxims of justice and prudence. To divest him entirely of the zemindary, though justifiable on the grounds stated above, would be attended with an appearance of severity, and might have furnished grounds for construction unfavourable to the credit of our Government and to my own reputation, from the natural influence which every act of rigour exercised in the persons of men who stand in elevated stations, is apt to impress on the minds of those who are too remote from the scene of action to judge by any evidence but of the direct facts themselves of their motives or propriety."‡ After weighing the conflicting considerations, Hastings ordered the Resident to put Cheyt Sing under arrest, and he sent two companies of the sepoys that he had brought with him to Benares, to mount guard in the Raja's palace. A numerous body of armed men from the Raja's fortified palace at Ramnagar suddenly crossed the river, attacked and massacred the whole party. The sepoys having no ammunition fell without resistance. The Raja escaped and fled to his fortress Luteefgarh. Hastings in his letter dated 27th August 1781 writes :-

Arrest of Cheyt Sing.

"On the 19th a large force returned to Ramnagar. Captain Blair with his battalion and Captain Mayaffre with the remainder of Major Popham's detachment were ordered to assemble for the attack of that place, and Major Popham to join and conduct the operations according to a concerted plan. The two corps having joined, Captain Mayaffre, the senior officer, without waiting for Major Popham, against orders, on the morning of the 20th, marched precipitately into the narrow streets of the town where, in an instant, he fell with Captain Doxatt and 33 rangers, and almost all the sepoys of Captain Blair's battalion that had entered with him; the rest of the detachment returned to Chunar with the loss of two guns, one howitzer, and 103 men of all denominations killed. I was in Benares with the broken remains of Major Popham's first party, consisting of about 400 men, in a place incapable of defence even with equal numbers. Preparations were making to attack me. I waited till the evening for a battalion ordered from Chunar to reinforce our party; at 7 repeated intelligence arrived that the Raja's boats were in motion; no news had arrived of the battalion from Chunar. It was resolved to meet it and march with it to Chunar. The resolution was instantly carried into execution. We passed the battalion which returned and overtook us, and on the 22nd at day-break we gained the bank of the river opposite to Chunar, having met no opposition. The detachment crossed on the morning of the 23rd. The Raja's forces are divided between Ramnagar and Luteefgarh. His family is at Bidjeegur. His fixed establishment exceeds 10,000 men, and all his recruits bear arms. Major Popham is encamped on the plain east of the fort. I expect to be joined by a regiment from Cawnpore which are ordered for my guard at Lucknow. Lieutenant Polhill, with six companies of the Nabob's guard, are at hand, and Major Moses Crawford's battalions. My only distress is the want of money and is great."§

The insurrection at Benares seems to have produced a strong impression on the mind of Hastings, for he wrote to his colleagues: "My regrets for the past are personal. I shall ever retain the painful remembrance of that scene of blood of which I have been too near a spectator, and which no future return of prosperity can ever efface from my mind, but in the prospect before me I

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th September 1781, Volume III page 784.

† *Ibid* " page 785.

‡ *Ibid* " page 785.

§ *Ibid* 15th October 1781, Volume III page 792.

think that I have every reason to expect the happiest termination of it in the extension of the power and influence of the Company, and that the past example may contribute to the permanency of both by prompting us to guard against the secret growth of the like evil which has produced it.”*

Engagement at
Pateeta.

In a letter dated the 4th September, Hastings announces to the Board that Captain Blair with his battalion and two companies of his own grenadiers and two guns (6-pounders) had attacked the enemy collected at Pateeta, seven miles from Chunar. “They were prepared to receive him, and made a very spirited resistance; after a very long action, the fortune of the day was happily turned in our favour by a bold but well-judged manœuvre. Captain Blair detached his two grenadier companies to attack two guns which were posted on the flank, and galled his troops exceedingly. The attack succeeded, and the two guns were turned on the enemy who were soon after totally routed. Captain Blair brought off three of their guns and spiked the fourth, the carriage of which was disabled; he also brought away one of their tumbrils and all his own loaded with their ammunition, three more of their tumbrils with much loose powder were blown up on the field, Captain Blair having no means of bringing them away. He was obliged to leave about 1,500 of their shot piled in a village. The enemy’s numbers are reputed 8 or 9,000 men. Captain Blair judges them from appearance to be only 3,000 or 4,000; they were their prime men. Our loss, which I add with regret, exceeds 105 killed and wounded, theirs must be proportionately more though unknown. It is remarkable that the enemy’s artillery and carriages made at Ramnagar are almost equal to ours; their cartridges and port-fires compounded with equal skill, and their powder much better.”†

Capture of Lutteef-
poor.

Information having reached Major Popham regarding the state of the two fortresses of Lutteefpoor and Pateeta which led him to suppose that they might be easily captured, he determined to attack them without delay, and for that purpose divided his army into two detachments. “The first detachment,” wrote Hastings, “marched on the night of the 15th by a large circuit through almost impracticable ways. But the spirit of the officers and men surmounted every difficulty. In places where the guns could not be drawn by bullocks, the sepoys lifted them up the rocks, and at length on the morning of the 26th they arrived at the heights lying behind and above the fort of Lutteefpoor, at a place called Lora, which commands a pass descending to Lutteefpoor and reputed inaccessible against opposition but from above. The profound secrecy with which this expedition was undertaken, and to which the security of the enemy in a region so unfrequented not a little contributed, prevented any opposition to our troops in the difficult parts of their route. Their first movement only but neither their strength nor destination was known till their very near approach. At Lora they met a body of 2,000 of the enemy which they defeated and dispersed with little loss on our side, but on theirs of 200 men killed on the spot. The next morning they took possession of the pass and of the fort of Lutteefpoor which they found evacuated.”‡

Hastings’ return to
Benares.

On the 25th September Hastings returned to Benares where he found the city restored to a state of order and tranquillity. He issued proclamations offering pardon to all except Cheyt Sing and his brother “whom their late rebellious conduct and their rancour manifested to our nation in the deliberate murder of many of our soldiers, and even unarmed passengers who had the misfortune to fall into their hands, precluded from every title of mercy.”§ A grandson of Raja Bulwunt Sing by a daughter was proclaimed Raja with great form and solemnity. Hastings also took steps for the protection of the persons and property of the inhabitants of the sacred city. When the sovereignty of Benares was ceded to the Company the superintendence of the police was formally made over by the English to Cheyt Sing, but the arrangement proved a disastrous failure. “From this period,” wrote Hastings, “the appearance of public justice was gradually effaced till at last without any system of police, any courts of judicature, or any awe of the sovereign power, the inhabitants of Benares were guilty of enormities and crimes which reflected the greatest disgrace

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 18th October 1781, Volume III page 798.

†	<i>Ibid</i>	”	page 803.
‡	<i>Ibid</i>	”	page 806.
§	<i>Ibid</i>	”	page 806.

on the government to which they were subjects. The relations and dependants of the Raja, or the merchants whose credit was useful in the payment of his revenue, might violate the rights of their fellow citizens with impunity, and the sacred character of a Brahmin or the high rank of the offender were considerations which stamped a pardon on the most flagitious crimes.”*

To remedy this scandalous state of affairs Hastings established distinct departments for the police and for the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the city, and placed them under the regulation and control of a chief magistrate who was subject to the immediate orders of the Governor-General and Council. The person chosen by Hastings to fill the office of chief magistrate was a Mahomedan, Ally Ibrahim Khan, “a man who has long been personally known to myself and, I believe, to many individuals of our Government, and whose character for moderation, disinterestedness, and good sense will bear the tests of the strictest enquiry.”† The Board on hearing of this appointment expressed a regret that “the incapacity of the more dignified characters of the Gentoo religion to conduct the management of such a trust prevented you and must ever do so from promoting them to high office.”‡ Regarding the measures which Hastings had taken for the better administration of the city of Benares his colleagues expressed their warmest approval in the following terms: “Your guarded attention to the security and convenience of the pilgrims, and your abolition of those taxes and embarrassments which have grown against them from the rapacity of a corrupt Government, are peculiarly to your credit.” They added—

Hastings' reforms in the administration of Benares.

“Even in a political view your arrangements upon the subject are interesting, and may lead to the most important consequences. All Indostan from the source of the Ganges to Cape Comorin is interested in the happy regulation of the police of Benares, and the unpolluted tranquillity of its colleges. The leading Mahrattas with whom we are at war are strongly attached to this supposed residence of the purity of their religion.

“From these considerations we beg leave to suggest to you whether it would not be proper to publish in the different languages of India the regulations you have adopted. A very short time will spread them over all Indostan, which, with the reports of the pilgrims upon their return, cannot but impress the natives with the mild liberality and attention of our Government.

“Even among the different nations of Europe whose learned enquiries have been of late particularly directed to the religious antiquities and early knowledge of the sciences in this country, it will be matter of satisfaction and admiration and of consequent credit to our Government that Benares, in which you were so dangerously exposed, should remain so deeply indebted to your careful regulation and protection §”

The measures so warmly applauded by his colleagues were afterwards as forcibly denounced by the managers of the impeachment. The first charge brought against Hastings was regarding his conduct towards Cheyt Sing. He was accused of violating a treaty with an independent Prince, unjustly compelling him to pay five lakhs of rupees annually for three years, intending to impose upon him an enormous fine for imputed delinquency, and causing his person to be arrested. Burke took infinite pains to prove that Cheyt Sing was made independent of the English Government in every respect except that of paying to it annually twenty-three lakhs of rupees, and that the Government had irrevocably bound itself down not to exact in any case a larger sum. It is however clear beyond all question that Cheyt Sing was a dependent on Sujah Dowla || and afterwards on the British Government and consequently responsible to Hastings in his character as Governor-General. As Hastings said in his defence at the bar of the House of Commons: “He was neither more nor less than a zamindar. His sunnud and potah were

Status of Cheyt Sing.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 12th November 1781, Volume III, page 815.

† *Ibid* *ibid* „ page 816.

‡ *Ibid* 3rd December 1781, Volume III, page 820.

§ *Ibid* *ibid* „ page 820.

|| See translation of the new cowlname or agreement and translation of the pottah given by the Nawab Sujah-ud-Dowla to Cheyt Sing—Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th October 1773, Volume I, page 56.

“Whereas by virtue of a treaty with the Nawab Asoph-ud-Dowla concluded on the 20th of Rabbey ul-Awwal 1189 Hijree, or 21st May 1775, the government and sovereignty of the Sircars above mentioned has been ceded to the Hon'ble East India Company from the 4th of Jemady-ul-Awwal 1184 Hijree or 14th July 1775: the said East India Company, therefore, in virtue of the rights thereby obtained, do confirm unto Raja Cheyt the Zamindary, Amceeny and Foudary of the said Sircars, agreeably to the Zommun, together with the Cutwalkes of Jampore and Benares and the mint of Benares from the said date.”—Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 15th April 1776, Volume II, page 512.

made out, not from a copy of stipulations and agreements between him and the Company but from the common formuke of such instruments granted to zamindars in the Company's original provinces. The Raja never pretended any right to stipulate or demand; he was content with what the Company was pleased to allow him." The sunnud distinctly states that "the government and sovereignty of the Sircars had been ceded to the Hon'ble East India Company, and that the said East India Company, therefore, in virtue of the rights obtained confirmed unto Cheyt Sing the zamindary." The sunnud also granted to him the right of coining money on the condition "that whatever gold and silver shall be coined in the mint, the said Raja shall coin conformably to his muchulka." The sunnud also stipulated that "all former sunnuds do become null and void." A pottah or document specifying the condition on which lands are held, was also framed. A kabulyat or agreement was also drawn up which stated—"It shall be my duty to do everything that may be needful and usual for the interest of the country." On the 13th June 1776, the Resident at Benares wrote that the Raja objected to signing any muchulka, or penalty bond, and to the insertion of any muchulka, or penalty bond in the sunnud or pottah. The Board replied: "As we have not insisted on the insertion of the clause respecting the penalty in the agreement of the Raja, the instrument which is to be executed by him cannot now be called a muchulka. We thereby authorize you to erase this word where it has been mentioned in the sunnud and pottah transmitted to you, as well as in the titles of the kabulyat, which you are to obtain from him." On the 17th July 1776, the Resident informed the Board that Cheyt Sing "has declined the acceptance of the sunnud and pottah for which he assigns these reasons, that any erasement in a sunnud or public deed is totally unprecedented in the usages of this country; that the clause in the sunnud by which the former sunnuds are declared to be null is likewise contrary to custom and practice, and further that in the above clause the word 'sunnuds' being used in the plural number, the couhuama which he received with the former sunnuds and pottah is thereby likewise rendered void and of no effect. The Raja objects to the execution of the kabulyat on account of the clause it contains by which the former sunnuds are annulled."* The Board ordered "that the Secretary prepare a new sunnud and pottah omitting the word 'muchulka' and the sentence declaring the former sunnuds to be null, and that these be transmitted to Mr. Fowke with directions to receive back the temporary pottah and grant which were first allowed him"† On the 25th September 1776, the Resident informed the Board that he had invested Cheyt Sing with a khelaut or robe of office and informed him that the continuance of this indulgence would depend on his own punctuality in completing his payments and adhering faithfully to the other conditions on which he holds his zemindary. "I likewise delivered to him the sunnuds transmitted to me by Mr. Secretary Auriol under date the fourth September 1776, and received back from him the former sunnuds which I herewith enclose."‡ In the charges brought against Hastings by the House of Commons, it was stated that neither the first set of deeds nor the second set of deeds was entered in the records or transmitted to the Court of Directors. Hastings in his defence stated that he had no concern in making out the sunnuds or omitting to record them; that these practical operations belonged to the Secretary of the Board under the superintendence of the majority, of which at this time he was not a part, and that if there was any misconduct the majority were answerable for it. The first deeds were however received and are now printed. There was no need to record the second deeds as the alterations were distinctly stated. These alterations do not affect the main question that Cheyt Sing was not a sovereign, but the zamindar of Benares by a sunnud granted to him by the English, and that he made an agreement binding himself to do everything that might be useful and needful for the interest and security of the country. The interest and security of the country demanded that he should contribute money and troops for its defence. It was also in accordance with long established custom that a vassal should afford aid to the sovereign State in money and troops. The conduct of Cheyt Sing, in hesitating to afford the

Hastings' action
with regard to
Cheyt Sing.

* Secret Select Committee : Proceedings, 29th July 1776, Volume II, page 549.

† *Ibid* " " page 549.

‡ *Ibid* 21st October 1776, Volume II p. 557.

necessary aid to his suzerain at a time of great danger was contumacious and refractory and deserving of punishment. Fifty lakhs was undoubtedly a large fine, but it by no means exceeded the ability of Cheyt Sing to pay it with ease, as is evident from the treasures he left behind in his fortresses without taking into consideration the gold and silver he exported beyond the frontier. But when we consider the state of India at that time, when we consider that the English were surrounded by enemies and in hourly expectation of the arrival of a powerful French armament, it is difficult to regard the imposition of even a too heavy fine on a refractory vassal as an act of criminality. In enforcing these demands Hastings was actuated by no personal or malicious motives, but was compelled by the pressing exigencies of the hour and the desire to save India to Great Britain. "I had no other view in it," he said, "than that of relieving the necessities of the Company by an act which I considered to be strictly just."

When Hastings went to Benares the Government was in the utmost distress for money. There were several armies in the field and the demands for treasure were various and immediate. The entire expense of all military operations fell on the treasury of Bengal, and the treasury of Bengal was empty. Heavy loans had been contracted, the credit of Government was low, and Hastings, as was natural under the circumstances, looked to the chief debtor of the Company for relief. The Vizier of Oude owed the Company a crore and a half of rupees. But the Vizier informed Hastings at Chunar, where he had gone to meet him, that his own funds were exhausted, and that it was no longer possible for him to maintain the English troops employed in protecting his territories. Hastings knew the statement to be true. The condition of Oude had for the past five years occupied his anxious attention. The settlement made at the death of the late Vizier against his strongest protests had proved a disastrous failure. Francis, Clavering and Monson had increased the hire of the English troops and at the same time deprived the Nawab of the means of paying for them. When his father Sujah Dowlah died he left about two millions of pounds buried in the vaults of the zenana. The widow and the mother of the deceased prince, historically known as the Begums, claimed the whole of the treasure under the terms of a will which was never produced. The late Vizier though possessed of a large sum of money was also very deeply in debt, a considerable portion of the debt being due to the Company and his troops. The treasure was State property, and the debt due to the Company and the sums due to Sujah Dowlah's army at his decease ought to have been paid from them. The widow, by Muhammadan law, was only entitled to one-eighth after the debts were paid, and a grandmother had no claim to inheritance when the daughter was living. The Begums however exercised the right of possession, and the Nawab did not interfere, either because he was too indolent or did not care to invade the rights of the zenana. He however obtained one loan from his mother of about twenty six lakhs of rupees, for which he gave her a jaghir of four times the value. In October 1775, when he was hard pressed for money both by the Company and by his army, he commenced through Mr. Bristow, the Resident, a negotiation for a fresh loan. Mr. Bristow, after informing the Board that neither the zemindars nor ryots would ever pay their rents, wrote as follows: "To add to this unfortunate circumstance, the Nawab has not yet been able to procure any money from the Begum. Immediately on his return from Fyzabad he stated his distresses to me, and begged of me to use my endeavours to persuade the Begum to assist him. I wished to have declined complying with His Excellency's request, especially after he had indirectly objected to my having any correspondence with her, but being sensible of his necessities I consented upon the condition of his not expecting of me to use violent means. I accordingly went to Fyzabad and explained particularly in writing to the Begum how impossible it was for the Nawab to conduct his Government without her assistance, and likewise insinuated to her that she could not complain of him, for he had granted her an additional jagir of four lakhs a year for the sums he had already borrowed of her, and treated her with great respect. I further insinuated to her that the treasures she possessed were the treasures of the State, as she had not succeeded to them by any legal right, and they had been boarded up to provide against an emergency. That that emergency was arrived,

and I recommended it to her to spare His Excellency the sum of fifty lakhs as a donation. If this did not please her, to let the treasure be divided according to the laws of the Koran, or else grant him a loan, and that I could engage for the re-payment of it."

"After much persuasion, the Begum agreed to pay the Nawab twelve lakhs on condition that the Company secured to her the possession of her jagirs for life, and that the Nawab did not interfere with her upon any account. I excused myself because of the insignificance of the sum, but offered to comply with her terms in case of her granting fifty lakhs. This I had authority for from the Nawab, who, on desiring me to undertake the negociation, repeatedly and earnestly expressed his desire not to use any violence. And in order to prove it, he said 'he would submit to the Company's being mediators of all differences between him and the Begum. But it was hard, when reduced to such distress, that his mother should uselessly keep up immense treasuries.'"* An agreement was concluded between the Nawab and Begum that in consideration of his receiving thirty lakhs more on account of his patrimony he gave the Begum a full acquittal as to the rest, and secured her jagirs to her without interference for life. Mr. Bristow was guarantee to this treaty on the part of the Company. The impolicy of the agreement was apparent, but the Governor-General and Council sanctioned it because, as they informed the Directors, the urgency of the case required it.

In December 1775, the Board received a long and curious letter from the Begum, in which she severely criticised the conduct of her son. By the agreement it was settled that she should liquidate eleven lakhs of the demand by giving goods, elephants, and camels. "I assented," she wrote, "concluding that as Mr. Bristow was a party in the affairs it would be conducted in a proper manner, but they valued the goods which they took at a fourth part of their intrinsic worth; how then could I make good the sum?"† She appealed to the feelings of Hastings by informing him that she "went to the Nawab when his hour of death approached and asked him to whose charge he left me. He replied—'Apply to Mr. Hastings whenever you have occasion for assistance; he will befriend you when I am no more and will comply with whatever you may desire of him.'"‡ She desired Hastings to cause the Nawab to dismiss Murteza Khan who was at that time the Minister, and to restore Mahomed Elich Khan and Mahomed Bushere Khan to their old offices, and she added:—"By them the revenues will be collected and whatever sums are due to the English Chiefs I will cause to be paid out of the revenues. This I will strictly perform."§ Hastings, who has been painted as a cruel tyrant, inflicting wanton injury on two helpless women, wrote a short minute on the letter in which he stated: "All my present wish is that the orders of the Board may be such as may obviate or remove the discredit which the English name may suffer by the exercise or even the public appearance of oppression on a person of the Begum's rank, character, and sex. Had the Nawab chosen to have made use of the means with which his own power alone supplied him to exact money from the Begum, his mother, this Government would have wanted a pretext to interfere in her behalf. But as the representative of our Government has become an agent in this business, and has pledged the honour and faith of the Company for the punctual observance of the conditions under which it was concluded, we have a right to interfere, and justice demands it, if it shall appear that those engagements have been violated, and an injury offered to the Begum under the cover of the authority by which they were contracted. I am therefore of opinion and recommend that a letter be written by the Board to Mr. Bristow commanding him to remonstrate to the Nawab against the seizure of the goods as his own original property, which he received from his mother in payment of the eleven lakhs stipulated to be so made, to insist on the Nawab's receiving them in payment, and that he either admit of the valuation which she has put upon them, or that he allow them to be approved by persons appointed for that purpose by both parties."|| The

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th November 1773, Volume II, page 439.

† *Ibid* 13th December 1775, Volume II, page 465.

‡ *Ibid* *ibid* " page 466.

§ *Ibid* *ibid* " page 467.

|| Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 3rd January 1776, Volume II, page 471.

majority however were less disposed to favour the cause of the Begum. Monson wrote: "She should be informed of the sums of money the late Nawab owed this Government by treaty for services performed, and which were not liquidated at his death; that she received the advantages of the Rohilla conquest, the plunder of those countries being deposited with her; as she succeeded therefore to all the Nawab's wealth it is just that she should discharge the demands due for those services by which she is the principal gainer. The Vizier's estate has not been divided according to the usual custom of Mahomedan princes. The present dispute turns upon the value of goods, elephants, and camels. I do not conceive, according to strict justice, these effects to be the Begum's property; as I understand, women can claim a right only to what is within the zenana; but if it be a condition made by the Nawab with his mother that he should take these things in part of payment of the thirty lakhs, the value of them should be ascertained by arbitration."*

Francis stated that he was "inclined to think with Colonel Monson that women can claim a right only to what is within the zenana. The property being determined, the value, if disputed, may be settled by arbitration or public sale. I cannot conceive that she has the least right to interfere in the Nawab's government. In a country where women are not allowed a free agency in the most trifling domestic affairs it seems extraordinary that this lady should presume to talk of appointing ministers and governing kingdoms."† The Board resolved that the letter of the Begum should be sent to the Resident and a full explanation of the matter demanded from him.

On the 3rd January 1776 Mr. Bristow wrote to the Board stating that, from the evidence he could gather, the complaints regarding the violence of the servants of the Nawab were totally unfounded. As to the complaint regarding the valuation of the property, he wrote: "I understand the late Vizier deposited the surplus of his revenues with the Begum, and having died intestate, or at least a will was never produced, though one is said to be secreted by the Begum, it left a door open to the disputes which have happened, for according to the Koran and the usages of the country, the Nawab could claim an infinitely greater share than he has got. It is beyond a doubt that she has money, for her principal eunuch brought me a message one day, not as a matter of any secrecy or confidence, that the wealth the late Nawab had amassed was intended to supply an emergency. I answered the Nawab could not well want it at a greater one; and pressed her very earnestly to supply his necessary wants." He added,—"The Begum had great influence in the late Vizier's time. On the Nawab Asoph-ul-Dowla's accession he at once placed the sole management in the hands of Murtezeh Cawn, which disgusted both her and her adherents, particularly her eunuchs who have their views in keeping the wealth in the Begum's possession. The principal, Behar Ally Cawn, enjoys her entire confidence; and how far she may be better affected to the English than the Nawab, I leave to the consideration of the Hon'ble Board from the following fact: On the conclusion of the treaty between the Company and the Nawab, the Begum blamed His Excellency very highly and insisted on his not ceding Benares, offering of herself a sum of money in lieu of it. The proposal was afterwards made to me by the Nawab, but I answered I was not authorized to accept an alternative, and that if he intended to have me represent the matter to the Hon'ble Board, he should give me his instructions in writing and explain his sentiments himself to the Governor-General, which he did not do."‡

In order that the Board should have a knowledge of "the Begum's sentiments at the present juncture and of her temper," he enclosed her last letter to him. She wrote as follows: "You were a party in this affair and took from me the sum of 56 lakhs of rupees: if you will cause the 56 lakhs of rupees to be restored to me, then the couluama will not be binding, and do not you then take any part in the affair, and then let Asoph-ul-Dowla and Murtezeh Cawn in whatever manner they are able take sums of money from me. They will then see the consequences."§ Mr. Bristow informed the Board that, "while

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 3rd January 1776, Volume II, page 472.
 † *Ibid* *ibid* " page 472.
 ‡ *Ibid* 25th January 1776, Volume II, page 485.
 § *Ibid* *ibid* " page 486.

the Begum complains of the Nawab and the Minister, she forgets the conduct of her own servants, who refuse to acknowledge the Nawab's authority or to obey his decrees and beat his executive officers." Six months after the guarantee. Mr. Bristow informed the Begum that the Vizier proposed a plan which would put an end to all future disputes. "It was that she gave up her jagirs and received the value in money; for, as His Excellency observed, two rulers are too much for one country." In December 1776, Mr. Bristow wrote that the Vizier intended to level the forts of the zemindars and to reduce their power as much as possible on account of their disobedience and disaffection. Hastings strongly remonstrated with the Nawab on his extravagance, the impolicy of his conduct, and earnestly advised him to dismiss from his presence the worthless favourites with which he was surrounded. To enforce his advice he plainly told him:—"The English if you do not follow it must break off their connection with you altogether." But the Nawab was unmoved by the constant remonstrances of the Governor-General, and, when Hastings proceeded to Benares, policy and justice alike demanded that decisive steps should be taken to introduce order into the government of Oude. But no reform was possible until some measure was adopted which would enable the sovereign to liquidate his existing debts; and in order to aid him to do this Hastings consented to the first article of the treaty proposed to him by the Nawab at Chunar. By this article the defence of Oude was to be left to one brigade, and the English officers who had been appointed to command the Vizier's corps were to be withdrawn. The Englishmen who had settled in Oude in various offices were also to leave the State. The Nawab on his part consented to separate his public from his private expenses; to fix the amount of the latter; to reform his army; to entrust the public treasury to his Minister under the inspection of the British Resident. By the second article it was stipulated: "That as great distress has arisen to the Nawab's Government from the military power and dominion assumed by the jagirdars, he be permitted to resume such as he may find necessary, with a reserve that all such for the amount of whose jagirs the Company are guarantees shall, in case of the resumption of their lands, be paid the amount of their net collections through the Resident in ready money."* The article stated that the resumption of the jagirs should be general, and Hastings pressed on the Vizier the necessity of resuming those held by his worthless favourites. The Nawab however was only anxious to resume those which were held by his mother. This Hastings opposed strenuously, and a vast number of jagirs were resumed. In consenting to the resumption of the Begum's jagirs much criminality has been imputed to Hastings as their possession had been guaranteed by the English Government. Lord Thurlow argued that the resumption of the jagirs on the payment of a proper equivalent was no breach of engagement. "The subjects of the first country in the world," he said, "are obliged on all public occasions to dispose of their property for an equivalent when the public good requires such a sacrifice; and in this case the experience of many years has proved the necessity of the measure." Hastings justified his action on the ground that the rebellious conduct of the Begums was a sufficient reason for withdrawing our protection. "My Lords," he said, "at the time of my giving this consent I was, from the intelligence I had received, fully convinced of the Begums' disaffection to our Government. It was not my opinion only, but it was the general rumour of the country, that she and her ministers aided and supported Cheyt Sing in his rebellion. That such was the general rumour and public opinion is evident from the affidavits already before Your Lordships, and, notwithstanding the ingenuity of the managers who laboured to explain away their meanings, they still contain and afford the most ample proof of the hostile intentions both of the Begum and her ministers towards our Government. But had the continuation of this Session enabled me to enter into a detailed defence, I could have brought the most irresistible evidence to prove, not only the general rumour and opinion, but also that the Begum did, through her ministers, actually lend her assistance to our enemies."

Treaty at Chunar
between Hastings
and the Vizier of
Oude.

Mill argues that the affidavits were worthless because the evidence was collected after Hastings had given his consent to the resumption of the jagirs.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 9th July 1783, Volume III, page 988.

We however find that, on the 8th September, eleven days before the Treaty of Chunar was signed, Colonel Hannay wrote as follows: "This town (Fyzabad) has more the appearance of belonging to Cheyt Sing than the Vizier. The Begums have placed guards to prevent any of my people going to the bazaar in it. Within these few days Shaik Chaan, with near 1,000 horse and foot, has marched from hence to Benares (they were raised here), and I must confess that for my own part I have no doubt but Jowar Ally Khan and Bahar Ally Khan, through their agents, stirred up all the disturbances which extend from hence to Zowey Azimgur."*

In a subsequent letter written immediately afterwards, Colonel Hannay writes: "I have before told you how violently the Begum's people inflame the present disturbances, and in addition to this the principal Zemindars and Rajas have all certificates under the seal of Cheyt Sing that he will supply them with whatever money they may require for subsisting all the troops they can raise. In a very short time I apprehend the greatest part of the Nabob's dominions will be in the state we are in here, and it is the general belief of every man in this part of the country that the conduct I have related is a concerted plan for the extirpation of the English. What may be the situation of the rest of the Nabob's dominions I know not, but it is most certain that from Goonda to Maujid, and from Fyzabad to Benares District, and across from the Gogra to the Ganges, the country is in the utmost ferment. Should the present disturbances proceed from a plan of policy, it will be concealed from you as much as possible, and therefore I take all possible means of communicating to you what I really know to be facts. I know not whether the dâks pass freely from you to Lucknow, but if they do not, and no measure is immediately taken to bring about order and draw the troops together, we may be deprived of all possible means of assisting one another, and the army lost by detached regiments; we have no communications with Bengal, and the troops on this side Benares are at present too much separated to yield one another timely assistance. I hope to God a sufficient force is ordered for the reduction of Cheyt Sing *for the people who are daily sent to him, horse and foot, from Fyzabad* and the seat of rebellion I have before named is *very great*." In his next letter dated the 13th he says: "It is impossible in the general insurrection which now reigns almost universally for me to get the force together the Nabob demanded, or to force my way to you without a loss. The greatest anarchy prevails—the present insurrection is said and believed to be with an intention to expel the English."† He subsequently wrote: "I have already and repeatedly informed you of the dispositions of those in favour in Fyzabad, which has in fact been one of the great sources of the insurrection and the place of all others in the Vizier's dominions which has supplied Cheyt Sing with the greatest number of troops. The old Begum does in the most open and violent manner support Cheyt Sing's rebellion and the insurrection, and the Nabob's mother's accursed eunuchs are not less industrious than those of the Bunack Begum. Capital examples made of Jawar Ally Khan and Bahar Ally Khan would, I am persuaded, have the very best effects."‡

Accusations against
the Begums.

The statements made by Colonel Hannay were corroborated by Captain Williams, who wrote: "Saadit Ally and the Begums are concerned deeply in the late business." Mill regards it as a most suspicious circumstance that these accusations were brought by Colonel Hannay and his officers "who were deeply interested in finding for the disturbance of the country which they ruled a cause different from their own malversations." But the accusations made by the Colonel were confirmed by the Resident who wrote: "The truth of these positions I found most fully proved upon my return, but observed in particular that the most vigorous efforts were limited to the jagirdars among whom the Begum, Fyzullah Khan, and Luttafut Ally Khan distinguished themselves." The jagirdars were powerful noblemen who by the support of armed retainers were able to defy the power of the State. Among them none possessed greater power than the Bhow Begum, "whose power," as the Resident wrote, "is rendered the more pernicious and dangerous, first from its being

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 28th July 1783, Vol. III, page 1004.

† *Ibid* " page 1004.

‡ *Ibid* " page 1005.

wholly delegated to her servants, who have their own views of ambition and interest to answer, and in the next place from the reluctance with which the ministers, and even the Nawab himself, interfere with any concerns of the Begum." He added—"From these two circumstances, strengthened by the immense wealth in her possession, also intrusted to her two chief eunuchs, Bahar and Jowar Ally Khan, and her unreasonable expectations of support from the English Government, of all which she and her servants avail themselves to the utmost, she is become one of the most serious internal evils that among others seems to bid fair to give great disturbance to this country."* The Bhow Begum was described by the Resident as a woman of uncommonly violent temper. "Death and destruction is the least menace she denounces upon the most trifling opposition to her caprice. By her own conduct, and that of all her agents and dependants during the Benares troubles, it may with truth and justice be affirmed, she forfeited every claim she had to the protection of the English Government, as she evidently, and, it is confidently said, avowedly espoused the cause of Raja Cheyt Sing, and united in the idea and plan of a general extirpation of their race and power in Hindostan."† Burke argued that these charges were brought against the Begum by Middleton, the Resident, to justify spoliation, but it is difficult to believe that every European officer employed in Oude conspired to slander the Begum and that a large number of witnesses perjured themselves to screen Hastings.‡ Hastings himself was thoroughly convinced of the rebellious conduct of the Begums§ acting through their agents, and he considered their conduct terminated the guarantee given them by the English. "My Lords," he said in his defence, "I believe there is no state in the world that considers a guarantee made in favour of another state binding any longer than whilst they continue in arms with each other. The first hostile act of the party guaranteed is, and must be, a sufficient reason for withdrawing protection." To Hastings the resumption of the jagirs was not only a measure of sound policy but also just. He likewise considered it both impolitic and unjust to leave the Begums in the possession of a large amount of treasure. He wrote to the Board: "It may be necessary in this place to inform you that in addition to the former resolution of resuming the Begum's jagir, the Nawab had declared his resolution of reclaiming all the treasures of his family which were in their possession, and to which, by the Muhammadan laws, he was entitled. This resolution I have strenuously encouraged and supported, not so much for the reasons assigned by the Nawab as because I think it equally unjust and impolitic that they should be allowed to retain the means of which they have already made so pernicious a use by exciting disturbances in the country and a revolt against the Nawab, their sovereign. I am not too sanguine in my expectations of the result of these proceedings, but have required and received the Nawab's promise that, whatever acquisition shall be obtained from the issue of them, it shall be primarily applied to the discharge of the balance actually due from him to the Company."|| The frankness of the last sentence reveals the existence of a force which influenced Hastings. The pressing need to recruit an exhausted treasury by the recovery of the Nawab's debt may have led him to be more rigorous towards the Begums than he would otherwise have been. But of their guilt he was thoroughly convinced. And

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 12th June 1783, Vol. III, page 51.

† *Ibid* „ page 51.

‡ "The notoriety of the rebellion of the Begum was such that one of the witnesses at Your Lordships' bar—Captain Wade I think—on being asked by a manager if he was applied to, to make an affidavit, said, that if any one in India had called upon him for such a purpose he should have thought they were joking" (Lord Thurlow).

§ On the 21st February 1782 Hastings wrote to a friend: "On the revolt of Cheyt Sing she and the old Begum Shuja Dowla's mother, raised troops, caused levies to be made for Cheyt Sing, excited all the zemindars of Gorakhpur and Bareilly to rebellion, cut off many parties of sepoys, and the principal Aumil and a favourite of the younger Begum openly opposed and attacked Colonel Gordon, one of our officers stationed in the neighbourhood. Let this be an answer to the men of virtue who may exclaim against our breach of faith and the inhumanity of declaring war against widows, princesses of high rank, and defenceless old women. These old women had very high effected our destruction." Memoir of Warren Hastings, by Gleig, Vol. I, page 456.

|| Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 5th February 1782, Vol. III, page 836.

In 1803 Lord Valentia met at Lucknow Almas Ali Khan, the eunuch, regarding whose suffering Burke was so pathetic. He writes—"But the person I observed with the most curiosity was Almas Ali Khan, the eunuch so celebrated by Mr. Burke's pathetic account of the distress which his wives and children suffered from the barbarity of that 'Captain General in iniquity,' Mr. Hastings. He is a venerable old woman-like being, upwards of eighty, full six feet high, and stout in proportion. After all the cruel plunderings which he is stated as having undergone he is supposed to be worth half a million of money; and no wonder when it is considered that for a considerable

if the evidence of some actors in these events, and of many who must have known about them at first-hand, is to outweigh the presumptions and diatribes of his enemies, he had solid foundation for his belief.

In order to recover the treasure the Nawab and his Ministers had to adopt severe measures towards the two eunuchs who had the chief influence over the Begums. The cruelty practised by the Nawab and his servants has been greatly exaggerated, but it was sufficient to have justified the interference of the Resident. To have countenanced it by transmitting the orders of the Vizier was a grave offence. But for what took place Hastings at Calcutta cannot be held responsible. He ordered the Resident not to permit any negotiation or forbearance, but there is a wide gulf between legitimate severity and cruelty.

At Chunar, surrounded by armed rebels and almost in their hands, Hastings with calm self-possession arranged and negotiated treaties with Sindia and the Raja of Berar. On the 29th of October 1781 he wrote to the Council:—
 “I lose not an instant in transmitting to you a copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Muir conveying to me the agreeable account of his having concluded a peace with Mahadaji Sindia and in congratulating you most heartily on this happy event.”* Soon afterwards he transmitted to them copies of his instructions to Mr. Anderson, our envoy at the court of Sindia. He desired Mr. Anderson to “obtain through the mediation of Sindia a treaty of peace and alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Peshwa, against all common enemies, but especially against Hyder Ali Cawn, or of peace simply on the condition of restoring all that we have acquired during the war except Ahmadabad, and the territory conquered for Futty Sing Gackwar.” To bring the war with the Mahrattas to a close, Hastings was willing to sacrifice every foot of ground gained from them for ourselves not excepting Bassein. “Reserve Bassein if you can. But do not insist on the reservation of Bassein to the hindrance of peace.” He was not willing, however, to purchase peace at the price of honour. “You may consent to yield what is ours,” he wrote, “and what we can in honour grant, but we will never suffer our treaties to be infringed, nor our faith to be violated.”† Sindia could not get the Peshwa to agree to an offensive and defensive alliance. The object of the great Mahratta minister Nana Fadnavis was by promising in turn each of the combatants his support to gain from the English Salsette, and from Hyder the territories south of the Nerbudda. The operations against Hyder Ali had, owing to the incapacity of the Madras Government, not been so successful as to inspire the Mahrattas with a belief in our ultimate success.

When the news reached the Council of the perils and misfortunes which beset Madras, Hastings implored Sir Eyre Coote, who was Commander-in-Chief in India and a member of the Supreme Council, “to stand forth and vindicate in his own person the rights and honours of the British arms.”‡ The gallant General was stricken in years and suffering from bad health, but he obeyed the summons to the scene of his early glory. He arrived at Madras

time he was Aumul, or ruler of nearly half the province of Oudh. The Nawab watches with care for his succession which by the Eastern custom belongs to him. With all his affluence Almas is but a slave, now nearly in his dotage, though formerly an active and intriguing courtier.” Lord Valentia also writes. “Almas the eunuch paid me a visit: he is held here in much consideration from the prominent part he has borne in politics; from having once held as Aumul above half the Province of Oudh and from his consequently great riches. When Lord Wellesley was here he was very anxious for the honour of a visit from His Excellency, who at length complied, in order to conciliate a person whose vast property still gave him a great influence in Oudh. He was notorious for his rigid strictness in exacting his dues, and is supposed to have in his possession at least half a crore.” *Voyages and Travels* by George Viscount Valentia, pages 136 and 141, Vol. I.

Eyre Coote was, at the special request of George III, invested by the Nawab of Arcot with the Order of the Bath. George III wrote from Weymouth to the Nawab as follows: “Having thought proper to bestow a high mark of Our approbation on two of Our subjects, whose conduct We hope will have rendered them worthy of your esteem, We cannot add to the dignity of conferring these honours on them more than by desiring you will represent Our person upon this solemn occasion, and that you will perform those functions for Us which We always perform ourselves when the circumstances will admit. Our intention being to confer the Order of the Bath, one of Our most honourable marks of distinction, on Our trusty and well-beloved Sir John Lindsay, Knight, Commander-in-Chief of Our ships and vessels in the East Indies, and of the marine force of Our United Company of Merchants trading to and in those parts, and on Our trusty and well-beloved Eyre Coote, Esq., Major-General of Our forces in the East Indies and Commander-in-Chief of all the said Company’s military force there, We have directed the said Sir John Lindsay to deliver to you this letter, with the Ensigns of the Order, and to learn from you the time when it may be most agreeable to you to perform this ceremony, as well as to make known to you the nature and manner of bestowing these honours upon him and the said Eyre Coote, and so repeating Our wishes for your felicity, We bid you heartily farewell.” *Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings*, 2nd October 1775, Vol. II, page 437.

* *Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings*, 12th November 1781, Vol. III, page 813.

† *Ibid* 10th December 1781, „ page 823.

‡ *Ibid* 25th September 1780, „ page 719.

on the 5th of November accompanied by a small European force. On the 10th he wrote to the Board announcing to them that the painful intelligence of the fall of Arcot had been confirmed by the arrival of the officers and soldiers who had capitulated. "The accounts they give of the strength, good order, bravery, and activity of Hyder's army are truly alarming. His approaches at the siege were carried on with all that regularity as if superintended by the most skillful engineers, and his artillery at the same time is numerous and so well served as repeatedly to have dismounted our guns on the batteries."* Sir Eyre Coote was furnished with orders for the suspension of Mr. Whitehill, the Governor of Madras, which he executed with considerable tact. Mr. Smith, the senior member of Council, succeeded to the Government of Fort St. George, and the new administration invested Sir Eyre Coote with the sole direction of the war. His force however was neither sufficient nor in so prepared a state as to be equal to the undertaking of attacking Hyder in the very formidable forts which he occupied. The field artillery requisite for the service was not in readiness. The draft cattle, besides being deficient in numbers, were too weak to drag the guns. Provisions could not be had five miles beyond Madras.† It was not till the 1st of January that Eyre Coote was able to take the field, and on the 21st he wrote to the Government of Madras announcing that "to the utter honour of the officers and men composing this detachment, the Fort of Carangoly was taken, and in a manner which redounds much to the credit of their bravery."‡ He added—

Difficulties of Eyre Coote.

Capture of Fort Carangoly.

"After congratulating you on this fortunate event, I must indulge myself with reciting to you the particulars as well, because I know it will prove acceptable to you to read, as that it is a justice I owe, on every account, to the officers and men of the detachment whose gallant conduct is highly deserving a place upon record. The detachment arrived at the barrier gate of the Pettah this morning at half-past 5 o'clock, when they were challenged by two sentries who discharged their pieces and retired. In two or three minutes the gate was forced, and our troops immediately proceeded to the gates of the fort with a twelve-pounder dragged by lascars before them. Captain Davis sent two or three of the village people to the crest of the glacis with an offer of cowl to the garrison if they surrender. In the meantime he was advancing towards the gate-way. When the twelve-pounder had got as far as the outer barrier the whole garrison appeared drawn up on the ramparts and traverses of the gates. They then began to fire, and the gun was with much difficulty run against the gate which, on the second shot, gave way so much as to admit the men one by one; a second gate which had been lately hung, was in about a quarter of an hour opened. A third gate also now presented itself, when the gun was brought up to, with much labour on removing the first gate out of its way at the first discharge; this also was burst open, when the troops entered and took possession, whilst the *bulk* of the besieged made their escape by ladders on the opposite side. During the whole of this transaction the detachment were exposed to a constant fire of musketry from the ramparts and upper work of the fort."‡

Relief of Wandewash and Perma-coil.

Hyder was at this time engaged in the investment of five different fortresses commanded by English officers—Ambur, Vellore, Wandewash, Perma-coil, and Chingleput. The first of these had unfortunately been forced to surrender before Eyre Coote took the field. After relieving Chingleput and capturing Carangoly, the Commander-in-Chief marched to Wandewash, which he reached on the 24th "and had the satisfaction to find that the enemy had raised the siege two days before."§ From Wandewash he proceeded towards Perma-coil, the siege of which the enemy on hearing of his approach had also raised. He had however marched only three miles when he received letters informing him that the French fleet consisting of seven ships of the line and three frigates had appeared off Madras. "As I had every reason to apprehend they must have brought troops and that they would land them and would, with the forces of Hyder, have laid siege to Madras, the security of which being the grand national object, I resolved to move towards its protection."|| On further intelligence that the French fleet had sailed to Pondicherry, Eyre Coote resolved at all risks to move there, and within a few days his army was encamped on the Red Hills of Pondicherry with its front towards Arcot. Up to this time he had not been able to obtain any certain information whether there was any

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 14th December 1780, Vol. II, page 747.

† Letter from Sir Eyre Coote, 20th November 1780, Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 18th December 1780, Vol. II, page 750.

‡ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 23rd February 1781, Vol. III, page 758.

§ *Ibid* 27th April 1781, " page 766.

Ibid " " page 763.

considerable force in Pondicherry, and he resolved to send a party to bring him intelligence. He accordingly despatched a detachment of cavalry which returned and informed him that there did not appear to be any force in the town. The next day he sent a detachment, who destroyed the boats that supplied the French fleet with provisions and water, and spiked the guns. But not a grain of rice nor any other article of provision for the army could be procured. "In the hope," writes Eyre Coote, "that by my personal presence something effectual might be done towards obtaining supplies, I set out for Pondicherry the 7th, about 8 A.M., on horseback, and I had but just entered the bound hedge when I received a note express from camp informing me that Hyder with his whole army was in sight; instantly upon the receipt of this intelligence I sent orders to the detachment in Pondicherry to join the army, main body, with all expedition and returned myself to camp."*

Eyre Coote, perceiving that Hyder was moving in great force to the southward with the intention, no doubt, of attacking Cuddalore, immediately struck his camp, and marched to its relief. The army of Hyder quickly followed, and having overtaken the English force opened a heavy cannonade. "As their cannon injured us so little, and as my object was to reach Cuddalore before them, I did not allow it much to impede my march, and what few shot we fired, by the accounts of deserters, killed and wounded many more than we lost, which, considering that they cannonaded us about three hours, were very few indeed. The quantity of ammunition which they expended that night must have been very considerable; they threw rockets at every part of the line until we entered the bound hedge of this place."† Arrived at Cuddalore, Coote found his situation critical in the extreme, for "there was only rice enough for one day's subsistence for the fighting men of the army. The alarming prospect which this presented me with, produced feelings which are much easier to be imagined than described. I saw in the fall of this handful of men the destruction of the English interest in India. * * * * * What to determine in a situation so critical, so difficult, and in its consequences so important, I confess was a question which I dreaded the decision of."‡ He resolved to offer them battle. Leaving his camp and followers under the walls of the fort he drew up his army in a wide plain. But the enemy refused the challenge, and all attempts to draw them to an action having proved fruitless, on the fourth day Eyre Coote returned to his encampment. His anxiety was relieved by seeing on the afternoon of the same day the French fleet set sail and steer a course to clear the Bay. On the 17th he had the satisfaction of watching the rice vessels from Madras come to an anchor. He writes:—

"By this time the inhabitants of the town were next to starving, some absolutely had died for want, and two days more would have completed the melancholy scene, as the troops also must then have been without a grain to eat. I had by the aid of Mr. Daniel made a small provision to have enabled me to act in this last extremity, and which was about three days' rice I had with inconceivable labour got together. And with which at a hazard dictated by a regard for the public, an unwillingness to subject the credit of the British arms to a disgrace which from their situation appeared to be inevitable, and a desire, if possible, to extricate our affairs from the distress in which they are involved, I determined to force my way at all risks into the Tanjore country, as the only place with three days' provisions I had the least chance of attaining and subsisting the army in. The same motives which dictated this daring undertaking—now our distress for provisions are greatly removed—induce me to continue in my station here, until I can reinforce the army by drafts from the southward, for which purpose I have sent some vessels to Nagore to receive on board as many sepoys from the Tanjore corps as can be embarked and landed here. The situation of the enemy's army rendering it altogether impracticable to bring them by land, at any rate too dangerous for me in prudence to think of it. My army, originally small, stands greatly in need of an augmentation, having been considerably weakened by the respectable garrison left in Carangoly, and by deaths, desertions, and the other casualties incident to the military service."§

For the next four months the English army remained stationary, owing to the want of provisions and the necessary equipment. On the 14th of June a small reinforcement of troops from Bombay reached Eyre Coote, and

Attack on Chillumbrum.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 27th April 1781, Vol. III, page 763.

† *Ibid* " page 764.

‡ *Ibid* " page 764.

§ *Ibid* " page 765.

§ History of Mysur by Colonel Wilks, Vol. I, page 476.

on the 18th, with four battalions of sepoy and eight pieces of ordnance under his immediate direction, he attacked the fortified temple of Chillumbrum. The assault was vigorous, but the sepoy were beaten back with serious loss. The next morning Eyre Coote intended to renew the attack with his scanty Europeans, but hearing how strongly the enemy were fortified he withdrew his force and, after five days' marching, encamped at the village of Porto Novo situated on the river Vellaar close to the sea. On the 24th Admiral Sir Edward Hughes arrived from Madras and was visited by the General. It was resolved by them that the united efforts of the fleet and the army should be directed to the speedy capture of Chillumbrum, and orders were issued for landing the battering train. But no sooner had Eyre Coote returned to camp than tidings reached him of the presence of Hyder's whole army within a distance of a few miles. "The grounds they occupied, naturally strong and commanding, were rendered much more formidable by most of the spots that would admit of it to advantage being strengthened with front and flanking batteries erected with judgment and despatch by Hyder Ally's corps appropriated for such services. Large bodies of cavalry, who had from our arrival at Porto Novo hovered round our camp, rendered it impracticable for even a single hircarrah to return with any intelligence to be depended on of either the strength or position of the enemy's batteries. Our grand guard and other outposts were absolutely the boundary and united extent of our knowledge respecting the enemy."*

Battle of
Porto Novo.

The English General had then to choose between a march to seek a battle, and to remain dependent for his supplies on the sea. He called a council of war. It was determined to abandon the preparations for a siege, to embark the battering guns, and with four days' rice on the soldiers' backs to strike for victory. The ships were to keep near the coast to embark the troops in case of disaster. At daybreak, on the 1st of July, the English troops were in motion and soon reached an open plain. Finding it covered with the cavalry of the enemy they formed in two lines and proceeded in order of battle. They had not advanced above a mile when the enemy's batteries were discovered lying exactly on the road of march. Then Eyre Coote, whose coolness never failed him and whose military judgment seldom was at fault, halted the army for near an hour to survey the situation. "It was necessary," he wrote, "to explore, if possible, the ground on our right, in hopes of its admitting to advance from that point, by which we should avoid the enemy's direct fire from their batteries, and have a chance by gaining the left of their posts to turn or other ways command them. The principal force of their army was drawn up in the rear of their works, extending further on the plain than either eye or horizon could command, with large bodies of cavalry in every direction, and their rockets were thrown in numbers to impede and harass our movements. During this interval of unavoidable inaction, thoroughly to examine their position, we were obliged to suffer a warm cannonade. Their guns were well served and did execution; we could not afford to throw away any shot to answer them, having occasion for every round we had for more decisive service."†

After mature deliberation Sir Eyre Coote determined to move to the right to the eastward of a range of sand-hills which followed the direction of the coast at the distance of eleven hundred yards from the sea. After moving in that direction for some little distance an opening in the range was discovered through which a practicable road had been made by Hyder "for the purpose of drawing his guns to a large redoubt about half a mile from the sea. The work was far advanced, and required but another day to complete it;‡ through it we proceeded towards the field; his guns which were under cover, and his artillery uncovered in line, galled us considerably as we advanced, but a quick

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 7th September 1781, Vol. III, page 790.

† *Ibid* „ page 791.

‡ *Ibid* „ page 791.

“I determined on the movement to the right and proceeded about 9 o'clock, the two lines marching parallel to one another in that direction, consequently it only required their facing to the front to re-assume at any time their original order. Two battalions with eight pieces were ordered to form a third force, the flanks of this corps joining both lines on the left to keep some batteries in check from that quarter, which opened while we were performing the above movement.” Letter from Eyre Coote, 6th July 1781, Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 7th September 1781, Vol. III, page 791.

and forward movement seemed absolutely necessary.”* After the pass had been forced the General again developed his troops in order of battle. “The minute was critical. I had gained the flank of the enemy’s batteries, waited with impatience under a heavy fire of cannon till I had ascertained that the heights in my rear were possessed by the second line, then instantly moved on with the first as far as order and an advancing fire of artillery on our side would permit.”† The enemy’s batteries quickly retired to their lines. Here the conflict was maintained for many hours with singular obstinacy. “The bravery of our troops at length carried the point, and the first line forced the enemy’s infantry, artillery, and their cavalry to give way, obliging them to seek for safety by a retreat.”‡ To the gallantry of our native troops the General paid a handsome tribute. “The spirited behaviour,” he wrote, “of our sepoy troops did them the greatest credit, no Europeans could be steadier; they were emulous of being foremost on every service it was necessary to undertake.”§

The advantage of halting till the second line had taken up their position on the sand-hill was made manifest during the engagement. Eyre Coote writes:—“The second line obstinately disputed and with success an attack meditated on my rear by many battalions of infantry with their guns and a very large body of cavalry. The different efforts made to force and charge the rear corps of the second line were all repulsed, the heights disputed carried and kept possession of, by which the advancing corps were left at liberty to push the enemy in front advantageously. The possessing the heights also prevented their proceeding towards the sea to attempt our baggage; it was from thence covered in perfect security and unmolested.”|| Owing to the want of cavalry the English were unable to take complete advantage of the victory, but as Eyre Coote remarked:—

“Considering the trying situation this army is in, destitute of most of the common resources for carrying on service; weak draft and hardly any carriage cattle (our guns in the face of the enemy’s heaviest fire were through deep sand obliged to be drawn a full mile by the soldiers); no provisions but from day to day; pay considerably in arrears; the principal part of the Carnatic and its capital in the possession of the enemy; our armies in different parts of India having also unfortunately received checks; an enemy in great force to deal with, whose rapid success has strengthened his cause with the natives to an alarming degree; no proper force of cavalry on our side, and not half carriage sufficient for our wounded and sick. These things considered, I think I may venture to say that fairly to beat Hyder on his chosen fortified ground was as much as could be expected.”¶

The consequences of the victory proved highly important. Hyder abandoned his design on the southern provinces: Tippoo raised the siege of Wandewash; and both retired with the whole of their army to the neighbourhood of Arcot. The Bengal brigade under the skilful guidance of Colonel Pearse was marching along the coast and shortly after the battle of Porto Novo it reached Pulicat, an inlet of the sea, distant about thirty miles from Madras. Hyder detached Tippoo to intercept him, but Coote, with a wretched equipment and a small force daily diminishing from sickness, marched one hundred and fifty miles and formed a junction with the relieving force. The reinforcement added greatly to his numerical strength, but it was not accompanied by the number of draught oxen requisite to drag the guns and convey the provisions. For want of transport Coote could not attempt the two main objects of the campaign—the relief of Vellore and the siege of Arcot. Hyder had now marched the whole of his army to oppose his return and taken up his position on the field where exactly a twelvemonth before he had defeated Baillie’s detachment. The astrologers assured him it was a lucky spot and a lucky day. On the 26th of August, with rice sufficient for a few days carried on the backs of the men, Eyre Coote march-

* Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 7th September 1781, Vol. III, page 789.

† *Ibid* „ page 791.

‡ Mill, with his desire to disparage his countrymen which amounted to a disease, writes—“A panic ensued, during which the General seemed irresolute, and some officers counselled a retreat.” Munro, who was present, writes—“The General rode along the front (of the first line) encouraging everyone to patience, and to reserve their fire till they were ordered to part with it; he only waited for accounts from the second line. An aide-de-camp from General Stuart told him that he had taken possession of the sand hills; he immediately gave orders to advance, and to open all the guns. The fire was so heavy that nothing could stand before it.” *Life of Munro*, page 43.

§ Secret Select Committee’s Proceedings, 7th September 1781, Vol. III, page 792.

|| *Ibid* „ page 793.

¶ *Ibid* „ page 792.

¶ *Ibid* „ page 793.

ed once more to fight Hyder on the ground selected by himself. The result of the battle was doubtful, and both parties claimed the victory by firing a salute. The next month, however, Eyre Coote again engaged Hyder at Solinghur and totally defeated him. After relieving Vellore, the English army was compelled, from the bursting of the monsoon and want of food, to enter into cantonments near Madras. Thus closed a campaign signalised by many combats won by a handful of veterans whose courage responding to their General's genius had baffled all the plans of Hyder.

Months of toil and combat had completely shattered the health of Eyre Coote. He wrote to the Board: "With respect to myself, my state of health is so bad that for these sixteen days past I have been in a manner confined to my bed, and such is the nature of my indisposition, and so much is my constitution impaired by the fatigues and anxieties which I have undergone in one of the severest campaigns I have ever served, now about thirteen months, that I have little hopes given me of recovery but by a retirement from business. It is my intention, therefore, to embrace the first favourable opportunity of returning to Bengal for the re-establishment of my health."* The grave tidings that reached him from Vellore however led him to abandon his intention and to incur all risks to relieve it. On the 2nd of January he placed himself at the head of the army; on the 5th he was found senseless in his tent smitten by a stroke of apoplexy. "For nearly two hours, during which little hope was entertained of his recovery, the despondency painted on every countenance, and particularly on those of the native troops, whose attachment and confidence exceeded the bounds of human veneration, and who could with difficulty be restrained from transgressing the limits of decorum to satisfy their anxiety, presented altogether a scene of mournful interests. Expresses to Madras excited a corresponding degree of apprehension: an earnest entreaty from the Government urged his immediate return, 'for the preservation of a life so valuable to the State,' and Colonel Lang was ordered to take eventual charge of the army. While the Government waited with impatience for the return of the General, intelligence was brought that he had marched on the next morning for the relief of Vellore, so far recovered as to admit of his being carried in a palanquin."†

Relief of
Vellore.

Nothing of importance occurred till the 9th, when the army of Hyder appeared in great force posted on the other side of the river Poonyr. On Coote crossing the stream the enemy struck their camp and marched away, but next day they appeared again just as the convoy was passing a swamp which had to be crossed. "The attacking our baggage and convoy for Vellore was apparently their grand object, and the guarding this, not to be repaired, often required the utmost circumspection. They made their attack supported by a number of heavy guns cannonading at a great distance; just at this time, the first line had crossed a deep morass which impeded both our train, rice carts, and bullocks very much. The different brigades were immediately ordered to be posted so as to keep the enemy in check on all sides while our convoy passed the bad ground. The whole got over safe and was secured at the head of our lines."‡ That evening the English army halted four miles off Vellore and the next morning encamped beneath its walls. "The provisions and stores to be deposited in the garrison will be lodged there this afternoon, and as the object of our march is now happily completed, I shall set off on my return to-morrow morning. The spirit of the troops in this service does them the greatest honour. This is the day the commanding officer of Vellore acquainted both Government and me that it was absolutely necessary to be relieved, that he could not hold out an hour longer."§ Having relieved the garrison, Eyre Coote began his return march to Madras. When he reached the morass he again found Hyder in full force prepared to dispute his passage. He tried "by a quick movement as his heavy and numerous train of artillery would permit to get near enough our rear corps, cannonade them advantageously before they were clear of the bad ground, and also to annoy our last line while they were posted

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 2nd January 1782, Vol. III, page 825.

† Wilks' History of Mysore, Vol. I, page 503.

‡ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 25th February 1782, Vol. III, page 839.

to cover the rear. His 24 and 18-pounders, commanding a much more considerable distance than our light 6's and 12's, gives him an opportunity of attempting these distant cannonades with an idea of some success, and Hyder always takes care to be certain that there is impeding or impassable ground between his army and ours: thus he is always sure of its being optional with him to draw off his guns in safety before our army can act offensively to advantage. Our troops sustained a heavy cannonade for three hours, happily with little loss. The instant the rear and baggage had crossed the morass, I posted my baggage and stores close to an adjoining hill, leaving for their protection a strong corps with fourteen 6 and 3-pounders, and pushed on the army over high ground by the nearest possible route for the enemy's main body and guns. I moved off from the left lines, in column first, and, as the ground opened sufficiently for forming, marched on in line of battle. This was about four in the afternoon. As soon as our army was near enough to do execution, we opened an advancing fire of artillery from all parts, and had the mortification to see the enemy precipitately draw off. I term it a mortification, for if Hyder would have stood and risked the chance of war for one hour, his army would, in all probability, have been destroyed, such is the ardour and power of the handful of veterans I have the honour of commanding, but truly distressing our situation for the want of proper magazines, means of field subsistence and carriage for it."*

Three days afterwards Hyder again appeared in full force with an apparent intention of offering battle. The invitation was not declined, but after many hours spent in manœuvres intended to force an engagement the English army continued its march. On reaching Fort St. George Eyre Coote complained bitterly of the negligence of the Madras Government in not furnishing him with supplies and transport. He wrote—"I can have no dependence on the armies being found in such a manner as to enable me to conduct it to such operations as would produce the most permanent advantages and do that justice which my zeal for the interests of the Company and honour of the British arms prompts me to. I must resign the task and leave it to the execution of some one whose health and abilities may be better calculated to surmount those difficulties which I can no longer, in a due regard to the cause of the public and my honour and reputation as a soldier, pretend to contend against."†

In October 1781 the President of Fort Marlborough addressed a letter to Lord Macartney congratulating him on his accession to the Government of Madras and suggesting the capture of the Dutch settlements. He wrote—"The invasion of the Carnatic by Hyder I fear has prevented a total conquest of Dutch India. Their settlements, my lord, would have been as easily wrested from them as the Portuguese were formerly by this nation. Their forts to the eastward generally consist of a square with four bastions, without any modern works. Their garrisons chiefly of a motley tribe, without discipline, without clothing, and very little pay. Their officers without practice, generally the scum of the people, exceedingly ignorant, and dead to every feeling excepting to that of smoking and sophi drinking, and so great is the economy of their Government that scarce a garrison has a corps of more than five or six officers—many two. I confine this account to the eastern settlements. Two ships of the line with two frigates and 500 land forces would have commanded terms to any garrison, excepting Batavia. Their government is everywhere abhorred by the country people, and I am persuaded the appearance of ships alone, at some settlements, would occasion a revolt. My lord, a detachment of such a squadron during the height of the monsoon would answer two purposes, not only distressing the enemy, but recruiting your own strength, for, as Dutch soldiers consist generally of Germans, they would all enlist under your colours, and I am persuaded if Sir Edward Hughes would send this small squadron to Batavia roads, he would soon man his fleet."‡ Lord Macartney contrary to the advice of Sir Eyre Coote adopted the suggestion of his correspondent and equipped an expedition from Tanjore and Madras which was commanded by Sir Hector Munro. Negapatam, the principal settle-

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 25th February 1782, Vol. III, page 841.

Ibid „ page 812.

† „ „ page 813.

Ibid

Capture of
Negapatam and
Trincomalee.

ment of the Dutch on the Coromandal Coast, was captured in November, and two months after Trincomalee the finest harbour in Ceylon was also taken from them.

First Naval action

The day that Admiral Hughes anchored at Madras after the capture of Trincomalee, a French fleet, consisting of twelve ships of the line and eighteen others under the command of Admiral Suffrein, reached the coast. On the 15th they came in sight of Madras. The English fleet had consisted of six ships of the line, but the day after its return it had been fortunately reinforced by three ships from England. The French Admiral hoped to destroy the English squadron in the roads of Port St. George, but finding it more numerous than he expected, he "hailed away to the southward." * The English fleet in spite of the disparity in numbers followed without hesitation. The day was spent in an exciting chase after the transports. The next morning the English admiral made the signal to form in line of battle. But it was late in the afternoon before "the action became general from our centre to our rear, the commanding ship of the enemy with three others of their second line leading down on our centre, yet never at any time during the action advancing further than opposite to the *Superb's* (our centre ship) chestree and beam, and we having little or no wind and some heavy rain during that time." †

"Under these circumstances the enemy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five of ours as the van of our line, consisting of the *Moumouth*, *Eagle*, *Burford*, and *Worcester*, could not be brought into action without tacking on the enemy, and although the signal for that purpose was at the mast-head ready for hoisting, there was neither wind sufficient to enable them to tack, nor for the five ships then engaged with the enemy, hard pressed, and much disabled in their sails and rigging, to follow them, without an almost certainty of separating our van from our rear. At six in the afternoon a squall of wind from the south-east took our ships and paid them round head on to the enemy to the north-eastward, when the engagement was renewed with great spirit and alacrity from our starboard guns, and at twenty-five minutes past six the enemy hauled on their wind to the north-east and ceased firing." ‡

The anxiety of the Board was greatly relieved by receipt of the admiral's despatch, "and deeming the advantages gained by our ships in taking the *Touriston* and rescuing a number of prizes captured by the enemy, and in silencing their fire after an action of two hours and a half under a great disparity of numbers as equal to a victory, ordered that a general discharge of the artillery in the garrison of Fort William be made to-morrow morning in commemoration of this event." § The Council also wrote a letter of the warmest congratulations to Sir Edward Hughes. They stated—"In a word, we regard your action with the French fleet as the crisis of our fate in the Carnatic, and in the result of it we see that province relieved and preserved, and the permanency of the British power in India firmly established. For such important services to the nation and to the Company we, as their representatives, offer you our warmest acknowledgments and our sincerest congratulations on your success and the glory you have acquired in obtaining it." ||

The roar of the cannon proclaiming the naval victory had scarcely ceased when evil tidings reached the Board from Madras. Colonel Braithwaite, who, after the capture of Negapatam was protecting with a small detachment chiefly consisting of sepoys the territory of Tanjore, allowed himself to be surrounded by the army of Tippoo. For twenty-eight hours, the scanty force successfully sustained a desperate conflict. Then the charge of Lally and his four hundred Europeans threw the sepoys into confusion and the little army was compelled to surrender. ¶ The troops of Tippoo were reinforced by the arrival of two thousand

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 1st April 1782, Vol. III, page 851.

Ibid page 852.

Ibid page 852.

Ibid page 853.

Ibid page 854.

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¶ An account of what took place gathered from sepoys and others who escaped is given in the Secret Select Committee's Proceedings of the 22nd April 1782, Vol. III, page 855.

Frenchmen; and Cuddalore, whose whole garrison consisted only of fourteen hundred sepoys and five artillerymen, was forced to capitulate. The loss was serious because it afforded a convenient station, both naval and military, to the French. On the 10th of April the English army once again took the field. Its veteran Chief wrote to the Government at Madras—"My lord and gentlemen, I have a weight upon my shoulders that almost bears me down. Worn out in constitution, I feel myself unequal to the constant fatigues and anxieties attending my situation. I shall, however, endeavour as far as lays in my power to stem the torrent that seems almost ready to overwhelm us, not doubting of your exertions to assist my labours."* On the 24th his army reached Wandewash, where, twenty-six years before, the old warrior had defeated Lally. But Hyder refused to fight him on the old battle ground, and Eyre Coote marching in the direction of Pondicherry, found Hyder and his French auxiliaries strongly posted in the neighbourhood of Kellinoor. To attack the enemy on his chosen and fortified ground would have been a rash act, and the English general wisely determined to attempt a movement which should draw them from their position and compel them to fight on more equal terms. He therefore, on the 30th of May, marched against Arni, Hyder's great magazine, feeling certain that this would draw him from his strong position. The result verified the correctness of his conception. Early in the morning on the 2nd of June, just as the English army were about to encamp near the fort, the roar of cannon upon the rear informed the general of the presence of the enemy. His baggage was in a hollow with commanding ground all around. Soon a heavy fire opened upon him from every quarter in front. After extricating the baggage with some difficulty, and placing it well protected on the banks of a tank, Eyre Coote ordered the army to advance in two lines towards that part of the rising ground upon which the enemy appeared in greatest force. But tidings that the main body of the enemy was inclining to the right to attack his rear, compelled Eyre Coote to alter his original disposition. The manœuvre having been executed with the greatest celerity and correctness, the English army again advanced. The enemy no sooner observed it in motion towards them than they retreated. After advancing a couple of miles and having taken possession of the heights originally occupied by the enemy, the English general halted the troops in order that the baggage should be brought up under cover of the line. When this had been accomplished after an hour's halt, the English again advanced. The enemy retreated in confusion. About sunset our troops came upon a part of their rear, superintending the crossing of some of their guns in the bed of a river.

Battle of Arni.

"I ordered," wrote Eyre Coote, "a fire to be opened upon them. Upon observing more attentively it was perceived that they had halted to cover the crossing of some of their guns or tumbrils then in the bed of the river. Being at this time advanced considerably beyond the ground of encampment we had in the morning, I sent orders for the baggage to assemble at a place contiguous thereto which had been reconnoitred for it the preceding day, and for the cavalry, as soon as they could be dispensed with, to join me. In the interim I ordered the grenadiers of the 73rd, under the Hon'ble Captain Lindsay supported by the other European corps and a Bengal regiment of sepoys under Major Blaine, to push across the river and to drive the enemy from the opposite banks, which was performed with great alacrity and spirit by the whole of the corps, and with the most exemplary ardour by the grenadiers of the 73rd who led the attack, and who received a scattered fire of musketry from the enemy as they approached. They gave way on all sides and left us in possession of one gun, a long brass six-pounder, five tumbrils full of ammunition, and two carts of shot. The corps continued the pursuit with great eagerness until they had gone upwards of a mile beyond the river, but could not come up with the enemy. However, they pressed them so close that it is out of doubt could even half our small body of cavalry been employed that day with the line, or had it been possible for them after receipt of my orders to have joined me in time, not only more guns would have been taken but the whole or greatest part of Lally's corps have fallen into our hands. When the cavalry did join, the enemy had so dispersed and got to so great a distance, that no attempt could be made upon them with the smallest prospect of success."†

Want of cavalry and want of provisions prevented the English commander from taking the greatest advantage of his victory. He wrote—"It has been my misfortune ever since I took the field, on the event of every success, to have cause to lament my inability to pursue the advantages open from victory for want of a sufficiency of provisions. On the present occasion, had I pos-

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 29th April 1782, Vol. III, page 864.

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Ibid

4th July 1782, Vol. III, page 872.

sessed the means of subsistence, I could not only have driven Hyder up the Ghauts, but most probably have got hold of his grand magazine of Arni which would most assuredly have so far ended the war as to have checked his immediately returning in force to the Carnatic, whilst it would have given to this army that very support which at this moment maintains his."*

Second
Naval action.

The same express which brought the Board news of Eyre Coote's successful action near Arni, also brought a despatch from the admiral containing a graphic account of a hard fought action with the French fleet. After the first engagement the English fleet had returned to Madras at the beginning of March. Towards the end of that month the French admiral left Porto Novo to attack a fleet of English Indiamen which had appeared on the coast. Sir Edward Hughes on hearing of this movement immediately got under weigh, and the day after leaving Madras "fell in with His Majesty's ships *Sultan* and *Magnanime* and their convoy of seven of the Company's outward bound ships, and a French prize. The convoy I immediately despatched to Madras roads, and took with me the *Sultan* and *Magnanime*, steering a direct course for Trincomalee, in order to land the military stores and reinforcement of troops for that garrison, determined not to seek the enemy's squadron till that service was first performed, nor to shun them if they fell in my way."†

On the 8th April, the English admiral discovered the enemy's squadron consisting of eighteen sail, but as his first object was to relieve Trincomalee, he held on his course, and the French followed. On the 11th, Sir Edward Hughes made the island of Ceylon about fifteen miles to the southward of Trincomalee, and bore away for that place.

"On the 12th at daybreak, having altered the position of the enemy's squadron and given them the wind by bearing away, I saw them crowding all the sail they could after us, and their coppered-bottom ships coming fast up with our rear, on which I immediately determined to engage them. At 9 in the forenoon I made the signal for the line of battle ahead on the starboard tack at two cables' length distance, the enemy's squadron then bearing north by east, distant about 6 miles, and the wind at north by east, they continued manœuvring their ships and changing their position in their line till 15 minutes past noon, when they bore down to engage His Majesty's squadron; one sail of them, stretching along to engage our ships in the van, and the other seven sails steering directly on our centre, the *Superb*, with the *Monmouth* her second ahead, and the *Monarca* her second astern; at half past one the engagement began in the van of both squadrons, and at three minutes after, I made the signal for a general engagement; the French admiral and his second astern bore down on the *Superb* within pistol shot, where he continued giving and receiving a severe fire for nine minutes, and then stood on, greatly damaged, to attack the *Monmouth*, at that time engaged with another of the enemy's ships, and made room for the ships in his rear to draw up to the attack of our centre, where the engagement was warmest. At 3, the *Monmouth* lost her main and mizzen-masts, and drew out of the line to leeward of our squadron. At 40 minutes past 3, being near the shore, I made the signal for the squadron to wear and haul their wind in a line of battle ahead on the larboard tack still engaging the enemy. At 40 minutes past 5, being in shoal water and fearing the *Monmouth* might drift too near shore, I made the signal for the squadron to prepare to anchor and hauled down the signal for the line of battle. At 40 minutes past 6 the enemy's squadron in great disorder drew off to the eastward, and the engagement ceased, at which time I anchored with His Majesty's squadron in order to repair our damages, which on board the *Superb* and *Monmouth* were very great indeed, both in their hulls, masts, sails, and rigging, nor had any one ship of the squadron escaped without great injury in her hull and masts, and ail were much torn in their sails and rigging."‡

For seven days the two fleets lay within shot of each other too disabled to fight or to sail. Then the English squadron returned to Trincomalee and the French to a Dutch port. After having "refitted the several ships of the squadron, and taken on board such of our recovered men as could be serviceable, the English fleet returned, at the end of June, to Negapatam to watch the enemy's squadron."§ On the 5th of July the two fleets again came in sight, and another desperate contest took place. It ended in serious loss on both sides, but without the capture of any ships. The French were however compelled to abandon all idea of capturing Negapatam.

Treaty of
Salbai.

The admiral in his letter announcing his engagement with the French fleet congratulated the Board "most sincerely on the peace concluded between

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th July 1782, Vol. III, page 873.

† *Ibid* 23rd May 1782, „ page 864.

‡ *Ibid* „ page 864.

§ *Ibid* 4th July 1782, „ page 876.

the Company and the Mahrattas.* After long and intricate negotiations and a succession of disappointments, on the 17th of May the treaty of Salbai was concluded with Sindia. All territories conquered from the Peishwa, subsequent to the treaty of Purandhar, were to be restored; the Nizam and Hyder Ali were also to restore the territories they had taken from the English, and all Europeans, except the English and Portuguese, were to be excluded from the Mahratta dominions. Broach was given to Sindia for his humanity to the English after the convention of Wargaum, and he became guarantee for the due fulfilment of the treaty by the contracting parties. Eyre Coote on receiving intelligence of the treaty of Salbai wrote and informed Hyder what had taken place. The Mysore Chief replied with considerable sarcasm—"I have received your obliging letter wherein you observe that the news of the treaty of alliance and friendship which has taken place between the Peishwa and the English must have been known to me because my name is included therein, all of which I perfectly comprehend. Without giving me notice, how is it possible that my name can be included?"† He requested that an envoy should be sent to him with a copy of the treaty and Eyre Coote acceded to his request. The account of the interview between Hyder Ali and the envoy is of considerable interest, and raises our opinion of the frankness and determination of the Mysore Chief. After stating that he had heard that the English general was a great and gallant commander and an excellent man, Hyder plunged at once into business. It was never any wish of his to quarrel with the English, but he had been driven to it by their want of faith. The envoy urged that he was the first to infringe the treaty, and Hyder replied—

Interview between
Hyder Ali and the
English envoy.

"I will tell you who it was that transgressed the treaty. In the first place it was stipulated that we should mutually assist each other, and they agreed to lend me troops. When therefore the Mahrattas had entered my country I wrote to them a variety of ways, desiring them to send me succours. In reply they at first told me *they would send them, they would send them*, and after some time they said they had written to Europe and expected orders from thence. To this I urged that it would be a year and six months before their orders could be obtained from Europe, and of what use would their succours be then? The Governor's answer was that without orders from Europe they could do nothing. And yet at length after a long time had elapsed they pretended that till then they had received no directions. In this manner have they framed excuses to evade this article of the treaty. In the next place I told them not to go against Mahé, they said they would not, and yet they went. I know not who they are that presume to enter and raise disturbances in my boundaries."‡

The envoy attempted to justify the attack on Mahé on the ground that the English and French were at war, and that the Madras Government were acting under orders from home. In passing through Hyder's territory they did him no injury. Hyder replied—

"In those sea-ports of mine that are large, the English, French, Dutch, Danes, and all the European nations have factories. If then the English factory should there be attacked by any of the rest, ought I to sit an unconcerned spectator? Surely not; but to proceed.—A third point is, that the people at Tellicherry are always supplying Nayem Ra with guns and ammunition and encouraging him by that means to wage war with me. What treaty can subsist when such unreasonable proceedings take place on our side? What friendship can even be maintained between you and me? But, besides all this, every year or two a new Governor comes out and does whatever he takes it into his head to do without any regard to treaties or engagements, but only to what happens to strike him as advisable. In this case the Company I acknowledge is one Company, they are not divided, but while these people that come hither continue to pursue such measures, what dependence is there on a treaty? It was on these accounts that I took it into my head, that though it should cost me crores of rupees I would spend it in destroying and laying waste your country till never a lamp was left to burn there, and having formed this resolution, I wrote to my vakeel that I should certainly come into the Carnatic. But though he went and reported this, it was neither believed nor attended to. An European vakeel, however, came from Madras, and presented me, as you do now, with a fine series of arguments, telling me "*that they and I ought to be friends*," and a great deal more to that effect. In answer to all which I told him immediately, in plain terms, that I positively would visit the Carnatic, and that on his way back to Madras he would see my cavalry and artillery in readiness. With this plain message I sent him back, and I have since kept my word. I have come, and for these two years have desolated your whole country and burnt all to ashes. In future, too, you will know what I can do, for what care I if it cost me ten crores of rupees more than I have spent already; you, indeed, will suffer, but to me it is a trifle, or nothing."§

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 8th August 1782, Vol. III. page 876.

† *Ibid* 12th August 1782, " page 881.

‡ *Ibid* 26th August 1782, " page 886.

§ *Ibid* " page 887

The envoy asked what Hyder expected to gain if he spent another ten crores of rupees on the war. "Do you think the English will ever be crushed by you? Or the Carnatic become yours? Do you expect to see it even in a dream? No! be assured, this is a vain idea." Hyder replied—"What I had to do I have done. Madras only remains, and what great matter is that?"* He desired to know if the envoy had brought a copy of the treaty which he was told had been concluded between the Poona ministry and the English, and in which his name was included. The envoy remarked that the ship bringing a Persian copy had been captured, that those which had reached them were in English, and that they had not forwarded him a translation as it might prove inaccurate, but that he had furnished him with a verbal detail of the particulars of the treaty. Hyder retaliated with warmth—"I am not a boy that, after spending crores of rupees and undergoing the fatigue of two years' war, I should quit the Carnatic and set your people at liberty, merely on the strength of your information." He knew nothing of the treaty which had been signed, but before four months elapsed the English would know the value of a treaty with the Mahrattas. "Do you know," he asked, "what engagements the Poona ministry have entered into with me?" I told him "No." "Hear then," said he, "I will tell you: I was to expunge the English name from the Carnatic, and they engaged to take charge of Bengal. This was what we agreed upon, and to this day the letters that come from there are to the same effect."† As to the material assistance that the Nizam and Mahrattas could afford the English he professed to attach no importance to it: He said "You will march four coss in a day, more you cannot for your lives, and so keep trotting after me all round the country; my business in the meantime I shall take care to dispatch. I shall lay all waste around you, this will be my employment, and then *you* do your best. Bring the Nizam and the Mahrattas to help you, and see what you can do. You were all three united for a time once before, and what did it end in? And what think you will it come to in future? Why, each will go back the same way he came."‡

A second audience was held the next day, and for an hour and a half the English envoy reiterated his arguments as to the advantages which would accrue to Hyder from making peace. The Mysore Chief listened patiently and at the close of the discourse declared that it was his wish to settle the dispute and contract a hearty friendship with the English. "My friendship," he declared, "will not be like that of the Mahrattas and the Nizam. You have now, you say, secured that of the former, but take my word for it, you will discover, in four or five months more, how far it is to be relied upon. When they have not observed one dot of the treaty they made with me, why should you imagine their attachment to you will be more durable? There is no occasion for *me*, however, to tell you this: you will be sufficiently apprised of it when the time comes. A sight of the letters and papers that come constantly to me from thence, which you may see if you please, would alone convince you."§ Hyder declared himself willing to make a treaty of peace, but he refused to close the war by merely agreeing to the Poona treaty. "I have not entered," he remarked, "the Carnatic and made war here for these two years past merely for the purpose of going out as I came, and if I chose to do so, there would surely be no need of waiting for your orders; rather than do that I will stay two years more. I care not for the expense, nor do I expect to get any money out of the Carnatic. That is no object with *me*, for when the English troops formerly entered my country, I did not scruple even then to burn and lay waste the whole territory in which they marched. But *you* are undone if your country is not in a condition to yield revenue; for what avails it that you possess a fort, like that of Vellore for instance, without being able to realize anything from its dependencies?"|| He argued that as

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 26th August 1782, Vol. III, page 881.

†	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 890.
‡	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 890.
§	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 893.
	<i>Ibid</i>	„	page 894.

in the treaty with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, the English had agreed to the surrender of territory, he had a right to expect the same terms. It was in vain that the envoy urged that it was to the Mahrattas only the English had agreed to restore the country they had taken from them, and that they had not invaded nor destroyed any English possession. On this point Hyder remained firm and would listen to no overtures. Sindia had written to him as to his real intention with regard to the Poona treaty. "My answer to him is, that let that measure take place when it may, I am bent upon war."*

Eyre Coote finding that Hyder would not withdraw his demands, closed the negotiations, and with his troops returned to Madras. The time had come when he must leave the veterans he had so often led to victory. He had begun the campaign broken in health, and the toils and anxieties of war had quite undermined his constitution. The doctors informed him that his only hope of recovery was a sea voyage and change of air; and it was with no common pain that he obeyed their commands and set sail for Bengal.

Death of
Hyder Ali.

He had not long left the scene of war when tidings reached the Board of the death of his great antagonist. Worn out by the fatigues of the campaign and suffering from a cancer, Hyder Ali expired in his eightieth year. A bitter and inveterate foe of England, he possessed some of those qualities which Englishmen admire. He had received from nature excellent parts, vast muscular strength, and unflinching courage. He was a bold and skilful horseman and no one outdid him as a marksman. His education had not been such as to develope his understanding. He could not read nor write any language, but he spoke Canarese, Mahratta, Telugu, and Tamil. He was his own prime minister, and in the business of the State was most assiduous. He had the talent of choosing his servants well, and treated them with generosity if they served his ambition, but with ruthless severity if they interfered with his glory. His temper was purely intellectual and was affected neither by pity nor passion. No act was too base or cruel for him to commit in the pursuit of his aim, the prosperity and greatness of the empire which he founded. The rising power of the English threatened, he considered, its security; and he carried merciless devastation into their dominions. With singular pertinacity he warred against them for years, but at the close of life he felt he was engaged in a hopeless conflict. After his death, his son Tippoo found in the folds of his father's turban a small scrap of paper on which were written the following words: "I have gained nothing by the war with the English, but am now, alas, no longer alive. If you, through fear of disturbances in your own kingdom repair thither, without having previously concluded peace with the English, they will certainly follow you and carry the war into your country. On this account, therefore, it is better first to make peace on whatever terms you can procure, and then go to your own country."†

Tippoo, however, did not hearken to the advice of his father, and continued the war. It might have been brought to a close if the English had struck a decisive blow. But General Stuart, who succeeded to the command of the Madras army, after the departure of Eyre Coote, wasted valuable time in altercation with the civil authority. With a better equipped army than Sir Eyre Coote ever commanded, he allowed sixty days to pass without making any forward movement, and when he did move his only action was to destroy the fortifications of three forts which Eyre Coote was most anxious to preserve. The Madras Government were not desirous to conduct the war to a successful issue, but were bent on making peace on any terms. They sent an envoy to negotiate with Tippoo, and requested from the Supreme Government full and special powers to conclude a peace with Tippoo. The request aroused the anger of Hastings. He wrote:—

"After having lost the most favourable occasion that could be wished for expelling the Mysoreans out of the Carnatic, and even preventing Hyder's son from succeeding to any considerable part of the power of his father, you now request to be invested with powers to acknowledge Tippoo as the representative of Hyder, and to yield to him whatever his father in all his power, amidst all our distresses, was subjected to resign by the treaty which we had concluded with the Mahrattas.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 26th August 1782, Vol. III, page 895.

†

Ibid

10th February 1783, Vol. III, page 916.

"It avails the interests of Great Britain in India but little that your President, in a long minute on the 11th of February last, appears sensible of the happy opportunity which has been lost for the recovery of the Carnatic, and the expulsion of our natural enemies; records of laborious altercations, stinging invective, and mutual complaint are no satisfaction to the public in compensation for a neglect that may cost millions, and upon a field where immense sums had been expended to maintain our footing."*

Death of Eyre
Coote.

The uneasiness caused by the tidings from Madras led Hastings once more to appeal to the patriotism of Eyre Coote. He asked him to resume command of the army in the field. Though his health had not recovered from the fatigues and anxieties of the late campaign Sir Eyre Coote acceded to the request and embarked on board the *Resolute* for Port St. George. After a rapid and prosperous voyage the vessel was approaching Madras when at dusk four ships were perceived steering the same course. At the break of day it was discovered that they were enemies. "For the four following days, it being full moon, the night as clear as the day, the chase was most indefatigably pursued; fresh breezes were in the day, calms in the night; in the former we had, in spite of their number, the apparent heels of them, but in the calms the frigates by making use of their sweeps and tow-boats always regained their distance; during the whole chase the four ships were never nearer us than one league, nor further distant than five, till the last day, when we ran two of them out of sight."† But the suspense proved too great for the shattered constitution of Eyre Coote. "On the third day, big with the fate of the service, wrapt up with his country's cause, and feeling, I believe, his own consequence and the benefit the enemy would reap if they captured him, his family also on board, and a thousand other points crowded on his shattered frame; the trial proved too great, and the General dropt on deck, struck with a paralytic stroke; from that day, he has been as ill as mortality is capable of enduring; however, thank God, we have got him on shore, better than could have been expected, and I have hopes that he may yet recover the use of his right side, and be otherwise in time reinstated."‡ The hopes were not destined to be realised. On the 27th April 1783, Colonel Owen wrote: "Your good and great general, Sir Eyre Coote, is no more, worn down by severe illness and fatigue both of body and mind, a very martyr to the public cause. He this afternoon about five o'clock, resigned his breath, thank God, seeming without pain; his last two days were remarkably placid and serene."§ To his native land in the spring which followed his death were taken the remains of Eyre Coote and buried in the quiet village of Rockwood in Hampshire. A sumptuous monument was erected in Westminster Abbey to commemorate his worth.|| He was a brave soldier and a great captain. His military acquirements were extensive, both from study and experience, and his movements were bold, comprehensive, and cautious. With cool reflection he planned his operations and with unflinching resolution, amidst appalling difficulties, he executed them. In him daring valour was combined with patience and sweetness of temper. In the hour of danger and trial his singular serenity roused the hopes of his veterans, and his unaffected kindness and consideration for them won the affection of the European soldiers and made him the idol of the native troops.

The death of Eyre Coote was a severe blow to Hastings' plans of retrieving the desperate state of the Carnatic. But his resolution never faltered to conduct vigorously the war against Tippoo; and he wrote to the Madras Government absolutely forbidding them to make peace with the Mysore Chief. The Poona Government had, after many months' delay, ratified the Treaty of Salbai, and Hastings hoped that by the aid of the Nizam and the Mahrattas a single campaign vigorously conducted should lead to his overthrow. But General Stuart was incapable of vigorous action, and Lord Macartney was bent on making peace. When news reached India that the French had concluded peace with the English, the Governor of Madras again wrote to the Supreme Government asking for power to arrange a treaty with Tippoo. Hastings replied: "You require our consent to treat

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 11th March 1783, Vol. III, page 912.

† *Ibid* 7th May 1783, Vol. III, page 943.

‡ *Ibid* " page 913.

§ Letter from Colonel Owen, Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 7th May 1783, Vol. III, page 945.

|| Willke' Mysore, Vol. I, page 463.

with Tippoo on the basis of the Mahratta treaty, and the pacification which has lately taken place in Europe. By both these authorities peace is already formally concluded with Tippoo if he will accept of peace, and by the former the Peishwa is bound to compel him to it if he shall refuse; therefore we cannot consent to any direct and independent treaty with Tippoo, nor to any conclusive agreement whatsoever which you may make with him, except for a cessation of hostilities."* He added: "Respecting your claim on Tippoo for a reimbursement of the expenses of the war, and a compensation for the losses sustained by the invasion of the Carnatic, we can only express our astonishment at your making it the subject of a serious proposal, and of serious reproach to us for omitting it in our treaty with the Mahrattas; but, in short, had it been ever practicable, your mode of proceedings would have effectually defeated every chance of obtaining it. To solicit peace in order to claim a reimbursement for the expenses of the war is a new doctrine in negotiation which will not answer in India, and we doubt of its efficacy in any country."† The letter closes with the emphatic remark: "We have only again to repeat that we will not consent to your making any direct treaty of peace with Tippoo Saheb."‡ Lord Macartney, contrary to these express orders, continued negotiations with Tippoo, but the Mysore Chief for three months treated his proposals with silent contempt. At length the gallant capture of Cannanore by a small body of English troops,§ Treaty with Tippoo. and the want of success which attended his own arms, led Tippoo to consent to negotiate a treaty which was signed on the 11th of March 1784. The terms were a mutual restoration of all conquests, and a severe struggle of four years left neither of the contending parties with any advantage. The treaty, though it made a temporary peace, was a provocation to future war. It entailed the necessity of another conflict to correct the arrogance with which it inspired Tippoo.

Hastings objected to the form of the treaty, as it made no mention of the Nawab of Arcot and excluded him from a participation in the peace stipulated for his dominions. This the Governor-General regarded as an avowed usurpation of his right of sovereignty and subversive of the principles of justice and good faith. But he considered peace to be "an object too valuable to be rejected if it can be retained with honour," and he expressed his willingness to sign the treaty provided it were accompanied with a declaratory clause which should include the Nawab of Arcot as an essential party to it. Hastings also objected to the treaty on account of the total omission of the names of the Peishwa and Mahadajee Sindia, who had both striven to compel Tippoo to comply with the treaty of Salbai. "The Mahrattas," he wrote, "after having manifested to the world the decided part they had taken, were left exposed to the consequences of Tippoo's resentment, since the treaty was settled without any provision for them, or even allusion to them, although the peace itself was dependent on the treaty with Sindia, and was in a great measure, if not absolutely, the effect of their vigorous interposition." In order to soothe the wounded feelings of Sindia, and to reconcile him to the treaty, Hastings wrote him a letter in which after declaring that "the treaty was in every respect conformable to that of Salbai," he endeavoured to make up for the inattention which had been shewn to his Government in the form of the treaty by ascribing to him and the Mahratta State that degree of merit in the completion of it which he thought was simply their due.|| Hastings' apprehensions that the Mahrattas would be offended at their names being omitted from the treaty were not without foundation. His letter, however, dispelled the unfavourable impression created by the treaty. Hastings wrote—"Sindia felt that some declaration of this kind was necessary not only to preserve the consequence of the Mahratta Government in the eyes of its neighbours from being diminished by the inattention shewn towards it by the deputies from Fort St. George, but also to justify himself to the ministers of his superior for having led them into measures which, whatever might have been their effect with

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 4th September 1783, Vol. III, page 1015.

† *Ibid* " page 1015.

‡ *Ibid* " page 1015.

§ For detailed accounts see Selections from the Bombay State Papers (Home Series), Vol. I, page 97.

A copy of the Treaty will be found in the Selections from the Bombay State Papers, Vol. II, page 316.

Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th July 1784, Vol. III, page 1104.

regard to the English Government, had been attended with no honour to the Mahratta State, and threatened to involve it in a war with Tippoo, of which the first movements were produced by a plan concerted with us, and our participation in it assured under a new engagement, but which they were now left to conduct by themselves. So strongly was Sindia impressed with these ideas that he thought it necessary to desire that a similar declaration should be given to him by the Board.* And although it was "contrary to the forms of our constitution which prescribed that all correspondence with the princes of India should be carried on through the Governor-General singly,"† Hastings recommended the Board to authorise him to send Sindia in their name a written declaration to the same effect as that contained in his letter to him. With pardonable pride he informed the Board: "It is in some degree foreign to the present subject, yet I cannot refrain from imparting to you the pleasing satisfaction which I myself feel in observing the great and evident change that has within these few years taken place with regard to our Government in the opinions and dispositions of the principal powers of Hindustan. We seem now to have regained our proper weight in the political system, and the neighbouring States, who formerly shrunk from our advances, are eager to participate in our views, and to connect their interests with ours."‡

The great change, to use his modest words, that had taken place was due to the courage and statesmanship of Hastings. Menaced by foes on all sides, ill-supported by his masters, surrounded by colleagues who thwarted, embarrassed and intrigued against him, he contrived by his individual energies to raise the Company from being a body of merchants and adventurers into the most powerful State in the politics of India. Englishmen have grown so accustomed to being the masters of India that they have not sufficiently realised the difficulty of Hastings' task, or the genius of the man whose far sight first saw and whose brave and confident patience realised this romantic idea of his country's greatness. As he told the House of Commons:—

"The valour of others acquired, I enlarged and gave shape and consistency to the dominion which you hold there; I preserved it; I sent forth its armies with an effectual but economical hand, through unknown and hostile regions, to the support of your other possessions; to the retrieval of one from degradation and dishonour; and of the other from utter loss and subjection. I maintained the wars which were of your formation, or that of others, not of mine. I won one member§ of the great Indian confederacy from it by an act of seasonable restitution; with another|| I maintained a secret intercourse, and converted him into a friend; a third¶ I drew off by diversion and negotiation, and employed him as the instrument of peace. When you cried out for peace, and your cries were heard by those who were the object of it, I resisted this, and every other species of counteraction, by rising in my demands, and accomplished a peace, and I hope everlasting, with one great State; ** and I at least afforded the efficient means by which a peace, if not so durable, more seasonable at least, was accomplished with another.††

"I gave you all, and you have rewarded me with confiscation, disgrace and a life of impeachment."

At the time when Hastings was straining every nerve to baffle the foes of England in India, and his efforts were about to be crowned with success, news reached him of the severe censures which had been passed on his conduct by the Secret Committee of the House of Commons. This was speedily followed by intelligence of the subsequent resolution of the House that it was the duty of the Directors to recall him. The Court of Directors decided that it was expedient to remove him, but the Court of Proprietors rescinded their resolution. In December 1782 Hastings wrote a letter to Lord Shelburne who had succeeded Lord Rockingham as prime minister, in which he vigorously defended his foreign policy. He stated with truth that the invasion of the Carnatic was

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th July 1784, Vol. III, page 105.

† *Ibid* " page 105

‡ *Ibid* " page 105.

§ The Nizam.

|| Moodjee Boosla.

¶ Mahadejee Sindia.

** The Mahrattas.

†† Tippoo Sultan

due to a great confederacy against all the British Governments, and that he had no concern in the origin of the Mahratta war, but "the prosecution of it was mine, and the Malwa peace is exclusively mine." "Forgive me," he writes, "the boast when I add that I have been the instrument of rescuing one Presidency from infamy and both from annihilation." Fearing that his conduct at Benares might be misrepresented and misconstrued, he forwarded to Lord Shelburne a copy of the narrative which he had ordered to be printed of what had taken place. "It may perhaps prove," he wrote, "a gratification of curiosity to your lordship to receive a book which is, every process of it, the manufacture of the country." Hastings' fears were well-founded. Fox and Burke, annoyed at the Court of Proprietors' refusal to recall him, had begun to attack the Benares case with all the invectives they could command. In February 1782 took place the famous coalition between Fox and North, and the combined parties defeated the ministry on a motion concerning peace. The same month Hastings received a copy of the resolution of the Court of Directors condemning his conduct in the affairs of Benares as a breach of treaty, and justifying Cheyt Sing. He regarded the resolution not only in the light of a personal insult, but as an incentive to the princes of India to throw off the authority of the Company and assassinate their servants. For the sake of his masters he had shrunk from no danger and no responsibility, and they had condemned him. It would have been more profitable to him to have followed a less arduous and safer course. The words he wrote to a friend reveal how deeply he felt the wrongs done to him:—

Coalition between
Fox and North.

Hastings' defence of
his policy.

"I could have guarded myself most effectually against their censures by avoiding all responsibility, and covering myself with their orders in whatever I did. I could have kept their troops and treasure at home, when the Presidency of Bombay was engaged in schemes to which it was confessedly unequal. I could have suffered the disgrace of the unhappy affair of Wargaum to remain an indelible stain on the British name. It was no concern of mine. I could have suffered the Carnatic to fall an easy prey to Hyder, when Francis opposed the measures which I suggested for its preservation, and I could have justified it on the principle of self-preservation, the prior care due to the first possessions of the Company, the want of authority from home, the season of the year, which would render it an act of madness to send their troops to perish by sea, and by a fair estimate of ways and means, which would prove that we had not assets for such an enterprise. I could have acquiesced in the violations of faith, which the Government of Madras were guilty of towards Nizam Ali, and contented myself with protesting against it. I could have seen Chimnajeeloy Bengal waste, for it was scarce in his power to avoid it, and nothing but my private aid prevented it. I could have sat quietly down when our ordinary resources would yield no more supplies for the war, and ruin threatened. What business had I at Benares?"

"But if I had observed this discreet and safe conduct, let me ask not you, my friend, but my most rancorous enemies, what would have been the state of the Company, or whether it is likely that it would at this time have existence?"

"In the meantime I could have provided an ample fortune for myself, by means which no one could have assumed to hurt or discredit me."

In a letter to the Court of Directors Hastings carefully and eloquently reviewed his whole policy. After apologizing for whatever might appear offensive in it, he declared that he should have submitted in silence to the severest expressions of censure had they been no more than expressions and applied to real facts. "But when the censures are not applied to real facts and are such as substantially affect my moral character, I should myself be an accomplice in the injury if I suffered the slightest imputation to remain which it was in my power to efface." He refuted by cogent arguments the statement that Cheyt Sing was an independent prince and that he was guilty of any breach of faith in his treatment of him. He then proceeded with great earnestness to deprecate the suggestion of the Court to restore Cheyt Sing, and declared that he would immediately resign if Cheyt Sing were reinstated at Benares. Then enlarging with considerable force on the services he had done the Company, and the patience and temper with which he had submitted to all the indignities which had been heaped upon him, he requested the Court to obtain the early nomination of a person to succeed him, and declared his intention to resign their service as soon as he could do it without prejudice to their affairs.

Hastings declares
his intention to
resign.

When Hastings wrote this letter, he fixed upon the beginning of the year for his departure to England, but shortly after despatching it an event occurred which compelled him to alter his plans. The Nawab of Oude and

Oude affairs.

his ministers had appealed against the conduct of Mr. Bristow, the Resident, and "impelled me," wrote Hastings, "by every tie of justice, honour and public duty to sacrifice every consideration that regarded myself alone, if necessary, for his redress." It was a costly sacrifice, for it entailed upon Hastings separation from his wife. His love and admiration for her were unbounded. There was not such a being in the world, as long as she was by his side, nothing could come amiss to him: the cares and fatigues of the day made no impression on his spirits. When she had left he wrote: "I miss you in every instant and incident of my life, and everything seems to wear a dead stillness around me; I come home as to a solitude." His greatest comfort in her absence was to read her letters. "It contains your words and your thoughts, and I had rather brood over the melancholy passions excited by it, than be a sharer in the most pleasing entertainments that nature or art could afford me." The only action in his lonely and stormy life concerning which a doubt seems to have ever crossed his mind was his resolve to part from her. "I think we have ill-judged. The reflection has often for an instant occurred to me that we were wrong, but I constantly repressed it. I urged everything that could fix the resolution beyond the power of recall, and felt a conscious pride in the sacrifice I was preparing to make."* The state of his wife's health laid him under the stern necessity of sending her to England: the state of India compelled him to remain at his post. "I will resign this thankless office," said he, "on the first favourable opportunity; but I will not be driven from it either by the folly of my subordinates or the injustice of my superiors. I have saved India, in spite of them all, from foreign conquest, neither will I quit my post until the internal affairs of this great country shall have been restored to something like order." Bengal and Behar was threatened with famine, and Hastings appointed a committee to take measures for the relief of the people. He also applied the whole energies of his mind to the ever-ungracious task of retrenchment and reform. The state of affairs in Benares and Oude caused him grave anxiety. He had always regarded Oude as our bulwark against foreign aggression, and its prosperity and good government as essential to the safety of our own dominion. From the first moment that he had become Governor-General he had courted an Oude alliance with unceasing assiduity, and he had sedulously cultivated the friendship of the Nawab Shuja Doula and his son. "His titular rank of Vizier of the Empire," wrote Hastings, "rendered him a conspicuous object of view to all the States and Chiefs of India, and on the moderation and justice with which the British Government in Bengal exercised its influence over him, many points most essential to its political strength and to the honour of the British name depended."† Hastings was of opinion that Bristow had treated the Nawab neither with moderation nor justice. When the latter met him at Chunar he had persuaded him to agree to the admission of the assistance of the Resident in the charge then specially given to his minister of his finances and public disbursements. Dissatisfied with the conduct of Mr. Middleton, to whom this charge was first committed, Hastings nominated Mr. Bristow to it in his stead. "To this I had various and powerful inducements. The principal was the reiterated order of the Court of Directors for his appointment; secondly the wish of the other Members of the Council urging it; thirdly, their declaration of uniting to support my authority, and other concurrent circumstances removing the objection which had hitherto opposed it; fourthly, a reliance on the personal gratitude of Mr. Bristow for my optional nomination of him to so important a trust; and fifthly, his assurances and a pledge given me for the performance of them in which I then reposed a religious confidence."‡ This confidence, Hastings considered, Bristow had betrayed. He had enjoined him to study on every occasion to conciliate the good-will of the Nawab and "to shew him every ostensible and external mark of respect," but the Resident treated the Prince as a dependant, and prescribed to him "the number of horses which he should be allowed to use and the dishes which should be cooked for his table."§ He also interfered in every department of the State. The Nawab com-

* "Echoes from Old Calcutta," page 302.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 29th September 1783, Vol. III, page 1018.

‡ *Ibid* " page 1019.

§ *Ibid* 27th December 1783, Vol. III, page 1

plained to the Board, and they requested Bristow to answer the charges brought against him. Six weeks having elapsed without a reply being received from him, Hastings moved that Bristow be recalled, the office of Resident dissolved, and the Nawab and his Minister made responsible for the payment of the Company's debt. All the proposals were, after considerable discussion, rejected. Bristow in due course of time replied and alleged that he was only acting according to the orders of the Governor-General who insisted on the claims of the Company being satisfied. Hastings was a statesman who identified his own personality with the objects of his administration, and the defence of Bristow was regarded by him in the light of a personal insult. He was accustomed to command and to be obeyed. The temerity of Bristow aroused his anger, and the opposition of his colleagues increased it. He knew they did not possess the ability or the courage of his old opponents, and that they had only plucked up spirit to attack him when his recall was imminent. He felt that he had not that collected firmness of mind which he once possessed "and which gave such a superiority in my contests with Clavering and his associates. My last year's sickness has left a debility upon my constitution which I cannot remove, nor shall I, till I try a colder climate."* He however possessed a sufficient amount of the old imperious vigour to baffle the spirit of cabal in his Council. He told them that he held them solely responsible for the state of anarchy in Oude since they would neither enforce his instructions nor give Mr. Bristow others. This alarmed them. After many discussions they offered to recall Mr. Bristow if the Vizier liquidated his enormous debt to the Company by bills on creditable bankers "payable half in one month and the remaining half in two months from the date of Mr. Bristow's surrender of his office to the Vizier." And they added—"We shall agree to this arrangement on the express condition that the Governor-General will hold himself responsible to the Company and the public for the faithful performance of these engagements on the part of the Vizier and his ministers, as well as for the security of the internal peace of the country, to maintain which and enforce these arrangements we shall give him our utmost support."† Hastings immediately replied, rejecting the offer. He pointed out that it was impossible for the Vizier to pay even half of the sum owed in the time mentioned, and he added—"Nor if the Nawab Vizier would engage to pay it and I believed him capable of paying it would I 'hold myself responsible to the Company and to the public for the faithful performance of such an engagement,' because I do not think it consistent with truth or the regard which every man ought to pay to his own reputation to bind himself to the performance of acts which depend solely on the ability and will of another."‡ His colleagues replied "that they could not imagine nor suggest that the Governor-General should be answerable in his private fortune for so large a sum or that his responsibility should extend further than those obligations which constitute responsibility in a decided recommendation of any measure contrary to the general opinion of the majority of the Board."§ Hastings gladly consented "to be specially answerable for the propriety of the measure," and the Board resolved to recall Bristow, and withdraw the Company's Residency from the Court of Oude. "I have indeed conquered," wrote Hastings, "but I feel little inclination to triumph in my victory; for my hands are yet fettered, and such is the wretched state of the Vizier's affair, that nothing can be more discouraging than the prospect before me. If the Nawab Vizier shall desire me to come to his assistance I shall offer it to the Board, and shall be better pleased if they refuse than if they assent to it. Yet I will do what I can to gain their assent."|| A short time afterwards he informed a friend that he had written a minute tendering his services to go to Lucknow and he added—

"I know that I can do much more if I am myself the immediate agent, than I can by distant influence and a delegated authority, but I may fail, for most wretched is the state of the Vizier's dominions, and I may lose my reputation in the consequences of it. On the other hand, I may be the instrument of retrieving it and of paying the debt which is due

* Memoirs of Warren Hastings by Gleig, Vol. III, page 122.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 27th December 1783, Vol. III, page 1050.

‡ *Ibid* " page 1051.

§ *Ibid* page 1052.

|| Memoirs of Warren Hastings by Gleig, Vol. III, page 14.

from the Nawab to the Company, and if I do, I shall close my service with glory and leave a lasting good name behind me, whatever reproaches the inventive malice of my countrymen may cast upon me for having saved the national interests and honour from the ruin which, but for my exertions, would have fallen on both."*

arture

The Council after some discussion gave an unwilling assent to Hastings' proposal to proceed to Lucknow. In January 1784 his wife sailed alone for England, and in the following month he started on his journey to Oude. He made a stay of five days at Benares and sent to the Council a long and minute account of the wretched condition of that province.† "From the confines of Buxar to Benares," he wrote, "I was fatigued and followed by the clamours of the discontented inhabitants." Their discontent and distress was due to a long continued drought and to "a defective if not a corrupt and oppressive administration."‡ The land agents and tax-gatherers exacted from the proprietors of the actual harvest a large increase in kind on their stipulated rent. Those who held their fields by the tenure of paying one-half of the produce of their crops were robbed of nearly the whole by false measurements: and from those whose engagements were for a fixed rent in money, the half or a greater proportion was taken in kind. Trade was paralysed by the extortion and oppression of the custom-house authorities. "The exorbitant rates," the Governor-General wrote, "exacted by an arbitrary valuation of the goods, the practice of exacting duties twice on the same goods, first from the seller and afterwards from the buyer, and the vexatious disputes and delays drawn on the merchants by these oppressions were loudly complained of, and some instances of this kind were said to exist even at the very time when I was in Benares. Under such circumstances we are not to wonder if the merchants of foreign countries are discouraged from resorting to Benares, and if the commerce of that province should annually decay."§ Hastings forwarded to the Council an elaborate plan for reforming the administration, for making the Raja more directly interested in its working, and for the appointment of fresh officials. The Board resolved "that the Governor-General be authorized to carry into execution the plan submitted, the Governor being responsible for its effect, as a temporary expedient."||

From Benares Hastings proceeded to Lucknow. He first devoted himself to the intricate task of adjusting the accounts between the Vizier and the Company. It was a matter to which he had devoted particular attention and he succeeded in persuading the Vizier to give his consent to an equitable arrangement. After adjusting the accounts, by wise handling of the finances and effecting considerable retrenchments he put the Nawab in a position to pay his debts. He also took great trouble in arranging a revenue settlement for five years which would afford relief to the husbandmen suffering from years of scarcity. The military establishment of the Nawab had been both inefficient and costly and he placed it on a regular and economical basis. After leaving Lucknow he discovered that the Vizier suffered a hardship "from the army subsidy being kept up at its original rate although the number of troops employed by us for the defence of his dominions has been greatly reduced."¶ The reduction was due to the strength of each regiment being reduced from one thousand to seven hundred men. Hastings wrote: "Neither the Vizier nor any of his ministers have ever mentioned to me this deficiency, but it is not the less our duty to take it into consideration. In all our adjustments of accounts with the Vizier for many years back, we have been regulated by the strictest regard to justice, and the Vizier on his part has on every occasion relied most implicitly on our justice as well as on the accuracy of our Accomptant-General. Let us then confirm that confidence which is so happily reposed in us by pointing out mistakes even although we must be losers by correcting them."**

To remedy the injustice Hastings proposed that the cost of the regiment at Lucknow, for which the Vizier paid a separate amount, should be included in

* Memoirs of Warren Hastings by Gleig, Vol. III, page 143.

† The minute will be found in Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 20th April 1784, Vol. III, page 1082.

‡ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 20th April 1784, Vol. III, page 1082.

§ *Ibid* " page 1083.

|| *Ibid* " page 1099.

¶ *Ibid* 1st November 1784, Vol. III, page 1113.

** *Ibid* " " page 1114.

that of the troops for which the original subsidy was settled. The proposal was vetoed by the Council, and they also repealed the order given by Hastings that a costly detachment of the Company's troops stationed at the Nawab's expense upon his northern frontier should be recalled.*

Finding that his colleagues were bent on maintaining the detachment, Hastings asked their consent to the Nawab lending it to the son of the Moghul Emperor to assist him in the expulsion of the Sikhs from the territories of which they had lately possessed themselves in the neighbourhood of Delhi. The Governor-General regarded the growing power of the Sikhs as a grave danger. He wrote—"A new source of serious contemplation has arisen from a nearer quarter, namely, that of the Sikhs, a people who from a mean sect of religious schismatics have rapidly grown into the members of a dominion extending from the most western branch of the Attock to the walls of Delhi. They are by their bodily frame and habits of life eminently suited to the military profession; but this propensity is qualified by a spirit of independence which is a great check to its exertion. Every village has its separate and distinct ruler acknowledging no control but that of the people of his own immediate community, who in their turn yield him little more than nominal submission."† Conquest and a man of superior capacity and enterprise aided by the spirit of religious enthusiasm might, however, weld them into a nation. The extinction of the Moghul Empire which was rapidly approaching to its fall he considered might give birth to a new dominion. "We are too apt," he wrote, "to despise the danger which we have not experienced, and to conclude that what has not happened in the ordinary course of events never will happen. On such a presumption my conclusions may expose me to the ridicule of those who may deem them the mere effusions of a wild imagination. I am willing to submit to this consequence if the events which I have foreboded shall be prevented by seasonable means of opposition; but I trust to time, and that not distant, for verifying my prediction if this people is permitted to grow into maturity without interruption."‡ Time verified the prediction. The genius of one man, the ruler of a petty tribe, welded the Sikhs into a great kingdom, and established a power greater than that of Sivaji and Hyder Ali against which we had to struggle for the mastery of India.

Hastings' proposal to aid the son of the Moghul Empire in a campaign against the Sikhs.

The Prince, whom Hastings was anxious to aid in a campaign against the Sikhs, had escaped in disgrace from the court of Delhi. The Moghul emperor, his father, was a mere puppet in the hands of his minister Afrasiab Khan. Afrasiab Khan had offered to enter, under the name and sanction of the Emperor, into a treaty with the English and the Vizier, but Hastings rejected the offer because "so far from promoting the wishes of the King, we should have to encounter the secret opposition of himself and his ancient servants, and perhaps the declared enmity of many other factions now lying dormant."§ The Governor-General had, however, expressed the opinion "that it would be for the credit and interest of the English Government to exert their endeavours to relieve the Shah from the thralldom of his ministers and to establish his authority at least in his dominions," and when the fugitive Prince prayed his assistance, he was not unwilling to grant it. He wrote—"Fallen as the House of Timur is, it is yet the relic of the most illustrious line of the Eastern World; its sovereignty is universally acknowledged, though the substance of it no longer exists, and the Company itself derives its constitutional dominions from its ostensible bounty." The wretched state of the House of Timur appealed to his imperial imagination, and he considered it not only a generous, but a wise policy to prevent its extinction. In the confusion which was certain to follow its fall he considered some new adventurer might start up from the general mass who would constitute a new dominion and join to it all the powers and prerogatives of the past. Hastings felt that those who had the Moghul Emperor in their hands must become the legitimate masters of India, and he wished to gain for his country that position. "I do not want to send armies into the field," he wrote, "nor to disturb the repose which

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 1st November 1784, Vol. III, page 117.

† *Ibid* 14th December 1784, " page 124.

‡ *Ibid* 11th May 1784, Vol. III, page 1090.

§ *Ibid* " page 1089.

our Government enjoys and requires and the fatigues and losses which it has sustained from a long and accumulated warfare. I want no more than the power to dictate, and I am persuaded that I shall have no need to enforce it."* The Board, however, were unwilling to adopt so bold a policy and refused to countenance any expedition in favour of the Moghul Emperor.

to Not only by arms and by diplomacy did Hastings extend the influence of England, but also by commerce. It was his capacious mind that first conceived the plan of opening friendly commercial intercourse between the people over whom he ruled and the natives of the lofty table-land behind the snowy peaks to the north. He had when Governor of Bengal begun a friendly correspondence with the rulers of Tibet and Bhutan, and on the 13th of May 1774 he sent the first British mission to Tibet under Mr. George Bogle. On the 26th of February 1775, the Governor-General laid before the Board a letter from Bogle informing them of his interview with Teshoo Lama, and an interesting memorandum on the trade of Thibet. "The principal articles of merchandise," he writes, "between Bengal and Thibet are broad-cloth, atter, skins, neel (indigo), pearls, coral, amber, and other beads, chauk, spices, tobacco, sugar, Malda stripped sattins and a few white cloths chiefly coarse; the return is made in gold dust, musk and cow-tails."† When Bogle returned from Thibet, he found Francis, Clavering, and Monson in power, and as he was a *protégé* of Hastings, he could expect no favour from them. The changes made in the administration had deprived him of all his appointments, and he had no employment but to act as one of Hastings' assistants. In December 1775, the Governor-General proposed that Bogle be allowed a salary of Rs. 1,200 a month during the time he was employed on the mission, and the motion was carried. It was a small sum considering the good work done and the amount which men situated like Bogle made in those days. When Hastings on the death of Monson regained his power, he once more turned his attention to establishing free commercial intercourse between Thibet and Bengal. On the 9th of April 1779 George Bogle was appointed to proceed again to Bhutan and Thibet "for the purpose of cultivating and improving the good understanding subsisting between the Chiefs of those countries and the Government, and to endeavour to establish a free and lasting intercourse of trade with the Kingdom of Thibet, and the other States to the northward of Bengal." The Lama, whose respect and confidence Bogle had won, was then on a visit to Peking, and he desired Bogle to go round by sea to Canton, promising to obtain the Emperor's pass for him to proceed and join him in the capital. The death of the Lama and of Bogle caused for a time the intention of sending a mission to be abandoned. But when Hastings got letters from Thibet informing him that the soul of the late Lama had entered and animated the body of an infant, he proposed to send a second deputation to Thibet. The Board consented, and Mr. Charles Turner was appointed to proceed on the mission. On his journey to Lucknow Hastings met at Patna Turner returning from Thibet, who handed him a report on the results of his mission and also a narrative of his interview with the young Lama.‡ "Teesho Lama," he wrote, "is at this time about eighteen months of age. He did not speak a word but made most expressive signs and conducted himself with astonishing dignity and decorum. His complexion is of that hue which in England we should term rather brown but not without colour. His features good, small black eyes, an animated expression of countenance, and altogether I thought him one of the handsomest children I had ever seen."§ The description of the interview between the English Envoy and the Great Lama, the high priest of millions of beings, is inexpressibly sad. "The little creature turned, looking steadfastly towards me with the appearance of much attention while I spoke, and nodded with repeated but slow movements of the head as though he understood and approved every word but could not utter a reply. The parents, who stood by all the time, eyed their son with a look of affection, and a smile expressive of heartfelt joy at the propriety of the young Lama's conduct. His whole regard was turned to us, he was silent and sedate, never once looking towards

Turner's Mission.

* Memoirs of Hastings, Gleig, Vol. III, page 193.

† Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 24th February 1775, Vol. III, page 254.

‡ Account of an embassy to the Court of the Teeshoo Lama in Thibet by Captain Samuel Turner.

§ Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 18th April 1784, Vol. III, page 1077.

his parents, as if under their influence at the time, and with whatever pains his manners may have been formed so correct, I must own his behaviour on this occasion appeared perfectly natural and spontaneous, and not directed by any action or sign of authority."* The next day the envoy again visited Teesho Lama to present some curiosities he had brought for him. "He was very much struck with a small clock and had it held to him watching for a long time the revolutions of the minute hand. He admired it, but with gravity, and without any childish emotion."† When he paid his last visit to the Lama, Turner "received his despatches for the Governor-General and from his parents two pieces of satin for the Governor with many compliments. They presented me with a vest lined with lamb-skins, making me many assurances of a long remembrance, and observing that at this time Teesho Lama is an infant and incapable of conversing, but they hoped to see me again when he shall come of age. I replied that by favour of the Lama I might again visit this country."‡ Turner never had another opportunity of visiting the country and no English official has since held personal intercourse with the rulers of Thibet. So completely was the policy of opening commercial intercourse between India and the trans-Himalayan regions abandoned that the very history of the Hastings' negotiations was forgotten, and most of the valuable records of the Thibet and Bhutan Missions have been lost.§

The expeditions of Bogle and Turner to Thibet were not the only voyages of discovery which Hastings despatched. He caused the harbours and rivers of Cochin China to be surveyed, and directed the explorer to penetrate as far as he could into the interior. He also had the shores of the Red Sea explored, with the view of opening, by that line, a more direct and rapid communication between England and India. He also collected much valuable information regarding the Kingdom of Ava and its adjoining districts. His untiring energy led him not only to explore the countries of the East, but also the languages of Asia. He was familiar with Arabic and Persian. Though unacquainted with Sanskrit he encouraged learned pundits to settle in Calcutta, and gave them support while they pursued their researches. The Asiatic Society and the Mahomedan College at Calcutta are splendid monuments of his zeal for the advancement of Oriental learning and education.

The time was drawing near for him to leave the land for whose welfare he had laboured with unwearied energy. In November 1784, Hastings returned to Calcutta from Lucknow. On his journey down he received letters from home announcing that Pitt had dissolved Parliament, and that the coalition party had been defeated at the elections. Major Scott told him that the Lord Chancellor considered that the ministry ought to give him a peerage and a red ribbon, and that His Lordship did not know a man who cut so great a figure upon the stage of the world as Hastings. To his other extraordinary actions must be added that of giving a ministry to Great Britain, for he had put an end to the late ministry as completely as if he had taken a pistol and shot them through the head one after another. Pitt had also declared that he looked upon Hastings to be a very great and indeed a wonderful man. The news of the downfall of his foes, and the flattering terms in which the new ministers spoke of him, led Hastings to hope that he would be permitted to pursue his policy without interruption from home, or obstruction from his colleagues. He wrote to his wife: "I shall abide by the resolution which I communicated to you in my letter of the 24th of September, that is to say, if I am required by authority to stay, and have the powers given me which ought to belong to my office, and proper objects are assigned for my stay, I will stay, however repugnant it may be to my own feelings, or hazardous to my health." Hastings had about this time also heard of Pitt's intention to introduce an East India Bill, and he trusted that it would grant him the powers he had so long desired. On the 20th of December he received a packet "by way of Bussorah" which put an end to all his hopes and

Hastings' return to Calcutta.

* Secret Select Committee's Proceedings, 13th April 1784, Volume III page 1080.

† *Ibid* " page 1081.

‡ *Ibid* " page 1081.

§ Narrative of the Mission of George Bogle to Thibet by Clements R. Markham. Mr. Markham writes—"All attempts to find adequate materials among the records at Calcutta or the India Office have failed." A note in the Consultations informs us that the original journal was sent to the Directors. I however hope that a careful search among the bundles in the Foreign Office may yet bring to light a copy of the journal.

hesitations. It brought him a copy of Pitt's Bill and of his introductory speech which Hastings considered more inimical to him than all the onslaughts of Fox and Burke. On the 27th December he wrote : " I have seen, read, and abstracted Mr. Pitt's Bill. It has determined me. I shall make an early trial of my colleagues on the affairs of Oude and if they will engage to abide by my engagements there, I will depart as soon as the *Barrington* is ready. She is now loading." The dream of his life was shattered; and in the account of his stewardship which he wrote on his voyage home he poured out his feelings. " Yet may I feel a regret to see that hope which I had too fondly indulged, and which I had sustained during thirteen laboured years with a perseverance against a succession of difficulties which might have overcome the constancy of an abler mind, of being in some period of time, however remote, allowed to possess and exercise the full powers of my station, of which I had hitherto held little more than the name and responsibility; and to see with it the belief, which I had as fondly indulged, that I should become the instrument of raising the British name, and the substantial worth of its possessions in India, to a degree of prosperity proportioned to such a trust, both vanish in an instant, like the illusions of a dream; with the poor and only consolation left me of the conscious knowledge of what I could have effected, had my destiny ordained that I should attain the situation to which I aspired, and that I have left no allowable means untried, by which I might have attained it."

Close of Hastings' Administration.

On the 13th of January 1785 Warren Hastings delivered to the Board a minute in which he informed them of his intention to relinquish the service, if his colleagues would give him an absolute and unqualified promise to carry out the late arrangements made with the Nawab Vizier. Having received from his colleagues an explicit answer agreeing to abide by the agreement, he wrote a formal resignation of his powers to his old masters. He told them with perfect truth that no man ever served them with a zeal superior to his own.

On the 1st of February, Hastings attended for the last time a meeting of the Council over which he had presided for thirteen years, and after wishing his colleagues a warm farewell and paying a handsome tribute of praise to those who had aided him in the heavy task of government, he surrendered the keys of office and brought to a close his great administration. Had he been guilty of the crimes laid to his charge, so unwearied was the pertinacity and malice of his enemies, that it cannot be doubted they would have been able to furnish more satisfactory evidence of his guilt. Of that guilt they never produced any proof. In answer to the charge of having oppressed the natives by extortions and exactions, there are the testimonials of all ranks of people in India in his favour. As he told his judges : " It is very seldom that mankind are grateful enough to do even common justice to a fallen minister; and I believe there never was an instance in the annals of human nature, of an injured people rising up voluntarily to bear false witness in favour of a distant and persecuted oppressor." Burke told the House of Lords that the testimonials were extorted, and " that the hands were yet warm with the thumb-screws that had been put on them." It is incredible that Hastings' successor Lord Cornwallis, a man of the noblest and gentlest character, would have countenanced acts of oppression and cruelty to gain petitions in favour of Hastings. In fact, when Hastings' attorney informed him that the natives of India were desirous of bearing testimony to the merits of Hastings, and requested permission that the officers of Government might have authority to transmit to the Governor-General in Council any testimonials tendered by the natives, Lord Cornwallis caused a cautious letter to be circulated among all the Collectors and Residents which stated : " With this request the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to comply, and I have therefore to inform you, that should any such address be tendered to you, you are at liberty to receive and forward them to me. The liberty now accorded is merely to receive and transmit testimonials when voluntarily offered; and you are not to deduce any inference from it that you are authorised to exercise any further interference in this business."* Macaulay, while admitting that Hastings was beloved by the

* " Debates of the House of Lords on the events delivered on the trial of Warren Hastings Esquire. Proceedings of the East India Company in consequence of his Acquittal and Testimonials of the British and Native Inhabitants of India relative to his character and conduct whilst he was Governor-General of Fort William in Bengal." Debrett M.C.C.X.C.VII.

people whom he governed, attaches little or no importance to the addresses because they may have been due to the influence of English officials. However, we find in the case of Benares that the Resident, Jonathan Duncan,* a man conspicuous for his courage and high mindedness, refused to forward the addresses to Government on the ground that "as the addresses have no connection with the business of the Company there is no necessity that they (the inhabitants) should come or send to me. Let them do what they think proper." In their address the inhabitants of Benares stated: "He laid the foundations of justice and the pillars of the law. In every shape, we, the inhabitants of this country, during the time of his administration, lived in ease and peace. We are therefore greatly satisfied with, and thankful to him. As the said Mr. Hastings was long acquainted with the modes of government in these regions, so the inmost purpose of his heart was openly and secretly, indeed, bent upon those things which might maintain inviolate our religious advances, and persuasions, and guard us in even the minutest respect from misfortune and calamity. In every way he cherished us in honour and credit." The Pundits and other Brahmins of Benares sent him an address in which they wrote: "Whenever that man of vast reason, the Governor-General, Mr. Hastings, returned to this place, and people of all ranks were assembled, at that time he gladdened the heart of every one by his behaviour, which consisted of kind wishes, and agreeable conversation, expressions of compassion for the distressed, acts of politeness, and a readiness to relieve and protect every one alike without distinction. To please us dull people, he caused a spacious music gallery to be built, at his own expense, over the gate-way of the temple of Veemaswar, which is esteemed the head jewel of all places of holy visitation. He never at any time, nor on any occasion, either by neglecting to promote the happiness of the people, or by looking with the eye of covetousness, displayed an inclination to distress any individual whatsoever." The inhabitants of Murshedabad also forwarded an address in which they stated that "the whole period of Mr. Hastings' residence in this country exhibited his good conduct towards the inhabitants. No oppression nor tyranny was admitted over any one. He observed the rules of respect and attention to ancient families. He did not omit the performances of the duties of politeness and civility towards all men of rank and station when an interview took place with them. In affairs concerning the government and revenues, he was not covetous of other men's money and property; he was not open to bribery. He restricted the farmers and officers in their oppressions in a manner that prevented them from exercising that tyranny which motives of self-interest and private gain might instigate them to observe towards the ryots and helpless. He used great exertions to cultivate the country, to increase the agriculture and the revenues. He transacted the business of the country and revenues without deceit, and with perfect propriety and rectitude. He respected the learned and wise men, and in order for the propagation of learning he built a college, and endowed it with a provision for the maintenance of the students, in so much that thousands reaping the benefits thereof offer up their prayers for the prosperity of England, and for the success of the Company." Quotations of a similar nature from other addresses might be multiplied to any extent. But addresses are not the only evidence we have of the honour and esteem in which Hastings was held by the natives of India. Burke declared in Westminster Hall that under the government of Mr. Hastings the country itself, all its beauty and glory had ended in a jungle for wild beasts.† A Brahmin pilgrim on the banks of the Nerbudda declared that "he had lived under many different Governments and travelled in many countries, but had never witnessed a general diffusion of happiness equal to that of the natives under the mild and equitable administration of Mr. Hastings."‡ The testimony of the Brahmin pilgrim was confirmed by Lord

* Jonathan Duncan became Governor of Bombay in 1795, and, after having ruled the Presidency with great wisdom for fourteen years, he died on the 11th of August 1811 beloved by men of all classes and creeds.

† "My Lords, you have seen the very reverse of all this under the government of Mr. Hastings; the country itself, all its beauty and glory ending in a jungle for wild beasts. You have seen flourishing families reduced to implore that pity which the poorest man and the meanest situation might very well call for." (Burke's Speeches and Correspondence, Vol. II, page 438.)

‡ Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II, page 70.—"I cannot forget the words of this respectable pilgrim; we were near a banian tree in the Darbar court when he thus concluded his discourse:—'As the burr-tree, one of the noblest productions in nature, by extending its branches for the comfort and refreshment of all who seek its shelter, is emblematical of the deity, so do the virtues of the Governor resemble the burr-tree; he extends his providence to the remotest districts, and stretches out his arms, far and wide, to afford protection and happiness to his people; such, *Sahib*, is Mr. Hastings."

Cornwallis, who said in the course of his evidence before the House of Lords that Hastings was much esteemed by the natives: and Sir John Shore afterwards Lord Teignmouth, "a man of whose integrity, humanity, and honour it is impossible to speak too highly,"* deposed to the same effect.

In answer to the charge that he violated treaties and disregarded the legitimate rights of native Chiefs, we have the letters of two of the leading native sovereigns to his successor requesting to be treated by him as they were treated by Hastings. There are also letters from the sovereign of Berar, from the Nizam, from Mahadjee Scindia to the King and the Company expressing their strong sense of his justice and good faith. His tender regard for the rights and feelings of the native Chiefs is testified in the strenuous battle he fought for the Nawab of the Carnatic and the Vizier of Oude. That he was lofty and imperious with those who were disloyal, that he could brook no opposition to his will, may be admitted. But that he was kind and considerate to those who were loyal, and a generous master to those who served him, there are numerous indications in these volumes. He saw that the power of England must be paramount in India, and for the honour and greatness of his country he strove with unwearied energy and unflinching courage, but he also desired that the paramount power should be surrounded by loyal feudatories allowed to govern their states without interference as long as they regarded the welfare and prosperity of their subjects.

Absorbed in the work of legislation and administration, in negotiating treaties, organising armies, and sending forth expeditions, Hastings had scanty leisure to devote to his own affairs and he proved a poor steward of his private fortune. He told his judges: "I was too intent upon the means to be employed for preserving India to Great Britain from the hour in which I was informed that France meant to strain every nerve to dispute that Empire with us, to bestow a thought upon myself or my own private fortune." It would have been better for his reputation had he bestowed more time on the regulation of his household, and had been less lavish in his expenditure, and had curbed his generosity. But during his trial it was clearly shown that the charge of having contaminated his hands with unlawful gain was wholly without foundation. It is not, however, by evidence produced at his trial that Hastings has been judged, but the calumnies of political opponents and the exaggerations of fervent orators have been accepted without examination or discrimination. The load of obloquy resting on his memory has in some degree been removed by clearer and juster views of the events of his time and the character of the man who did good service for his country and the land in which he toiled for five and thirty years. His fair fame will not suffer from an examination still more rigid and dispassionate, and for this examination authentic materials are supplied in these volumes.

* Macaulay's Essay on Warren Hastings.

SELECTIONS
FROM THE
LETTERS, DESPATCHES, AND OTHER STATE PAPERS
PRESERVED IN
THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT
OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
1772—1785.

Proceedings of the Secret Select Committee, from 28th April 1772.

Secret Department.

Fort William, the 28th April 1772.

AT A CONSULTATION PRESENT :

The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

PHILIP M. DACRES, Esq.

THOMAS LANE, Esq.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

JAMES HARRIS, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

Read and approved the Proceedings of 16th instant.

The President informs the Board that in consequence of orders received from the Secret Committee by the *Lapwing* and referred to in paragraph the of the general letter from the Court of Directors which accompanied it, he has sent instructions to Mr. Middleton to arrest the persons of Mahomed Rezza Cawn and Rajah Amrit Sing, his Dewan, and to send them under a guard to Calcutta; that he has received advice from Mr. Middleton that the same has accordingly been put in execution. His letter to Mr. Middleton, and Mr. Middleton's in reply, he desires may stand in the proceedings:—

President's Minute informing the Board of the seizure of Mahomed Rezza Cawn and his Dewan.

To SAMUEL MIDDLETON, Esq.

No. 1.—His letter to the Chief of the Durbar and reply thereto.

SIR,—By the *Lapwing's* packet which arrived last night, I received a letter from the Secret Committee of the Honorable Court of Directors, in which they direct and enjoin me immediately on the receipt of the said letter to issue my private orders for securing the person of Mahomed Rezza Cawn, and to bring him down to Calcutta.

Their commands are peremptory and require immediate execution, neither will the urgency of the occasion admit of delay. Many considerations induce me to delegate this trust to you. Your station and authority point you out as the fittest person for it, as the particular confidence, which I repose in your integrity and fidelity to our common masters, is a pledge to me for your punctual and instant discharge of it.

This therefore is to require of you, that upon the receipt hereof you do immediately arrest the person of Mahomed Rezza Cawn, and send him under a sufficient guard to Calcutta, allowing him only the time necessary for furnishing himself with such conveniences as he may want on the way.

Your own disposition will make it needless to recommend that every mark of tenderness and respect be shown him consistent with the literal performance of this service; but it will be best to avoid a personal meeting with him. I advise, but do not insist on this, leaving it to your discretion.

You will be pleased to keep a guard on the house of Mahomed Rezza Cawn, and suffer nothing to be removed from it, until you receive further instructions on this subject either from myself or the Select Committee.

I must desire also that you will cause Rajah Amert Sing, the Dewan of Mahomed Rezza Cawn, to be seized and sent down to Calcutta.

It is unnecessary to recommend to you the greatest caution and secrecy in the conduct of this business, that it may be the cause of no alarms or disturbance.

FORT WILLIAM,
The 24th April 1772.

I have, &c.,
(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

No. 2. To the Honourable WARREN HASTINGS.

SIR,—In obedience to your commands signified to me in your letter of the 24th instant, I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that I have this morning seized the persons of Mahomed Rezza Cawn and his Dewan Amert Sing, and placed proper guards upon their houses and effects.

As you were pleased to intimate your wish that I should avoid a personal interview with the Nawab I deputed Mr. Anderson, one of my Assistants, to wait upon him with a letter from me, and to communicate the disagreeable orders I had received regarding him; at the same time an officer with eight companies of sepoys was detached from the brigade to expediate the execution of these orders and to guard against any evil consequences which might have issued in the city. Apprehending that this alarm would occasion some disturbance, I went myself with a part of this force, joined to some companies of pergunnah sepoys to the killah with a view to explain the matter to the young Nabob, and to obviate any consternation or surprise which might have seized him from an event thus sudden and unexpected, and at the same time to prevent any irregularities which at this critical juncture the Nizamut sepoys or the Nabob's own servants might have been tempted to commit; but I had the satisfaction to find that however prudent circumstances might have made these measures appear, there was in fact no absolute necessity for their adoption, for I did not discover the least tendency to tumult or disorder throughout His Excellency's dependants and so little inclination did Mahomed Rezza Cawn show to oppose or impede the immediate execution of your orders, that he was no sooner acquainted with the purport of them, than he made a voluntary resignation of himself and effects to the officer who was deputed to take him into custody, and here I should not do justice to the calm submission with which he met his unhappy fate was I not to notice the readiness he manifested to comply with your orders in their fullest extent, and so far from wishing to protract the period of his departure from hence, I can venture to assure you, you cannot be more impatient for his arrival in Calcutta than he appears to be, and he accordingly proceeds on his journey tonight under an escort of two companies of sepoys, commanded by Lieutenant Lucas.

He proposes embarking at Mirzapore and will require 3 budgerows and 15 baggage boats for himself and his Dewan; these with a small addition to the number of boats for the service of the sepoys, I am to request may be despatched from the Presidency with all possible expedition.

I am, &c.,
(Sd.) SAMUEL MIDDLETON.

MOOTIJIL,
The 27th April 1772.

As the purpose of the Secret Committee in their private command has been fulfilled and as the conduct of Mahomed Rezza Cawn hath been referred by the Court of Directors to the examination of the Board at large, the President thinks it necessary as well for their satisfaction as to enable them more clearly to understand the meaning of the Court of Directors in the restraint which they have thought proper to order on the person of Mahomed Rezza Cawn to lay before them an extract of such part of the orders of the Secret Committee as respect this particular subject which he desires may be recorded:—

No. 3.—The President lays before the Board extract of the Orders received from the Secret Committee.

Extract of a letter from the Secret Committee to the President, dated the 28th August 1771.

In order therefore to make him amenable to a due course of justice, and to prevent the ill consequences that might result from the resentment and revenge, which he may conceive on the knowledge of our intentions, we hereby direct and enjoin you immediately on the receipt of this letter to issue your private orders for the securing the person of Mahomed Rezza Cawn, together with his whole family and his known partizans and adherents, and to make use of such measures as your prudence shall suggest for bringing them down to Calcutta; and it is our pleasure and command that they be by no means suffered to quit the place until Mahomed Rezza Cawn shall have exculpated himself from the crimes of which he now stands charged or suspected, or shall have [only and]* for the revenues collected by him in the Chucklah of Dacca, and have made restitution of all sums which he may have appropriated to his own use either from the Dewannee revenues or the Nabob's stipend, and until he shall have satisfied the claims of all such persons as may have suffered by any act of injustice or oppression committed by him in the office of Naib Dewan.

The Board, taking into consideration the Company's orders as expressed in their letter to the President, the object it has in view, and the measures that have consequently been pursued, and having received information of the Nawab Mahomed Rezza Cawn's near approach to the Presidency, judge it necessary to come to an immediate determination in what manner he shall be received, and having viewed the subject in all its different lights are agreed in the following resolution:—Resolved, that they cannot consistently with the orders of the Company and his present situation receive him with the honours which were usually paid him on the occasion of his former visits to Calcutta.

The majority of the Board however, considering the rank of His Excellency Mahomed Rezza Cawn, the station he has filled, and the character and consequence he has held in the empire of Hindustan by the honours and dignity conferred on him by the King at the particular instigation of Lord Clive and his Council on the part of the Honorable Company, judge it proper that one of its members be sent to intimate to him the cause of his seizure, and to inform His Excellency of the points on which the Honorable Company express their displeasure, and that they look to us to obtain satisfaction from him for the injuries which they conceive their affairs to have sustained by his mismanagement and corrupt administration. Resolved in consequence that Mr. Graham be appointed to wait upon His Excellency on his arrival at Chitpore; and upon that gentleman's motion for particular instructions to regulate his conduct in the discharge of so irksome a duty, the Board is of opinion he should be furnished with a letter from the Government to the following purport

*No, not found in bundle

(here enter, No.*), and that he further inform the Nawab in general terms of the heads of the accusations laid to his charge which will afterwards be properly digested and delivered to him in writing. He is also to acquaint His Excellency that it is left at his option either to remain at Chitpore or proceed to his house in Calcutta, and should he find the Nawab under any apprehension or alarm for the safety of his person he is to remove such wrong impressions by giving him full assurance of his personal safety, and further to dissipate all groundless fears it becomes necessary he should give His Excellency a competent idea of the Honorable the Company's intention in his seizure, which is merely to render him amenable to a due course of justice.

- The President, Mr. Aldersey, Mr. Harris, and Mr. Goodwin beg leave to enter their dissents to the last resolution.

No. 5—Mr. Goodwin's Minute.

I think that deputing a member of the Council to meet Mahomed Rezza Cawn at Chitpore, though not meant as a mark of respect by the Board, must have that appearance in the eyes of people in general, and I apprehend the Company will also deem it as such, which I take to be expressly contrary to their intentions as well as inconsistent with the circumstances and situation Mahomed Rezza Cawn at present is in; whereas I take it to be the meaning of the Company, by their having been pleased to divest Mahomed Rezza Cawn of his office and ordering his person, with his relations, dependants, and adherents, to

be seized and brought down to Calcutta, and that measures be taken to prevent their making their escape, that no honours whatever or even the appearance of them can or ought to be shewn him. Besides it may have such an effect with the natives that it may discourage those who otherwise might have complaints to prefer against him from doing it, instead of which I think that all people should rather be invited to bring their complaints against him and the cause of his disgrace proclaimed; in the meantime that both Mahomed Rezza Cawn and his Dewan should remain at their houses with guards over them to prevent their escaping, and that he should not be visited or visits received from him. It may happen that Mahomed Rezza Cawn will prove himself innocent of the crimes the Company suspect him guilty of. I wish he may, but from the strong manner the Company have wrote regarding him they must have been furnished with substantial grounds for their present proceeding, otherwise they would surely not have put themselves to the expence of sending out a packet on purpose.

For these reasons I must beg leave to enter my dissent to the resolution of the majority of the Board for deputing one of its members with the letters from the Governor to Mahomed Rezza Cawn, which I think would have a better appearance if conveyed to him through the Secretary as proposed by the President, or through the Persian Translator.

(Sd.) GOODWIN.

No. 6—Mr. Harris' Minute.

The President having informed us that he had in part put in execution the orders of the Honorable Company, addressed to him direct by their Select Committee in a separate letter per *Lapwing* enjoining him to seize and secure the persons of Mahomed Rezza Cawn, his relations, dependants, and adherents, and that the said Mahomed Rezza Cawn with his Dewan are on their way to the Presidency, as prisoners under charge of an officer's party, it appears to me that he thereby suffers the most apparent marks of disgrace, and their displeasure; that the deputing therefore a member of the Board to receive him on his arrival is but an ill compliment to him in his present situation, and as whilst labouring under the serious and heavy charges preferred against him by the Honourable Company he must be considered as a culprit till he had vindicated his conduct, he cannot with propriety receive the honours heretofore due to his station. Consequently as a member of that tribunal, before which he is to prove his innocence or stand condemned, I should object to visiting him in my public capacity; the intention of the majority of this Board to console him thereby under his misfortune I am convinced proceeds from the most humane sentiments, but I should suppose the assurances from the President of a candid and fair trial, with the most just and equitable decision, ought to be deemed sufficient consolation to a mind supported by conscious innocence; whereas if he is guilty, all that can be said by a member of the Board will, and indeed ought to be ineffectual, but such a mark of favor and distinction may in some measure bias the weak minds of the natives in general, and of those in particular whose evidence may be necessary to his conviction, for which reasons I beg leave to enter my dissent to the opinion of the majority.

(Sd.) J. HARRIS.

No. 7—Mr. Aldersey's Minute.

In my opinion there will be a manifest impropriety in deputing a member of the Administration to Mahomed Rezza Cawn on his arrival at Chitpore or at the Presidency, as I cannot help thinking that it may be regarded in the light of a compliment at least, and that every appearance of that kind should be avoided as totally inconsistent with the intentions of our employers both as to the mode they have prescribed for making a scrutiny into the conduct of that Minister as Naib Dewan and Naib Subah; and the tendency that any mark of respect paid to him under his present circumstances may have to disappoint those intentions or render it the more difficult to execute the express com-

mands we have received from the Court of Directors by the *Lapwing* packet, and that whatever it may be thought necessary to communicate from the Board to Mahomed Rezza Cawn on his arrival at the Presidency should be done by the hands of their Secretary or Persian Interpreter.

(Sd.) W. ALDERSEY.

No. 8—The President's Minute.

The President thinks it his duty to minute that the second resolution has passed without his assent. He wishes to shew Mahomed Rezza Cawn every mark of attention and even of respect due to the station which he has so lately filled in the administration of these provinces, and still proper, while his conduct is only a subject of enquiry. He also thinks it becoming the dignity and justice of the Government to give him such assurances as a man in his situation may stand in need of, whose ideas of the consequences of ministerial disgrace have been originally formed on the despotism and violence of Asiatic manners; that however rigidly we may prosecute the enquiries which the Company have ordered to be made into his conduct, no personal ill-will shall be allowed to take place against him, and that equal and strict justice shall be shown him. To this effect the President has already written a letter to Mahomed Rezza Cawn.

But however he may approve of such private intimations he is of opinion that any public show of respect to Mahomed Rezza Cawn in his present circumstances will be inconsistent with the restraint which has been imposed upon him, and may counteract the end intended by it, in creating an opinion in the minds of the public that his power is but suspended, and thereby discourage those who may have complaints to prefer against him by the fear of their falling hereafter under the effects of his resentment.

He also thinks it very unbecoming the character and dignity of a member of this Administration to be employed on a public deputation to a man who stands accused by the Court of Directors themselves of the most criminal conduct.

Since however the majority of the Board have resolved otherwise, he thinks it very proper that Mahomed Rezza Cawn should on this occasion be apprized verbally, and in general terms, of the articles which have been laid to his charge.

The following is copy of the letter to Mahomed Rezza Cawn alluded to in the preceding minute of the President.

No. 9—To MAHOMED REZZA CAWN.

From the knowledge which I had of your character before my arrival in this country, and from the friendly intercourse which had commenced between us, it was my very earnest wish to cultivate the same good understanding with you which had subsisted between you and my predecessors in this Government. It was therefore with exceeding grief and mortification that I found myself disappointed in those hopes by the peremptory commands which I have received within these few days past from the Company, with which you have been since informed by the proceedings of Mr. Middleton, in consequence of the directions which I was under the necessity of giving him. I am a servant of the Company, and whatever they order it is my duty to obey nor can I deviate little from it. I shall be happy in my private character if I can afford you any testimony of my good-will or attachment to you of which you will rest assured.

As Mahomed Rezza Cawn is now deprived of his office of Naib Dewan the Honourable Court of Directors have resolved to stand forth themselves in the character of Dewan. The Board are of opinion that the Moorshedabad Council of Revenue to act for the present as Dewan. Council should be directed immediately to undertake the conduct of that office until proper plans can be formed for the management of so important a trust. It is therefore—

Agreed to send the following direction to that Board:—

No. 10—Letter to Moorshedabad
in consequence.

To SAMUEL MIDDLETON, Esq., Chief, &c., Council of Revenue at Moorshedabad, R.B.

GENTLEMEN,—The Honourable the Court of Directors having thought proper to divest Mahomed Rezza Cawn of his station of Naib Dewan and having determined to stand forth publicly themselves in the character of Dewan, we direct that for the present you take charge of that office and perform the duties of it until we shall have settled and digested a proper plan for the conduct and management of so important a trust, and you will immediately make this alteration public at the city as well as in all the districts appertaining to the province of Bengal.

FORT WILLIAM,

The 28th April 1772.

We are, &c., *

(Sd.) Members of Council. .

The Board, considering that the seizure of Amert Sing, who at present farms the western division of Radshai, may probably induce the persons employed under him in that district to attempt an embezzlement or secretion of the revenues, judge it proper to enjoin the Moorshedabad Council to pursue immediate measures for securing the rents, and obviating any ill-consequences that might otherwise arise from the privation of his authority, and the following letter is accordingly written:—

No. 11—Letter to Moorshedabad enjoining them to pursue measures for securing the revenues of Radshai, Amrit Sing's Farm.
Moorshedabad.

To SAMUEL MIDDLETON, Esq.,
Chief, &c., Council of Revenue at

GENTLEMEN,—As in consequence of our President's orders to the Chief, the person of Raja Amrit Sing, the private Dewan to the Nawab Mahomed Rezza Cawn is in confinement, it may be necessary to recommend to you the taking such immediate measures as shall prevent the officers and people employed under him as the farmer of the Western Division of Radshai from taking advantage of this circumstance by withholding or embezzling any part of the revenues or collections of that district, and we request that you will use your best endeavors for securing the payment of his rents and obviating any other ill consequences which might otherwise ensue from this privation of Amert Sing's authority.

FORT WILLIAM,

The 28th April 1772.

We are, &c.,

(Sd.) Members of Council.

No. 12—Board's Minute.

As the charge of neglect or embezzlement of the revenues is equally applied by the Court of Directors to Setabroy, the Naib Dewan of the Behar province, as to Mahomed Rezza Cawn, as they have directed a minute enquiry to be made into both, and as the leaving Setabroy in possession of his office after the measures which have been taken respecting Mahomed Rezza Cawn, and the conclusions which he must necessarily form with regard to himself, may put in his power to elude any enquiry into his conduct either by private collusions with his agents or by fight:—

The Board are of opinion that it will be equally necessary to lay an immediate restraint upon his person and that of his Dewan also.

President to write to the Chief of Patna to apprehend Setabroy. Agreed therefore that the President be requested to write to the Chief of Patna for the above purpose in like manner as he has written to the Chief of the Durbar.

Fort William, the 23rd May 1772.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT :

The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

PHILIP M. DACRES, Esq.

THOMAS LANE, Esq.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

JAMES HARRIS, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 21st instant.

The Board take into consideration the present situation of the army and the several stations of the troops. The President lays before the Board the following distribution of the army, which having been duly and attentively considered—

Resolved it be adopted and immediately issued in General Orders—

Distribution of the Army.

Of the First Brigade	Company of Artillery, 2 Bat-	To march to and canton at Dinapore under command of Colonel Champion.
	talions of Infantry.	
	5 Battalions of Sepoys.	
	1 Battalion of Sepoys, viz., that of the oldest Captain of Sepoys.	To garrison Chunargur under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilding.

The Company of Invalids now at Allahabad.

Of the Second Brigade	Company of Artillery, 1 Battalion of Infantry, 3 Battalions of Sepoys.	To march to and canton at Mongeer under command of Colonel Champion.
	1 Battalion of Sepoys, viz., that of the oldest Captain of Sepoys within the provinces.	To be stationed at Rajmahal subject to the authority of the Collector of that district.
Of the Third Brigade	2nd Battalion of Infantry. 2 Battalions of Sepoys.	
	Company of Artillery, 2 Battalions of Infantry.	To be stationed at Berhampore under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Galliez.
	1st Battalion of Infantry, 3 Battalions of Sepoys.	At the Presidency under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant.
	3 Battalions of Sepoys.	To march to and canton at Ghyretta under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan.

The Officers commanding bodies of the forces which compose the 2nd and 3rd brigades are immediately and forthwith to repair with the corps under their command to the several destinations assigned them, that they may reach their respective quarters before the setting in of the rainy season.

The bodies of the forces now beyond the provinces will receive their orders of march from the General.

The Officer commanding at Monghyr will wait till he can be relieved and then join his corps.

The remaining corps of the army to continue where they are at present stationed.

The brigades or parts thereof are to relieve the garrison of Fort William according to one of the Regulations issued for that purpose on the 21st of August 1769.

It being the object of Government that the rules of military service respecting precedency of rank should be hereafter as strictly adhered to as the nature of it will admit, as well as to obviate ill impressions and discouragements arising from every kind of undue preference, it is determined that all fixed and established commands, such as garrisons and cantonments, shall in future be delegated to the oldest officers excepting on extraordinary occasions or pressing necessity, which, from a peculiarity of circumstances may require a deviation from the general rule. In such cases the Government means to reserve to itself the power of appointing such officers as it shall think proper.

Pursuant to the above resolutions the senior Lieutenant-Colonels not holding separate commands are to be appointed to the Sepoy Corps of the brigade to which they are attached.

The Field Officers are stationed to brigades as follows :—

Lieut.-Col.	{ Wilding Upton				} Infantry.
Lieut.-Col.	{ Muir Tottingham				} Infantry.
Lieut.-Col.	{ Grant Gallicz	:	:	:	} Infantry.
Lieut.-Col.	{ Goddard Cummings Morgan	:	:	:	} Sepoys.
Majors	{ Blair Auchmuty	:	:	:	} Infantry.
Majors	{ Hanway Stainsforth				} Infantry.
Majors	{ Eyret Wear				} Infantry.

The Board also deliberating on the little service the small body of cavalry in the Company's pay can ever be of, and that in time of actual service it would be either exposed to the perpetual hazard of being cut off at any distance from the infantry or prove an embarrassment if joined to it, reflecting also that the expense of a body of horse capable of doing real service would exceed our means since the annual cast of so inconsiderable a number as we now maintain is not less than Rupees 3,01,675-1-2—

Resolved that the whole cavalry, both European and Hindostan, be directly disbanded and that the European officers, Serjeants, &c., be incorporated with the brigades.

Secret Department.

Fort William, the 1st June 1772.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

PHILIP M. DACRES, Esq.

THOMAS LANE, Esq.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

JAMES HARRIS, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

Read and approved the proceedings of the 28th ultimo.

Received the following letter from General Sir Robert Barker:—

To the Honourable WARREN HASTINGS, President, &c.; Council of Fort William.

GENTLEMEN,—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 16th ultimo, and are rejoiced to find that my motives for moving the troops at Dinapore, although they did not appear to you from my first letter so satisfactory as I could have wished, nevertheless from subsequent representations have proved to correspond with your sentiments on that occasion, and it is with real satisfaction I learn that my conduct towards the Vizier has met with your approbation.

Permit me now, Gentlemen, for your information,* transactions and conduct of the acting powers in this quarter of the Empire for the last twelve months, as by it I hope to elucidate more particularly to you and to our Honourable employers, how far the measures I have taken, have contributed to the interest of the service, and counteracted such schemes as were evidently prejudicial of the Company's affairs.

In my letters to the Secret Committee in the year seventy-one, it will appear how much I endeavored to prevail on and [amuse]* His Majesty from his intended scheme of throwing himself into the hands of the Mahrattas, and I even preferred a Mahratta war to a Mahratta Government. Very soon after the arrival of the Vizier at the Royal encampment in May seventy-one to take his leave of the King, I discovered that His Excellency was carrying on private conferences with His Majesty regarding his future operations. Whether this conduct in the Nawab proceeded from self-interest, or to make the most of His Majesty's distresses and departure as he found the King determined to leave us, or whether he really meant at that time to co-operate in the plan His Majesty had laid down, I will not take upon me to assert. But it was evident His Majesty had made over to him the sunnuds for the Fort of Allahabad, and I have since learnt that he at that time received also fresh grants for the district of Bunali, belonging to Haufess Ramut, in which it was but too evident he had then some intentions of acting in conjunction with the King and the Mahrattas in the reduction of the Rouhilla country. The Vizier has himself shewn me the sunnuds for Bunali since my arrival at Shawabad.

The Nabob did not chuse to attend the King himself, because he should then have been too much under the influence of the Mahrattas, and his pride would not admit of it, unless he had the sole direction of affairs. He however assisted the King with ten lacks of rupees and ten thousand men to escort him to the capital, and thereby secured the cession of the Fort of Allahabad, and the hopes of availing himself of some advantages by the destruction of the Rouhilli. When the Mahrattas were directing their arms towards Suwantaul repeated messages were sent from the King, desiring the Vizier to attend at the presence, and before they attacked that place the Mahrattas sent a Vakeel to sound the Vizier and learn his intentions. Behur Gee and Mulhar Rao were the persons employed upon this occasion, and the Nawab was told that His Majesty expected him with his army, without delay, or the consequence would be disagreeable to him. However I have reason to apprehend that the true

intent of this Embassy was to sound His Excellency regarding his co-operating with them on this side the rivers by attacking the Rouhilli in the east, whilst they should attack them on the western frontier of their country. The Nawab from several prior conversations which I had with him on this subject, began to discover the imprudence of such a plan. He knew it was contrary to the inclination of the English that His Majesty had thrown himself into their power. He discovered that their views were more extensive than he at first imagined, and dreading their establishing themselves so near his own dominions, he knew that the total crush of one of the Mussulman powers must add as much strength to the Mahratta tribe. He was not insensible of our jealousy of those powers, nor indeed could he depend on their sincerity, for it might have happened that when he had assisted them in the reduction of the Rouhilli they would have destroyed him, and he could with little confidence call the assistance of the English forces after having drawn a war so ridiculously on himself. He reflected on all the arguments which I had so frequently made use of to him at the conference at Benares, as will appear by my letters to the Secret Committee at that time, when it was determined he should join the Rohilli in opposition to the intentions of the Mahrattas to prevent His Majesty falling into their hands. He had also doubts whether his connections with those powers might not draw him into measures that would infringe upon the treaty between him and the English. In short he considered the interest of the English and that of the Mahrattas so diametrically opposite to each other, that to prosecute his plan he must either give up the one, or the other, and considering his disposition and situation it is no wonder upon reflection that he gave up the Mahrattas, and the precarious hopes of acquisition, for the more solid and secure system of remaining satisfied in his Soubahship with the friendship of the English. But upon this conclusion consequences started up before him, and he viewed the resentment of the King and Mahrattas in strong colors. It was then that he wrote me when I was at Benares requesting a conference at Faizabad, and sent Elich Cawn, with the Mahratta Vakeels, to relate to me the message which they brought to the Vizier.

The Nawab found himself embarrassed in difficulties from which he could not extricate himself. The Mahrattas were then advancing towards the Rohilli, and he wanted the advice and assistance of his allies. The knowledge of these circumstances were my inducements for acquiescing in His Excellency's request, and at our first interview after my arrival he informed me with much anxiety that his situation was become very critical; that his possessions and reputation were in danger by his withholding himself from the schemes of the confederates; that to obey His Majesty's directions under the present circumstances, he was resolved not to do, as the Mahratta Chiefs had too great an ascendancy over the King for him to support the dignity of his station; that he might be necessitated to enter into measures opposite to his inclinations, and interest, or otherwise leaving the King under worse pretensions than not joining him at all. To remain inactive, and see the Rouhilli reduced by the Mahrattas was as bad, or worse; for he very justly observed that the Rouhilli would, to prevent a total extirpation, undoubtedly give up a part of their country, and would consequently be necessitated to join their arms to the Mahrattas. Such a general confederacy would immediately fall on him as their next object; and he further observed that in such case he must claim the performance of our treaty for the defence of his possessions. On the other hand, should the Mahrattas decline receiving any conditions of peace from the Rouhilli, and the King determine on their overthrow, such an acquisition of country and riches would strengthen that power (already arrived at too great a height) to a very dangerous degree, particularly by establishing themselves so immediately adjoining his dominions they would be ever ready to fall on him when opportunity offered by his troops being called to the assistance of his allies. It was this therefore that occasioned him such uneasiness. He told me he saw the danger of permitting the Rouhilli to be subdued, and letting the Mahrattas destroy the Mussulman powers one after the other in this Empire. It was then he made the proposal of marching his whole forces to the western frontiers of his dominions, having received letters from the Rouhilli Chiefs requesting his assistance to save them from the impending blow; and the Nawab judged that on his appearance at the frontiers, and my being with him,

which was necessary to give confidence to his negotiations, he could effect a compromise between the Mahrattas and the Rouhilli for a sum of money; and that by giving up a proportion of their country for His Majesty's support, they would remain in possession of such parts as would be a barrier to His Excellency's dominions; it will also appear in my letters to the Committee why it was so particularly necessary I should attend him on this business. Soon after our arrival at Lucknow, the Nawab received answers to the proposals he had made to Haufiss Rahmut that were little satisfactory to him, nor did they appear inclinable either to defray his expenses or give him a part of the recovered country on the other side of the Ganges, pretending that an opposition was as necessary for the preservation of his own country as for theirs.

It now became necessary to urge the Nawab to proceed to the frontier with his army, and be in a position ready to defend his own or the Corah province, and there wait the fate of war, since no terms could be made with the Rouhilli; nor could His Excellency be prevailed on to march to their assistance, unless the English would attend him, although I represented the advantages of defending the Rouhilli possessions in preference to his own, which might probably be the case when the Rouhilli were reduced. Having failed in our negotiations I had nothing left but to throw confidence into the Rouhilli, as would induce them to stand on their defence, and not enter into any treaty with the Mahrattas; and I could not have hit on a more effectual way than by assuring them, that during their absence for the defence of Succurtaul no advantage would be taken by His Excellency on their possessions adjoining to his country, having previously obtained a promise from the Vizier to this effect. These assurances they received with joy, and actually began their march for Succurtaul, when accounts of the passage of the Mahrattas over the Ganges and the defeat of Zabital Cawn reached their ears. The panic which ran through the whole Rouhilli tribe is inconceivable; each chief considered nothing but the safety of himself and family; and having left their towns, and villages to the plunder of their own rabble, they most shamefully fled to the jungles, leaving the whole country open to the enemy.

His Excellency, from such unheard of cowardice in the Rouhilli, concluded the Mahrattas would consequently detach a considerable part of their army to seize on such of the effects of the Rouhilli which they could not carry off, and leave a detachment of their troops to prosecute the siege of Nudzib Gun, and this conclusion led him to apprehensions for his own safety. He applied to me for the assistance of a brigade, saying that now the junction of our forces became a necessary measure for the defence of his country, and that if any attempt should be made, the time taken in writing to the Government and receiving their orders for the march of a brigade would allow the Mahrattas to make their attempt before our troops could be under order of march, and requesting I would direct them to proceed immediately. Considering the Nawab's flighty disposition, I did not hesitate to order the troops at Dinapore to march, not only for the reasons which he assigned, but to prevent him also from entering into improper treaties with the Mahrattas, since all the arguments I could have made use of would not have availed under his seeming apprehensions; and I was certain when he knew our forces were under march, the dread of our resentment would keep him from improper schemes; and give him spirit to withstand their offers, for he could not possibly have engaged himself in any treaty with those powers, but what must have been prejudicial to the Company's affairs if not immediately in some future time, and indeed I esteemed the present opportunity of supporting the Vizier a fortunate circumstance to our affairs in India since it not only convinced the Nawab of our readiness to assist him, but it likewise became a test of his attachment and real sentiments towards us. For it is a trial which few Hindostanders could be able to stand; and considering the suspicion which it was natural for us to entertain of his extraordinary military improvements, it appeared as if fortune had thrown these events in the way to prove his sincerity. To have abandoned him therefore in this conjunction of affairs, or indeed not to have shewn the readiest exertion of our endeavors to support him, would have been a failure on our part, and to have waited the Committee's instructions on this head must to a man in his situation have appeared as an evasion to amuse him

under the expectation of our assistance; the consequences which have arose from the measures I pursued are apparent by the present situation of affairs.

The Mahrattas from a certain knowledge of the English being on the march to join the Vizier, and my appearance at the frontiers with a few battalions joined to His Excellency's army, chose not to march a part of their troops to follow their successes, but retained their whole army together for the simple sieges of Nudgib Gur and Pattur Gur, and from these delays they have lost the season to conclude their operations. The Rouhilli who are preserved from extirpation have expressed their acknowledgments in several letters from their Chiefs to me, particularly Haufiss Rahmut's letter, wherein he says—

“At this juncture that you and the Vizier with a view to the interest of the Rouhilli Chiefs have proceeded as far as Shawabad. It has been productive of the greatest advantage, but for this Mahrattas even now had entered this country. We owe this benefit to the Almighty, and the friendship of you and the Vizier.”

We are now assured that Sujah u'dowlah shews an implicit confidence in our advice; and when we take him by the hand he has resolution to withstand the intrigues of other powers with the alluring prospect of accumulated countries. The reception of the fugitive Zabitah Khan who arrived yesterday, and the probability of Haufiss and the other Sardars throwing themselves under his protection, has given him a reputation which he never would have acquired had I not been with him. The distressed King too seeing the intentions of the self-interested Mahrattas, and the very little respect they pay to His Majesty will open his eyes, and it is probable upon the departure of those powers, unless they force him with them, he will join the Vizier in the management of the affairs of the Empire; in which case I leave you to judge, Gentlemen, what a reputation the Company must acquire by being the means of such a prosperous junction; the Rouhilli too will never forget their obligations and the powers must view us in a favorable light.

Let us for a moment reflect on the consequences of having left the Vizier to himself during the present commotion. I believe it is not to be doubted, but he would have been deeply engaged in the destructive plan of the Mahrattas. Considering his flighty disposition, the flattering prospects of acquiring half the Rouhilli country, the resentment he bore that tribe, and the invitations he received from the King and the Mahrattas, how could he withstand it; the consequences of such a junction, such connections, requires but little contemplation; an alliance with those powers defensive to their new possessions are natural suppositions. The establishment of the Mahrattas and their increase of strength, a train of other circumstances will follow in your imagination, and it requires no great penetration to judge of events had a French invasion taken place.

The payment of the extra expenses occasioned by the troops being called to the assistance of the Vizier has been agreed on. I shall now settle the mode of that payment.

CAMP AT SHAWABAD,
The 15th May 1772.

I am, &c.,
(Sd.) B. BARKER.

Fort William, the 4th June 1772.

To

THE HON'BLE JEAN BAPTISTE CHEVALIER,

PRESIDENT, &c., COUNCIL AT CHANDERNAGORE.

GENTLEMEN,—The letter which you did us the honour to write to us, dated the 23rd of March last, was received in due course, and would have obtained a more speedy reply had not the multiplicity of papers which accompanied it, all requiring translation, and the attention we wished to bestow on a subject which you deem of importance, obliged us amidst the hurry of more pressing affairs to postpone it till this day.

But before we enter into the subject of your immediate complaint, you oblige us to re-call to your attention some circumstances relative to the former, since you have taken an advantage of our candor in the censure of Mr. Cotes which we are sorry to say appears to us neither fair nor generous. You tell us

in your letter that you were in hopes of more tranquillity after our "acknowledgment of the injuries you had received by the many acts of violence and force committed by Mr. Cotes." We ask you, Gentlemen, where we make this acknowledgment? That neither your superiors nor ours may be deceived by such an assertion, we shall here re-capitulate the sum of what we wrote respecting the transactions alluded to. We complained of the violent and arbitrary conduct of Mr. Chambon, in which it plainly appeared the disputes between him and Mr. Cotes had their origin; but leaving him to your justice, we declared that however great we thought the provocation which urged Mr. Cotes to free the Pycar Pockurdoss from the confinement in which he was forcibly detained by Mr. Chambon, yet we disapproved and condemned the precipitate manner which he took to effect it. We blamed him for his behaviour towards Mr. Chambon, and for the rash step he took in the delivery of the Pycar, by which he very indiscreetly deprived himself of the privilege of complaint for the injuries he had sustained, and transferring it to Mr. Chambon who was himself the aggressor. Such, Gentlemen, and no more was the acknowledgment we made, but further to convince you of our sincerity and to set you an example of removing every bar to mutual harmony we immediately determined on the removal of Mr. Cotes from Kerpoy, where he had faithfully served his employers and erred only through the heat and indiscretion of youth. It is not necessary that we should inform you of the particular reasons which have induced us to suspend the execution of it, and to allow of his continuance at Kerpoy till this time, since we are well assured that his presence can have had no influence on your affairs, of which we received no better proof than that we have received no complaint against him, and since Mr. Chambon, the author of all these disputes, both continues in his station, and if we may judge from the tenor of your letter, is fixed to remain there, we know not for what purpose, unless it be to furnish additional matter for disturbing the good understanding between your Company and ours.

If you mean to excite and treasure up a variety of trivial complaints to be thrown together into one sum and used afterwards as occasion shall prove favorable, you could not have employed a fitter Agent. The harmony and good understanding between the two Companies will always be at the mercy of Mr. Chambon, while he is at liberty by purchasing private debts of 19 years' standing under the plea of transfer for the payment of those claimed by your Company, to draw us into disputes equally irksome and unprofitable.

But his late subject of complaint is of a new and extraordinary kind. It seems that the Government of the country of Burdwan in order to restrain the unbounded licentiousness of your Residents and Gomastahs, had found it necessary to establish a Court of Cutcherry with a Zilladar or Officer at the head, for the sole hearing and deciding on all claims of debt, and expected that your Factory should submit to its authority. One should think that to a nation so enlightened as the French and so conversant in the universal rights and powers of Government there could be no necessity of pointing out the legality, as well as the justice and the expediency of such a measure; yet it is this alone of which your Resident complains as a piece of the most flagrant injustice; and which you, Gentlemen, have qualified with the names of contradiction, chicanery, and even violence itself. Had Mr. Chambon objected to the equity of the decisions of the Zilladar, with proofs to support him, there might have been some colour of complaint; but he has effectually precluded himself from this by refusing to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Court: and we for the same reason are prevented either from interfering in order to procure him redress, supposing him to be injured or from entering into a minute discussion of his complaint, since it is not on the merits of the particular case, but on the general principle on which he rests. You deny the right in the country Government to establish this Court, and therefore condemn its authority, but these are opinions which can neither be justified nor admitted.

Let us, however, see what is the alternative you propose to this regular, and what we affirm to be a legal mode offered to you for the recovery of your debts—an unbounded power of seizing by force through the whole country the persons, effects, and papers of those who are indebted to your Company, or to their

servants or Gomastahs, or even to private people whose dealings are foreign to yours, but whose debts you may have chosen to buy up. These pretensions need only be advanced to be exposed. Upon what principle of justice or policy can you expect to be supported in them? You cannot surely imagine that the Government will ever permit, or we consent, to the exercise of an authority that would render you absolute master of the country. If you, or rather your servants, are suffered to seize at their pleasure whomsoever they think fit, without any check, to call your debtors, to imprison them, to drag them before them, where they sit both as judge and party, and finally to dispose of them at their mercy, does it not follow that the liberty and security of every individual is laid at your feet? For what you now pretend to with regard to Pykars or weavers only might soon be extended to labourers, farmers, merchants, and even to the zemindars of the country, since the only criterion you allow to measure your justice by is your own declaration of the debt, and on this the exercise of your power to remain uncontrolled. Whatever may be the purpose of claiming such powers we are convinced you cannot in your own minds approve of them. Even Mr. Chambon, in the affair of his seizing Durgachurn, makes no scruple of declaring that he would agree to the violence and injustice of his own proceedings, did not the English act in the same manner. Supposing for a moment it were as he alleges, can the invariable principle of right and wrong depend upon usage or precedent? What is wrong is wrong (morally speaking) in all situations, and from whatever hand it comes. A contrary sentiment may become the breast of the Resident at Kerpoy, but you, Gentlemen, in the wisdom of your Councils will not surely adopt it.

The assertion you make of our having acted in the same manner we absolutely deny. We never claimed this extraordinary power; on the contrary our incessant labours have been employed to check and repress all violences in the administration of our affairs; and if the presumption of individuals in our service has ever hurried them beyond the bounds of justice and moderation in their dealings with the country people, they have always from this Board met with the discouragement and censure they deserved. We are not ignorant that in the former unsettled state of the country several complaints were made, of which you are pleased to remind us. How far they were just we do not exactly know; but on this head we cannot do better than refer you to the gentleman who has the honor to preside at your Board. His connections with the English at that period were considerable, and he was involved with others in the subject of these complaints against us. We are far from imagining that he exceeded the powers which you now claim as matter of right; and yet these were sufficient to draw censure on us, and were actually assigned as some of the principal reasons for proceeding to violence against us. The gentleman referred to has too much candor to deny that in these pretensions he met with no support from our Board.

You are also pleased to remind us of the revolution which, as you observe, bestowed on us the degree of power we at this time enjoy. Suffer us in our turn to observe that the revolution you allude to, though effected solely by the blood and treasure of the English, has turned out to the general advantage of all the European Powers. We have thereby acquired no preference to trade but what naturally arises from the extent of our dealings and correspondence; and other Companies are enabled under our protection to carry on their commerce in peace and security, unincumbered with high expences and military establishments, emancipated from arbitrary taxations and interruptions of their inland trade; and they are no longer exposed to the indignity of having their factories surrounded by armed forces, and their gates shut up at the pleasure or caprice of the rulers of the country. You, Gentlemen, must have experienced its good effects at a time, when it would have surpassed the power of any management in India, to have borne you up against the distresses of the Company in France, if at the same time, you had been exposed as heretofore to all the violence and despotism of a Moorish administration.

Such were the oppressions to which you and all the European Companies were in former times exposed, and to which they patiently submitted, and, yet Gentlemen, you now talk of the humiliation your nation receives from being obliged to have recourse to a regular Court of Justice for the recovery of your

debts. We cannot reply to this; your sensibility in this respect must depend on your own ideas, and not on our judgment. We only lament their delicacy which prepares from such a circumstance so great a mortification. You will permit us to observe that the English nation in India has at all times been equally attentive to the maintenance of their national honour and reputation, yet at no time did we ever conceive it to be an humiliation for us to yield a proper submission to the equitable regulations of the country policy.

We cannot avoid taking notice of one reason you in particular assign for applying to us on the occasion of your present complaint, "that the province of Burdwan makes part of our proper acquisition, and consequently we alone have the right to order and command there the same as in Calcutta." If this is the case, you answer yourselves. You surely would not refuse to acknowledge the jurisdiction of our Catcherry in Calcutta, nor would Mr. Chambon within its limits dare to seize any of his debtors, and drag them into confinement by his own authority, any more than Mr. Stuart would presume to do the same in Chandernagore. If we have the right to order and command why, while you assert, do you dispute it?

With regard to the proposition of taking your debts upon ourselves, did it depend upon us alone, we would gladly embrace it to free us from these disagreeable altercations, nor do we believe it would be a great undertaking, if we are to judge from the magnitude of the complaints of Mr. Chambon's letters, and the claim quoted by him as the immediate source of his present grievances, which does not appear to exceed R71-4-30, little more than 200 livres. But this is a point which we as agents for others are without authority to undertake. We are however ready at all times to afford very reasonable assistance to facilitate the recovery of your debts; and that you may no longer have a pretext to complain of the authority of these Courts, and to give you the strongest proof in our power of our candor and desire of supporting your Company in its just pretensions, we submit to your consideration whether the mode of arbitration would not be the effectual and least exceptionable of any. It is, as you well know, the common practice of the country and therefore will be readily assented to by the natives. If you approve of this we will use our influence with the Rajah for his authority in putting your balances in this course of liquidation, and are willing to interfere in it ourselves as far as you shall think proper in reason to require.

This, Gentlemen, is, what for the sake of harmony we propose to you, and thus far we will go; but we never can admit of the pretences you set up. We disclaim all such for ourselves, and cannot allow them in others. We beseech you therefore to depart from them and from those proceedings, in consequence of which the country so loudly complains. It has ever been the glory of the English nation, jealous of her own privileges, to stand forth on all occasions in support of the general rights of mankind. The people of this country look up to us for protection, and we cannot better employ the power we possess than in saving them from oppression. Our interest as well as duty prompts us to this. Our title to the revenues would soon become vain and illusive if their collections were to be interrupted at all times at the will of any of your factors or Gomastahs, and the people of the country harassed and driven from their habitations. Be persuaded we never can consent to the claims set forth in your letter and will not cease to oppose them. We esteem and respect the French nation, and will endeavour to cultivate their friendship by every fair and honourable means, but we cannot to this desire sacrifice justice, good order, the rights of the people, and the duty we owe to our nation and our employers.

We hope, Gentlemen, this candid exposition of our sentiments upon the subject of your letter now before us will set the matter to you and to all the world in its true light, and serve to put a stop to further altercations of this nature between the two Companies in this part of India.

Signed by the President.

FORT WILLIAM,
The 4th June 1772.

Agreed it be immediately transcribed and sent.

Fort William, the 15th June 1772.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq., *President*

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

JAMES HARRIS, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

Read and approved the Proceedings of the 4th instant.

Read the following letter from the Council at Chandernagore :—

No. 1.—To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS,

Governor & President, & to the Gentlemen of the

Council at Calcutta.

GENTLEMEN,—This is the third letter we have the honour to write to you, to complain of the continual obstacles that we have long since incessantly met with in the recovery of what remains due to our Company in the Aurungs. We at first thought, with reason, that those people who raised them acted of their own accord, and that you would not hesitate to do us justice the moment you were informed of it, but your silence upon a subject so interesting, not having even vouchsafed to reply to our letters, proves sufficiently that in the whole of this affair your agents have only executed your orders. Do not then be surprised to see us take the measures in this respect which our duty obliges us to do, as well as the actual account that we have to render of our conduct to our superiors, who would have reason to make us the sharpest reproaches and the most justly merited, if we did not lay the account before them, and in such a manner as to prove to them that we have neglected nothing; but to the contrary that we have made use of every possible means to hinder their interests, which are entrusted to us, from being endangered; to complete this object we have only one single method remaining, which is again once more to repeat to you, as we do this day, our entreaties to cause the obstacles of which we complain and which occasion the most considerable damage and the greatest confusion to our affairs to be removed. If you persist in not paying attention to them, and in not assigning the reasons to us which you may have for causing us such considerable losses, we hope you will not take amiss the regular protest which we propose sending you, accompanied with the general account of what remains due to us and which you prevent our recovering. These will at least serve us a little and a proof to our superiors in France, who will afterwards look for the method which shall appear most convenient to them to get the justice done them in England which you have constantly denied us here. They will judge at the same time, Gentlemen, whether important letters which treat of national affairs and which are written to you by a Council who is the representative of its nation, ought to appear in your eyes an object of too little consequence to merit an answer.

On our part, what comforts us is that we have no reproach to make to ourselves. We have spared nothing on all occasions to create and entertain that union and harmony which it would be so desirable to see reign between you and us, but so far from having been able to succeed, we have had nothing but the concern to see the innumerable multitude of oppressions which they have made us suffer increase, and against which we have always in vain implored your justice. The subject of this letter is a fresh proof of it, which leaves not the least room for doubt.

They deprived us by force and violence of the ground of Chandela, which we had bought for the purpose of transporting our factory of Jougdia [to]* (which is more and more threatened to be overflowed by the sea) in spite of our having been in possession of it more than four or five years, and of our having paid for it to the zemindar of the place for which we have the pattah. We frequently preferred our complaints to you about it at the time. You know yourselves what justice we have obtained. We have been iniquitously and

shamefully driven from this place and still are so, notwithstanding the evident risk our factory at Jongdia runs, which has made no impression upon your minds.

For many months past your Agent at Houghly, Mr. Lushington, under the name of Fougedar of that place, has not ceased to oppress our trade with a thousand difficulties and chicanes every one more unreasonable than the former. He stops all our boats without having any cause, and under frivolous pretences, which only shew his determined ill-will not to call it anything more. It was in this manner that a few days ago he stopped several, which the Fougedar (who only acts by his orders) obstinately refused (in spite of all our representations) to let come on to Chandernagore. It happened that a violent gale of wind arose, and they all perished, which caused a considerable loss to a private person of our colony named Mr. DelaBat. We immediately demanded justice of the Fougedar; this man sends our Vakeel to Mr. Lushington who in his turn sends him back to the Fougedar. It was then, at seeing ourselves thus tossed about, we declared to this gentleman by a letter which our President wrote to him, that until he had rendered justice against the authors of this accident he could not disapprove of our suspending the payment of the rents, which we owe for some land dependant on our colony. Mr. Lushington, who looked upon this letter as offending the majesty of his post, immediately took his revenge upon several other boats that are actually stopped, and which they refuse to release. Be, Gentlemen, the judges of this proceeding and see how much Mr. Lushington deserves to be reprimanded for it by you. With what right does he stop our boats in any case? And why does he not let them arrive at Chandernagore according to the immemorial custom, and in the manner it has been constantly practised? Have they ever refused to pay him duty upon the merchandize? A proof to the contrary results from the last account that was agreed to with his receiver, by which there only remains a balance due to him of about R40. Was it then to secure the payment of so moderate a sum that he should put a stop to our trade as he does? That would be laughable and ridiculous, besides it only depends upon himself to receive these R40 when he pleases to demand them. If he has any other lawful reason for acting in so strange a manner, be kind enough to let us know them that we may be enabled to answer them in urging ours; in the meantime we beg, Gentlemen, you will send him the most positive order that he may not again disturb the operations of our trade, and that he may release our boats, which have been actually detained above these eight days, and which run the same risk as those that have already perished.

We have the honour to be with all the sentiments of the most perfect considerations,

Gentlemen,

Your, &c.,

(Sd.) CHEVALIER

(,,) FUICOLAD.

(,,) J. PANON.

(,,) SINFRAY.

(,,) BREU.

CHANDERNAGORE,

The 11th June 1772.

Agreed extract of the above letter be sent to the Collector of Houghly and his immediate and particular answer required.

No. 2.—To

MR. WILLIAM LUSHINGTON,

Collector of Houghly.

SIR,—We have received a letter from the Director and Council of Chandernagore, containing some heavy complaints against your conduct, an extract

whereof is enclosed for your more particular information and that you may transmit to us a detail of the circumstances as they really happened to enable us to decide upon the subject in question.

We are, Sir, &c.,

Signed by the President & Council.

FORT WILLIAM,

The 15th June 1772.

As we have already replied so fully in our last letter to the several complaints made by the French,

It is resolved to postpone answering this letter until we hear from the Collector at Hooghly.

Secret Department.

Fort William, the 18th June 1772.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT :

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq., *President.*

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

JAMES HARRIS, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 15th instant.

Received the following reply from Mahomed Rezza Cawn to the several articles of accusation against him as extracted from the Company's orders under date 28th August and recorded upon our Consultation of the 16th ultimo :—

No. 1.—Translation of a letter from the NAWAB MAHOMED REZZA CAWN under date 26th May 1772.

I have the pleasure to enclose Your Excellency an answer of each separate article of the translation of the Company's orders relative to me, which you enclosed me in your letter. As you are intent upon justice and equity, I have the most flattering assurance that the invention of designing men (in what they wrote to the Directors of England) will in a little scrutiny become evident to you, and that these propagators of reports, who have brought me, the Company's well-wisher, in this situation, may be punished agreeable to their crime, and I receive justice, and my well-wishes being repeatedly tried by the Directors in England, I may receive more honour than before. I am ready to reply ; and I flatter myself that I may be honoured with an interview with you and the Gentlemen of Council, and that you will issue your directions for withdrawing the guards of the Sircar, for they being stationed over me is the occasion of many evils. In the first place my helpless children both here and at Moorshedabad are terrified. In the second place, being dismissed from my station, it is requisite that I should consider for my expences, and plan for the payment of the loans of the merchants, which are very great, and the writers on account of the sentries cannot have access to me with their papers and accounts, and it is not probable that without understanding the accounts of the merchant, and my servants, that I can plan for lightening my expences. I have particularly represented to you my circumstances. Whatever your understanding the repository of justice points out, direct that I may not be sunk under the weight of my expences, and that I may no longer be ruined in the eyes of the public.

The underwritten is an answer to the five articles of accusation against me, extracted from the Company's letter under date 28th August 1771 and received from the Governor and Council of Calcutta, under date 17th Suffin 1186 of the Hijerry agreeable to the 22nd May 1772 :—

Article 1st.—That he hath withheld the payment of a large balance due from him on account of the revenues of the Chuckla of Dacca, which were collected by him during the time he was the renter of the said Chuckla.

Answer.—At that time, which was the scene of the troubles of Meer Mahomed Cossim Cawn, and for fear of whom no one gave attendance, what were the [necessary well-wishers]* for the Company and assistance to the deceased Nawab Meer Mahomed Jaffir Cawn those I performed, and at his particular solicitation I consented to go to Dacca. In the Bengal years 1170 and 1171 I paid the amount of whatever was collected on account of the revenues of the Dacca province, without a dam variation, besides that, in the Bengal years 1172 and 1173 what was received on account of balances, &c., that likewise I accounted for to Mr. Verelst at the time of the appointment of the salaries; that gentleman paid part of it to Maharajah Daleb Ram and to Maharajah Shetab Roy on account of their allowances, and the remainder he accounted for in my salary. After that, at the commencement of the Bengal year 1174, Mr Sykes agreeable to the orders of the Gentlemen in Council went to that province and examined my receipts to the end of the year 1173, and he found no difference in my accounts; and from that year what receipts your vassal accounted for (after the greatest scrutiny) being included in the bandebust, that gentleman appointed an Ameen on his own part to keep a check account of the daily receipts; be pleased, Gentlemen, to examine this.

Article 2nd.—That of his own authority and knowing the same to be contrary to the express orders of the Company, and the regulations of the Select Committee, he did grant perwannahs to certain merchants for a monopoly of the trade in salt for three years, and thereby occasioned a loss on the Company's duties on that article.

Answer.—Sooberam Pawlet and Gunney Sam Sircar received a perwannah for the sale of salt at Gualparah (which is the district on the borders of Assam) after the payment of the stipulated duties. From the tenor of their engagements, on account of the sale of salt in that district whatever they paid to the Royal Cutchery, exclusive of the regular duties, was an advantage, and not a disadvantage to the Company; and I did not give grants to merchants for an exclusive three years' trade which has occasioned a loss to the Sircar, do you, Gentlemen, be pleased to examine this? And a person by name Teleuke Ram requested a perwannah for erecting a thousand new collieries in the pergunnah of Roy Mungul, and considering that the making of a thousand new collieries in that district would be an increase in the manufacture of salt, and an increase of duties to the Company's Sircar, I granted him a perwannah, but he quarrelling with the merchants there, and they complaining, in two or three months afterwards I suspended him, and prohibited him that business, and the perwannah was never carried into execution; be pleased, Gentlemen, to examine this.

Article 3rd.—That in the exercise of the authority committed to his charge he has been guilty of many acts of violence and injustice towards the natives and subjects of the province of Bengal, and in particular that during the height of the famine in the year 1769 he did issue orders for stopping the boats laden with rice and other provisions intended for the supply of the city of Moorshedabad, and forcibly compelled the owners to sell their rice to him at the price of 25 to 30 seers per rupee and resold the same at the rate of 3 or 4 seers per rupee and other articles of provisions in the like proportion to the destruction of many thousands of the people.

Answer.—From the day that I was appointed to the Company's affairs, I have approved of nothing except the well-wishes of the Company, and the benefit of the public, nor have I ever been the means of their distress or injustice. I have always been under the direction of the Gentlemen of Council, and the Gentlemen of Mootejyl, and the Gentlemen of Council have sent many orders to the Gentlemen of Mootejyl, which agreeable to his directions I have executed and they fell under the business of my department. If I have committed acts of violence and oppression why did the Gentlemen at Mootejyl allow of it? Your vassal has committed no acts of violence and oppression on any one. Just so is the affair of the rice. In the time of the famine agree-

able to the customs of former Magistrates, I was night and day to the utmost of my power pressing the arrival of grain to relieve the public distress, and having told Mr. Becher I had seven places appointed in the city for the distribution of charity on the part of the Company, the Sircar of the Nawab Mebareck-ul-Dowlah, and myself; and thousands received nourishment from this, and were manifesting their prayers for the Company's prosperity; and in the like manner at Purneah, Dinagepur, Raj Mahal, Beerbhoom, and Hooghly I had places of charity appointed for the support of the poor, and what quantity of rice I purchased for the supply of the Company's troops I sent to Monghyr, and what I planned for the troops in the cantonments of Burrumpore, to that likewise I was bound, in consequence of the orders of the Gentleman at the Durbar, and with a view of the business of the Company's Sircar. Having purchased rice I did not sell it, and I never traded in rice, or any other kind of grain, nor have I in the least prohibited boats laden with rice, and other articles of provision in coming to Moorshedabad; be pleased, Gentlemen, to examine this.

Article 4th.—That he hath abused the trust reposed in him as Naib Dewan in causing or suffering through his misconduct or malversation in the superintendency of the collections a diminution of the Dewannee revenue, and in collecting by violent and oppressive means large sums on account of the said revenues and appropriating the same to his own use.

Answer.—Your vassal from the time of his appointment to the Neabut has never entertained an idea except the increase of the collections of the Company's Sircar, and wherever it was necessary to allow a diminution in order to dispel the complaints of the riots, and for the cultivation of the country, it has been done with the examination and scrutiny of the gentlemen resident at Mootejyl, under whose orders I was. Nor did I ever expend the Company's revenues, nor having collected the revenues by force or violence from any man, have I appropriated them to my own use, but even I have occasioned myself some loss for the completion of the revenues. The English papers and the accounts of the Calsah and the officers are ready; be pleased, Gentlemen, to examine this.

Article 5th.—That in the discharge of the trust which he held under the Nawab he has withheld and applied to his own benefit, nor hath given a due account of the large sums which have passed through his hands on account of the annual stipends of the deceased Nawab Nijam-ul-Dowlah and Syfe-ul-Dowlah which were allotted to them for the maintenance of their family, and the sepoy for the support of their dignity.

Answer.—From the time that I was appointed to the Neabut of the Subahship, and an annual salary was fixt for the sepoy, and the private expences, what was for the private expences of the Nawabs that I delivered to them and they were masters of their own expences, and even kept several circumstances secret from me. Whenever the papers came to me to be signed, I was then acquainted with them. The cash books in the time of the said Nawabs are now ready in the house accounts. With regard to what depended upon the Nizamut (the management of which the Gentlemen of Council, agreeable to the treaty under the seal of the Company, delivered over to me) the large sums which have been repeated profits, have been paid to the Company's Sircar. Examine that agreeable to the treaty how much was the annual salary appointed? And what salary is now remaining? On this account a few people void of understanding, who had an influence over the Nawab's disposition, through enmity propagated evil reports, which through their artifice was the Nawab's coolness. Notwithstanding all this, whatever I thought as proper that I represented as my advice, and never parted from the line of my acquaintance. I transacted the affairs of the Nizamut with their knowledge, and whatever was the occasion of the wants of maintenance of their dependants, and the diminution of dignity was never effected by me, nor did I ever lessen the wages of any man. The old and new servants and dependants are present. "It is astonishing in which manner the sums can have been withheld, and I have appropriated them to my own use." The accounts of these sums, which are deposited in the Nizamut, it was never a condition of the treaty that these

papers should be delivered, nevertheless who is the person who has demanded these accounts of me, and to whom I have not delivered them? Anterior to this, when the Gentlemen of Council of Moorshedabad called for the accounts of expences, they were delivered; judge, Gentlemen, if a man who agreeable to the agreements of the treaty has been manager in this business, and is the occasion of profits of large sums to the Company is worthy of favour, or merits disgrace.

Resolved the enquiry into Mahomed Rezza Cawn's conduct be suspended until the return of the President.

Proceedings of the Secret Select Committee from 6th August 1772.

Fort William, the 6th August 1772.

Cossimbazar, the 28th July 1772.

AT A COMMITTEE PRESENT :

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President.*

SAMUEL MIDDLETON, Esq.

PHILIP M. DACRES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL Esq., and

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

The President's minute.

The President delivers in the following minute :—

The President feels a reluctance to dwell any longer on a subject which has divided the opinion of the Committee, and already engaged too much of their attention, but he thinks it incumbent upon him to say something in reply to the objections which have been made to his proposition, because he apprehends that a very different conclusion may be fairly drawn from the arguments which have been urged against it. His own inclination will induce him to confine himself within the same bounds of candor and moderation which the gentlemen who differ from him in opinion have so properly chosen, and which ought to be invariably adhered to, where the end sought by all is the public good, and the only disagreement is on the mode of attaining it.

The President has already declared that he meant by the appointment of Rajah Goordass, that this Government should avail itself of the abilities and influence of Rajah Nund Comar for the purposes assigned, but it was his declared intention to exclude him from any formal trust in the Nabob's service, in order to guard against any attempts which might be apprehended from his intrigues, thus leaving the Government at liberty to recall him whenever he shall be suspected of applying the opportunities afforded him to ill purposes, without giving umbrage to the Nabob or leaving a pretence to screen him from our authority.

The President does not take upon him to vindicate the moral character of Nund Comar; his sentiments of this man's former political conduct are not unknown to the Court of Directors, who, he is persuaded, will be more inclined to attribute his present countenance of him to motives of zeal and fidelity to the service, in repugnance perhaps to his own inclinations, than to any predilection in his favour. He is very well acquainted with most of the facts alluded to in the minutes of the majority having been a principal instrument in directing them. Nevertheless he thinks it but justice to make a distinction between the violation of a *Trust* and an offence committed against our Government by a man who owed it no allegiance, nor was indebted to it for protection, but on the contrary was the actual servant and Minister of a Master whose interest naturally suggested that kind of policy which sought by foreign aids and the diminution of the power of the Company to raise his own consequence, and to re-establish his authority. He has never been charged with any instance of infidelity to the Nabob Meer Jaffur, the constant tenor of whose politics from his first accession to the Nizamut till his death correspond in all points so exactly with the artifices which were detected in the Minister that they may be as fairly ascribed to the one as to the other. Their immediate object was beyond question the aggrandizement of the former though the latter had ultimately an equal interest in their success. The opinion which the Nabob himself entertained of these services and of the fidelity of Nund Comar evidently appeared in the distinguished marks which he continued to shew him of his favor and confidence to the latest hour of his life.

His conduct in the succeeding administration appears not only to have been dictated by the same principles, but if we may be allowed to speak favourably of any measures which opposed the views of our Government and aimed at the support of an adverse interest surely it was not only not culpable but even praiseworthy. He endeavoured (as appears by the extracts before us) to give consequence to his Master, and to pave the way to his independence by obtaining a firman from the King for his appointment to the Subahship; and he opposed the promotion of Mahomed Reza Cawn because he looked upon it as a supersession of the rights and authority of the Nabob. He is now an absolute dependant, and subject of the Company, on whose favor he must rest all his hopes of future advancement.

But whatever may have been the conduct of Rajah Nund Comar in a different station, and on former occasions, the President cannot form an idea of any danger to which the Company's interests can be exposed, by his influence with his son in the office which is now proposed for him. No situation of our affairs could enable the Nabob, or any person connected with him, to avail himself by any immediate or sudden act of the slender means which he has left to infringe our power or enlarge his own. He has neither a military force, authority in the country, foreign connexions, nor a treasury. A design of such a nature, if ever practicable, can only take effect by a long train of concerted events and must be the uninterrupted work of years. But, as has been repeatedly remarked, the father having no trust or authority, nor the son abilities equal to so great an undertaking, the slightest confusion will be sufficient to remove the former and frustrate every hope of the kind for ever.

With respect to any other person who may be nominated for this charge, the President declares that he has fixed his choice upon Rajah Goordass, from the thorough conviction that no other will be found equally qualified to answer the particular purposes of that appointment.

To conclude, at a different season, and under other circumstances, the President would acquiesce in the arguments which have been urged against his recommendation. He should be very sorry to see Nund Comar become the Minister of a rival power because of his abilities. He thinks they may be most usefully employed in the service of our own Government.

(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

(Sd.) JOHN STEWART,

Secretary.

Proceedings of the Secret Select Committee from 15th February to 4th
October 1773.

Fort William, the 15th February 1773.

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, President and Governor of Fort William, &c.

SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you that the troops under my command arrived this day at Cawnpore, and those of His Excellency will be here to-morrow. There is everything necessary provided for crossing the Ganges, but since my making known to the Nabob your instructions to me, he has declared he will not pass over till the last extremity.

By our advices from Delhi the 26th instant the Mahrattas had not marched, and they seem from all accounts to be under great consternation at our approach, and was I to form a judgment, I should think they will not venture to move down this season.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

CAMP AT CAWNPORE,

A. CHAMPION.

The 31st January 1773.

Fort William, the 17th February 1773.

AT A CONSULTATION PRESENT:

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR ROBERT BARKER.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

THOMAS LANE, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

WILLIAM LAMBERT, Esq.

MESSRS. REED and BARWELL indisposed.

Read and approved the consultation of the 15th instant.

The following extract of the Proceedings of the Board of Revenue stands recorded here as more particularly belonging to this department:—

Extract of the Proceedings of the Council of Revenue, dated the 8th December 1772.

In consequence of Mr. Harwood's representation of the necessity of an additional force to protect the Districts of Rajemahal and Boglepore from the depredations of the banditti who inhabit the neighbouring mountains, General Barker lays before the Board the following plan for establishing a corps for this purpose.

The General proposes this corps for the protection of the inhabitants at the foot of the southern range of mountains near Rajemahal, and finally to extirpate those race of freebooters so detrimental to the collection of the revenues in those districts. He also would employ them as a useful partizan corps* should a considerable part of the Company's forces be acting in the field at the same time. The men should be chosen for their strength and agility more than from their appearance, and the establishment, arms, and dress for this corps ought to be considered with the nature of the services on which it is proposed to employ it. The annexed plan contains the particulars of the establishment, &c. That this corps may be prepared for service as speedily as possible, it will be advisable that the native officers to be attached to it should be supplied from the most active and experienced of those now supernumeraries in the several battalions of Seapoys. Great part of the common

* *Partisan*.—"A leader of a detached body of light troops who, knowing the country in which the operations of war are carried on, is employed either in obtaining intelligence or harassing the enemy, by falling on his rear, attacking his convoys, and destroying his line of communications. *Querillas* during the Peninsular campaigns, and *Franc tireurs* (q. v.) during the war of 1870-71, carried on partisan warfare."—Major General G. E. Voyle's Military Dictionary.

parade duty will be left out, so the chief objects of the Commanding Officer will be to teach them to manuvre with briskness, to inure them to fatigue and labour, both in marching and field works, and to fire well at a mark.

Battalion of light infantry to protect the Rajemahal Districts and be commanded by Captain Brooke.

The establishment of the corps to be as follows:—

One battalion consisting of eight Companies of 50 privates each, and two Companies of grenadiers of 100 each, to be armed with light fuzes or carabines, shafts, bayonets, and belly-pouches.

The dress—brown leathern jackets, close leathern trouzers, and coarse green cloth caps.

Europeans.

One Captain.
Three Lieutenants.

Four Ensigns.
Ten Sergeants.

Black Officers.

One Commandant.
Ten Subadars.
Thirty Jemmidars, 10 of whom to act as colour men.

Fifty Havildars.
„ Naicks.

Privates.

600 Seapoys.
20 Hatchet men instead of tom toms to be armed with blunderbusses.
12 Trumpeters.

12 Busties.
4 Armourers.
3 Sircars.
2 Black Doctors.

N. B.—Two stand of colours for the corps, and a small flag at the end of a pike to distinguish each company.

Artillery.

One Sergeant and one Gunner.
Two Howitzers.
One Magazine Tumbrel.
One Serang.

Two Tindals.
Twenty-four Lascars.
Twenty-six Draft Bullocks.
Three Elephants for the Baggage.

General Barker further informs the Board, that in consequence of the Company's orders, he is at present employed in preparing a plan for a general reformation in the Seapoy establishment, and proposes to include these Rangers in such a manner as he hopes will occasion a saving to the Company, the Board approving of the General's plan.

Resolved that a corps be formed in the manner proposed to be substituted in the room of the battalion now stationed in Rajemahal, but that it is to remain attached to the brigade like the other battalions in the service.

The General begs leave to propose Captain Robert Brooke for the command of this corps as an active officer and who has particularly distinguished himself in Partizan service both on the Coast and in Bengal.

Agreed that he be appointed.

Ordered that a copy of these Resolutions be transmitted to the Secretary to the President and Council in the Secret Department.

The following extracts of letters, correspondence, orders, and advices relating to the affairs of Cooch Beyhar being originally transacted in the Council of Revenue at which Board the treaty with Rajah Nazir Deo was first settled and agreed to, were not received in regular course in this department; but as they are now referred here, and it being determined that these matters shall always be taken up at this Board, they are here entered and are as follows:—

Extract of a letter from the Council of Revenue to the Committee of Circuit, dated the 1st December 1772.

As you are now on your way to Rungpore, we think it proper to advise you that we have lately fitted out an expedition consisting of four Companies of Brigade Seapoys from the 6th Battalion under the Command of Captain Jones to free the Zemindary of Cooch Beyhar from

the ravages and invasion of the Bootanners and reduce that country to its former dependence on the Government of Bengal. We desire you will take this subject under your consideration, and give us your opinion upon the further steps which it may be necessary to take for bringing to a speedy and successful issue; such as you shall judge to be immediately requisite we desire you will cause to be carried into execution.

*Copy of a letter from the Collector of Rungpore to the Council of Revenue, dated the 21st November 1772.

HON'BLE SIR AND SIRs,—The Governor having informed me that he had laid the representations before you which I had made to him regarding the state of the Cooch Behar country and the tender made by the Rajah of its revenues, and that you had in consequence been pleased to resolve upon the defence of it, and afford the Rajah assistance against his enemies, I wrote him signifying your pleasure, and requiring his acquiescence to the terms contained in the enclosed paper, agreeable to the instructions sent me by the Governor, to which the Rajah has signified a ready compliance. In case you may think proper to make any alterations in any of them, I do not doubt they will be readily accepted, as late intelligences from Beyhar say that the Rajah is surrounded on all sides by the Bootanners and is reduced to very great straits, which will discover to you the necessity of sending the force you may judge requisite with all possible expedition; from the best accounts I can obtain the number of the Bootanners are about 4,000 men, who, I am informed by everyone, will retreat very precipitately when the appearance of our troops shew them that you are in earnest in your intentions to relieve the Rajah from the unmerited oppressions he now labours under. I have therefore now sent a Company of Seapoys to Nazir Deo to remain with him and protect him until I hear from you, which I hope will meet with your approbation.

Nazir Deo having signified two requests by his Vakeel, though not in his letter to me, I think proper to lay them before you for your determination, only taking upon me to assure the Vakeel that you would comply with every proper requisition. The first is that he may have the power continued to him of coining his own rupees as before, being the *Narany* rupees which are current through Rungpore, and the other that Durrup Deo, who was a servant of his formerly but now his most inveterate enemy and persecutor, may be brought into due subjection to him. Durrup Deo is Rajah of Bycuntpore, a province to the north-west of Beyhar, which pays Government a tribute of R10,000 per annum, as you will perceive by a reference to the bundobust paper of last year.

I have already received on account of the troops which are to be employed on this service R5,000, and expect R15,000 more in ten or twelve days, the Nazir having informed me that the distracted state of his country at present will not allow him to pay so large a sum down at once.

Having received intelligence from Jughugopah that a body of 2,000 Bootanners were come down towards Bisnu, a purgunnah a little to the northward of Jughugopah, and had summoned the Rajah of Bisnu to join them against Nazir Deo, I have written a letter to the Rajah threatening him with the Company's displeasure if he affords them any kind of assistance. I have also thought it advisable to order the Subadar at Jughugopah, who is stationed there with a Company of Seapoys, to oppose all Bootanners, whether single or in a body, passing through our districts into Beyhar, since, should they obtain a passage from Rangamatty, they will come in upon a place where the Nazir's family reside, whom, if they get into their power, they will reduce the Nazir to their own terms.

I beg leave to request your instructions for my conduct, and remain with the utmost respect, &c.

Letter from the Council of Revenue to the Committee of Circuit, dated the 4th December 1772.

GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letter of the 27th ultimo.

Enclosed we transmit you a copy of a letter we have received from the Collector of Rungpore regarding an engagement he has proposed to enter into with the zemindar of Cooch Beyhar, which we entirely approve, and we now send you a copy of the treaty to be executed by the Rajah and returned us, when a counterpart shall be signed by the President and Council, and transmitted to

the Rajah; any further Regulations you may judge necessary to make we leave it to you to confirm with the zemindar, and also to decide upon his requests with respect to the coinage of Narany Rupees and the annexing to his zemindary the Purgunnah of Bycuntpore.

Letter from the Committee of Circuit to the Council of Revenue, dated the 23rd December 1772.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—We have been honoured with your commands of the 1st and 4th instant, and the Collector of this place has laid before us copies of his correspondence relative to the expedition undertaken for the defence and annexation of Cooch Beyhar. We have, in consequence of the rights thus submitted to us, and the authority with which you have been pleased to invest us, resolved to depute Mr. Purling to procure the execution of the treaty by the Rajah, and to settle with him for the revenue to be paid to the Company. On these and other points we have furnished Mr. Purling with a letter of instructions, a copy of which is herewith transmitted, and we hope will meet your approbation.

Advice has just been received from Captain Jones of his having succeeded in carrying by assault the Fort of Beyhar. The Collector having laid before us that officer's letter to the Governor, we have in consequence held a Committee, a copy of the proceedings of which is enclosed, and we hope will receive your approbation.

Extract of a letter from the Council of Revenue to the Committee of Circuit, dated the 5th January 1773.

We have been favoured with your letter of the 25th ultimo, which conveyed to us an extract of your proceedings on the settlement of the Cooch Beyhar Districts.

The Commission you have thought proper to give Mr. Purling for concluding the treaty with the Rajah meets with our entire approbation, as well the timely reinforcement you sent to Captain Jones, from whose success and from Mr. Purling's services we flatter ourselves this object will soon be brought to a happy issue.

The presence of Captain Jones' Battalion affords a good opportunity of reducing the Bycunt Rajah to obedience, and we entirely concur in the instructions you have given for that purpose.

Immediately on the receipt of Captain Jones' advices, our President gave orders for the remainder of his Battalion to proceed to Cooch Beyhar, and we must leave to Captain Jones to judge whether or not the assistance of the Purgunnah Companies will be necessary after the arrival of this reinforcement. If not, let them be sent back immediately to their station.

If the Rajah of Cooch Beyhar can be prevailed upon voluntarily and cheerfully to relinquish the privilege of coining, we would be glad to have it effected out; but if he yields to it with reluctance, which we imagine will be the case, we would not wish to insist on it.

As to the proposition of meliorating the standard coin of the country we apprehend the Rajah will, with difficulty, be brought to assent to it, as he, no doubt, derives an advantage from its debasement, nor are we clear that this alteration would prove beneficial to Bengal, as it might induce the Bootan merchants to carry their money into northern countries from whence it would never return.

Having thus delivered our opinion on these points, we refer it to you to settle them with the Rajah in such a manner as on mature consideration and your further enquiries may appear most for the advantage of the Company.

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, President and Governor, &c.

HON'BLE SIR,—Having information that the fortress possessed here by the Bootans was to be reinforced to-day by four thousand men, I resolved on an immediate storm, which I have happily executed, though with considerable loss, as it was resolutely defended by a very great multitude.

I have lost a good many Seapoys and manymore wounded; a return shall be sent to-morrow.

Lieutenant Dickson is wounded in the breast and knee; I have received a ball through my right arm.

I find by some prisoners we have taken that there are really four thousand of these people expected here to-night. I shall issue as prudent orders for a defence as I possibly can.

The next post possessed by the enemy is not more than a coss distant, but I am afraid it will be impossible for me to attempt anything against it without a reinforcement.

The Seapoys behaved extremely well. I cannot sufficiently praise the bravery and resolution of the officers under my command.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Beyhar,

J. JONES, *Captain.*

The 21st December 1772.

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, President and Governor, &c.

HON'BLE SIR,—I desired Lieutenant Comfort to transmit to you yesterday a list of the killed and wounded. Soon after I had possession of this place I sent out Harcarrahs all over the country: most of them are now returned and inform me that the enemy are retreated at least seven or eight coss from this. I have ordered the Harcarrahs farther off for intelligence.

I sent this morning a Subadar and a Company of Seapoys towards the posts along the river, which they found the Bootans had abandoned. The suddenness of our attack on this place appears to have been very lucky; a very great body of them were within half a mile of our camp the night before the attack, with stakes, &c., to assist in strengthening the place; a few of them advanced and were fired at by our sentries. Our beating to arms and forming intimidated them so much that they retreated leaving their stakes, bamboes, &c., in the jungle. This circumstance I did not know till this day, and have reason to hope that the Bootans are so much frightened as to prevent our being obliged to beat them from each post, which would probably have been attended with much more loss than this attack has cost us.

The Rajah of Beyhar writes me word that he will be here in a few days. I have therefore delayed sending any message (by the prisoners) to the Bootans, especially as they are so far removed. As soon as the Rajah has given me farther information relating to the state of his country and of his opponents, I shall do myself the honour to inform you of it; in the meantime I presume to hope that what I have done will meet with your approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Beyhar,

J. JONES, *Captain.*

The 24th December 1772.

P. S.—My wounds and Mr. Dickson's are both in a favourable way. One wounded Seapoy is dead, but Mr. Durbam tells me he expects all the rest will recover.

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, President and Governor, &c.

HONoured SIR,—I did myself the honour of writing to you from Mowamany the 24th. The only road for the artillery was round by Lollbazan, which has occasioned my being so long in reaching this place. My information this night is, that a body of the Senassies are within four coss of us, at a place called Bunnindanga, that they have two other posts all within the space of a coss and an half of each other. I shall march to-morrow morning very early, and hope to be able to attack them at the first place, and shall proceed to every exertion of the force under me to drive them out of this country. Durrup Deo, whose forces are joined with the Senassies, and under hope of whose reward they have yet stood, is at Luckipore; one of the passes into the Hills of Bootan, Rohimgunge, and the country to the westward, I hear, is deserted. The strength of the enemy is by most accounts said to amount to five or six thousand men.

I have the honour to enclose you a return of the troops now under my command which the hurry of my march has prevented my doing before.

My situation will, I hope, plead my excuse for any incorrectness in this epistle.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

PATGONG,

J. JONES, *Captain.*

The 27th January 1773.

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, President and Governor, &c.

HONoured SIR,—I wrote you of yesterday's date. About eleven o'clock this morning I came up with the Senassies, with whom were joined some of Durrup Deo's people. They immediately advanced and endeavoured by their numbers to surround us at a distance. I detached parties on the flanks and rear which prevented them. They kept retiring, as I advanced, out of the reach of our firelocks, and threw their rockets pretty thick amongst us, by which I had one man killed and four dreadfully wounded. The Scapoys shewed great steadiness, kept their ranks, and advanced without firing a musquet. One round shot, of which I have very little left, reached the enemy and did some execution; they at last broke and fled over the country. I thought it dangerous to attempt pursuing them. I hear they are all joined at Bouthaut, four coss to the northward, where there is a fort. I am not determined on my next motion till the return of the Harcarrahs whom I have sent out for intelligence, of which I will do myself the honour to inform you.

I am, &c.,

SIBGUNGE ON THE BANKS

J. JONES, *Captain.*

OF THE DENLAH,

The 28th January 1773.

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, President and Governor, &c.

HONoured SIR,—I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in our late affair with the Senassies, and also a monthly return of the battalion.

Late last night I was informed that the Senassies had all crossed the Teesta and sunk the boats they made use of. This produced the necessity of my marching after them to Bouthaut, &c. I now propose taking possession tomorrow of the Fort of Rohingunge, from whence, if the situation of Beylah with regard to the Bootans, of which Mr. Purling will advise me, does not render it dangerous, I shall proceed to cross the river to Gilpygory, a principal fort belonging to Durrup Deo, where I learn he is inciting the Faquires to make another stand. I do not doubt but they will fly before us; if they should not, I must invest them in it and wait the arrival of the supplies of ammunition.

I am, &c.,

CHINGERABANDANIGH, SIBGUNGE,

J. JONES, *Captain.*

The 30th January 1773.

To PHILIP MILNER DACRES, Esq., President, &c., Gentlemen of the Committee of Circuit, at Dinagpore.

GENTLEMEN,—I am honoured with your letter of the 8th instant, and have some pleasure in being able to inform you that I this day saw the Nazir Deo, who came here with the young Rajah, and that he expressed (after being acquainted that I was the person with whom he had corresponded) the greatest satisfaction and confidence in me, and told me that he put himself entirely into my hands, and depended upon me for the support of the young Rajah in his country. I took that opportunity of telling him that nothing could shew such a confidence so much as the separating his camp from that of the Senassies, who were only an useless expense. To this he has consented, saying that he would, if we go out into a plain, come and encamp with us; and upon my acquainting him

with the purport of the Governor's letter, just received, informing me that he had been pleased to order up the remainder of Captain Jones' battalion, he proposed of himself the dismissal of the Senassies, and his own troops, excepting a few about his own person. This I did not choose to urge too sanguinely, particularly as the Senassies have been so much alarmed, since my arrival, as imagining we shall attack them, that they have been three nights under arms and have of themselves proposed to leave the country, which I intend allowing them to do; and if the rabble he has for Seapoys can be made ryotts of, it must be highly advantageous to this at present deserted ruined country. The Nazir Deo himself is quite a young man and has neither sense nor power to carry his own orders into execution. Until this is rectified, and the country is allowed time to recover from the late ravages, I fear the perpetual settlement for our Hon'ble Masters will not be adequate to our expectations, nor will it be a just one.

The Bootanners, I am informed, will make overtures for a peace. As the parts on the other side of the Sorredunga to the hills, which is an extent of about four coss, has been possessed by them these fifty or sixty years, I am of opinion that if we do not allow it them, that it may be ever a bone of contention; but if we allow them the possession of it, provided they build no forts or strongholds between the Sorredunga and the hills, they may probably be contented, and insure us peace on their side and a quiet possession of this country.

Nazir Deo is at present so very poor on account of the long war, that I am afraid he will not be able immediately to comply with the demand of R50,000 stipulated by treaty. I shall, however, assure you that I will use my utmost diligence to get him to pay it.

Agreeable to your directions I have ordered down a Company of Rungpore Seapoys from hence, and have wrote to Mr. Speke to send your Company to Dinagapore.

I am, &c.,

CHAS. PURLING.

Beyhar Fort,

The 12th January 1773.

To PHILIP MILNER DACRES, Esq., President, &c., Gentlemen of the Committee of Circuit at Dinagapore.

GENTLEMEN,—I have now the honour to transmit you the treaty executed by the Regent of Beyhar, having informed him that a counterpart would be returned him signed by the Hon'ble the President and Council, after which I put him in possession of the fort and capital of his country, Captain Jones having thought it advisable to encamp at a little distance to the northward.

Having prevailed upon the Nazir Deo to dismiss the Senassies he had in pay at a most heavy expense without receiving any real service from them, I shall make my next object the procuring of the remainder of the R50,000 stipulated in the treaty. And I request your instructions regarding the disbursements of it, whether for the pay of the Seapoys, together with all the extraordinary expenses in marching the detachment, of ammunition, &c., or only for the latter. I have already informed you I cannot wish the adjustment between the Company and the Rajah to be yet made up on account of the total devastation and desolation of the northern parts of this province as far as the Bootanners have penetrated.

As the Bootanners have made overtures for a peace, I propose staying here till the remainder of Captain Jones' Battalion arrives, by which time I expect to get far in a treaty with them, whom I have taken every pains to convince that we desire no farther possession than the limits of the Cooch Beyhar country, and it is not our meaning to molest them, if they do not oblige us to continue their enemies by prosecuting their unjust claims to this district. I have also sent them two of their prisoners as a token of our good intention who (I must do Captain Jones the justice to say) will return with accounts of the most humane treatment of all the Bootanners who have been taken. The first impression has occasioned their retiring within their own boundary, being, from every information I can procure, about 4 coss below the hills, where they have hitherto remained quiet.

When I find matters in a fair way to a conclusion with the Bootanners, I propose sending Captain Jones to the reduction of the Bycunt pore country according to your instructions. I have the pleasure to inform you that the Bootanners have entirely deserted Durrup Deo, who retired from Beyhar upon the first attack our Seapoys made, and is endeavouring to entertain the very party of Senassies whom Captain Thomas engaged and who are now at Santoungunge in this district.

As all my provisions are brought from the distance of 12 or 15 coss by land, and I must be at great expence in servants, &c., in the present appointment which you have been pleased to bestow on me, I hope it will not have the appearance of presumption to request leave to charge my expences in the Rungpore monthly accounts, or that you will be pleased to point out some source by which they may be defrayed.

BEYHAR,

The 17th January 1773.

I am, &c.,

CHAS. PURLING.

TO MR. CHARLES PURLING at Cooch Beyhar.

SIR,—We have received your letters of the 12th and 17th instant.

We entirely approve of your having prevailed upon the Rajah to dismiss the Senassies, as they were only an useless expense upon him at a time that he could by no means afford to maintain them.

We make no doubt but the country must be in a desolated state from the ravages committed in it during the late wars; but as Durrup Deo has fled the country and is deserted by the Bootanners, we do not think he will have it in his power to give Nazir Deo any further molestation. We would, therefore, recommend it to you to use your best endeavours to promote a friendly accommodation between Nazir Deo and the Bootanners settled by treaty between them, but that you do not let it be executed till you have transmitted the several articles to the Hon'ble the President and Council for their approbation and sanction. You will be particularly careful that the Bootanners do ascertain the boundaries of their district, and that they be specified in the treaty.

We approve of your sending back the two prisoners to the Bootanners, as we think it will be the means of giving them a just idea of our inclination to be upon good terms with them, and that it will induce them to enter with more willingness into the treaty you proposed.

The reinforcement the Governor has been pleased to order to join Captain Jones will, we think, enable him to proceed immediately to effect the reduction of Bycunt pore, and at the same time leave a sufficient force in Beyhar for the protection of the Rajah and the province. We do not, however, mean that this should be immediately put in execution, unless you are yourself of opinion that it can be done without running any risk.

Should Captain Jones have no further occasion for the Purgunnah Seapoys, you will be pleased to order them back to their stations.

The fifty thousand rupees stipulated to be paid by the Rajah we hope you will soon recover payment of from him; the amount must be disbursed in defraying the charges of the forces sent to his assistance agreeably to the first article of the treaty. We think likewise that your own expences should be disbursed from this money, and you will please to charge them accordingly, acquainting the Board with the particulars of them for their approbation.

We enclose you an extract of a letter from the Hon'ble the President and Council on the subject of the Beyhar coinage, and we desire you will settle those points with the Rajah in such a manner as on mature consideration and further enquiries may appear most for the advantage of the Company.

As our stay here will now be very short, you will be pleased from this time to correspond direct with the Board.

We are, &c.,

DINAGEPORE,
The 21st January 1773.

To the Hon'ble the President and the other Gentlemen of the Council of Revenue at Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letter of the 5th instant and have communicated to Mr. Purling your sentiments on the Beyhar coinage, and ordered him in future to correspond with your Board.

We have now the pleasure to enclose you the treaty executed by the Cooch Beyhar Rajah; also copies of two letters from Mr. Purling, and our answer to them.

DINAGEPORE,
The 21st January 1773.

We are, &c.,
P. M. DACRES.
JAMES LAWRELL.

To the Hon'ble the President and the other Gentlemen of the Council of Revenue at Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—Having this day received a letter from the Collector of Rungpore in which he encloses an extract from Captain Jones representing the absolute necessity he has for a reinforcement to enable him effectually to complete the purpose of his expedition, we recommend it to your consideration to send an additional force as expeditiously as possible, the more especially as the several bodies of Senassies now travelling about the country render it expedient to keep the Seapoys attached to each Collectorship within their respective districts.

DINAGEPORE,
The 8th January 1773.

We are, &c.,
P. M. DACRES.
JAMES LAWRELL.

The Secretary acquaints the Board that he has it notified from the Board of Revenue that the Director and Council of Chandernagore, in a para. of a letter relating to revenue matters, takes occasion to complain of the conduct of Padre da lus, a Portuguese Friar at Backergunge, who, as they allege, has seized the effects of a Frenchman lately deceased there, and applied them to his own use, desiring our interposition to call him to account for them.

Letter to Dacca.

Agreed that the Council at Dacca be directed in the following letter to send the Padre immediately down to Calcutta:

To MR. NICH. GRUEBER, Chief, &c., Council at Dacca.

GENTLEMEN,—Complaint has been made by the Hon'ble the Chief and Council of Chandernagore, supported by certificates of sundry persons, witnesses to the fact, that the effects of a Frenchman who died at Backergunge was immediately seized by a Portuguese Padre residing there and sold by public auction on the spot. As this self-erected authority of the Padre is a contempt of Government, as well as an injury to the persons concerned, we desire that on receipt of this you will take proper means to send the Padre down here to answer for his conduct in this affair.

We are, &c.,

FORT WILLIAM,
The 17th February 1772.

Read also the following letter from Chandernagore :—

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor and President, &c., Gentlemen of Council at Calcutta.

GENTLEMEN,—We have received the letter which you did us the honour to write to us the 31st ultimo and the inclosures.

As specious the reasons may appear which your representatives at Rungpore allege to justify their conduct in the affair with Mr. Compagnac, it is nevertheless certain that they were wrong in seizing his boats. An attentive perusal of the papers you have sent us gives reason to think that Mr. Middleton's Manjees have been the occasion of all that has happened; in fact, these people who had brought goods to Backergunge ought, doubtless, to have returned empty in order to receive a fresh lading at Courigan. To get freighted they offered themselves to Mr. Compagnac, who willingly took them into his service and paid them well. Whatever they may say of the matter, as we have a proof of it in the report made to us by Mr. Desgranges, our Chief at Dacca, it was these Manjees then who were culpable and ought to have been punished, without however making Mr. Compagnac the victim for their conduct. It is him notwithstanding who has suffered the most, since by depriving him of his boats, he was forced to abandon his merchandize for a very considerable time, and has had much wastage to suffer besides expense and the slowness of his operations.

We see with a sensible pleasure, Gentlemen, sentiments you are pleased to express relative to the impartiality which you promise us on every occasion and the desire you shew to see a good harmony reign between us. There is nothing but we are ready to do to second such views. Our interest leads us to it, but still more so the satisfaction we should have, to see for ever disappear the spring of all the disagreeable things which have hitherto come to pass, and which have occasioned that immense quantity of writings and complaints which we found ourselves obliged to offer you.

We have the honour to be with the most perfect consideration,

Gentlemen,

Yours,

CHEVALIER.

NICOLA.

J. PANON.

SINFRAY.

BREW.

CHANDERNAGORE,

The 25th January 1773.

Fort William, the 18th February 1773.

AT A CONSULTATION PRESENT:

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

JOHN REED, Esq.

THOMAS LANE, Esq.

RICH. BARWELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

WILLIAM LAMBERT, Esq.

GEO. VANSITTART, Esq.

Read and approved the consultation of the 17th instant.

The Secretary having prepared the following instructions for General Barker agreeable to the Resolution of the 15th instant, lays them before the Board for their consideration :—

Instructions to General Barker on his joining the Army. To Brigadier-General Sir Robert Barker.

SIR,—The situation of affairs on the frontiers of our possessions and in the countries of Corah and Oud requiring the appearance of the Company's forces

to encourage their allies and check the hostile designs of the Mahrattas, we have judged it expedient that you proceed to these parts without loss of time to assume the command of the troops employed in those services, and to transact such other matters as shall be from time to time intrusted to your management by the Select Committee or this Board. In the meantime for your immediate direction you will consult the following instructions, conforming to them as closely as circumstances will permit:—

1. You will repair with all convenient expedition to join the 1st Brigade in the country of Oud and to take the immediate command of it; but as we deem it highly necessary that you have an interview as soon as possible with the Vizier, it is left to your discretion to proceed to him before you join the Brigade should he be absent from it.

2. On a meeting with him you are to consult together on the best plan of operations for fulfilling the objects of your commission, *viz.*, the defence and security of his country and of the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad.

3. Although for the first objects our intention was to confine our operations altogether within the limits of the Vizier's dominions, yet, for reasons with which as a Member of the Board you are well acquainted, we have determined to include in the line of defence the Rohilla District laying on the same side of the river, known by the name of the country of Haffiz Rahmut Cawn, and for that purpose you are hereby authorized to enter into a treaty with Haffiz Rahmut Cawn for the defence and protection of his dominions on such conditions as shall fully indemnify the Company for the additional charge and hazard which may be incurred by such an engagement.

4. But should Haffiz Rahmut Cawn either fall into the hands of the Mahrattas, or from any other similar circumstance be rendered incapable of entering into such an engagement, you are still to consider his dominions as an object of your operations; and if the Vizier require you to undertake their defence and engage to perform the conditions which we have desired you to claim from Haffiz Rahmut Cawn, you will not hesitate to comply, but adopt that measure heartily and pursue it as included in the instructions for the immediate defence of the Vizier's dominions.

5. It is, however, understood that in all this you rigidly and strictly adhere to the maxim laid down of confining your operations on that side within the Ganges, and on no account cross the river, or carry the war into the Rohilla Districts beyond it.

6. It is further the determination of the Board, of which you will take particular notice, that no operation for the Vizier's defence shall be carried into execution without a previous stipulation on his part for the extraordinary charge attending the succours we afford him. We have estimated this at £1,15,000 per month, and have required an assignment on his revenue for the amount; you will therefore as a preliminary demand and receive the assignment required by us; and in case an additional force should be hereafter called for on his requisition, you are previous to their march to require also and receive a proportionable assignment for the extra expenses on that account.

7. If in either case the Vizier should refuse complying with these requisitions in their fullest extent, and shall persist in the refusal, it is our positive command that you immediately abandon him and withdraw your whole force from his territory, either employing it, if needful, in the Corah Province agreeable to the instructions hereafter given, or remanding to Beyhar such part of it as shall exceed the exigencies of that service. But in such an event you are not to fail giving us the most speedy advice that we may resolve on what future measures are to be pursued.

8. The recovery of the arrears due from the Vizier for the expenses of the last campaign is also to be a particular object of your attention. You are to endeavour immediately to get them discharged or a proper security given for the payment on a future day.

9. The next general object to be given you in charge is the defence of the Corah Province; for this purpose it will be necessary that you immediately cross the Ganges with such part of your army as you judge necessary to take possession of it as allies to the King Shaw Allum.

10. Should the Mahrattas on this motion keep at a distance without crossing the boundaries of that province, you are to remain in quiet possession without interfering in any manner with them or their transactions beyond it; but should they cross that line and actually invade the province, you are then to endeavour to expel them by force, prosecuting such measures as you shall deem most advisable for that purpose.

11. It is understood that whether you remain in quiet possession of the province or are engaged in hostilities in it, you are to act only as in alliance with the King, and you are to confirm and maintain his Naib Minnur o'Dowla in the actual government of it, but he is to remain under your control and to be accountable to the Company for the revenues of the province, till such time as it shall be finally settled in what manner they are hereafter to be disposed.

12. But as the defence of the province is undertaken for the King's behalf, we expect and require that part of the revenue shall be applied to defray the extra expense of the expedition. For this purpose you will demand and receive of Minnur o'Dowla monthly 1 lack of rupees, which we estimated to be nearly the expense which will be thereby incurred.

13. We also recommend that while you are in these provinces you endeavour to obtain in the best manner your prudence shall suggest as exact an account as possible of their revenues without taking any steps that may alarm Minnur o'Dowla, and you transmit to us such accounts with your sentiments on the means of their further improvement.

14. Whatever may be the circumstances which attend the taking possession of this province, whether war or peace, you are by no means to deliver over the possession either to the King or the Vizier or any other Power whatsoever or quit the countrol as above directed till our further pleasure on this subject shall be signified to you.

15. We repeat again that in all your operations, whether for the defence of the Vizier's territories or the Corah Province, you are studiously to avoid engaging the Company in an offensive war with the Mahrattas. All your manœuvres must be directed to cover and protect these dominions, and to expel all hostile invaders from them, but you are on no consideration whatever to carry the war beyond their limits as above explained.

16. It is not however meant so far to restrain your actions in the field as to prevent you from seizing in a certain advantage, the war being once begun, beyond the strict limits of the Corah Province or pursuing a signal success to compleat it on the other side. These must be left to your discretion and experience, on which we repose our entire confidence. But it is our positive injunction that the immediate end of such an excursion being accomplished, you retire again within the limits prescribed, and act afterwards according to the spirit of these instructions.

17. This latitude is only given for your operations in the Corah Province, which lying open to the Mahrattas may afford them too great an advantage in the attack, should they be allowed to lie unmolested near its borders. But on the other side of the Ganges we consider that river as a sufficient security against such attempts, and therefore direct that you do not suffer any consideration to lead you across it.

18. If the Mahrattas by a divided attack or by an augmentation of strength should become too powerful to be opposed with effect by one Brigade of the Company's forces, you are hereby authorized to call for and order from Patna any parts of the 2nd Brigade which you shall think necessary for your reinforcement; but in this case you are to keep the most watchful eye over the motions of the Mahrattas, and if they seem to point towards Beyhar, trusting to that province being destitute of forces, you are with all expedition to send back your reinforcement or even detach such further succours as may be wanting for its security; at all events you will not fail to advise as the moment you come to the resolution of drawing troops from Patna, that we may on our part take such steps here as we shall judge advisable for the protection of the province during their absence.

19. Such are the points on which for the present we think it necessary to instruct you. As a Member of our Board, you are acquainted with the motives on which they are drawn up, and will no doubt endeavour as much as possible to conform to the spirit of them. As to the rest you will be regularly furnished with such occasional instructions as the alteration of circumstances or progress of affairs shall render necessary. In the meantime these are for your guidance in the general line of your conduct, and as to the particular operations in the field they will be left, as is most proper, to your sole direction, in full confidence of their being carried on with all the success that can be wished, for the honour and advantage of the Company and the reputation of this Government.

We are, with esteem,

FORT WILLIAM,

SIR,

The 18th February 1773.

Your most humble servants,

POSTSCRIPT.—To avoid any misapprehension of our instructions respecting the Corah Province, we think it necessary to add this explanation that we mean by it the Province of Corah properly so called; that part of Allahabad which lies between the Jumna and the Ganges and the District of Corah which altogether form the territory ceded to the King by the treaty with the Vizier in 1765.

Agreed they be written fair and signed.

THOMAS LANE.

Secret Dept.,

Fort William, the 21st April 1773.

Wednesday.

AT A CONSULTATION PRESENT:

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President.*

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

GEORGE VANSITTART, Esq.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 19th instant.

Mr. Barwell begs to lay before the Board the following Minute in consequence of the appointment resolved on at their last assembly:—

I could have wished, Gentlemen, that the occasion had not offered which influences me to transgress upon your time; but as it has been my misfortune to differ in opinion and to oppose your sense and wishes in the late appointment of Mr. Lawrell to the Eliabad and Corah Station, I am necessitated to request you will resolve me the following question. Whether you had any and what objections to the gentlemen, Mr. Lawrell's seniors, and particularly to myself, that you precluded the option which the rules of the service give them to all appointments falling to the lot of the Members of the Board. Or whether you have been solely influenced to the acceptance of Mr. Lawrell's services by his previous voluntary tender of them without any intention to derogate from the merit or abilities of others, who might have wished to have executed the trust reposed in that gentleman. Pardon me for proposing this question, but it is become indispensably necessary. The gentlemen, my superiors in rank, have given their assent to Mr. Lawrell's nomination (I too in justice must declare that I think his abilities may credit the commission confided to him), and have observed an entire silence touching their own rights, further than by remarking the latest orders of the Company give the Board a latitude to deviate from the long-

established and fixed rule of seniority. As I was the only person present at the debate of the 19th ultimo superior to Mr. Lawrell who expressed a disapprobation of the measure, I of course appear conspicuous and particularly pointed to by every observation on the records of that day in support of his nomination, and as I would not have my name presented to the public in an ambiguous light, I cannot be silent. An implied reflection uncanvassed by me would naturally prejudice my character in the opinions of all men; if no reflection is implied, I demand of your justice to declare as much; if any is implied I expect from the same justice, the particulars of my demerits. Excuse this jealousy with which I regard my reputation—a reputation that has hitherto been unsullied and unspersed during the long course of my services; in almost every station I have filled it has been my happiness to be distinguished by the favourable notice of my employers. And as I have filled amongst the various stations of the service many of the first consequence and discharged my duty in all to the public satisfaction, I confess it would mortify me much to find myself justly charged with any particular deficiency for the discharge of any particular branch of public duty; but as this is a point of too delicate a nature for me to dwell upon, I leave it; in the confidence of being able to preserve the good opinion which the Company have entertained of my past services and to vindicate their sentiments in my favour.

RICHARD BARWELL.

The President replies to the above Minute of Mr. Barwell's in the following manner:—

President's reply.

The question variously proposed by Mr. Barwell, namely—"whether the Board had any and what objections to the gentlemen, Mr. Lawrell's seniors, and particularly to himself, in the nomination of Mr. Lawrell to the Corah commission: whether the Board intended to derogate from the merit or ability of others who might have wished to execute the trust reposed in that gentleman; whether any reflection is implied on Mr. Barwell, with a demand on the justice of the Board to declare the particulars of his demerits,"—is contrary to the rules of the service and unprecedented. Neither the Members of the Board collectively nor individually are obliged to reply to any question put to them by a single Member, much less to account to him for their private sentiments or to arraign the conduct and impeach the characters of others.

The demand made on the latter part of the above quotations is in effect to require of the Board to bring a formal accusation against him, or to give him a plenary absolution and acquittance of all blame which may be imputed to him. Through the whole course of his services, I know of no cause or necessity for the former. There would be the highest impropriety in the latter.

The General Order alluded to by Mr. Barwell was not before the Board when they resolved on the appointment of Mr. Lawrell, nor does it anywhere appear to have been the ground of that Resolution; on the contrary, they proceeded in this, as hath been usual in all extraordinary commissions, by making the election without any regard to the line of seniority, but merely to the nature of the service which was to be performed, and to the fitness of the person who should offer himself for that service.

I have said that this is the rule of the service; many reasons might be assigned why this ought to be so.

Those to whose lot such commissions would fall by seniority may wish from private motives to decline them, although they might not choose to assign their reasons, or declare their reluctance to go upon any service in which the public interest is materially concerned; and it would be contrary to good policy to entrust such commissions to the charge of persons who accepted of them with reluctance.

Extraordinary services require particular talents to execute them, with which certain persons may be endowed in a degree beyond others, who may be better qualified for affairs of a different kind or for business in general: why should the Government preclude itself from the benefit of making its own

election in such cases, or why must it be accompanied by an invidious and partial comparison of the merits of those who may be competitors for it? Perhaps, also, as Mr. Barwell has asserted, objections founded on incapacity, on peculiarities of disposition which disqualify them for the particular service which is to be performed, or on the general run or tenor of their character which do not depend on detached circumstances nor can be easily established by legal proof.

To prevent misconstructions I declare that I do not in these instances mean to allude to any particular persons, but only to show the inconveniences which would arise from an invariable choice of the senior Members of the Board in all extraordinary commissions. I will, however, add for the information of my Hon'ble employers, who, from the abundance of argument which has been wasted on this subject, may be led to suspect some unworthy motive in the distinction which has apparently been paid to Mr. Lawrell, that I myself was influenced by two considerations which may be deemed personal. I knew Mr. Lawrell to be possessed of much knowledge in the general business of the revenue, of uncommon talents in account, and a great share both of method and assiduity—qualifications peculiarly adapted to the service on which he was to be employed. Mr. Barwell has made it necessary to declare that although I have the justest deference for his abilities, I have not yet had an opportunity of experiencing their effects but in points of controversy or opposition, nor derived any benefit from his assistance; that whether from a different mode of thinking, or contrariety of temper, or from whatever cause, it has not been my good fortune to be upon a footing of confidential communication with him, and therefore I could not judge him to be the fittest person for a service which was to be preparatory to my own, and which would impose upon me the necessity of taking his assistance, and of consulting with him on points of the utmost importance to the political interests of the Company; and requiring instant decision, if the proposed interview with the Vizier should take place.

I am sorry to be compelled to such a declaration. I am satisfied to refer the Court of Directors for the justice of it to their public records, and hope I shall stand justified in their opinion for the motives which have led me to the preference of Mr. Lawrell, in a case which was never yet considered as determinable by the strict line of seniority.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Mr. Barwell further begs leave to record his sentiments in the following Minute:—

The Hon'ble the President's observations touching the question I proposed to the Board on the subject of the Corah appointment which took place in favour of Mr. Lawrell are such as might have occurred to my mind, because the propriety of the sentiments urged for a deviation from the strict line of seniority on extraordinary occasions and under very particular circumstances are doubtless obvious, and will always be admitted by men capable of distinguishing what is beneficial for the public service. I should not have given the Board the trouble of my preceding minute but for the reason therein assigned—the jealousy with which I conceive every man will regard his own character who is conscious of meriting well from the public and desirous of vindicating himself against any possible exception that can be made to his pretensions to serve the Company in any line of duty to which he may with propriety aspire; in this respect, having acquitted myself of the duty I owed to myself, I can only lament my not being favoured with the Governor's confidence to balance in his mind the objection which he declares to have preponderated against me, at the same time that I feel the deepest concern at so public a mark of his dissatisfaction I can safely aver my unhappiness in the particular which he has reluctantly noticed, to be my thinking differently of the subjects which appear upon your records; my principle would be very much mistaken indeed if an idea of opposition should be ascribed to me—an idea I disclaim as entirely foreign to my thoughts, while I admit that a free and impartial description of points that fall under the Board's consideration made me deem it my duty to speak my particular sentiments where they appear repugnant to the sense of the majority. My wishes, my inclination, and my interest lead me to desire nothing more ardently than to

conform to every opinion the propriety of which may have been admitted by the sanction of your approval. You may imagine then that the occasions which arose were a force upon my inclinations and compelled me in the instances in which I have differed either to give up my own judgment without conviction of its being erroneous or to record it. Your candor, I am convinced, did not impose on me the first, and I am satisfied you will be no longer displeased with the last when you credit my observation that it was the result of the first.

The utility of the measure which has given rise to the present argument I approve from sentiments formed regarding it long since, and these I submitted to the Governor, actuated equally to lay them before him by private delicacy and deference to his station as by my public duty; it proved my happiness on this occasion to hear from him that the same subject had a place in his thoughts and that it would be shortly perfected and brought before the Board. You have since seen and approved the Governor's plan and I flatter myself from his great political knowledge and abilities every happy consequence will result to your affairs in the execution of the commission with which he is entrusted. Pardon me if you think I have unnecessarily engaged your time, and let the idea, which renders a subject interesting to any particular character, influence your indulgence to the person who may be under the impulse of that idea.

RICHARD BARWELL.

The President craves the indulgence of the Board while he subjoins a few words as a
The President's second minute. close to the subject of the foregoing Minutes :—

He sincerely acknowledges the satisfaction he has received from the very candid and liberal reception which Mr. Barwell has been pleased to give to his explanation of the motives which induced him to prefer Mr. Lawrell for the deputation to Corah, and he here repeats that his sole view was to secure in the execution of the important negotiation which had been assigned him by the Board a cordial and effective assistance from the gentleman who was to be intrusted with the preparatory measures of them.

He is sorry there was not at that time such an established confidence between himself and Mr. Barwell as might afford him the certainty of that assistance as he shall always be happy to benefit by Mr. Barwell's abilities; he shall on his part with great cheerfulness study to second the desire which that gentleman has expressed, that there may be a perfect cordiality, and an unreserved communication of sentiments between them, so that in future there may be no room for such objections as the President has been compelled in this instance to make use of, convinced that, while he at the same time finds his inclinations gratified and his labours relieved, the public service will equally benefit by a mutual harmony subsisting between all the Members of the administration.

Secret Dept. Fort William, the 6th May 1773.

Thursday. AT A CONSULTATION PRESENT :

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

GEORGE VANSITTART, Esq.

MR. DACRES indisposed.

Read and approved the Consultations of the 3rd instant.

Resumed the consideration of the President's Minute of the 15th ultimo.

President's Minute.

At the time the alteration of the Scapoy establishment was resolved in Council I mentioned the necessity that appeared of appointing some independ-

ent Companies for the duty of the Presidency. This subject was at that time referred for after-consideration.

I am now to assign my reasons for recommending this measure.

In the first place, having a great number of guards and chokis constantly stationed in and about Calcutta and the perpetual call for small escorts on indispensable occasions, which are frequently absent from the corps for several months, would disjoint and break a Brigade Battalion, in such a manner as to defeat the utmost endeavours of the best officers to keep it under a proper discipline and good order, and if this duty was to be taken in rotation by every battalion in the service it might go far entirely to destroy our intentions of preserving discipline uniformly throughout the Seapoy establishment.

In the second place, the Town Major who commanded the Calcutta Seapoys for several years having assured me that most of the duties which fall to their lot might be equally well performed by invalids, I propose to enrol all the native invalids which are stationed here, officers as well as Seapoys, into the corps which shall be raised for the Calcutta duty, by which means we shall save the expense of an unserviceable invalid corps and at the same time make a much better provision for these poor people who have suffered materially in the service of the Company.

The Seapoy invalids at the Presidency are:—

Sabadars	10
Jemaldars	5
Havaldars	7
Naicks	9
Sepoys	58

To these I would propose to add as many officers and Seapoys selected and drafted from the present Calcutta Battalion as would complete seven independant Companies upon the following establishment to be put under the charge of the Town Major and Fort Adjutant:—

	R	R	
1 Commandant (to be appointed only in case there is an invalid Commandant)	80	80	
7 Subadars	40	280	
7 Jemadars	16	112	
7 Trumpeters	5	35	
56 Havildars	10	560	
56 Naicks	8	448	
700 Sepoys	5	3,500	
1 Serjeant-Major	} from the European invalids	160	
7 Serjeants			
Allowance to Serjeant-Major		20	
Staff	1 Writer	20	20
	2 Sircars	10	20
	3 Doctors	10	30
	1 Head Armourer	10	10
	3 Inferior Armourers	8	24
	7 Watermen	5	35
Sanat R		5,334	

In the above establishment I have appointed a smaller number of Subadars and Jemadars in proportion than in the Brigade Battalions, because they would be a needless burden to the service as there is seldom a command from the Presidency that would require either of these officers, but, on the other hand, I have considerably increased the proportion of non-warrant officers on account of the frequency of petty commands.

I beg leave also to acquaint the Board that the Resident at the Darbar has represented to me the necessity he is under of furnishing a number of scattered guards for the protection of Moorsshedabad, which have hitherto employed not a less force than four Companies of Seapoys, and that he will likewise have

occasion for petty detachments for the business of the Cossembazar Factory. The two great cities of Patna and Dacca will in like manner require some bodies of armed men for their safeguard and protection, and it further appears that guards will be indispensably necessary for the security of the treasury at the several Collectorships. To these points I request the Board's attention to enable me to carry into execution the Resolution for disbanding the four Purgannah Battalions, which cannot be done with safety until some provision is made for preserving the peace of the country and the security of the Company's property. Whatever establishment it may be determined to form, all the other Seapoy invalids in the pay of the Hon'ble Company, of which there are returned with the Army 16 Subadars, 21 Jemmadars, and 174 rank and file, may be incorporated into it.

In the original plan Chittagong was comprehended to be relieved from the brigades; but considering its distance from any of the stations of the Army, there is a powerful objection to the proposed relief of the Seapoys there, at the stated times fixed for our military changes, as a very considerable expense must be incurred by so frequent and so distant a removal of the troops, and the country through which they must pass being so much inclosed and the inhabitants mostly decoys, great disturbances are to be apprehended, and both real and pretended losses will occasion deductions from the revenue; moreover, the battalion there is composed of natives of that district, who, if dismissed the service, would most probably for want of other means of subsistence become decoys. I would therefore propose that the battalion there stationed should remain fixed for the service of that district, Tepperah and Luckypore.

Present Establishment of a Battalion of Regular Seapoys.

	Full pay.			Full batta.	Allowance.	Gratuity.	TOTAL.		
	R	a.	p.	R	R	R	R	a.	p.
1 Captain	124	0	0	186	...	36	346	0	0
3 Lieutenants, @ R62 each ..	186	0	0	372	186	72	816	0	0
3 Ensigns, @ R49-9-7 „	148	12	9	279	186	36	649	12	9
1 Serjeant-Major	20	0	0	...	20	...	40	0	0
4 Serjeants, @ R20 each	80	0	0	80	0	0
2 Drummers, @ R14 „	28	0	0	28	0	0
1 Commandant	60	0	0	30	60	...	150	0	0
10 Subahdars, @ R60 each	600	0	0	300	900	0	0
30 Jemmadars, @ R16 „	480	0	0	450	930	0	0
10 Color Bearers, @ R10 each	100	0	0	100	200	0	0
40 Tomtoms and Trumpeters, @ R6 each	240	0	0	120	360	0	0
40 Havildars, @ R10 each	400	0	0	400	800	0	0
40 Naicks, @ R8 each	320	0	0	400	720	0	0
700 Seapoys „ R6 „	4,200	0	0	2,100	6,300	0	0
1 Subadar Acting Adjutant, Non-Effectives	16	...	16	0	0
1 Writer	20	0	0	20	0	0
1 Linguist	20	0	0	20	0	0
3 Doctors, @ R10 each	30	0	0	30	0	0
10 Sircars „ R10 „	100	0	0	100	200	0	0
1 Head Armorer	10	0	0	10	0	0
3 Inferior Armourers, @ R8 each	24	0	0	24	0	0
10 Watermen, @ R6 each	60	0	0	30	90	0	0

Monthly Charges of Sonaut R 12,729 12 9

Annual Charges supposing it 6 months on full and 6 months on half batta 1,40,667 9 0

Present Establishment of a Battalion of Purgannah Seapoys.

	Full pay.	Batta.	Allowance.	Gratuity.	TOTAL.		
	R	R	R	R	R	a.	p.
1 Captain	124	186	...	36	346	0	0
3 Lieutenants, @ R62 each	186	372	186	72	816	0	0
1 Serjeant-Major	16	...	20	...	36	0	0
4 Serjeants, @ R16 each	64	64	0	0
2 Drummers, @ R11 each	22	22	0	0
1 Commandant	60	The Company furnishes these Seapoys with clothing instead of batta.	60	...	120	0	0
10 Subdars, @ R60 each	600		600	0	0
30 Jemmadars, @ R16 each	480		180	0	0
10 Color Bearers, @ R10 each	100		100	0	0
40 Tomtoms and Trumpeters, @ R6 each	240		240	0	0
40 Havildars, @ R10 each	400		400	0	0
40 Naicks, @ R8 each	320		320	0	0
700 Seapoys, " R6 "	4,200		4,200	0	0
1 Subadar acting as Adjutant, Non-Effective	16	...	16	0	0
1 Writer	20	20	0	0
1 Linguist	20	20	0	0
3 Doctors, @ R10 each	30	30	0	0
10 Sircars, " R10 "	100	100	0	0
1 Head Armourer and 3 men	34	34	0	0
10 Watermen, @ R6 each	60	60	0	0
Monthly Charges of Sonaut R					8,024	0	0
Annual Charges of Sonaut R					96,288	0	0
Annual Charges to the Company of clothing a Battalion being Sonaut Rupees					3,605	10	2
Total Charges annually for a Battalion being Sonaut Rupees					99,893	10	2

Proposed Establishment for a Battalion of Seapoys.

	Full pay.	Batta.	Allowance.	Gratuity.	TOTAL.		
	R a. p.	R	R	R	R	a.	p.
1 Captain	124 0 0	186	...	36	346	0	0
5 Lieutenants, @ R62 each	310 0 0	620	310	120	1,360	0	0
5 Ensigns, @ R19-9-7 each	247 15 11	465	310	60	1,082	15	11
1 Serjeant-Major	20 0 0	...	20	...	40	0	0
10 Serjeants, @ R20 each	200 0 0	200	0	0
1 Commandant	60 0 0	30	60	...	150	0	0
10 Subdars, @ R60 each	600 0 0	300	900	0	0
20 Jemmadars, @ R16 each, of whom are to carry the colors	320 0 0	300	620	0	0
10 Trumpeters, @ R6 each	60 0 0	30	90	0	0
12 Drummers, @ R14 each	168 0 0	168	0	0
30 Havildars, " R10 "	300 0 0	300	600	0	0
30 Naicks, @ R8 each	240 0 0	240	480	0	0
640 Seapoys, " R6 "	3,840 0 0	1,920	5,760	0	0
1 Subadar acting as Adjutant, Non-Effective	16	...	16	0	0
1 Writer or Linguist	20 0 0	20	0	0
3 Doctors, @ R10 each	30 0 0	30	0	0
10 Sircars, " R10 "	100 0 0	100	200	0	0
1 Head Armourer	110 0 0	110	0	0
3 Inferior Armourers, @ R8 each	24 0 0	24	0	0
10 Watermen, @ R6 each	60 0 0	30	90	0	0

Monthly Charges of Sonaut R 12,186 15 11
 Annual Expenses, supposing it 6 months on half and 6 months on full batta 1,36,493 15 0

Comparative view of the Expenses attendant on the proposed and present Establishments of the Battalion of Seapoys.

THE PRESENT EXPENSES.			THE PROPOSED EXPENSES.		
	R	a. p.		R	a. p.
Pay, batta, and allowance of 18 Battalions of Regular Seapoys agreeable to the annexed establishment amounting annually . . .	25,32,016	2 0	Pay, batta, and allowances of 24 Battalions of Seapoys agreeable to the annexed establishment . . .	32,75,854	8 0
Annual Charges of 10 Battalions of Purgannah Seapoys to the Company . . .	9,98,936	5 8	Proposed expences of Chowkidars and Tannedars for the collections in Bengal annually . . .	1,68,000	0 0
Pay and batta of 80 th Gentlemen Cadets struck of the Select Picquet to complete the proposed establishment of officers at 6 months' half and 6 months' full batta . . .	62,400	0 0			
Present expences of Chowkidars and Tannedars for the collections in Bengal annually about . . .	60,000	0 0	Decrease of expenses annually	2,09,497	15 8
TOTAL . . .	36,53,352	7 8	TOTAL . . .	36,53,352	7 8

Fort William, the 23rd September 1773.

Read the following letter from the Governor :—

The Governor, he has completed his Negotiations. To William Aldersey, Esq., &c., Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Fort William.

GENTLEMEN,—This day, I finally concluded an agreement with the Vizier the original of which I shall have the pleasure of laying before the Board on my return. In the meantime I think it my duty by the earliest opportunity to communicate the substance of it to you for your satisfaction, as follows :—

The Districts of Corah and Allahabad are ceded to the Vizier on condition of his paying 50 lacks of rupees to the Company, 20 of which is ready money and the remaining 30 in two years by equal payments.

He has engaged to pay the whole expense of the Company's forces which may hereafter march to his assistance, on his requisition which has been computed and fixed at R2,10,000 per month for a brigade.

I have obtained a renewal and formal confirmation of his former engagements with Rajah Cheit Sing.

I propose getting out from this place in two days.

I am, &c.,

BENARES,

WARREN HASTINGS.

The 7th September 1773.

Jumma Wasel Baky of the Province of Allahabad for the Fussilee year 1176.

Names of the Mehals or Branches of Revenue.	Jumma or amount settlement		Amount collected.		Balance.		Naukar		Abated or irrecoverable.		Balance due from the Districts.	
	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.
Havelly Cheyll	1,48,806	2 3	1,40,815	12 3	8,047	6 0	2,159	0 0	345	0 0	5,543	6 0
Secunderpore	1,33,566	2 6	1,26,027	14 6	7,538	4 0	6,909	8 0	728	12 0
Arrey with the Talook of Brahra	2,49,087	3 0	2,18,267	10 3	30,919	7 9	14,716	1 9	10,628	1 9	5,475	4 3
Nuabgunge	64,979	0 0	58,569	0 0	10,410	0 0	3,535	0 0	1,300	0 0	5,575	0 0
Mah	51,315	9 0	49,140	0 0	2,175	8 9	1,000	0 0	1,000	0 0	175	0 9
Suram	1,23,553	15 6	1,06,680	1 3	16,903	14 3	5,973	1 3	4,617	5 9	7,311	14 9
Joussey	98,428	0 0	91,671	2 0	6,757	5 0	3,242	0 0	3,515	5 0
Mehal Sayer or Duties, &c.	1,20,000	0 0	1,20,000	0 0
Mehal Darul Zerb or Mint	55,000	0 0	55,000	0 0
Kheyragur	1,75,000	0 0	1,75,000	0 0
TOTAL ALLAHABAD R	12,23,825	15 0	11,41,174	9 3	82,651	5 9	36,534	11 0	17,619	3 6	26,497	7 3

BENARES,

The 22nd August 1773.

Jumma Wasel Baky of the Province of Allahabad for the Fussilee year 1177.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma or amount settlement.		Amount collected.		Balance.		Nankar.		Abated or irrecoverable.		Balance due from the Districts.	
	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.
Havelly Cheyll	1,28,587	6 0	1,21,775	0 0	6,811	15 9	3,422	0 0	325	0 0	3,064	15 9
Secunderpore	97,485	12 0	69,630	11 3	28,155	0 9	6,804	8 0	12,296	6 6	9,054	2 3
Arreyl and Barah	1,72,464	0 0	1,57,921	9 3	14,542	6 9	9,316	10 0	3,370	0 0	1,825	12 9
Nuabgunge	51,606	0 0	46,907	10 0	4,398	6 0	3,635	0 0*	763	6 0
Suram	87,020	13 9	74,733	4 9	12,287	9 0	6,991	13 3	1,057	15 9	4,237	12 0
Joussey	92,940	0 0	87,398	0 0	5,512	0 0	3,242	0 0	2,300	0 0
Mah	40,675	0 0	39,120	0 0	1,555	0 0	1,000	0 0	555	0 0
Mahal Darul Zerb or Mint	55,000	0 0	55,000	0 0
Kheyragur	1,75,000	0 0	1,75,000	0 0
Mahal Sayer or Duties, &c.	1,20,000	0 0	1,20,000	0 0
TOTAL ALLAHABAD R	10,20,478	15 9	9,47,186	9 6	73,292	6 3	34,441	15 3	17,019	6 3	21,801	0 9

BENARES,

The 22nd August 1773.

Jumma Wasel Baky of the Province of Allahabad for the Fussillee year 1178.

Names of the Mchals.	Jumma or amount settlement.		Amount collected.		Balance.		Nankar.		Abated or irrecoverable.		Balance due from the Districts.	
	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.	R	a. p.
Havelly Cheyl	1,61,693	11 3	1,53,652	10 9	8,041	0 6	3,422	0 0	325	0 0	4,294	0 6
Secunderpore	1,30,142	12 0	1,16,546	5 3	13,596	6 9	6,179	11 0	2,752	4 6	4,664	7 3
Arreyll	2,35,002	0 0	2,26,524	9 0	11,477	7 0	7,836	15 6	355	0 0	3,265	7 3
Nuabgunge	83,443	0 0	72,666	14 0	10,776	2 0	5,453	0 0	1,000	0 0	4,323	2 0
Mah	42,885	10 0	40,370	5 0	2,515	5 0	1,000	0 0	1,515	5 0
Suram	1,19,720	12 0	92,282	15 9	25,437	12 3	5,601	13 9	4,776	0 6	17,059	14 0
Joussev	1,22,819	0 0	1,12,327	0 0	10,492	0 0	3,242	0 0	7,950	0 0
Mehal Sayer or Duties, &c.	1,20,000	0 0	1,20,000	0 0
Mehal Darul Zerb or Mint	55,000	0 0	55,000	0 0
Kheyragur	1,75,000	0 0	1,75,000	0 0
TOTAL ALLAHABAD R	12,48,706	13 3	11,64,370	11 9	84,336	1 6	32,735	8 6	9,208	5 0	42,392	4 0

BENARES,

The 22nd August 1773.

Jumma Wasel Baky of the Province of Allahabad for the Fussilee year 1179.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma or amount settlement.		Amount collected.		Balance.		Naukar.		Abated or irrecoverable.		Balance due from the Districts.	
	R.	a. p.	R.	a. p.	R.	a. p.	R.	a. p.	R.	a. p.	R.	a. p.
Havelly Cheyll	1,97,109	1 9	1,69,928	6 0	27,180	11 9	3,514	0 0	383	0 0	23,283	11 9
Secunderpore	1,26,430	6 0	1,03,682	11 3	22,747	10 9	5,867	1 0	1,900	2 0	14,980	7 0
Arey and Barah	1,92,772	0 0	1,77,806	4 0	13,965	12 0	8,172	4 9	5,793	7 3
Nuabgunge	79,175	14 0	68,484	14 0	10,691	0 0	5,453	0 0	5,238	0 0
Mah	50,432	1 3	43,232	8 3	7,199	9 0	1,000	0 0	2,133	0 0	4,066	9 0
Siram	1,18,957	4 3	91,418	12 6	27,538	7 9	5,383	9 6	1,641	2 6	20,513	11 9
Joussey	1,30,001	0 0	94,546	15 0	35,454	1 0	3,242	0 0	4,227	0 0	27,985	1 0
Mehal Sayer or Duties, &c.	1,10,000	0 0	1,10,000	0 0
Mehal Darul Zerb or Mint	7,000	0 0	7,000	0 0
Kheyragur	1,75,000	0 0	1,75,000	0 0
TOTAL ALLAHABAD R	11,85,877	11 3	10,41,100	7 0	1,44,777	4 3	32,631	15 3	10,294	5 3	1,01,860	15 9

BENARES,

The 28th August 1773.

Fort William, the 4th October 1773.

The Governor delivers into the Board the following report of his negociations with the Nabob Suja-ul-Dowla at Benares and his other proceedings during his absence from the Presidency, with all the papers referred to in the report:—

Governor's report and subsidiary papers.

To William Aldersey, Esq., &c., Council at Fort William.

GENTLEMEN,—I have already advised you in my letter of the 7th September from Benares of the issue of my negociations, and the sum of the treaty concluded with the Vizier. I now lay before you No. 1, the treaty itself, a counterpart of which remains in his possession. The other papers which accompany this I shall refer to, numbering them in the order in which they may occur.

In the course of my journey to Benares, I repeatedly addressed the King, advising him to send some person of confidence to meet me there with full powers to treat upon his affairs. He did not comply with my advice, but contented himself with writing to the Vizier, and Munneer-o-Dowla to demand the balance of the tribute of Bengal, the regular payment of it in future, and the restitution of Corah and Allahabad to Munneer-o-Dowla on his behalf, but without empowering them to deviate from those demands; under such circumstances your instructions directed me to treat for the cession of those countries with the Vizier. I proposed to him the exchange of the territory of Raja Cheit Sing for them, but I found him inflexibly averse to it. He replied that if I insisted upon it he had not the power to dispute it, and must of necessity submit, but that he would never willingly consent to part with a span of his territory; that his principal inducements to wish for the districts of Corah and Allahabad was that he might have the credit of repossessing all the territory which he before enjoyed and had inherited from his father; that an exchange would defeat his purpose; that he could have no reason to give up a valuable part of his country, with a certain revenue, for a district which even in time of peace would not yield him near so large net revenue as was paid him by Raja Cheit Sing, and in war, or even the alarm of war, nothing besides his being continually exposed to the invasions of the Mahrattas. These arguments were certainly just; and as my view was to confirm and strengthen the alliance between him and the Company, and this proposal, if insisted upon, would have been productive of a contrary effect, I thought it advisable to drop it. Indeed I mentioned it but so slightly, knowing his repugnance to it, and I flatter myself that the sum of 50 lacks of rupees, and the stipulation of R2,10,000 per month for the payment of an incomplete brigade whenever required for his service, will appear to you, Gentlemen, and to our hon'ble masters, a very advantageous compensation for a territory which perhaps ought in policy to have been given to him, even though no return had been made for it.

To have kept it ourselves would have been inconsistent with the repeated and peremptory commands of the Company. The 7th, 8th, and 10th paragraphs of their general letter, dated 11th May 1769, are so directly in point, and mark so forcibly their sentiments concerning the impropriety of holding territories beyond the boundary of their own provinces, and separated from them, that this administration would have been culpable in the highest degree in retaining possession of Corah and Allahabad for any other purpose than that of making an advantage by the disposal of them. It would have imposed on us the necessity of sending our troops continually out of the Provinces of Bengal, not at the requisition of the Vizier and at his charge, but at our own expense, and for the protection of these distant acquisitions; and as the Mahrattas must unavoidably pass either through these districts, or near them, to invade the Vizier, this would furnish him with a perpetual excuse for refusing to bear his proportion of the expense of the forces which should be employed in his protection; nor indeed would it ever be necessary for him to call for their aid, since the presence of our army for the protection of the lands lying on his frontier would make them a secure barrier to him, and thus leave us the whole burthen, and immediate hazard of the war, although he would be the greatest and in the end would probably appear the only gainer by it. Nor is their contiguity less exceptionable on account of the tendency which our possession of them

would have to destroy the harmony and good understanding which our hon'ble masters so earnestly enjoin us to maintain with the Vizier, their ally, since, as he himself observed to me upon it, they do not form a compact and detached space, which could admit of an easy defence from one central station with its bounds clearly defined, but consist in a narrow line without breadth extending along the western frontier of his dominions, and so intermixed with them (many parts lying on the eastern bank of the river) that his aumils and ours would be for ever engaged in natural quarrels, which would not fail to weaken the friendship between him and the Company, as it would be impossible to examine on which side the right lay at so great a distance from our observation, nor (to use the words of our hon'ble masters) could we send a man or a gun for the defence of these new acquisitions without passing through his country, which would be a perpetual source of dispute and complaint.

Had we restored these districts to the King, who so lately abandoned them, and who is confessedly unable by his own strength to maintain them, we should still have been burthened with the care of their defence, or we should have given them only nominally to the King, but in reality to the Mahrattas, the evil consequences of which it is needless to enumerate.

By ceding them to the Vizier we strengthen our alliance with him, we make him more dependant upon us, as he is more exposed to the hostilities of the Mahrattas; we render a junction between him and them, which has been some times apprehended morally impossible, since their pretensions to Corah will be a constant source of animosity between them; we free ourselves from the expense and all the dangers attending either a remote property, or a remote connection; we adhere literally to the limited system laid down by the Hon'ble Court of Directors; we are no longer under the necessity of exhausting the wealth of our own provinces in the pay and disbursements of our brigades employed at a distance beyond them, but by fixing the sum to be paid by the Vizier for their services at their whole expense, and by removing every possible cause for their passing our own borders, but at his requisition and for his defence, we provide effectually for the protection of our frontier, and reduce the expenses of our army even in employing it; and lastly we acquire a net sum of 50 lacks of rupees most seasonably obtained for the relief of the Company's necessities, and the deficient circulation of the currency of the provinces.

General Sir Robert Barker favoured me at my request with the calculation on which the sum was fixed at R2,10,000 for the pay, batta, and extra charges of a brigade employed without the provinces, and I herewith enclose it (No. 2.)

No. 3 is a Persian copy of a cowlnama or engagement which I obtained from the Vizier confirming to Raja Cheit Sing and his posterity the stipulations formerly made in behalf of his father Bulwand Sing. No. 4 is an English translation of it. No. 5 a copy of the Vizier's pottah, or rent-roll, fixed with Raja Cheit Sing for the year 1178, and alluded to in the cowlnama. No. 6 an English translation of the pottah. No. 7 the translation of a letter which I wrote to Raja Cheit Sing as a further assurance of the conditions promised in the cowlnama.

The cowlnama was executed in my presence and attested by me. The Vizier desired that the stipulations made in favour of the Raja might be executed in this mode rather than by an article in the treaty, and it was equally satisfactory to the Raja. I must remark that he had already given the Raja a cowlnama of this tenor soon after the death of Bulwand Sing through the solicitation of Captain Harper by the orders of the Select committee. He could therefore have no reasonable plea to refuse the confirmation of it. Nevertheless he seemed to think his former act of so little validity that he pressed me in very earnest terms for my consent that he should dispossess the Raja of the forts of Luttefgur and Bidgygur, and take from him 10 lacks of rupees over and above the stipulated rents, and he seemed greatly dissatisfied at my refusal. He argued that the treaty of Allahabad related to Bulwand Sing solely, and was never meant to extend to his posterity. I confess the letter of the treaty expresses no more, yet I cannot conceive that either the Raja or

Lord Clive, when the treaty was made, could have intended it in that sense. It has certainly been differently understood both by the Company and by this Administration, and the Vizier himself had before put it out of all dispute by the solemn Act passed in the Raja's favour on his succession to the zemindary. I am well convinced that the Raja's inheritance, and perhaps his life, are no longer safe than while he enjoys the Company's protection, which is his due by the ties of justice, and the obligations of public faith, and which policy enjoins us to afford him evermost effectually. His country is a strong barrier to ours without subjecting us to any expence, and we may depend upon him as a sure ally, whenever we may stand in need of his services.

The day before my departure from Benares a khowass, or attendant on the King's person, a man of no consequence, arrived with a letter to me from his master, of which and my answers I enclose translations Nos. 8 and 9. You will observe that the acquisition of Corah and Allahabad, the payment of the tribute, and the assistance of our troops, were the objects of his commission. As I see no use in false profession or concealment and have ever found plain-dealing the best policy, I hope you will approve of my reply.

Whatever policy suggested the first idea of the tribute, and whatever title he may be conceived to have had to the payment of it while he remained under our protection, and united his fortune with ours, his late conduct has forfeited every claim to it, and made it even dangerous to allow it, even if the resources of Bengal and the exigencies of the Company could any longer admit of it. Our conduct towards him has certainly afforded matter of admiration to the whole people of Hindostan, whether they construe it as the effect of a mistaken principle of duty, the just return of benefits received, or attribute it to some hidden cause. We have persevered with a fidelity unknown to them in an unshaken alliance to a pageant of our own creation, and lavished on him the wealth of this country, which is its blood, although not one of his own natural subjects has ever afforded him the least pledge of voluntary obedience, although our constituents have been compelled to withhold the legal claims of our own sovereign, although we have loaded them with an accumulated debt of a crore and a half of rupees, almost the exact amount of the sums remitted for the use of a man who in return has ungratefully deserted, and since headed armies against us. It is unjust to argue, in support of his pretensions on the Company, that the tribute is no more than a reasonable acknowledgment for the favour which they received from him in the grant of the Dewanny. They gave him all. They received nothing from him but a presumptuous gift of what was not his to give, but what they had already acquired by their own power, the same power to which he was indebted for his crown, and even for his existence.

The Vizier was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English force to put him in possession of the Rohilla country lying north of his dominions and east of the Ganges. This has long been a favorite object of his wishes, and you will recollect that the first occasion of my late visit was furnished by a proposal of this kind. He had certainly just grounds of resentment against the chiefs of this nation, who had not only failed in their engagements to pay him 40 lacks of rupees for his protection against the Mahrattas, but had actually supplied them with money when they appeared in arms against him. He offered to make the Company a consideration for this service of 40 lacks of rupees besides the stipulated sum for the expenses of our troops; but he afterwards laid aside this design, fearing that it would disable him from fulfilling his engagements for Corah and Allahabad. I enclose, for your observation, No. 10, the original agreement of the Rohilla chiefs, witnessed by General Barker; No. 11, a translation of the same; No. 12, a translation of a letter which I received from Haffiz Rahmut Cawn, in whose name the agreement was ratified; and No. 13, a translation of a narrative delivered to me by the Vizier in reply to it. The measures to be pursued for his security on that quarter must therefore be determined by future occurrences. I was pleased that he urged the scheme of this expedition no further, as it would have led our troops to a distance from our own borders, which I would wish ever to avoid, although there are powerful arguments to recommend it.

The Vizier having no occasion for the services of the first brigade, I have directed it to return within the provinces, and I have ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Muir, with a battalion of sepoys from the 2nd Brigade, to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Wilding in the fort of Chunar.

In consequence of the cession of Corah and Allahabad Mr. Lawrell will return to the Presidency. On my arrival at Benares he made a report to me of his proceedings, and delivered me accounts and estimates of the collections and revenues of those districts, copies of which he has also transmitted to you. These appear to have been collected with great industry, and were very useful to me in my negotiations.

The Vizier insisted very strongly on his right to the balance of the King's tuncawas on the treasury of Murshidabad. He said that he advanced the money for which they were granted to him on the faith of Lord Clive's agreements at Allahabad before there was the smallest intimation that the tribute would be discontinued, and that Mr. Cartier had both promised him payment and accepted his assignments on them. As these arguments appear to be well grounded, and the amount of the tuncawas was actually due to the King before he separated himself from our protection, I thought our credit required that this demand should be complied with, and I accordingly agreed to it.

His engagements for the extra expense of the first brigade during the last campaign have been adjusted, and the account closed to the 15th of this month. The balance being R4,52,834-13-3 is to be paid by an assignment of R3,23,000 on the King's tuncaw, and the remaining R1,29,834-13-3 in ready money at Fyzabad. No. 14 is a copy of the account.

In the course of our conference he made a demand upon me for the pay of the 19th battalion of sepoys from the time it was first stationed with him, and was very urgent for the payment. I told him I was not then furnished with the necessary papers to enable me to adjust the account at Benares, this being the first intimation that I had ever received of his having such a claim, but promised to settle it equitably after my return to Calcutta. The vehemence with which he insisted on the immediate conclusion of this business, notwithstanding the length of time which it had remained unnoticed, proved an interruption to the other more important affairs, which were depending. The enclosed translation of our correspondence on the subject, No. 15, will explain the circumstances of this demand. You will observe that the Vizier denies his having agreed to pay R15,000 a month for his half of the extra expenses of the brigade at Allahabad, but this circumstance seems to be very well attested, and he at length acquiesced to refer it to our records; and if these should establish the claim to allow it to stand against his advances for the 19th battalion.

I had much conversation with the Vizier concerning a free intercourse of commerce with his dominions, and recommended to him an establishment of customs similar to that which we have lately adopted in Bengal, of which I gave him a plan and explanation in writing; but I found it impossible to convince him of the utility of either. He seemed confirmed in the persuasion that the current specie of this country would be drained by a free trade with ours; that if the English gomastahs were authorized to reside there they would exercise an authority prejudicial to his revenue, notwithstanding any regulations or restrictions of our Government, and involve him in disputes which might perhaps end in the ruin of his connections with the Company. I promised that no English gentleman should reside in his country, and that I would never interfere in any disputes between English gomastahs and his people, which I left to be decided by his officers, who might exercise the same authority over them as over his own subjects. As I found it impossible to overcome his objections, and I learnt that Mirzapore was the mart from which not only his dominions but all the interior parts of Hindostan were supplied with goods from Bengal, I judged it improper to press him any further to agree to innovations so much against his will, when I could effect the same purposes by an agreement with Raja Cheit Sing, to whom the town of Mirzapore belongs, as well as all the intermediate country from the borders of Behar. I informed him of my intention, to which he said he had no objection. I accordingly settled with Raja Cheit Sing that the articles of broad-cloth, copper, and

lead bought at the Company's sales should pass duty-free through his territories to Mirzapore, and that on all other goods he should collect an equal rate of duties from all merchants, European or Native, or others indiscriminately. No. 16 is the Raja's agreement with the rates of duties, and No. 17 a translation of it. These rates are in general a medium between what was before charged to the English merchants and that paid by the natives. The former was only half of the latter. The establishment of the duties on an equal footing will be a benefit to the fair trader, and of course a general encouragement to the exportation of goods from Bengal. The exemption allowed on the articles abovementioned will be particularly serviceable in promoting the Company's sales of the productions of England, which is the purpose to which, in their letter to the Select Committee, dated the of 1766, they expressly direct that the 8th article of the Treaty of Allahabad should be confined. Raja Cheit Sing having desired that the general residence of Europeans in his country might be prohibited, and that any particular persons to whom an indulgence might be granted should be restricted to Benares; and having at the same time informed me that Messrs. Fowke, Motte, and Scott had conducted themselves so entirely to his satisfaction that he had no objection to their remaining, I gave notice to all others to quit his territories by the end of December, and told him that after that time they would be no longer under the Company's protection, and if they proved refractory he might seize and send them away by force. I did not hesitate to comply with his request in this particular because it is literally conformable to the Company's orders.

During my stay at Benares a vakeel from Nudjiff Cawn came to me with a letter from him, requesting the continuance of his annual pension of two lacks of rupees which Lord Clive settled upon him at Allahabad. Inclosed No. 18 is a translation of his letter. His representation concerning his attendance on the King to Delhi, and his conduct since, has been entirely confirmed to me by the General. I see no plea therefore for withholding the allowance engaged to him by treaty, and I think it may be of material consequence to keep him attached to our interest; but as I could not give him an answer at Benares, I desired his vakeel to accompany me to Calcutta. I now refer his claim to your determination.

I applied to the Vizier for the dismissal of Mr. Gentil, using such arguments as I thought most likely to induce him to make it his voluntary act, but not insisting on it. He promised that he would dismiss him, but I confess I much doubt whether he will. As the peremptory injunctions of the Company in the 52nd and 53rd paragraphs of their letter to the Commissioners, dated the 23rd of March 1770, required my endeavours to obtain this point, so I have literally observed their orders in the mode in which I solicited his compliance with it. At the same time I must declare my opinion that the man has acquired his importance only from the notice with which he has been thus repeatedly honoured, having neither abilities nor influence which are likely to affect our interest.

The Vizier left Benares the 10th of last month, on which day I also departed. Mr. Lambert accompanied him to Fyzabad to receive the twenty lacs promised in the first payment for the cession of Corah and Allahabad, and the balance of the extra charges of the brigade being R1,29,834-13-3, both which sums he has assured me shall be instantly paid on his arrival.

I made a short visit to Chunar, where I fixed the boundary of the lands appertaining to the fort, and made some other arrangements of too little moment to swell this letter with the relation of them.

On my return to Patna the chief and council of the factory delivered to me the particulars which I had desired of the charges at the saltpetre factories, together with the statement of the quantity provided and the medium price (also charges included) for seven years past. It appears that the price has not of late been increased, and I imagine it will hardly admit of a reduction. I enclose the accounts No. 19 for your observation.

In the course of our conversation the Vizier frequently expressed the satisfaction which he had received from our meeting, and from the friendly and confidential intercourse which had taken place between us. Though our pro-

fessions are not always to be received in their literal sense, I took occasion from them to ask him whether it would be agreeable to him that a person in whom I could confide should be appointed by me to reside near his person, for the sake of perpetuating and strengthening the good understanding so happily begun, as well as for the transaction of such ordinary affairs as might not suit the formality of a correspondence by letter, but which in their amount are always found to be productive of important effects; that I desired it myself, but unless it was equally his wish I would neither propose nor consent to it, as it would not in such a case be productive of the good effects which I meant to derive from it. He declared to me that it would be entirely pleasing to him. I told him that I would again address him after my return to Calcutta on the same subject, when I should have made choice of a person duly qualified for so important a trust. It now rests with you, gentlemen, to determine on the propriety of this appointment. I will offer it frankly as my opinion that if you shall think it proper to entrust with me the sole nomination of such a resident, and the power of recalling him whenever I shall judge his presence to be no longer necessary, it may be attended with good effects. In any other mode I fear the appointment would exclude me from being any longer the channel of connection between this Government and the Vizier, and prevent me from availing myself of that influence with him which I have taken much pains to establish, and I hope not altogether unsuccessfully.

I have addressed the Board of Revenue in a separate letter concerning such matters as fell under my observation in that department.

Permit me, gentlemen, to conclude my letter with my acknowledgments for your indulgence in permitting Mr. Vansittart to accompany me on this service. It is a justice which I owe to him and to Messrs. Lawrell and Lambert, the other gentlemen of the Board who were with me at Benares, to declare that the cordial assistance which I received from them was of the most effectual service to me in my proceedings.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c.,

FORT WILLIAM,

WARREN HASTINGS.

The 4th October 1773.

(Treaty with Sujah-ul-Dowla, No. 1.)

THE VIZIER OF THE EMPIRE.—Asiph-jah Shujah-ul-Mulk, the Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla, Aboo-ul-Munsoor Cawn Bahadur, Sifdar Jung Sippah Salah, on the one part, and Warren Hastings, Esq., President of the Council, Governor of Fort William, and Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the English Company, in the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, for and in the name of the English Company on the other part, do agree on the following articles:—

1st. Whereas in the treaty concluded at Allahabad, the 16th of August 1765, between the Vizier and the Company, it is expressed that the districts of Corah and Allahabad were given to His Majesty for his expenses, and whereas His Majesty has abandoned the possession of the aforesaid districts, and even given a sunnud for Corah and Currah to the Mahrattas to the great prejudice of the interests both of the Vizier and of the English Company, and contrary to the meaning of the said treaty, and hath thereby forfeited his right to the said districts which has reverted to the Company, from whom he received it, it is therefore agreed that the aforesaid districts shall be put into the possession of the Vizier on the following conditions; and that in the same manner as the Province of Owd and the other dominions of the Vizier and possessed by him, so shall he possess Corah and Currah and Allahabad for ever. He shall by no means and under no pretence be liable to any obstructions in the aforesaid countries from the Company and English Chiefs, and exclusive of the money now stipulated, no mention or requisition shall by any means be made to him for anything else on this account. This agreement shall be observed by all the English Chiefs, Gentlemen of the Council, and by the Company, nor shall it ever be broke or deviated from.

Conditions, viz.

He shall pay to the Company fifty lacks (50,00,000) of sicca rupees according to the currency of the province of Owd as follows, *viz.* :—

	R
In ready money	20,00,000
In two years after the date hereof, <i>viz.</i> :—	
The first year	15,00,000
The second year	15,00,000
	<hr/> 30,00,000
Sicca Rupees	50,00,000

2nd. To prevent any disputes arising concerning the payments which shall be made by the Vizier for the expenses of the Company's troops that may march to his assistance. It is agreed that the expense of a brigade shall be computed at two lacks ten thousand (2,10,000) sicca rupees per month, according to the currency of the province of Owd. By a brigade is meant as follows, *viz.*

2 battalions of Europeans.
6 battalions of Sepoys.
1 company of Artillery.

The expense of the said troops shall be defrayed by the Vizier from the time that they shall have passed the borders of his dominions till they return within the borders of the province of Behar, and exclusive of the abovementioned sum no more shall on any account be demanded from him. Should the Company and the English Chiefs have occasion to send for the troops of the Vizier, the Company and the English Chiefs shall also pay their expenses in the like manner.

Signed, sealed, and solemnly sworn to by the contracting parties at Benares, this seventh day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three.

In the presence of us—

JOHN STEWART.

WILLIAM REDFEARN.

Estimate of the monthly expenses of a Brigade employed without the Provinces.

	R	R
A company of Artillery		5,072
A regiment (two battalions) of Infantry		48,271
Six battalions of Sepoys	76,923	
Staff allowances	4,500	
	<hr/>	81,423
Lascars' pay and batta		5,920
Artificers' and coolies' batta		12,988
<i>Contractors' Charges.</i>		
Victualling	12,600	
Carriage and camp equipment, &c.	15,706	
	<hr/>	28,306
<i>Hospital Charges.</i>		
Cost of camp equipage for a twelve-month, including 50 per cent. for the charges of transportation	72,945	
Deduct supposed to be expended in a twelve-month $\frac{1}{2}$	24,315	
	<hr/>	
	48,630	$\frac{1}{12}$ th is 4,052
Carried over		<hr/> 1,89,082

	R	R
Brought forward		1,89,032
<i>Hospital Charges—continued.</i>		
Cost of stores for a twelve-month including 50 per cent. for the charge of transporta- tion	1,78,314	
Deduct not supposed to be expended in a twelve-month $\frac{1}{2}$	87,157	
	87,157	$\frac{1}{2}$ th is 7,268
Contingencies of paymasters, quartermasters, &c., agreeably to the list delivered by the General		8,757
		2,05,052
Sundry contingencies which cannot particular- ly be specified estimated at		4,948
	TOTAL	2,10,000

Translation of the new cowlname or Agreement given by the Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla to Raja Cheit Sing.

The affairs of the zemindary and hahud of the Sircar of Benares, and Sircar Chunarah, and of the mehals of Juanpoor, Bejapoor, Buddohy, Suknesegurrah, Mulboo Khans; Sircar Gazeypoor, Sekindarpoor, Khereed Shadeyabad, and Toppeh Serinch, &c., which were under the charge of Raja Bulwand Sing deceased, I do hereby grant and confirm unto you upon their former footing. It is necessary that after deducting the Nankar and half of the Toghier of Buddohoy, you monthly and annually pay into the treasury of the Sircar the established and stated payments. By the favor of God, whatever is promotive of your honor, shall be performed; and exclusive of the jumma specified in the cabooleat, of the present Fusselly year 1178, no increase shall ever hereafter be demanded. And if you remain firm and steady in your obedience and in the payment of your rents, no harm shall by any means happen to your ryots or country. By the Word of God and of the Holy Coran and of the blessed Imaums, this agreement is made between me and my heirs, and you and your heirs, and it shall never be deviated from. Dated this 18th day of the Moon Jemmady-ul-sani, in the year 1177 Hegiree, answering to the 6th of September 1773 English style.

A true translation.

WILLIAM REDFEARN,

Pn. Tr.

Translation of the Potta given by the Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla to Raja Cheit Sing.

The Sircar of Benaras and Chunarah, and the Mehals of the Sircar of Juanpoor, &c., including land and rents and sayer duties; and haveli Mahomed-aban, Benares, Mulboo Khans, Pergunnah Booder, &c., Talooks of Sekinra Mow, in the dependencies of the Pergunnah Khaundah, Pergunnah Buddohoy, Suknesegur, Bejeypoor, Sircar Gazeypoor, Pergunnah Sekinderpoor, Khereed Shadeyabad, and Toppeh Serinch, &c., land, rents, and sayer duties included; after deducting the dustoor Dewanny, Nankar, half of the jaghier of Buddohoy, and the other exempted jaghiers and whatever has formerly been allowed as deductions I do now fully grant and make over to you on the terms of your cabooleat from the first of Khareef 1178. In consideration of the sum of Benares Cum-sunna R22,48,449 Assil and Ezafa, as specified underneath, clear of all expenses of Sehbundy. It is necessary that you pay the above

sum to the Sircar according to the stated and established khists year by year. And, by the favor of God there shall never be any deviation from this agreement.

Particulars, viz..

	R	R
Paid by Raja Bulwand Sing as follows:—		
Benares	12,00,607	
Buddahoy	1,30,000	
Suknesegur	16,000	
Bejeypoor	2,00,000	
Gazeypoor	5,00,000	
Shadeyabad	40,000	
	<hr/>	20,86,607
Deduct Nankar, half of the jaghier of Buddohoy and Utturga, &c.		88,156
		<hr/>
Net revenue paid by Raja Bulwand Sing		19,98,449
Increase settled with Raja Cheit Sing		2,50,000
		<hr/>
Net revenue to be paid by Raja Cheit Sing		22,48,449

Dated the 27th Rajub in the year of the Hegirce 1184.

A true Translation.

WILLIAM REDFEARN,

Pn. Tr.

From the Governor to Raja Cheit Sing.

At this time, the Vizier of the Empire, having given you an agreement under his hand and seal, which I have countersigned, and also affixed my seal to, it is necessary that conformably thereto, and according to the treaty concluded at Allahabad by Lord Clive and the Vizier respecting Raja Bulwand Sing, your deceased father, you with the greatest cheerfulness pay to the Vizier the rents thereby established, in which case the Company will always attend to your welfare, and afford you their care and protection, and in the agreements aforementioned there shall never be any breach or deviation.

A true Translation.

WILLIAM REDFEARN,

Pn. Tr.

From the King to the Governor, received the 9th September 1773.

We are informed by our loyal servant, Munneer-ul-Dowla, that you, the strength of our empire, have sent your own aumils into the districts of Allahabad and Corah. My chosen servant? It is now two years since we have received any money from Bengal, Allahabad, or Corah; and our distress for money is in the greatest degree. The English Chiefs are bound, by a treaty of allegiance to our sacred person, to pay our tribute from Bengal; and at what place soever we may reside; to let Corah and Allahabad remain in the hands of our own servants. From this treaty we are assured there will be no deviation. Considering the loyalty and rectitude of you our loyal servant, we have full confidence that you will remit to our presence the balance of our tribute from Bengal, and continue the monthly payments in future; and that you will deliver up Corah and Allahabad into the hands of Munneer-ul-Dowla, and at the same time enforce payment of our revenue from thence regularly month by month. Do you, our loyal servant, in concert with our brother as dear as life, the Vizier of the empire, come to our royal presence. Should it happen that you cannot yourself come, let General Barker be sent; and after their arrival we shall assent to whatever they may propose. We had intentions of

sending to you our noble kinsman, Mujad-ul-Dowla, to communicate to you our commands, and to reconcile you to our royal person, of which we informed you in a former shukla. Afterwards this counsel occurred to our enlightened mind, that if we were informed that you had intentions of settling the affairs of our empire, we would then send our noble kinsman to you; that after learning from him our royal commands, you might despatch the General with the Vizier to our presence; and we could then be assured that when we had two such supports with us, the Vizier and the General, your emulation would not suffer you to permit the usurpers and disturbers of the peace of our empire, such as the Jauts and the Rohillas, to hold possessions so near our capital. As for the rest, know that our royal favour attends you? Remit our tribute from Bengal, and give up Corah and Allahabad, which will give the utmost satisfaction to our sacred person.

Postscript in the King's own hand—Do you our loyal servants come with cheerfulness to our presence. After settling affairs here we shall give our loyal assent to whatever you may represent.

A true translation.

WILLIAM BEDFEARN,

Pn. Tr.

From the Governor to His Majesty Shah Allum, written the 13th September 1773.

I have had the honour to receive your Majesty's commands by the hands of Mahomed Jacob Cawn, which I have thoroughly understood.

Long before my arrival at Benares I repeatedly addressed your Majesty with a request that some person of confidence, and empowered to treat upon your Majesty's affairs, might be appointed to meet me at that place, and I was happy when you intimated to me your pleasure that Mujid-ul-Dowla was deputed for this business; because I had no doubt that with the assistance of so capable a person everything would be adjusted to your Majesty's satisfaction, as I represented in the addresses which I sent on this subject. But upon my arrival at Benares I understood that the orders for his departure were repealed, and that your Majesty's attention was engaged in other affairs. In this case I was remediless. The Vizier having afforded me a meeting at the abovementioned place, after many conferences I judged it most expedient, for the security of the peace and tranquility of these parts, and even for the benefit of your Majesty's affairs, that the Chuklahs of Corah and Allahabad should be restored to his possession, and I have accordingly assigned them to him. I think it incumbent upon me to explain to your Majesty fully my motives for this transaction. While the union between yourself and the Company subsisted, your Majesty is witness, and all the world have seen, that postponing the consideration of every other concern, the wealth and forces of the English Company were continually employed in promoting your prosperity and in the care of your safety. The same desire and attachment shall prevail, but the necessity of the times requires other measures and other counsel. When your Majesty separated yourself from the English and the Vizier; and gave your preference to, and conferred your royal favours on others, whose views have ever been hostile to your former friends and allies; whatever power your Majesty possessed instantly became theirs, and presuming upon it, they opposed their forces to the Vizier and the forces of the English Company; and even proceeded to acts of violence against both, which we forbore to repel from respect to your person, which authorized their proceedings. What return of loyalty and services your Majesty received for the grace which you thus bestowed upon them your Majesty best knows. In addition to your other bounties you were pleased to grant them sunnuds for the districts of Corah and Currah, which, in effect, would have also given them the command of Allahabad. By whatever means the sunnuds were obtained it is evident that your Majesty either wanted power to retain these districts, or that you abandoned them of your own free will to strangers, whose designs and

interests were ever contrary to the designs and interests of the Company. As these districts were originally assigned by the Company for the purpose of paying your expenses, when they ceased to be your property, by the universal principles of justice, they reverted to the Company, from whom you first received them; and I accordingly caused possession to be taken of them in the name of the Company, both for the security of their rights and to prevent an enemy from usurping them. And I have given them to the Vizier for these reasons: first, because as his interests and the Company's were the same, and this country lay contiguous to his, the defence of it would be more easy and our mutual alliance become stronger by this addition to his dominions; secondly because the Vizier being your first servant and the only representative of your person, it would enable him hereafter more effectually to serve your Majesty and to retrieve your affairs. It was certainly my intention to have put these districts again into your hands, and it was with this view that I so repeatedly entreated your Majesty to send a person of your confidence to settle with me the means of effecting this and the other arrangements dependant on the Company. But as no one came, and being informed that nobody would come, and I knew that without some well-concerted plan of defence, to restore them to your hands would in effect be to give them up to the Mahrattas and prove a certain means of arming their hands against his, I was therefore compelled to change my first design, and act as the necessity of the season advised.

Upon the affairs of Bengal I have before in my letters represented the distressed condition of the people and the poverty of the country, which are solely owing to the heavy drafts which have been made of its current specie for your Majesty's remittances. As it is the will of God, and agreeable to the commands of the English Company, my masters, that I am entrusted with the care and protection of the people of these provinces, and as their condition, which is at this time on the edge of misery, would be ruined past remedy by draining the country of the little wealth which remains in it, I must plainly declare that until the safety and welfare of these provinces will admit of it, I cannot consent that a single rupee be sent out of them which it is in my power to detain. This declaration I make from the integrity of my heart and a real attachment to your Majesty, which will not suffer me to deceive you by doubtful promises, while I am certain that they can have but one effect. For the rest, I pray to the Almighty for a more favourable season, to enable me to shew my zeal for your Majesty's service, and shall continually communicate with the Vizier on the means of exerting our endeavours in conjunction for this purpose which, God willing, may be speedily and happily accomplished.

A true translation.

WILLIAM REDFEARN,

Pn. Tr.,

Translation of the Agreement given by Hafez Rahmut Cawn to the Vizier.

As the Vizier of the Empire the Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla will put the Rohilla Sirdars in full possession of their country, it is at his own option to effect it either by peace or war. Should the Mahrattas at this time, without coming to an engagement or peace being established, cross the river and retreat owing to the rainy and after season, and after that is elapsed commit disturbances in the country of the Rohillas, the quelling of these disturbances shall belong to the Vizier. The Rohilla Sirdars after the aforesaid business do agree to pay the sum of 40 lacs of rupees on the following terms, *viz.*: As the Mahrattas are now committing disorders in the country of the Rohillas, the Vizier shall march from Shahabad to such place as may be thought proper to arrive at in order that the Rohilla dependants may come out of the jungles and arrive at their own homes. The sum of ten lacs of rupees shall then be paid in ready money in part of the stipulation, and 30 lacs of rupees shall be

discharged in 3 years beginning from the Fusselly year 1180. This agreement is sealed in the presence of General Sir Robert Barker.

From Hafiz Rahmut Cawn, Chief of the Rohillas, to the Governor.

After the usual compliments, and expressing his desire of an interview, he proceeds. The bonds of friendship and affection, and the mutual intercourse which have long subsisted and taken root between me and the English Sirdars may not be unknown to you. Having heard of your fame, I wish that a perfect harmony and concord should be established and confirmed between us; and I hope that you will have the same inclination on your part. It is from these motives, as well as in consideration of there being no difference or disagreement between us, that I represent to you the following few circumstances that you may have them in your memory at the time of discussion.

Last year, when His Majesty and the Mahratta Sirdars were at variance with the Nabob Zabitta Cawn, and when after confusion was thrown into that Nabob's affairs, His Majesty and the Mahrattas crossed the Ganges to come into these parts, the Rohilla Sirdars, for the protection of their women, fled to the skirts of the jungles; at this time the Vizier of the Empire and General Barker arrived at Shahabad, and sent Captain Harper to me with a message to me to come and join them, which they persisted in with great perseverance. As our interests were equal, I therefore went and had an interview with the gentlemen, when an agreement was concluded between us, in which I agreed to pay 40 lacs of rupees on account of pesheush to the King and the Mahrattā Sirdars, and the gentlemen on their part engaged to effect my security, by establishing peace between me and the King and the Mahratta Sirdars, declaring that if they would in a day or two after that march from Shahabad to fall upon and come to extremities with the Mahrattas, and to put an end to their operations. Notwithstanding this, the gentlemen never came to any negociation with the Mahrattas so as to put an end to their operations, nor ventured to attack them, but finally returned towards Fyzabad, leaving their engagements unfulfilled. When the rainy season commenced, the Mahrattas of themselves crossed the Ganges and encamped in the Doab, threatening me still with hostilities. During the rains I repeatedly called on the Nabob, the General, and Captain Harper to conclude these affairs with His Majesty and the Mahrattas, but they came to no determination on the subject, nor took any measures for effecting security. When the rainy season was drawing to an end, and the Mahrattas had approached near the banks of the Ganges, they then demanded of me sums of money, which after much temporizing I was at last obliged to pay them. Afterwards they went to the presence, and procured a sunnud for Corah and Allahabad, with which they returned to the banks of the Ganges and made preparations of bridges for crossing it; and at the same time sent a person of their confidence to demand payment of the money which had been stipulated, saying it belonged to them and the King; and also with many inducements requested that I would let them pass through my territories, assuring me that they would commit no depredation or ravages on the rayats, and they would pass through with expedition towards the Soubah of Oude, or withersoever they thought proper. They also engaged to remit me a large sum on account of the stipulation, and to do whatever was agreeable and would give satisfaction to the Rohilla Sirdars. At this juncture the Nabob and the General being arrived near, they sent to me Syed Shaw Muddun and Mahomed Mukrim Cawn, desiring that I would enter into no terms with the Mahrattas; and they would give me back my engagement for 40 lacs of rupees, and do everything both for my present and future security. Having therefore in view the long friendship which had subsisted between the Nabob Vizier, the English gentlemen and myself, I declined all offers made by the Mahrattas, and came over to them, in revenge for which it is well known that the Mahrattas re-crossed the Ganges and plundered Moradabad and Sumbul. The gentlemen promised that they would cross and cantone on the other side of the Ganges during the rains, and would not return to Fyzabad or Calcutta until they had entirely driven away the Mahrattas, and fully satisfied themselves both with respect to their own and my security. But at length they left everything unfinished; and after temporizing for a long time with the Mahrattas returned to their own homes.

leaving me still a prey to the Mahrattas. You are no doubt acquainted with all these proceedings. It is a point which requires justice and consideration. As a friendship has long been established between us, I doubt not but you will at all times and on all occasions wish to preserve it. Other particulars the Major will inform you of.

The Vizier's Narrative of the Behaviour of the Rohillas.

The case of the Rohillas is as follows:—That from the beginning to this time I have treated them with friendship and attention, and on their part I have met with nothing but ill-treatment, treachery, and a breach of faith. Accordingly when the Mahrattas marched with a large army against Najib-ul-Dowla and the Rohilla Sirdars and besieged Najib-ul-Dowla un Sukertaul, and Hafiz Rahmut, Doondee Cawn, and the rest at Jellabad, where they reduced them to the greatest straits and difficulties, if I had not assisted them, they would all have been ruined and deprived of their women, country, and government. But by the favour of God I afforded them at that time such assistance that the Mahrattas were put to flight, and took their route to the Deccan, and the territory, property, and women of the Rohillas remained in security. Again, the year before last, when the Mahrattas advanced their troops against the Rohillas, Zabitta Cawn received a total defeat; and Hafiz Rahmut and the others being unable to oppose them, took shelter with their women at the foot of the hills, where, if I had made 10 days' delay, they would all have perished by the bad water and unsalutary air. By the favour of the Almighty I went with the English troops to Shahabad and stopped the approach of the Mahrattas, and sometimes using authority and menaces, and sometimes friendly mediation and temporizing, according to the circumstances, I caused them to pass the Ganges; and releasing from confinement delivered to Zabitta Cawn the daughter of Ally Mahomed Cawn, a principal Chief of the Rohillas, and nine of the women and daughters of Najib-ul-Dowla and the wife and son of Zabitta Cawn, together with 400 women the Mahrattas had taken prisoners. I also called to me Hafiz Rahmut Cawn and the others who had taken protection under the hills, and replaced them on their former footing in the possession of their country. My friend General Barker is well acquainted with these circumstances, in whose presence they entered into an engagement for the payment of 40 lacks of rupees, and pledged their faith and religion for its performance. In the sequel they did not remain steady to this agreement, but in the height of the rains, antecedent to every other person, Zabitta Cawn first went and connected himself with the Mahrattas, and Hafiz Rahmut Cawn sent the holy Coran, which contains the religion of the Mussalmen, to the Mahrattas as a token of his friendship. He also gave them five lacks of rupees and established a friendship and good understanding with them. The whole world are well acquainted that envoys from Hafiz Rahmut were with the Mahrattas, and treated with them in the above manner. Myself, continuing firm and steady to my engagements, I proceeded in concert with the English troops from Fyzabad to the assistance of the Rohillas and arrived by successive marches to Ramgaut. I previously acquainted Hafiz Rahmut Cawn that he should make preparation, and that I should shortly arrive and act in conjunction with him. As Hafiz Rahmut Cawn had entered into intrigues with the Mahrattas notwithstanding I was near him, and the Mahrattas at a considerable distance, he nevertheless under various pretensions and evasions drew near the Mahratta army to such a degree that the morning when I arrived with the English forces, and came upon the Mahrattas, Hafiz Rahmut Cawn was within 7 or 8 coss of them, when from necessity only he came and waited on me. I am certain that if I had been 4 guries later with the English forces, he would have joined the Mahrattas and fallen upon me; and that only from my near approach he was compelled to come to me. Afterwards when the Mahrattas could not face the English forces and myself, and set out for the Deccan, Hafiz Rahmut Cawn did not pay me a single daam on account of the agreement executed in presence of the General as aforementioned: nor did he treat me with that respect, or present me with the customary presents, which are used amongst mankind as marks of friend-

ship and hospitality. The heavy burthen of increased expense which I have sustained, both on account of my own troops and those of the English, are as evident as the sun at noon-day. I made no use of menaces concerning taking the money by force, otherwise, had I been so inclined, I could have taken it in the space of a day. I passed the matter over and took no notice of it, and they on their part pleaded excuses, evasions, and delays. They even encamped at 3 or 4 coss distance from mine and the English army, with an intention to come to a battle should I insist on the payment of the money. Of the truth of this every gentleman that was with me can witness. My mentioning it is unnecessary. In short, the Rohillas have been guilty of treachery, baseness, and a breach of faith, and have paid no regard either to their oaths or agreements. I have notwithstanding hitherto put up with this behaviour, but can do it no longer. To oblige them to make reparation is expedient and just.

A true translation.

WILLIAM REDFEARN,

Pn. Tr.

The Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla in account with the Hon'ble United

DR.

To two battalions for August, September, and October 1772	...	30,000	0	0
To preparations and Colonel Goddard's detachment, current rupees	31,021 13 10			
Deduct batta at 11 per cent.	3,074 4 1	27,947	9	9
To extra expenses from 1st December 1772 to 31st August 1773, 9 months, at Rs 15,000 per month	...	10,35,000	0	0
To extra expenses for September and half the month of October sonats	...	1,72,500	0	0

Sonats

12,65,447 9 9

Month	Day	Description	Amount	Balance
Feb. 4th.		By cash paid Lucknow and Allahabad siccas	43,250 0 0	
		Deduct batta at 3½ per cent.	1,513 12 0	
			41,736 4 0	
		Benares sonats.		
		Zecaully rupees	13,750 0 0	
		Deduct 4½	618 12 0	
			13,131 4 0	
		Benares sonats	43,000 0 0	97,867 8 0
Mar. 18th.		By cash paid Owde rupees	99,000 0 0	
		Deduct 3½	3,465 0 0	
			95,535 0 0	
		Zecaully rupees	1,000 0 0	
		Deduct 4½	45 0 0	
			955 0 0	
				96,490 0 0
Apl. 19th.		By cash paid Benares sonats	12,650 0 0	
		Zecaully rupees	30,350 0 0	
		Deduct 4½	1,770 12 0	
			37,579 4 0	
		Owde rupees	48,000 0 0	
		Deduct 3½	1,680 0 0	
			46,320 0 0	
				96,519 4 0
Apl. 25th		By cash paid Corah sonats	31,900 0 0	
		Deduct 3½	1,221 8 0	
			33,678 8 0	
		Corah siccas	58,371 4 0	
		Deduct 5½	3,210 6 0	
			55,160 14 0	
				8,883 9 6
May 24th		By cash paid Corah siccas	53,920 8 0	
		Deduct 5½	2,965 10 0	
			50,945 14 0	
		Corah sonats	76,070 8 0	
		Deduct 3½	2,602 12 6	
			73,466 12 6	
				1,24,371 10 6
July 1st.		By cash paid Owde rupees	8,000 0 0	
		Deduct 3½	250 0 0	
			7,720 0 0	
		Benares sonats	24,000 0 0	
		Zecaully rupees	18,000 0 0	
		Deduct 4½	810 0 0	
			17,190 0 0	
				48,910 0 0
July 2nd.		By cash paid Benares sonats	5,000 0 0	
		Owde rupees	60,100 0 0	
		Deduct 3½	2,114 0 0	
			58,286 0 0	
		Ferrachabad rupees	600 0 0	
		Deduct 3½	21 0 0	
			579 0 0	
		Zecaully rupees	34,000 0 0	
		Deduct 4½	1,530 0 0	
			32,470 0 0	
				96,335 0 0
July 8th.		By cash paid Owde rupees	50,000 0 0	
		Deduct 3½	1,750 0 0	
Aug. 31st		By cash paid	...	
		By balance due from Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla—	...	
		To be paid to Mr. Lambert at Fyzabad	1,29,834 13 3	
		To be paid from the balance of the king's tuncaw on Moorsheidabad	3,23,000 0 0	
			4,52,834 13 3	
		Sonats	12 65,447 9 9	

Extract of a letter from the Governor to the Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla.

Mahomed Elich Cawn has repeatedly and fully explained to me your Excellency's commands, upon the subject of the accounts of Captain Harper's battalion. The state of this matter is as follows:—I am informed by the General that, at your requisition, the brigade, of which the General had then the command, was sent to Allahabad. It there continued at your own request about three years; that it was agreed between the king, yourself, and General Smith that for the batta of this force R30,000 should be paid monthly, *viz.*, R15,000 by the king and R15,000 by yourself; that your share of this payment never was paid but was always understood to have been balanced by the advances made by you on account of the 19th Battalion, of which about R5,000 monthly were due from you for batta and extra expenses, and R10,000 were advanced by you on account of their pay, by which means it was always considered the account was settled.

I also find it mentioned in some authentic papers, which have accidentally fallen into my hands, that the brigade aforementioned was called to Allahabad and continued there at your own express requisition; and the Company have been so informed in many letters from the administration of Bengal: of the truth of this I am myself entirely unacquainted. I know not the dates of the arrival or return of the brigade which went to Allahabad, nor of the appointment or continuance of the 19th Battalion, with your person, nor have I one paper or account which can show me what sums have been received and are due on either of these accounts. The persons who were privy to these transactions (on which a knowledge of these accounts depends), are either in England or in Calcutta. How therefore can I possibly attempt to settle this account here without a single voucher to assist me? Reflect also that this is a business of 7 years' standing; and that since the commencement of it, Mr. Cartier and other gentlemen appointed by the Government of Calcutta have had a meeting with your Excellency for the purpose of settling all matters between you and the Company. If this account was not settled with them nor with the other English Chiefs, who had the immediate cognizance of it, in what manner and by what means am I to settle it, who never heard of such an account nor expected such a demand to be made upon me, till my arrival here! I therefore sent you word that upon my return to Calcutta I would carefully examine the Paymaster's books, and make such enquiries as might be proper from the persons who had any knowledge of them, and of your agreements with the English Company concerning them; and if it should appear that anything was justly due to your Excellency, it should be faithfully and most certainly paid you.

From the Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowla, received 4th September 1773.

I consider you as my true friend, and shall write you the plain truth with respect to the account of Captain Harper's battalion, on which I troubled you. The fact is this. The pleasure with which I heard of your coming into these parts is not to be expressed, and since I have met you, the knowledge, wisdom, and understanding with which I have observed you are endued. Your address and the regard which you have shewn both for the preservation of your friendship and public faith have all given me the utmost degree of satisfaction. I therefore resolved at home that several matters which had been put off for years should be settled now. Of former affairs you already know that while the Nabob Sabut Jung (Lord Clive) remained in the country our negotiations were settled in the best manner; but from the gentlemen who came after him I never got an answer to my letters in less than four months: then what could become of other affairs? Ever since Lord Clive's time I have had a battalion stationed with me, and whatever was the batta settled for it, Lord Clive, on the consideration that it was too great a distance from Calcutta to send money for the payment of it, settled that the whole of its pay should be advanced by me, and that whatever sums I might advance on that account, over and above the batta, should be repaid me. Accordingly this mode took place. At that time Persend Roy, my vakeel, was in Calcutta, and upon his coming away the surplus money which I had advanced on account of the payment of the battalion was paid to him, with which he purchased several articles, and was bringing

them up to me when they were stopped at Patna. Afterwards a fire happened at Patna, in which the whole of these goods were burnt, as a recompense for which 300 and odd English firelocks were given me at the time of my going to Allahabad. This transaction may have come to your knowledge. General Barker is well acquainted with it. With respect to the batta of the brigade which was quartered at Allahabad; and which you say was called there by my desire, the case is this. When Cossim Cawn joined himself with the Rohillas, and was going to set disturbances on foot, I sent for the English troops, in about 10 days after whose arrival at Allahabad the disturbances were concluded; and the enemy seeing that I and the English Chiefs acted in concert, and that the English troops were at Allahabad, dispersed, and in about 10 days or a month after the arrival of those troops at Allahabad I dismissed them. That friendship which subsisted between me and General Smith is known to all the world? You must also be well acquainted that at length I carried on a correspondence to Calcutta, and had some controversy with the gentlemen respecting the troops that I kept in my service. Although no number of troops was mentioned in the treaty, nor was it any infringement of the treaty, yet purely out of regard to the friendship and satisfaction of the English gentlemen, I made no use of this argument, but dismissed my troops after the conclusion of the disturbances with Cossim Cawn. I know nothing of the English troops being sent for. If they were sent for, General Smith did it of his own accord. There was never any agreement between General Smith and me regarding the Rs30,000 on account of batta for the brigade at Allahabad, nor do I know anything of it. General Smith had at that time gone to Souragepore, and had a congress with Hafiz Rahmut Cawn, and upon hearing of some disturbances of the Mabrattas in the districts of Bundelcund he required my assistance. Upon which I sent Beney Persaud with my troops to him. You write, "that of the Rs30,000 half was to be paid by me and half by the king." If the king sent for those troops, why should I pay half? or if I sent for them, why should the king pay half? Besides this, the troops were stationed at Allahabad, which is at the distance of 7 days' march, and in such case what use could they be of to me. Respecting the disturbances of the Abdallah, if there was any disturbance, it must have been at Lahore, and I am entirely unacquainted with it, nor could those troops be required upon that occasion. You are just and wise. If I had sent for those troops, there must be some letter or voucher for it, or it must be mentioned in your records, and let them be produced. This I have written out of pure friendship and from a consideration that you are just.

Translation of Raja Cheit Sing's Agreement relative to the duties.

Whereas the duties of the Syers dependant on me have been fixed and decreed in the presence of the Governor at the following rates, which are to be taken from the English and Hindostani merchants without distinction; for this cause I give in writing that I will demand no more, nor will consent to an exemption in favour of any man, excepting broad-cloth, and lead and copper purchased of the Company, which shall be accompanied by a letter from the Governor. On these I will consider the duties as excused and discontinued, nor in any respect interrupt or impede them.

	At Chowra Sonat Rs.	Zemance Sonat Rs.	Gheely Sonat Rs.	Seapore and Gungapore.	Mirzapore Sonat Rs.	Cudjewa Sonat Rs.	Darra Sonat Rs.	Gazipore Sonat Rs.	TOTAL Sonat Rs.
On kerana, as dry ginger, pepper, &c., and tungghy of 6 Mirzapore maund	0 8 0	0 7 3	0 7 3	1 13 9	1 15 9	0 4 9	0 8 6	3 1 3	9 0 6
On both silk, cloves, nutmegs, &c.	1 4 0	0 15 0	1 0 0	5 10 0	7 9 3	0 10 3	0 12 6	5 3 0	23 0 0
On tin, toothnague, &c.	0 8 3	0 7 6	0 7 6	1 14 0	2 13 0	0 7 0	0 6 9	3 0 0	10 0 0
On iron	0 4 3	0 3 3	0 3 9	0 11 0	0 15 3	0 2 0	0 2 0	1 14 6	4 8 0
On copper	0 8 3	0 7 9	0 8 0	3 6 9	3 15 0	0 7 9	0 8 6	3 4 0	13 0 0
On cloth and bale containing 6 pieces	0 14 3	0 14 3	0 7 6	3 4 6	3 9 0	0 5 0	0 6 0	2 3 6	12 0 0
On cotton	0 6 6	0 6 0	0 6 0	1 8 0	2 4 0	0 5 9	0 4 9	2 15 0	8 8 0
On chatia, &c., coarse cloth	0 3 6	0 3 6	0 3 6	1 2 0	3 5 0	0 3 3	0 3 0	1 5 3	6 13 0
On beetlenut	0 6 0	0 6 0	0 6 0	1 9 0	1 10 0	0 3 9	0 5 3	2 2 0	7 0 0
At Benares 2 per cent. on the purchase price as usual.									

Representation of Nudjif Cawn as delivered by his Vackeel.

When Major Munro was encamped at Benares there were great disturbances in the districts of Corah and Allahabad; and I was in Bundekund; the Major sent me a letter of invitation through Raja Kyaullyram together with a bill for 30,000 rupees and gave me hopes of Shuja-ul-Dowla's country. In the letter he desired me to join the English by the way of Corah, and immediately upon my arrival to establish my own authority there and drive out Shuja-ul-Dowla's people, because he said the Chukla of Corah and Subadarry of Allahabad were settled upon me. Upon the receipt of this letter I marched to Corah with 7 or 8,000 horse and drove away Shuja-ul-Dowla's people, and I was active in assisting Colonel Fletcher and General Carnac at the siege of the fort of Allahabad and in the war with the Mahrattas. These circumstances are well known to many English gentlemen. When the Vizier surrendered himself to the English, they gave up to him the Subah of Oude, and Corah and Allahabad were made over to the King. The King told Lord Clive that he should not get a single daam by the acquisition of Corah and Allahabad; for that I should expend the whole revenue, for the payment of my troops. Lord Clive ordered that I should receive two lacks of rupees per annum out of the revenues of Bengal for my support, and told me that for my pay and the pay of my troops I should receive from the King whatever he might appoint; that if my inclination to serve the King should not continue I might live where I pleased, and there should be no failure in the payment of these two lacks. Only I must not join with any person who was an enemy of the King, the English, or the Vizier: accordingly this is inserted in the treaty. I am now in the King's service, whom I attend agreeably to the permission of General Barker, and have been guilty of no infringement of my agreement, and I am now also ready to obey your commands. As the English gentlemen never act contrary to their engagements, I flatter myself you will pay my allowance as usual, together with the arrears. I am ever ready to act agreeably to your directions.

Secret Dept., Fort William, the 7th October 1773.

Thursday. AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT;

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

GENERAL SIR ROBERT BARKER, being arrived at the Presidency, takes his seat at the Board.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

GEO. VANSITTART, Esq.

Read and approved the consultation of the 4th instant.

Received the following letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George.

Fort St. George, Tanjore, taken. To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, President and Governor, &c., Council of Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND SIRs,—We have the pleasure to acquaint your Honor, &c., that the capital of Tanjore was taken by storm, the 17th at noon, with a very inconsiderable loss.

The enclosed packet to the Hon'ble Court of Directors contains the accounts of this event, which we request your Honor, &c., will forward by the very first despatch for Europe.

By advices received from Poonah, dated the 5th instant,* we are informed that Narrain Row was assassinated by a Commandant of sepoys, and that his uncle Bagonaut Row was thereupon set at liberty and will, we understand, be appointed his successor.

* On the 30th of August 1773 the young Peshwa Narayana Row was murdered. The murder seems to have been planned by Ananda Rai, the wife of his uncle Bagoba. When the assassins attacked him he ran to his uncle's apartment and implored him to save him. This his uncle attempted in vain to do.

As the *Mansfield* is not yet arrived, and we are apprehensive it may not be in our power to despatch her for Europe, should she not arrive in the course of this month, we must again request your Honor, &c., will order the *Mercury* to call here for our despatches to the Hon'ble Court.

We are, &c., &c.,

FORT ST. GEORGE; (Sd.) ALEXANDER WYNCH, &c., *Council.*

The 20th September 1773.

Secret Dept., Fort William, the 12th October 1773.

Tuesday. AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President.*

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

GEO. VANSITTART, Esq.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR ROBERT BARKER, *Absent.*

Read the consultation of the 7th instant.

The President desires to enter the following minute in reply to those recorded by the General in the last Proceedings.

The Governor's reply to the General's dissent.

Remarks on the General's dissent to the President's measures at Benares:—

The objections made by the General to the article of the treaty with respect to the cession of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier are these:—

1st.—That they are repugnant to the treaty of Allahabad.

2nd.—That the conditions of the cession were much below its worth, and what might have been obtained for them.

3rd.—That an exchange might have been obtained for them of the lands of Chunar and that part of the zemindary of Gauzipore which lies on the south side of the Ganges.

4th.—That it has contributed to the Vizier's purpose of accumulating as much power, wealth, and country as he possibly can, and rendering himself a still more formidable and dangerous neighbour than he has hitherto been.

5th.—That besides an advance of a sum of money, a continuation of half the revenues arising from those Provinces should have been obtained for the Company for a number of years.

6th.—That equal advantages might have been obtained from the King for his reinstatement in those Provinces, viz., the renunciation of his stipend of 26 lacks per annum, and sunnuds or grants for the soubahs of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa to the Company for ever.

1st.—The 4th article of the treaty of Allahabad runs in these words:—

"The King Shah Allum shall remain in full possession of Corah and such part of the Province of Allahabad as he now possesses, which are ceded to his Majesty as a royal demesne for the support of his dignity and expenses."

The General affirms that "in consequence and by virtue of this cession, the Company were to hold the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa in perpetuity." No such declaration is made in the above or in any subsequent treaty, nor is the cession of Corah and Allahabad either mentioned or alluded to in any other. Although no conclusion is drawn from this affirmation, I have thought it of consequence to remove it, because it seemed to imply that the possession of Corah and Allahabad and that of the Dewanny of Bengal, &c.,

stood upon the same tenure, and that if the former were left to the King, the right of the Company to the latter ceased with it.

The true estate of the case as I conceive it is this.

The Government bestowed the districts of Corah and Allahabad upon the King Shah Allum of its own free will, "for the support of his dignity and expenses." He first abandoned, and afterwards by a solemn grant he gave them away to the Maharattas. We disapproved of the grant, because it frustrated the purpose for which these lands were bestowed on the King, and because we saw danger in admitting so powerful a neighbour on the borders of our ally. It was therefore resolved to resume the possession of those lands, not from the King, whose property and right were annulled by his own alienation of them, but from the Maharattas, their new proprietors.

If it was repugnant to the treaty "to possess ourselves of the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad, and to cede them to the Vizier, because the king had an undoubted right of doing what he judged proper with those Provinces, without reference to the English," it was also repugnant to the treaty to oppose the Maharattas, to whom he had assigned them, and to prevent them from taking possession according to the intention of his grant. Yet this measure was resolved on, after having been very maturely debated both in the Select Committee and at the Board, with the presence, concurrence, and advice of the General in both. What was the opinion of the Board at that time on the subject will best appear from the following extract of the consultation of the 1st February, at which the General was present?

"The Board are entirely of opinion, with the Select Committee, that they have the justest grounds to contest this point with the Maharattas. The Province of Corah was a grant of the Company to the King, and declared to have been made for the support of his dignity and expenses. By its being made an article of their treaty with the Vizier, they must be considered as the guarantees of it. The present transfer is unquestionably an act of violence, and, as such, can be repelled by none with so good a plea of right as by those from whom it was originally held: were it even a voluntary cession, the equity of it might well admit of a dispute, and the Company might justly reclaim the possession of it, both because the conditions of their original grant to the King were defeated by his assigning it to another power, and their interests are likely to be endangered by it.

Resolved that measures be immediately taken for the defence of the Province of Corah and Currah against the Maharattas; that the President be desired to communicate this our intention to the Vizier; that Colonel Champion be directed to consult with him on the proper means of effecting it, and if advisable, to cross the river at Allahabad, either with the whole or such a part of the brigade as he shall judge advisable for this service, &c.

2nd.—Mr. Lawrell has given his opinion, founded on the testimony of the most authentic records, that the nett revenue of the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad, after deducting all charges, may amount to 22,09,416 rupees "if the country remains in peace and is affected with no unusual calamity." This is a condition in which we have no right to expect them to continue long; and in war, or even on the threatening of a war, it may be questioned whether the collections would be sufficient to defray the charge of the forces which would be required at once to guard the country against an enemy, and to curb the mutinous spirit of the people. I beg leave to quote an expression which I have heard attributed to Nudjif Cawn, and which strongly marks the troublesome and precarious tenure of these districts,—"that the ryots never pay their rents but with the dagger held to their throats." In effect we find that on the bare expectation of an invasion of the Maharattas the last year, notwithstanding their distance, and the speedy approach of our forces, the zemindars and farmers had withheld their rents, and some of the Rajas had actually risen up in rebellion; which circumstances are mentioned by Mr. Lawrell to have rendered the state of the collections so precarious that he was glad to accept of an agreement from Munneer O'Dowla to rent the whole country for the nett sum of 16 lacs.

To the refractory spirit of the people let it be added that the nearest point of Allahabad lies at the distance of 180 miles measured in a straight line

from our cantonments at Dinapore. The length of Corah and Allahabad with the same measure is 150 miles, and their breadth, which is in every part nearly the same, but 20. That they are annually exposed to the attacks of the Maharattas, who have an ancient claim to the possession of Corah, which they are not likely to forego, and then let a calculation be formed of the probable amount which these lands would yield to us on a medium of ten years, with the probable amount of their expenses.

Upon the whole, whatever may be the General's opinion, I am convinced that the terms which I obtained from the Vizier were fully adequate to the real worth of the lands, all circumstances considered. I will not pretend to say whether more might or might not have been extorted from him. It was not without much pains and persuasion that I brought him to these terms. Besides, I beg it may be remembered that the Vizier was as well acquainted with the obvious difficulties which would have attended our retaining possession of this territory on behalf of the Company as I was with his motives for wishing to acquire it.

3rd.—I cannot avoid complaining of a want of candor in the assertion that had I persevered in the demand of the Gauzipore lands, it is probable I might have obtained an equivalent in them for the exchange of Corah and Allahabad. The General may well remember that he himself informed me of the extreme reluctance which the Vizier had to yield up the smallest part of that country. But I will plainly declare that territory was not my aim. My attention was wholly fixed on the means of relieving the distresses of the Company by an acquisition of ready money rather than of embarrassing them by an extension of possession which, in the case supposed by the General, would not have been an equivalent, since the whole zemindary pays to the Vizier no more than 22½ lacks under our guarantee, and that part of it which the General refers to composes but about one-third of it, from which we could in justice claim no more than the proportional rent, that is seven or eight lacks.

4th.—I have already declared my opinion—with my reason for it—that the acquisition of Corah and Allahabad will increase the Vizier's dependence on the Company. I have often heard of the treacherous designs of the Vizier, and the danger of allowing him to possess either wealth or power, but I never heard this opinion well supported. On the contrary, I conceive that he would be a much more useful ally, if he had a greater degree of both; but while the policy prevails of curbing him in every improvement, we not only deprive ourselves of every benefit of his alliance, and make him a burthen to us, but we alienate his affections, and teach him to abhor the hand which is held out to oppress, instead of relieving him. The additional revenue and security which the Vizier would have acquired by the reduction of the Rohillas had, I own, a considerable share in the reasons which induced me to consent to that proposition, although the stipulations which were proposed for the Company were undoubtedly the first consideration. I presume that the General himself, when he first communicated the proposal, was aware that the reduction of the Rohillas would have been an accumulation of wealth, power, and country to the Vizier, and a far more important one than the possession of Corah and Allahabad.

In the above sentiments respecting the treatment of the Vizier, I am supported by the opinion of the Hon'ble Court of Directors, which is strongly implied in many of their commands, and pointedly expressed in the following paragraph of their letter of 30th June 1769, which, though alluding to a different subject, evidently marks both their opinion and that of the General at another period of the little danger which we have to apprehend from the power of the Vizier.

"The number of Sujah Dowla's forces not being limited by any treaty, your demand upon that subject can only be justified upon the principles of self-defence, where considerations of justice must sometimes give place to necessity; but we do not see in the present instance any such danger impending. Colonel Barker in his letter of the 23rd March 1768 gives an opinion that a single Brigade would be an over match for all Sujah Dowla's army. This opinion stands uncontroverted, and indeed it is founded upon the uniform experience of our former success. We do not therefore see the necessity of coming to a resolution so very disgusting and humiliating without some overt

act committed on his part, manifestly showing his hostile intentions against us : whenever that happened you were able enough to reduce him, and we could not have been charged with being the aggressors. Whereas, if a war should break out in consequence of this, and other aggravating circumstances attending the deputation, the breach of friendship will be imputed to the Company."

5th.—This being a mere speculative opinion unsupported by reasons, I shall decline answering it, observing only that a stipulation for the continued payment of one-half of the revenue (if the Vizier had agreed to it, which I am morally certain he would not) would have made it necessary to join our own officers with the Vizier's in the management of the collections, and besides continual contests would have entailed upon us all the bad consequences, but in a greater degree, of an unconnected possession.

6th.—The renunciation of the tribute, which we cannot pay, and the grant of the sunnuds for Bengal, which we do not want, cannot in propriety be termed equal advantages with a positive payment of 50 lacks in money, and the Vizier's engagement to bear the whole expense of our troops when they shall be employed by him. Besides, I know not by what right the King could give, or the Company take, from the Nawab the little share which he possesses of the soubahship, and which he holds by treaty. But the General adds, that "it is now more than probable we shall soon see those sunnuds in the hands of other nations"—and what will they avail them? It was not the want of the sunnuds of Shah Allum which defeated the long-concerted projects of the Duc de Choiseul, nor will the possession of them quicken the designs of the Maharrattas against us. The sword which gave us the dominion of Bengal must be the instrument of its preservation, and if (which God forbid) it shall ever cease to be ours, the next proprietor will derive his right and possession from the same natural Charter.

Opinions of what might have been done always have an advantage in the comparison with what has been done : any conjectures may be hazarded of the probable consequences of the former; no events can refute them. The latter are fixed to certain and unavoidable proofs. I feel the force of this inequality in the present argument with the General. I can only oppose my own opinions to his conjectures, which cannot overthrow them. The measures which I have adopted can at this time admit of no amendment, or variation, nor can any reasoning avert the effects which must follow them; although it will always be easy to infer every disappointment and every ill-consequence as the necessary deductions from them. The remainder of the General's letter consists in a charge which respects the Board more immediately than myself. I shall beg leave, however, to reply to it. He complains that he was not included in the commission which the Board thought proper to intrust to my sole management; that he was never present at any of the conferences held between the Vizier and myself, excepting the last day, when everything had been concluded; and that the natives of Hindustan, influenced by these appearances, must view his consequence in a lesser degree than any of his predecessors, whom they have been taught to look on with reverence and respect. This latter charge he afterwards repeats in terms which too strongly imply that his attendance at Benares was required for that purpose only.

The charges are severe, but how far they are merited may best appear from a plain state of my conduct on the points to which they refer.

Immediately on my arrival at Benares I acquainted the General very circumstantially with the subject and design of my commission. I shewed him my instructions, which he read with attention, and to the best of my remembrance expressed an approbation of every part, excepting that he mentioned a regret that some more notice had not been taken in it of himself. I expressed to him my wish to have the benefit of his assistance, and that he might know with what degree of cordiality he might in reason bestow it, I very frankly informed him, that as it appeared evident to me that the Vizier was hitherto very little acquainted with the regular powers of our constitution, and had placed no dependance on the Government itself, but made all applications to the commander of the army, it was my intention to convince the Vizier that, in his concerns with the Company, his immediate dependance was on the Governor alone, and to establish a direct communication between him and

myself without any intervention : at the same time I assured the General that I considered the second place as due to him, and that it should be my study to add as much as was in my power to his importance within that limitation. In other points my views were no other than such as were contained in the substance of my instructions.

I can truly declare that my whole subsequent conduct was consistent with this declaration. I can indeed offer but one proof of it, to which the General himself will bear evidence, in the information which he received from the Vizier of my desire, as I had before expressed it to him, that the General might be prevailed on to take the command of the army, in case the projected expedition against the Rohillas should take place.

With respect to his not participating in the conferences with the Vizier, a thousand obvious causes forbade it. The very purpose to which I have just alluded would have made the presence of the military commander a circumstance equally of restraint and indelicacy. The commission which I had undertaken required speedy despatch ; the very essence of it was the power of instant decision. Both these purposes would have been frustrated by the General's intervention. The conversation must have been broken by the interpretation of every word that was said on both sides for the General's information. His opinion must have been consulted on every new point that arose out of the debate, and arguments discussed on both sides till we should concur in the same determination, while the Vizier was to sit patiently and wait the issue of our discussions, or catch the difference of our sentiments, and apply it, as he easily might, to his own advantage. Who too should be the interpreter between us ? I could not ; a fourth person therefore must have been admitted to the conference to act in that capacity. The other Members of the Board must of course have been called in, or they would have had real cause to be offended ; and if the Nawab had thought it necessary to support his part of the negotiation with an equal weight of numbers, our business would have been determined by a diet instead of a conference, and most probably concluded with nothing decided, or by compulsion, instead of a free and amicable accommodation.

• The instances quoted by the General were not applicable to the circumstances of my commission. There might have been no impropriety in the junction of General Carnac with Lord Clive. They stood in a different predicament together : their views, their way of thinking, their objects were the same. Each equally stood in need of an interpreter ; nor did the case then subsist of a difference of interest between the Government and the military authority. General Smith was joined in the deputation of 1768 because his rank entitled him to it. Their business was simple, to be effected by command, and not by persuasion, and might (I will presume to affirm) have been concluded full as well by the General alone as by the joint powers of a Committee. In a word, the Board, in the two commissions above mentioned, thought proper to compose them of more than one person. The Board chose to delegate the trust reposed in me to myself singly. I have every reason to be convinced that the effect was answerable to their intention ; and so well assured was I of the necessity of this mode before I accepted of the charge, that I would not have undertaken it on other conditions.

It will be recollected that the various points referred to my management were none of them fixed to any specific terms, but the undefined ideas and wishes of the Board, and the political principles of the Court of directors, given me at large for my guidance. The spirit of these last is strongly repugnant to the imperious manner in which the Vizier has been too often treated by our Government, and enjoins a style of persuasion in the place of command. Every circumstance of the negotiation required that it should be managed by that familiar and confidential intercourse which can take place only between two persons unembarrassed by interruption, and unchecked by the reserve which always attends a conversation held between strangers and before many witnesses. Fortunately, too, the habit which I had acquired of speaking the Hindustan language, though imperfect, yet aided on the part of the Vizier by a very clean and easy elocution, and an uncommonly quick apprehension, greatly facilitated this mode of communication, and not only

forwarded the conclusion of our debates, but, I am persuaded, left him much better pleased with what had passed than if it had been conveyed to him through the doubtful channel of an interpreter.

I will only add my regret that the General should have suffered his feelings on this occasion to hurry him into expressions of too personal resentment which I think his natural moderation would have led him to avoid had he allowed himself time for cool and deliberate reflection.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Secret Dept., Fort William, the 26th November 1773. .
Friday evening. AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR ROBERT BARKER.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

GEO. VANSITTART, Esq.

The book of standing orders upon the table.

Read and approved the consultation of the 22nd instant.

The President, in consequence of a reference from the Select Committee, lays before the Board the Proceedings of that Committee on the 19th and 22nd instant as follows:—

Extracts from the Select Committee Proceedings of the 19th November 1773.

The President lays before the Committee the following intelligence which he has received from the westward:—

“On the 13th of the month of Sawban, the Nawab Nujiff Cawn Bahadur by the blessing of God and the King's auspices was victorious, and Nawab Sing, the Jaut, was defeated and fled to the part of Dhyge. Thousands of men were killed and wounded on both sides, and many of the tents and horses of Nawab Sing, the Jaut, with other valuable effects, have fallen into the hands of the royal troops. The Nawab Nujiff Cawn Bahadur has obtained a very great victory.”

The President lays before the Committee the following letters received from the Vizier:—

FROM THE NAWAB SHUJA-UL-DOWLA.

Received 23rd of October 1773.

By the papers of intelligence I learn that Narrain Row Sirdar of the Deccan has been assassinated by the order of Rogonat Row, who, I look upon it for certain, will succeed him in the Government. Copy of a paper containing this intelligence I enclose for your perusal. I have now determined to take possession of the country in the Duabe, which formerly belonged to the Rohillas and is now possessed by the Mharattas. For this purpose I shall shortly despatch my army thither, and shall also follow myself. Should I, therefore, have occasion for the assistance of the English forces to carry on my operations in that country, I desire to know what is your pleasure,—whether you will let me have those forces when I shall call for them, or you will not? If it be agreeable to you to supply me with them, it will be best and most proper, and signify the same to me, that I may immediately begin considering upon and forming my plan of operations. Let me have your answer fully and particularly to this, that I may take my measures accordingly.

A true translation.

WILLIAM REDFEARN,

Persian Translator.

FROM THE NAWAB SHUJÀ-UL-DOWLA.

Received 18th November 1773.

I have before written you several letters, which you may have received. I have now learnt that Hafiz Rhamut Cawn and other Sirdars have intentions of taking possession of Ettawah and the rest of the country belonging to the Maharattas. I therefore write to inform you that if such is their intention, I will not put up with it, but shall undoubtedly undertake an expedition against them; for in the first place they have not made good a single daam of the 40 lacks of rupees, according to their agreement, and in the next they are now going to take possession of another country. This I will never submit to, and am therefore determined to punish them. During our interview at Benares we had some conversation on this subject, and it was then agreed on that I should pay to the Company the sum of 40 lacks of rupees after the expulsion of the Rohillas, and 2,10,000 rupees monthly on account of the English brigade during my operations in the Rohilla country; and that I should with the assistance of the English forces endeavour to punish and exterminate the Rohillas out of their country. If, therefore, these terms are agreeable to you, I desire to know whether you will assist me with the English forces, or you will not. Lest you should want to discuss and settle this matter anew, I now send you a separate paper containing the points we before conferred upon, in order that you may come to a final determination concerning them; for if you should write to me and want my answer much time will be lost. Should I have occasion to call for the assistance of the English forces on this expedition, whenever I dismiss them I will pay to the Company 40 lacks of rupees ready money on condition of the entire expulsion of the Rohillas, and during the time of their service with me, the sum of R2,10,000 shall be paid to them monthly on account of their expenses. But one thing more I must mention to you, which is whenever you shall send me those troops, I hope that they may be commanded by General Barker, who is well acquainted with the affairs of this quarter, and especially with my negotiations with the Rohillas. For this reason it is absolutely necessary that the General should then have the command of those troops, which will afford me the greatest satisfaction.

In the course of our interview at Benares I spoke to you about 10,000 fire-arms, and you were pleased to say that you would give me an answer on that subject on your arrival in Calcutta. As there is no disunion between us, and the alliance between the Company and myself has become more firmly cemented than ever since our interview at Benares, insomuch that our armies, stores, and every thing else belonging to us are equally the property of both, and my house and yours are the same. I therefore applied to you for a place for my family, and you told me that if it was possible you would remove the fort of Calcutta and appropriate it to my use. If, therefore, you will supply me with 10,000 fire-arms, I shall consider them as equal to the fort of Calcutta. In short, your compliance in this application will afford me the greatest satisfaction, and be a means of perpetuating the friendship between us, from which I have the greatest hopes. The money for the fire-arms shall be paid immediately. I have paid the money according to my agreement to Mr. Lambert, of which I give you this information. I have already acquainted you with my intentions of making a journey to Corah; but as I always take medicines at this season of the year, I have delayed it longer than I intended on that account. However, I shall now set out immediately, and therefore it is necessary that you favor me with an answer to these matters without delay. They are of the greatest importance, and I shall wish to hear from you concerning them with the greatest impatience. Let your answer be sent with the utmost expedition.

On a separate paper.

On condition of the entire expulsion of the Rohillas, I will pay to the Company the sum of 40 lacks of rupees in ready money whenever I shall discharge the English troops, and until the expulsion of the Rohillas shall be effected, I will pay the expenses of the English troops—that is to say, I will pay the sum of R2,10,000 monthly.

From the advices now before the Committee, it appears absolutely necessary that some immediate resolutions should be taken with respect to the requisition made by the Vizier, as well as for guarding against those attempts and changes which the absence of the Maharattas may give rise to in the Duabe, or tract of country lying between the River Ganges and Jumna. And the Committee having maturely deliberated on the measures proper to be adopted, are unanimously agreed in the following opinions and resolutions.

That should the Vizier persist in his intentions with respect to the Rohilla country, and determine to prosecute the enterprise with steadiness to a conclusion, this Government, considering the strict alliance and engagements which subsist between the Company and Shujah Dowla, and particularly what passed between the Vizier and the President at the conference at Benares, cannot on this occasion refuse him support and assistance; that the terms proposed by the Vizier appear highly advantageous to the Company, not only on account of the sum which is ultimately stipulated as a consideration for this service, but by immediately relieving them from the heavy expense of a large part of their army. Provided, therefore, full assurance and security can be obtained of the Vizier's intention and ability to make good the many payments which will in this event be due to the Company.

Resolved that the 2nd Brigade now quartered at Dinapore be ordered to march on the Vizier's requisition, and to prevent delay—

Agreed that orders for this purpose be lodged with the Chief at Patna, to be issued by him on the receipt of the Vizier's requisition for the march of our troops on the terms above specified, and in the mean time that every preparation be made for putting the 2nd Brigade in readiness to take the field on the shortest notice.

Agreed in consequence that the following letter be written to the Chief at Patna:—

To THOMAS LANE, Esq., Chief at Patna.

SIR,—The President has desired the Vizier to address himself to you in case he should require the assistance of the 2nd Brigade. On receiving from him such a requisition, you will be pleased to forward the enclosed letter to the Officer Commanding the Brigade at Dinapore, which you will retain in your hands till then.

We are, &c.; &c.

FORT WILLIAM;

The 19th November 1773.

Agreed that the following orders to the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Brigade be enclosed in the letter to the Chief at Patna:—

To LIEUT.-COLONEL TOTTINGHAM, Commanding the 2nd Brigade at Dinapore.

SIR,—You are hereby directed, as soon as you conveniently can after the receipt of this order, to take the field with the 2nd Brigade, to march with it into the territories of the Nawab Sujah Dowla, and to join him in whatever part of his territories he may be or may require your presence.

We are, &c., &c.

FORT WILLIAM;

The 19th November 1773.

Agreed that the President be requested to prepare an answer to the Vizier's letters in conformity to the above resolutions.

Agreed that the President be requested also to prepare letters to the King and to the Rohilla Chiefs, requiring from them an explanation of their intentions with regard to the Duabe.

Proceedings of the Select Committee on the 22nd November.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, PRESENT :

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR ROBERT BARKER.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

The President lays before the Committee the following draft of a letter to the Vizier, which he has prepared agreeable to the resolution of last meeting :—

TO THE VIZIER.—Some days ago I received your letter containing the intelligence of the death of Narain Row, the late Sirdar of the Deccan, and the succession of Rogonaut Row to his Government; at the same time intimating your resolution to take possession of the country in the Duabe, which formerly belonged to the Rohillas, and is now possessed by the Maharattas, and desiring to know whether I will send the English forces in case you should have occasion to call for their assistance.

I am since honoured with another letter from you to the following purport, *viz.*, that you have learnt that Hafiz Rahamut Cawn and other Sirdars have intentions of taking possession of Ettawah and the rest of the country of Duabe belonging to the Mharattas, and that in such case you are resolved to carry into execution the plan, which was concerted between us at Benares, for their expulsion from the country lying to the north of yours, and desiring to know whether I will assist in the execution of this design, repeating the conditions formerly proposed with other particulars of importance which I clearly understand.

As the subject of both the above letters are intimately connected and admit of only one and the same determination, I shall reply particularly to both in this address.

With respect to the Duabe, you are the master to act in whatever manner you shall deem most fitting for the advancement or security of your own affairs. You know that you may always command the forces of the Company for the defence of your own dominions. If you should engage in a war beyond their borders, and should stand in need of assistance, I certainly cannot sit still and see your danger without endeavouring to relieve you, and for that reason I hope you will avoid an enterprise at this distance which you cannot be well assured of performing with your own strength, as the commands of my superiors are, as I have repeatedly informed you, peremptory that I shall not suffer their arms to be carried beyond the line of their own boundaries and those of your Excellency their ally, although in one instance I have ventured to go beyond them.

Concerning the country of the Rohillas, whatever was formerly proposed at Benares, that I am now equally ready to agree to—that is, the brigade which is now at Dinapore shall march, whenever you require it, to join you, and proceed with you into the country of the Rohillas, which lies north of your dominions, to assist you in the entire reduction of it; and your Excellency, on your part, will supply them monthly with the stipulated sum of Rs. 2,10,000 for their expenses, and whenever the country shall be so far conquered, that you shall remain in possession of it, although the enemy may lurk in the hills and jungles, or a few refractory zemindars, as is usual, may withhold their allegiance, and your Excellency shall dismiss the brigade, you will, on its departure, pay 40 lacs of rupees to the Company as a consideration for that service. To prevent future misunderstanding I have been thus explicit. I must beg leave further to add that if the expedition shall be once undertaken, it will be absolutely necessary to persevere in it, until it shall be accomplished. You will therefore reflect whether it will be in your power to make the above payments punctually with others, which are already due, and whether you can resolve on going through with the undertaking. If you are not certain of accomplishing these necessary points, I must request that you will suspend the execution of your undertaking till a more favourable time. As I cannot

hazard or answer for the effects of the displeasure of the Company, my masters, if they shall find themselves involved in a fruitless war, or in an expense for the prosecution of it. But if you are satisfied of your ability to perform these conditions, and will engage to perform them, the brigade which is at Dinapore shall attend you on your requisition, and that there may be no delay, if you will signify your orders for the march of the brigade to Mr. Lane, the Chief of Patna, and will send a letter from him to me, containing your acquiescence in these conditions, in the terms of the form enclosed, he will cause the brigade to proceed to you immediately, being furnished with the proper orders from me to the commander of the forces for that purpose.

On the receipt of your first letter, I ordered all the detachments of the brigade of Dinapore to be assembled, and every preparation to be made to enable it to take the field, and I hope it will be in readiness for that purpose whenever you may require it.

Although in the enclosed form I have mentioned nothing of the mode in which the money for the expenses of the army is to be defrayed, I think it proper to observe that it would be highly expedient that a sure and effectual mode be previously formed for the regular payment of the army. This will prevent difficulties, and will be the subject of much ease to both you and myself, as the charges of the army must be regularly paid, or the most fatal consequences may attend the neglect of it, and I have not money to send with it.

A true translation.

WILLIAM REDFEARN,

Persian Translator.

Form of a letter to be written by the Vizier.

Having summoned the brigade at Dinapore to my assistance, I now send you this declaration, that no subject of future doubt or discussion concerning the terms and service on which it is to be employed may remain between us. That it is my resolution to employ the said brigade in the reduction of the country of the Rohillas, which lies between my borders, the River Ganges and the mountains, and I will not require them to pass these boundaries. That besides the stipulated sum of 15 lacks of rupees, which will be due on the 19th of Jemadee-ul-sanee next, on account of the cession of Corah and Allahabad, I will pay month by month punctually the sum of 2,10,000 rupees for the extra expenses of the brigade during the time of its service according to the terms of the late treaty concluded between us, and 40 lacks of rupees in ready money when this service shall be concluded—that is to say whenever I shall dismiss the said brigade, or one-half of it, whether the country of the Rohillas shall be conquered and established in my possession, or an accommodation shall have taken place with them.

Some doubts having arisen concerning the regularity of the Committee's issuing the orders of the 19th instant of their sole authority—

Agreed that the Proceedings of that date, together with the above letter, be submitted to the Council at large.

The President thinks it requisite to accompany this reference with a brief explanation of the nature of the measure proposed and of the motives which determined his opinion in the resolution of the Select Committee now before the Board in the following Minute:—

I have long considered the power of the Rohillas as dangerous to the Vizier, the only useful ally of the Company, and as such have wished to see it annihilated. We have till lately had a very imperfect knowledge of the Rohilla states, and consequently the advices transmitted to our Hon'ble Masters on that subject must have been too defective for them to form an accurate judgment upon them. It is our duty to correct our information to them as we receive more lights, and I am inclined to believe that such information would induce them to adopt the system with respect to those powers which is now proposed.

I must therefore declare that although the Hon'ble Court of Directors have been pleased to rank the Rohillas among the powers capable of opposing

the Maharattas, I cannot regard them in that light. Their country is too remote from that of the Maharattas, and too much out of the line of the incursions of those people for them either to be able to oppose these with effect, or to have much to apprehend from them. The Maharattas may occasionally attack them from the allurements of plunder only, but they can never form a systematic scheme of conquest over a country so distant and so difficult to hold.

On the other hand, the Subadar of Oude must always be an object of jealousy and enmity to the Rohillas. His power is to be dreaded by them, and the situation of their country contiguous to his, and in a manner enclosed within the same natural boundaries, must make the possession of it always a desirable object with him, both for security and advantage. These are sources of enmity between them, which from the nature of things cannot fail of producing suitable effects; and it is more probable that we should soon see the Maharattas and Rohillas join in hostilities against the Vizier than that they should continue in war with one another.

But let us next view the advantages which would result to the Vizier, the ally of the Company, and to the Company itself from his possession of that part of the Rohilla country which is the object of the expedition now proposed. Our ally would obtain by this acquisition a complete compact state shut in effectually from foreign invasions by the Ganges, all the way from the frontiers of Bahar to the mountains of Thibet, while he would remain equally accessible to our forces from the above provinces either for hostilities or protection. It would give him wealth, of which we should partake, and give him security without any dangerous increase of power. I would undoubtedly, by bringing his frontier nearer to the Maharattas, to whom singly he would be no match, render him more dependant on us and cement the union more firmly between us. I must further declare that I regard as none of the most inconsiderable benefits to the Company from this measure, besides the 40 lacks held out to us, the easing them immediately of the burthen of one-third of their whole army, while at the same time it is employed usefully for their interests and conveniently for keeping up its own discipline and practice in war.

With these reasons for the propriety of the expedition on general principles, I must confess I entertain some doubts as to its expediency at this time, arising from the circumstances of the Company at home, exposed to popular clamour, all its measures liable to be canvassed in Parliament, their charter drawing to a close, and his Majesty's Ministers unquestionably ready to take advantage of every unfavourable circumstance in the negotiation for its renewal. In this situation there appears an unusual degree of responsibility annexed to such an undertaking. I would therefore recommend it to the serious consideration, and at the same time I think it my duty to declare that I find myself embarrassed in a peculiar manner in my decision from the circumstance of what passed between the Vizier and myself at Benares. The Board will recollect that this very country was included in the line of defensive operations which they thought fit to adopt last year in support of the Vizier, and it is now necessary to acquaint them more fully that the Vizier at the interview did propose this expedition to me, and earnestly solicited my assistance. That I regarded this request as a lucky circumstance in the negotiation; and availing myself of it as the means of purchasing the Vizier's compliance in the other measure, which was the principal object of my commission, I consented to it, engaging to assist them in the enterprise on the conditions with which the Board are already acquainted. Afterwards, from a suspicion of his own ability to make good so many pecuniary engagements at once as those he had come under, he himself made the proposal for suspending the Rohilla expedition, but the condition which took its rise from it, viz., that the future payment of the extra charges of the army sent at any time to his assistance should be fixed at 2,10,000 rupees per month for a brigade, was still allowed to be made an article of the new treaty, and it was further agreed that the stipulation for Corah, which I had before raised with difficulty to 45 lacks of rupees, should now be made 50, in consideration of his being exempted from the additional burthen of the projected campaign and better enabled to fulfil his other payments. It is unnecessary to explain the motives which urged the Vizier to make concessions for the liberty of relinquishing a point which he had appar-

ently so much at heart, and what I was not solicitous to pursue. The detail would be tedious. The Gentlemen who were with me, and to whom I made daily communication of the progress of the negotiations, will remember that such was the issue of this part of them. The expedition remained only suspended, and I gave him every reason to expect that whenever it could again be with prudence resumed, and he desired it, it should be undertaken.

This is the predicament in which I now stand with the Vizier; and although, from a fear of his not being able to fulfil his part of the agreement, I wish to avoid engaging in the project at present, yet it appears to me that a direct refusal, after what passed, would have an unfriendly aspect, and might admit of the construction of artifice and insincerity in our dealings with him.

Moved by the doubts which I have exposed to the Board and thus hampered by my situation with the Vizier, no better method occurred to me for freeing us from this dilemma than the letter which is now in reference before the Board. I have there expressed my consent to the expedition in terms which, if he agrees to them, are most likely to secure the advantages hoped from it, but which are more likely to make him relinquish the design. I trust the Board will find it so guarded, both in the substance and expression, that the Vizier must necessarily feel himself engaged to perform every condition required of him with the most rigid punctuality at the hazard of forfeiting the Company's friendship or revolt against the terms imposed upon him and drop all thoughts of prosecuting the design, and that I verily believe will be the issue of his correspondence.

The Board, after due consideration of the matter in reference from the Select Committee, and of the President's representation, concur heartily in wishing to avoid the expedition proposed without entering into a discussion of the propriety of such an enterprise on general principles; the Board see in their full force all the circumstances of doubt as to its present expediency which the President has so clearly set forth, and they are also sensible of the embarrassment which he lies under from what passed on the subject between him and the Vizier at Benares. They are equally solicitous to save the honour of the Company and watch over its interests, and for that reason they approve of the letter now before them, which seems equally calculated to save both. The conditions, if accepted, would undoubtedly secure the greatest possible advantages from such enterprise, but they appear to them more calculated to drive the Vizier into a refusal, which is what they trust in, as its most probable and almost infallible consequence, and which they wish for as the proper result of this proposition in the present circumstances of affairs.

The General begs to record his sentiments on this occasion in the following words:—

The General has already given it as his opinion that the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad should have been restored to the King for such acquisitions to the Company as are premised in his Minutes and letters to the Board on that subject, in which case the conquest of the Rohilla country for the Vizier became an object of our attention, because in this he would have accumulated nothing more than was necessary to put him on a par with his neighbours, and to enable him to resist the hostilities of any force, united with the King against him, or what is the same thing—to have enabled him to pay for the assistance of the English forces when called to his aid. But now that he is in possession of Corah and Allahabad, I think it would be impolitical from the same parity of reasoning to put him in possession also of the Rohilla country, unless the Company can acquire by it the possession of those lands in the zemindari of Cheyt Singh lying to the south of the Ganges.

If the Vizier has the Rohilla country added to those of Oude and the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad, he will be in possession of a revenue of nearly two crores and a half per annum, a sum that, in some future day, might render an enterprising genius a very troublesome neighbour on the north-west frontiers of the Company's dominions; and although we have no present occasion to suspect the sincerity of Sujah-ul-Dowla's attachment to our interests, yet it must not be forgotten that he is an Hindustander, or that a successor might enter the Government with very different ideas and disposition.

The General agrees with the President that the Vizier's dominions would become compact, and not subject to invasions; but the General supposes it will become too compact and not sufficiently open to invasion: it is from the apprehension of invasion that cements the Vizier's friendship with the English and makes him that staunch ally we find him.

Had we risen the King to the possession of the Doab including the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, it would then have become necessary to strengthen the Vizier, because the interests of these two potentates are separate and it is political to guard against the one by the sufficiency of the other. It was on this account the General wrote down to the Board the proposal for adding the Rohilla districts on the north of the Ganges to the Vizier's dominions; but the case is exceedingly altered: one-half of the General's proposal only is adopted, and we appear to be raising a particular power, at the expense of the Empire and in defiance to royalty, for the transitory advantage of a pecuniary object, and by it to raise a power who, from ambitious views, or imaginary resentment, may hereafter, at a time when the Company's affairs may be embarrassed, have strength to form foreign alliances to invade the Company's possessions.

Indeed, the General is of opinion that it is the political interest of this Government, according to the present system, to instil into the mind of the Vizier the necessity, and indeed propriety, of his studying the welfare and defence of his present possessions, without extending his ambition to conquests that may endanger his own tranquillity and that of the Company's, his ally. He has already a sufficiency to secure himself from any sudden invasion; and we can at all times prevent the fatal consequences of such an event when it is likely to take place, unless the Company are pleased to adopt the system of supporting the two great powers of Hindustan—the King and the Vizier—in opposition to the rest of the Empire, and in which case only the General thinks it would be necessary to strengthen the Vizier to render the interest of either dependent on our decision.

ROBERT BARKER.

Secret Dept., Fort William, the 16th December 1773.

Thursday.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR ROBERT BARKER.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

GEO. VANSITTART, Esq.

Resumed the consideration of General Sir Robert Barker's letter from Benares, which stands recorded on consultation, the 4th September last.

The President delivers the following Minute and subsidiary papers on the subject.

As the letter addressed to the Board by the General, dated the 4th of September, and the observations enclosed in it contain many particulars which, for want of an application, may be construed to reflect on my conduct in the orders issued to the army, I think it incumbent upon me to take notice of such passages as seem to have a relation to me, and to explain the rule of practice which I have observed or endeavoured to observe in the exercise of my authority in the military command. I have purposely deferred replying earlier to these papers, although my other avocations have afforded ample reason for the delay, that I might give my sentiments at large upon the nature and extent of my own powers, when this subject, with that of the deficient rules and arrangements of the Military Service,

should be fully discussed and adjusted with the assistance of Colonel Chapman, the second in command, who has been called to the presidency for that purpose, and is now present. What I shall urge may serve as introductory to the general subject; and if my principles are just, may assist the decisions of the Board upon it.

The objections, which are made by the General to the extension of the civil authority in the extremes enjoined by the Company relate to the abuse of that power, rather than to the power itself; although it does not appear very evident how a division of the forces under the command of a Collector is more likely to affect the military subordination than the like injudicious practice would prove under a military officer. The former from inexperience is indeed more likely to commit an error of this kind, but it is easy to be restrained by a positive order of Government. I have already described the line which according to my notions of military duty ought to be drawn between the civil and military authority in every gradation of it, in a letter which I wrote to Mr. Purling on the 7th of March last, and which is recorded in consultation of the 3rd May; and in the instructions which I have since given to Colonel Cummings, who is now on service with the same gentleman, a copy of which I beg leave to annex to this number. I presume to suppose that the General will find nothing in either of these letters liable to material, if any, objection. God forbid that the like evils should exist under the present institution of the military corps as did prevail in the Purgunna Battalions. But I believe it may be easily proved that the instances of unmilitary behaviour to which the general has alluded, in the officers of the latter, did not arise from the connivance of the Collectors, but from a defective authority to prevent it. The General complains that promotions to the command of sepoy battalions, removal of officers to different corps, and nominations to public offices have been made without his authority or advice. Before I examine the propriety of this practice, I think it necessary to acquit myself of the charge of having introduced it. In every point of this kind I have studiously enquired what was the conduct of my predecessors, and to that I have implicitly adhered, where I saw no cause to depart from it. If I am rightly informed, these appointments have always been made by the Governor. The use that I have made of this privilege is well known. I have neither employed it to gratify personal resentment, nor personal favour; having made it a rule from which I have never varied, but at the instances of the General himself, to promote every officer according to his rank in the service.

The commands of sepoy battalions have been given to Captains who were every one of them almost unknown to me, while many whom I wished to have had it in my power to serve, either on the score of private regard, or powerful recommendations, have remained unprovided for. Let this power be taken out of my hands and given to the military commander, or to any other, on the principle of applying it to the reward of merit, and I will venture to foretell that it will be applied to the purposes of partial supersessions. Those of my own family, or whose services I have most had occasions of employing, are those whose merits come immediately within my view, and these too may be magnified by affection; while the conduct and characters of others are remote from my observation, or are often falsely transmitted to me through prejudiced informations. Such is the lot of power in every degree of it, and while I suppose it to be my own, I am authorized in attributing it to every man possessed of it.

For a proof of what I have asserted, I have added a complete list No. 2 of the promotions which have been made by my order to sepoy battalions, in which it will appear that I have made but two variations from the line of seniority, *viz.*, in the appointment of Captain Edwards and Captain Bickerton. The former had already possession of the second battalion by the appointment of Mr. Cartier, but was not in orders. From a just respect to the acts of my predecessor, I confirmed the promotion by a public order of the 12th December, copied in No. 2, in which I took care to express that I did it in consequence of his original appointment, that it might not be construed a deviation from the rule which I had prescribed to myself. Captain Bickerton was junior to Captain Gwinnett when he had the command given to him of the 22nd

Battalion in preference to Captain Gwinnett on the 26th February 1773. I passed Captain Gwinnett because of an objection made to him by the General, which being soon after removed, I gave him the next vacancy of the second Battalion on the 12th March, so that even this supersession, although it was not in reality an act of mine, was but of fourteen days duration. It is necessary that I should add that I have also passed by the following officers who have the claim of seniority to sepoy commands, *viz.*, Captains Martin, Roach, and Morrison. These also I set aside at the instance of the General. The first of these has ever been employed in the surveying branch and is a foreigner, although in general esteem as a brave and experienced officer and a man of strict honour. The other two are invalids.

Accompanying is an abstract No. 3 of the orders issued by me since the general arrangements of May 1772, for the removal and posting of officers to different corps, by the dates of which it will appear that most of them were made at the time when a general promotion took place in the service, and when the General was in the Rohilla country, at the distance of forty days in the intercourse between him and the presidency.

Some appointments of the same nature were made during the General's residence at Shahabad, and such as took place while he was at the presidency either had or were supposed by me to have had his concurrence, if not his immediate recommendation. In the artillery corps I have ever left arrangements of officers entirely to the commandant, I believe with a single exception.

The General is long since acquainted with my wish to leave this part of the military detail to him, reserving to myself the right of exercising it in particular cases, and where the commanding officer is too far distant to perform it himself.

In public offices, and in staff employments, I have paid no regard to seniority, but have generally complied with the recommendation of the commanding officers of the corps. In instances which did not affect their authority, I have yielded to the bias of inclination or of importunity, where I thought I could do it without injury or discouragement to the service.

These instances amount in all to eleven appointments in the space of twenty months, including my own staff, and four Barrack masters recommended by me but appointed by the Board.

The General enumerates the instances in which the Board and the President, as he says by himself, have attempted to weaken his authority and deprive him of the means to execute the essentials of his trust. These instances are general, *viz.*, 1st, forming arrangements in the army; 2nd, encouraging and decreasing the establishment; 3rd, posting officers; 4th, nominating appointments without requiring information from him of men deserving such promotion; 5th, shewing disapprobation in public orders at his having acted contrary to their intention; 6th, restricting him in public orders from giving leave of absence to those under his command, excepting when he is on the spot; 7th, receiving the addresses of individuals without a reference to their superiors; 8th, issuing orders by which many disbursements in the Military Department are rendered absolutely independent of his control; and 9th, allowing courts martial to be held by the appointment of Collectors. For these reasons he declares it impracticable for him to carry a proper command, or to enforce discipline and subordination, and that there is no occasion for the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief.

I have taken some trouble to extract these charges from the General's letter and paper of observations, and to reduce them to formal articles. I find myself at a loss to apply them to facts. I shall endeavour to do this, although I must express my regret that the General has left me this labour by an omission which imposes upon me the hard necessity of searching for matters of accusation against myself in order to justify myself upon them.

The first article, the latter part of the second, and the third I suppose to allude to the general orders of the 23rd May 1772, which stand fully justified in the consultations of that date of the 17th August and 7th October. The separate share which I have had in the third I have already acknowledged and

explained. I have caused the book of general orders to be searched, but without effect, to discover the instances alluded to in the first part of the second article in which the Board have increased the establishment. I am sure no act of mine has had that effect.

To the fourth article, so far as it regards the commands of sepoy battalions, I have replied above. I can make no other application of it.

The fifth alludes to the order of the 28th of March last, which was published by the Board, for the recal of Captain Harper from the Vizier's Court. The Board has been already compelled to say too much on this subject, which will be found in the consultations of the 30th September, 1st October 1772, 25th January, 28th January, 18th March, and 31st May, and in the Select Committee proceedings of the 7th January. I wish not to revive it.

Sixth.—The following is the order meant by this article.

Fort William, 9th June 1773.

“Commanding officers of brigades and detachments composing the army are not in future to permit officers under their command to proceed to the presidency on leave of absence or sickness without a report being first made through them to the Governor and his approbation obtained, except by express permission from the General when he is on the spot.”

This order was intended to put a stop to the practice of officers running to the presidency to solicit indulgences. The reservation expressed in it of a power in the General to dispense with the order by granting such permission when he is on the spot was neither meant nor considered as a restriction, but rather as the diminution of a former restriction by which the commanding officer was bound indiscriminately with others, as I understand, and did at the time in which I published this order, that an old order then subsisted forbidding any officer to come to the presidency without express leave from the President. Indeed, it appears to me but reasonable that if the Governor is allowed to possess a separate authority in any instance, it should be allowed him within the limits of the place where he personally resides. I am sorry that in this point I should have given offence to the General. I thought I afforded him a proof of my attention.

Seventh.—I cannot recollect the instances in which the Board have received addresses from officers without a reference to their superiors.

There is an order extant of the 1st of June 1768, that whenever an officer thinks himself aggrieved he shall in an humble manner represent his case to the Board through the proper channel. I wish it had been explained what the proper channel was, but until this point shall be more clearly ascertained, I shall not consider the Board as liable to blame for admitting the natural appeals made immediately to the supreme authority, although for many reasons I think they should be made through the Commander-in-Chief, if not the commanders of the brigades. It seems reasonable that they should also be made to the Governor. It is sufficient on this head to observe that this has generally been the rule, and that instances have happened in which applications made immediately to the Board have been returned with orders that they should be first communicated to the General.

Eighth.—I have caused the book of orders to be examined narrowly for the facts on which this charge is grounded. I can find none. It rests with the General to point them out, and prove that they render the military disbursements absolutely independent of his control.

Ninth.—If courts-martial have been held by the appointment of the Collectors, I agree with the General in pronouncing it a great irregularity; but I am certain that the Board has never authorized an act of this kind, nor to my recollection have I done it, although I might have been inexcusably led into the error by the want of a fixed rule for the appointment of general sepoy courts-martial. In that which I have followed, I have taken the advice of the Board, which was to appoint them by public orders, and the sentences have been always transmitted to me for confirmation.

I have but one remark to apply to all the preceding charges, which is that the circumstances on which they are grounded should have been noticed

when they happened. It is of no utility to have reserved them for general and indefinite allusions.

Whatever cause I may have to conceive myself to have been unfairly treated in the reflexions cast upon me by the General, I mean only to vindicate myself in this reply. Had he on any occasion in which he judged that I had encroached on the line of his duty acquainted me with it, he would have found me disposed to hear him with candour, and to repair my own inadvertencies. I am not ashamed to acknowledge my errors, because from the variety and rapid succession of affairs which occupy my attention, I have less time and power of recollection, and of course am more liable to errors than any person in the service. But the duty of my station would be very hard indeed if I was to be made strictly accountable for every minute part of my conduct in the administration of the affairs of so extensive a province as this is.

I have often wished that the line of duty were drawn for every office in the service. The following principles may point out the general means of ascertaining it in all cases where the limitation of it may be disputable. The collective body of the Council are or ought to be possessed of an absolute and uncontrollable authority over every office and every department of the Government. But in the detail of business and in the execution of their orders which they have entrusted to others, they should impose upon themselves the rule of avoiding to interfere, but on very necessary occasions, of which they only can be the judges.

The powers of the Council devolve on the Governor during the intervals of the meeting of the Board, with the same cautionary reserve in respect to the detail and executive business, and with the exception of such matters as either by express rule, by usage, or by their evident importance, are only cognizable by the Board.

If these principles are just, the Board may easily determine every question regarding the duties of the Governor in the Military Department by applying it to them. Such points I leave to their fuller discussion, expressing only my wish to have them determined and a line drawn which may enable me to execute this part of my duty without doubts of the propriety of my own conduct and without exposing it to the censure of others.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Ordered that the papers which are delivered in by the President with the above be copied after this consultation.

General Barker begs leave to reply in the following manner to the Governor's Minute.

General Barker having persued the President's answer to the observations

The General's reply No. 3. contained in his letter to the Board of the 4th September, regrets much that the very short period of his stay will not admit of his replying so fully as the search into matters of fact would require, and without which references he does not choose to enter into a discussion of the several charges and reflexions contained against the justness of his observations. Nor can he pass over utterly unnoticed some of the passages contained in this Minute. He therefore is constrained to observe in this particular that, notwithstanding the very harsh allusion of the President's observation on the plea of rewarding merit, and the remarks he has made on the General's recommendation of Captain Bickerton in preference to Captain Gwinnett, and that his reasons for this were not founded on partiality, but from his regard to the service he neither considered Captain Gwinnett a proper officer to command sepoys, nor did he esteem him meriting it from his former services, and he had not long before returned from a visit of some years to Europe, whilst other officers had been constantly doing their duty; and the General supposes it is the undoubted and required province of a Commander-in Chief to object to persons either unworthy or improper for so material a trust as the command of a battalion of sepoys. As to Captain Martin, it was not an objection of detriment to that officer which the General made, but a conviction that the service and the Company would derive more benefits from his abilities in the surveying branch.

General Barker now assures the Board, upon the whole amount of the President's reply, that he has in no instance whatever impeded the service in consequence of any appointment of the President or the Board, however they might have been repugnant to his opinion or inattentive to his station, as he never admitted the smallest comparison between the welfare of the service in general and his own private feelings, reserving them for representation, in which he has unfortunately, and to his great regret, been too often reduced in the course of his command.

R. BARKER.

The other members of the Board remark that it was their intention to have replied to the General's letter immediately on its receipt, but they were prevented by not having before them a proper state of the facts which could only be furnished from the military books in the President's possession; but as these are now fully detailed in the President's Minute, the Board think it incumbent on them to record their sentiments also, and desire that the Minute which they will prepare may stand entered on this date:

It is as follows:—

The charges of the General being chiefly confined to the President's execution of the duties of his station as Governor, they have most properly been replied to by him. But when we see the conduct of our President apparently censured and the charge imputed to him of usurping the exercise of an authority which does not fall within his province, and which tends to injure the public service by weakening the necessary powers of the commanding officer, the Honorable the Court of Directors will doubtless expect that we should record for their observation our testimony how far such charge can with justice be applied to the President's administration, and how far the explanations he has given in answer are consonant with truth and the real rule of conduct which he has observed. We are concerned for the occasion which urges us to this necessity, but we should swerve from justice and a becoming support of our public character were we to be withheld by any considerations from giving the most ample testimony of the candour with which the President has stated facts in his answer to the General's letter and Minute. It is unnecessary to descend to particulars, but we declare it our public opinion, grounded not on partiality, but observation, that his conduct in the exercise of his military command has been strictly regulated by the principles of equity and moderation, and in no instance has exceeded the usage of his predecessors. To this opinion some of us can even superadd the conviction of experience in the President's declining to comply with solicitations where they interfered with his prescribed maxim of adhering to sincerity, and in his divesting himself of the power of appointing cadets hitherto invariably exercised by his predecessors, to avoid burthening the establishment and loading the Company with additional expense.

Whatever grounds the General may have had for animadverting on the use or abuse of the military authority exercised by the civil servants when it descends into the lower branches of the service, we cannot admit that such strictures ought, in any degree or instance, to be applied to the Governor of this Presidency, who is doubtless not nominally but actually the superior of both departments and invested by the Company with a particular share of responsibility in the superintendence and regulation of that of the military; he has of course a right to exercise the powers of that station in their fullest extent, and should on all occasions be qualified to judge and determine on every military point which does not depend on a mere professional knowledge. With him and with the Board the sentiments of the commanding officer will ever be allowed the greatest weight in all affairs of a military nature, but we can never acquiesce in the unbounded right the General seems to lay claim to of recommending to all promotions and commands. To grant him such a right would in fact be investing him with the sole power of promotion and rendering him, as the General himself expresses it, the source of rewards as well as punishment; for his recommendation must either be invariably and implicitly received or a constant scene of dispute and contention will ensue between him and the President, and him and the Board. If the construction is admitted,

to grant him such a right would in short alter the constitution of the Presidency; it would establish an *imperium in imperio*, and however perfect our persuasion may be that such a power would be made no improper use of by the General and the officers who are next in succession to him, yet upon general principles we are surely justified in pronouncing it to be of a dangerous tendency, and the conferring of it incompatible with every maxim of wise and sound policy. It is very proper that we should always be acquainted with the merits of our officers, and a representation thereof cannot come from any person so fitly as the commanding officer of the army, assisted by reports from the Colonels of Brigades; but this representation should be transmitted from time to time for the Board's general information, not at a particular period for the purpose of supporting an immediate claim to a vacant appointment, office, or command. By this method the President and Council would be enabled to judge impartially of the merits of their officers, and to take proper opportunities of rewarding them as far as the established rules of the service might permit. This we conceive to have been the intention of the Court of Directors in the orders to Madras alluded to by the General, as it is a mode which will always reserve a right of judgment and control in the breast of the President and Council, where it unquestionably ought to lodge, but where it will no longer exist if the commanding officer's recommendation is to be implicitly received at the immediate period of the re-occurrence of each vacant appointment and command.

We premised that the General's charges were chiefly confined to the President's conduct in the execution of the duties of his station of Governor. A few of them extend also to the conduct of the Board, to some of which, although the President has already answered to each, we shall beg to offer a few words of reply.

On the first part of the second article. The President informs us that he has caused the book of general orders to be searched without effect, to discover the acts by which the Board have increased the establishment. We will add that we feel a consciousness of the impossibility that we could have passed any such, at a time when we were exerting every endeavour to retrench the Company's expenses and bring them within the limits of the strictest economy. The only decrease in the establishment we are aware of having made without the concurrence of the General is the reduction of the cavalry—a measure which was soon after ordered by the Court of Directors themselves. There are still many other branches of the establishment which we think will admit of reduction and retrenchment, especially as the provinces enjoy and are likely to enjoy a state of profound tranquillity.

It is with the greatest reluctance that we revive the subject of the fifth article; but as the General has laid particular stress on it, as one which has weakened his authority in the eyes of the army, we find ourselves obliged to declare that it was an act of necessity to which we were impelled by the General's own conduct; the particulars are recorded in consultation, the 18th March and 31st May, which will shew that the Board did not proceed to such extremity, until they found their public resolutions taken in the General's own presence, disregarded and superseded by his single order. We hesitate not to acknowledge we thought it was then time to check an authority which had attempted to absorb the power on which it depended.

On the seventh article, we agreed with the President that under the undefined circumstances of the public order with respect to receiving appeals from officers who might deem themselves aggrieved, the Board could not be to blame for admitting those made immediately to their own tribunal; nor can we conceive a more proper channel of bringing them before them than that of our President; at least, if it is determined to be thought the more immediate province of the commanding officer and left to him, it should never be in his power to reject any appeal preferred to him, but he ought invariably to transmit it to the Board with his sentiments to assist their decision.

With respect to the appointment of courts-martial, the General says they cannot be held but by a special delegation from the authority of an Act of Parliament. This we very well know to be the case in regard to the courts appointed for the trial of the European troops; but we think it can never apply

to the appointment of sepoy general courts-martial, as otherwise the present constitution of them must be totally altered, the persons who now sit as members of them not being subjects of Britain, but aliens and natives of Hindustan. The Governor, Commander-in-Chief, and commanding officers of Brigades are all at present authorized by the general orders of 4th May 1770 to appoint sepoy general courts-martial, and by such alone have the sepoys of the brigade corps been brought to trial. The courts-martial appointed by civil servants were only for the trial of the pergunnah sepoys—a corps which was expressly raised for the service of the collections, and so little considered as a part of the army as never to have made returns to the Commander-in-Chief until the government of Mr. Cartier. It is, however, highly proper that this point should now be precisely regulated, and the line of authority in general be drawn and established between the two departments to prevent and preclude all future prejudice to the public service.

We approve of the principles laid down by the President as the basis for this necessary work, and we apprehend the best mode of proceeding in it will be by forming a set of propositions which shall comprise all points of military service and duty and affixing solutions to each according to the sense of the Board.

Proceedings of the Secret Select Committee from 13th January to 3rd
June 1774.

Saturday. Fort William, the 13th January 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

The Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

WILLIAM LAMBERT, Esq.

GEORGE VANSITTART, Esq.

Colonel Chapman and Mr. Dacres indisposed.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 10th instant.

The President lays before the Board the following translation of a letter which he has received from the Vizier Sujah Dowlah—

Suja Dowlah refuses the
brigade on the terms offered.

From the Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah, the 10th January 1774.

I have received your friendly letter informing me that the English brigade is either for the protection of my own dominions or to assist me in my operations against the Rohillas. It is known that the firmest union subsists between us, and I am certain that you will suffer the English forces to join me for the protection of my own dominions; but as the distance between us is now so great that much time will be taken up in writing to you and receiving your answer, for precaution sake, I request you will send a positive order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces at Patna to march them to the frontiers of Oude or Corah (both which countries now belong to me) whenever I shall require them. At present I have no occasion for them, and should I chance to call for them, I will not require their proceeding further than the frontiers of Corah and Currah. I make this request by way of precaution only, and to guard against future events. Whenever I shall write to the Commander-in-Chief at Patna for the troops, let them immediately be sent; and it is becoming our union that you give orders accordingly, which will give me great satisfaction. My friend, I request this of you that I may be at ease with respect to my own dominions, as well as to prevent future delays, otherwise I have at present no occasion for the troops.

Agreed that advice be given of the above letter in our present advices to the Court of Directors by the "Egmont."

Monday. Fort William, the 14th February 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

The Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

COLONEL ALEXANDER CHAMPION, *Commander-in-Chief*.

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

WILLIAM LAMBERT, Esq.

Messrs. Dacres and Vansittart at the Committee of Revenue.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 10th instant. The Secretary lays before the Board the Draft of Instructions for Colonel Champion prepared agreeably to the order of the 3rd instant.

Revised and completed the above instructions, and agreed upon writing two letters to the Chief and Council at Patna. The first to be immediately

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despatched to that place, and the other given in charge to Colonel Champion, agreeably to the tenor of his instructions.

Ordered that one copy of these papers be referred for the information of the Select Committee, and that they be also recorded in this department as follows:—

Colonel Champion instructions and 2 letters to Patna.

To Colonel Alexander Champion, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces under the Presidency.

1st.—Having thought proper, at the requisition of the Vizier, to grant him the assistance of one brigade of the Honourable Company's forces, and the troops being already on their march towards his dominions, you will please to repair with all convenient speed to take upon you their immediate command; and although you are acquainted as a Member of the Administration with the motives and intentions of this expedition, we judge it necessary for your more particular guidance in the general line of your operations to give you the following instructions, trusting the particular conduct in the field to your military skill and capacity.

2nd.—The express purpose for which the Vizier at this time demanded our aid being the reduction of the Rohilla country, lying between the Ganges and the mountains, you are immediately on your arrival in his country to acquaint him that you are ready to proceed on that service, and require his further instructions. For the general stipulations in the case of his requiring the assistance of our forces, we refer you to the accompanying copy of a Treaty executed between our President and the Vizier at Benares in August last, and for the particular conditions on which we afford him our assistance in this expedition to the translation of an address from the latter on his making the requisition of a brigade.

3rd.—As the Vizier appears completely occupied at present in his expedition into the Do-aba for the recovery (in behalf of the King Shaw Allum) of the territory seized by the Mahrattas, we imagine he will hardly find time this season to attempt anything towards the conquest he meditates of the Rohilla country before described. We think it, however, necessary to suppose the possibility of such a service taking place in describing the line of your operations, which is to be as follows:—

4th.—You are not to pass the boundary which divides the Province of Oude from the Rohilla country, except at the express requisition of the Vizier, and in that case you are to confine all your operations to that country, as above described, and to the dominions of the Vizier. You are in no case, or on any account whatever, to permit the troops, or any part of them, to pass the river Ganges from the Rohilla country, nor the boundaries of the Vizier's dominions, comprehending his ancient possessions of Oude and the new acquisition of Corah and Allahabad. At any rate, whatever be the particular service which you are required to proceed upon, within the line of these instructions, you will use the necessary precaution to receive this requisition from the Vizier in writing, to obviate future doubts or disputes which may arise upon them.

5th.—If, upon your arrival with the army, you shall find that the Vizier has not returned from his expedition into the Do-aba, or concerted his plan for immediately executing his intentions on the Rohilla country, we think it will be necessary that you should, as soon as possible, have an interview with him, as well for the purpose of concerting the operations in which our troops are to be employed for his aid, as to give you a proper introduction to him in the station which you now fill of our Commander-in-Chief; but as such interview taking place within the limits of the possessions which were formerly conquered by the Mahrattas, and have been lately regained by the Vizier, in behalf of the King, may be liable to future misrepresentation, and be construed an act of hostility against that power, on the immediate part of this Government,—a consequence which we wish studiously to avoid,—we would recommend that you advise him of your approach, appoint a place for meeting him, and proceed thither without any other military force than a retinue suitable to your station and a guard sufficient for your security. You will publicly

declare that you go only to meet the Vizier, and with no intention of joining in any operations against the territories of which the Mahrattas had possessed themselves; and as soon as you have settled with the Vizier the necessary plan for your operations, you will immediately return to the army:

6th.—The military conduct of the expedition is entirely left with you; but as the regular payment of the troops is an essential point, and will depend altogether upon the exactness of the Vizier, you will be particularly attentive to make proper applications to him for this purpose; but should he neglect or evade to furnish the monthly subsidy, you will, in conjunction with the Resident at his Court, set before him in the strongest terms the impropriety of his conduct.

7th.—If such instances should, contrary to our expectations, prove ineffectual, and one month shall have elapsed beyond the period in which the payment should have been made, we authorize and enjoin you to suspend your operations and to return to Benares, there to wait our future orders, declaring to the Vizier in the name of the Board that you consider this failure in his engagements as equivalent to a dismissal of the troops, and that you shall halt at Benares until the balance due, both of the subsidy and for such other conditions as shall have been performed, conformably to the tenor of his letter, in Consultation 3rd of February, shall have been fully discharged.

8th.—You will perceive that the Vizier's payments are not to become due till the brigade shall have passed the borders of his dominions. In the meantime we have sent instructions to the Chief and Council at Patna to supply the paymaster with a sum sufficient for the pay and charges of the brigade to the end of this month, trusting to the punctuality of the Vizier for the future supplies; nevertheless, to guard against every possibility of distress which may attend the troops from the want of money, we herewith deliver to you a letter of credit upon the Chief and Council at Patna for R2,50,000, to be used in case of your having left the Vizier, and being then reduced to extreme necessity for employing it.

9th.—Whenever the Vizier shall think it expedient to dismiss the troops, you are to require such dismissal in writing, and to proceed immediately to the frontiers of our Provinces with all convenient expedition; but if he shall not have discharged the balance due for the charges and other conditions of this expedition, you are to halt at Benares until the same shall be fully discharged, as we have above directed, or until you shall be furnished with our orders for your further conduct, according to the stipulations of the agreement.

10th.—We recommend in the strongest manner that you cultivate a good understanding with the Vizier, and that you pay the strictest attention to the behaviour and discipline of the troops, that no subject of complaint may arise on that head, either from himself, or from any people of the countries with whom we are not in a state of hostilities.

11th.—For the more convenient execution of military law and justice, we furnish you with a regular warrant for assembling courts-martial according to Act of Parliament.

12th.—You will correspond regularly with the Honourable the President and Select Committee, and receive their orders both as to your political and military operations.

We are with esteem, &c., &c.

The 14th February 1774.

Monday.

Fort William, the 21st. February 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

The Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, *President.*

COLONEL ALEXANDER CHAMPION, *Commander-in-Chief.*

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACKES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

WILLIAM LAMBERT, Esq.

GEORGE VANSITTART, Esq.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 17th instant. The Commander-in-Chief delivers the following address to the Board, which is read:—

Colonel Champion requests to be allowed superior rank.

To the Hon'ble Warren Hastings, President and Governor, &c., Council of Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—In consequence of your resolution of the 3rd instant, I took every possible method to expedite my journey to the Camp of our ally Sujah ul Dowla, and, having now received your instructions, am ready to take my departure.

The second brigade has marched from Dinapore, and will continue their route with all proper expedition. I hope to overtake them by the time they can arrive at Benares, and I shall, agreeably to your directions, without loss of time, consult with the Vizier on the measures to be pursued, of which and the operations in the field the administration may expect as regular advice as circumstances can admit.

Since I had the honour of being called to a seat amongst you, I have considered it a duty to give constant attendance to your frequent meetings; and being fully sensible how extremely necessary, in the present situation, of the Company's affairs, retrenchments of expenses had become, I joined in your endeavours to bring them within the bounds of economy; and though the remote distance to which the more immediate duties of my station now call me from the Presidency must deny me to attend your further deliberations, yet you may rest assured, Gentlemen, that so far as falls within my province I will strictly enforce the due execution of such measures as you may from time to time adopt for the public good, and the same zeal for the interest of our employers will make me also happy to receive such communication of their commands as you may think proper to give, more especially such as may regard the department which I have the honour to superintend.

I should now, Gentlemen, take my leave, but that I think I cannot more seasonably introduce to your consideration a circumstance which I must confess is the cause of some mortification to me as Commander-in-Chief, and gives me also concern as a Member of the Administration—I mean the difference of rank with which Sir Robert Barker held the command of the Army and that with which it has devolved to me.

I need not observe to you that it is the policy of all well-regulated Governments to support the dignity of the leaders of their armies, and to invest them with degrees of rank and honour which serve at once to render them respectable to their own troops, and to raise them in the opinions of other powers by these public testimonies of confidence and approbation. Agreeably to this maxim it was well said in the general letter from the Honourable Court of Directors, 11th November 1768, "that they esteemed it necessary that the Commander-in-Chief on your establishment should hold a rank superior to any other officer therein," and that they therefore conferred on the then commanding officer the rank of Brigadier General. An officer deemed equal to the command of so formidable an army as the Honourable Company's may, without any compliment, be concluded worthy of a rank which in other services is given to officers who do not command a fourth of the number of troops; and

as all officers in the Company's service are provisional (their duration depending merely on the pleasure of the supreme administration), it does not, with great submission, occur why the rank of Brigadier General should not immediately devolve with the command; for supposing the Court of Directors should not think the temporary commander fit for the important trust, and even granting it possible, though very far from probable, that your Board, who best know the characters of all the officers on this establishment, and who are therefore least liable to mistake their abilities, should confer the command on an unqualified one, yet it is not obvious that any additional ill-consequence could ensue from his also holding the temporary rank of Brigadier General.

On the contrary, I submit to you, Gentlemen, whether the withholding from the first officer a rank established in the service and held by his predecessors will not in the opinion of the Native Princes and of our own troops imply a distrust on the commander; whether it may not tend to lessen the respect due to him; to depreciate his abilities, and awaken the neighbouring powers to acts of boldness and hostility.

I could urge much more on this subject; but if these considerations should strike you, Gentlemen, in the light they appear to me, I persuade myself it will, in every view, be thought highly proper to raise your Commander-in-Chief to the rank of his predecessors, and that you will deem it more indispensably necessary at this juncture, when he is on the eve of embarking on an expedition of very considerable moment, the success of which it is well known to you, Gentlemen (who are acquainted with the genius and constitution of the Asiatics and with their ideas of power), may be facilitated in proportion to the rank and importance which your principal officer should carry with him, and by that degree of consideration which he should appear to hold in the State.

I am aware, Gentlemen, of the attention due to the sentiments lately expressed by the Court of Directors relative to the rank of the Commander-in-Chief, and should be the last man to propose any deviation from their orders; but could they have divined that our political interest and our connection with Sujah ul Dowla should have rendered it indispensable or necessary to carry our forces to so great a distance into a foreign country, I am persuaded they would have directed their first officer to be elevated to the highest rank known in their service, as a measure which, in its effects, would tend to the acquirement of credit and reputation to their arms, and would have ordered that he should be supported in his authority and consequence so as best to convey to the country Princes the highest idea of the power and magnificence which the Company have arrived at, and which they sought to maintain in the Empire.

Such I am humbly confident would now be the injunctions of our Hon'ble Masters, were it possible to give them immediate notice of the present situation of their affairs in this country; and as their Administration here must of necessity act discretionably in circumstances such as the present, where the event could not be seen, and consequently could not be provided for by the Court of Directors, I cannot give myself room to doubt that they would clearly perceive the propriety and necessity of departing in a small degree from their directions on this occasion, and that the measure of granting a Brevet for the rank of Brigadier under the same provisional condition that I hold my appointment to the command of the army, namely, until their pleasure be known, would meet with their approbation. At the same time that their authority of confirmation is reserved, the juncture would in my humble opinion justify it.

And though you, Gentlemen, should, on the contrary, think that the measure which I have taken the liberty of suggesting cannot with propriety be adopted, be assured that I will not with the less alacrity exert myself for the public advantage, but patiently wait the pleasure of the Court of Directors, indulging myself in the meantime, however, with the hope that what I have here advanced may induce these our Hon'ble Masters to make such provision on this head as will tend to the future good of their service and prevent the like discouragement to succeeding commanding officers.

That I am ambitious enough to court rank I will not deny. Ambition glows in the breast of every soldier; but this I can assure you of a truth, Gentlemen, that the political interest of the Company and what I esteem the real good of the public service have prompted me much more to this address than the gratification of my own private desires.

With hearty wishes for success to your unremitted endeavours for promoting the interests of the Company and ensuring to yourselves credit and reputation, believe me with great esteem and respect; &c., &c.

The 21st February 1774.

A. CHAMPION.

The Board admit of the truth of the argument urged by the Commander-in-Chief, and are clearly of opinion that upon the principle laid down by our Hon'ble Masters, the rank and title of the Commander-in-Chief are essential to the support of his influence and authority; nevertheless they think themselves positively interdicted by the Company's orders of the 10th of April 1771 from granting the present Commander-in-Chief a title or rank superior to what he now possesses. The Board therefore can only refer this point to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors with their opinion for their consideration and final orders upon it. Agreed that it be accordingly referred in the next general letter.

The Commander-in-Chief takes his leave of the Board on his departure to take the command of the army on its march to assist the Vizier.

Monday.

Fort William, the 9th May 1774:

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

The Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS; *President.*

WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

GEORGE VANSITTART, Esq.

NICHOLAS GRUEBER, Esq.

MR. GOODWIN, indisposed.

The President lays before the Board the following copy of a letter and enclosures addressed to the Select Committee which is just arrived from the Commander-in-Chief:—

Colonel Champion's account of the victory over the Rohillas. To the Hon'ble Warren Hastings, President, &c., Members of the Select Committee.

GENTLEMEN,—In a letter of the 22nd to the President, I gave a full account of the progress of the army from the 19th, the success of the feint made use of to draw the Rohillas out of their post, behind Cuttera, with my resolution of taking the advantage of their movement, and yesterday I had the inexpressible satisfaction of transmitting a short note to the Governor with the news of the victory, of which I am now to give the particulars.

About 3 o'clock in the morning the brigade, with five battalions of the Vizier's regulars and the Najib Fultan, consisting of about 4,000 matchlock men, began to cross to the westward side of the Gurra River; and, with much perseverance, dragged the artillery over a broad and heavy sand to the opposite plains.

The armies marched in three columns towards the Babul Nullah, with intentions to have it on our right flank when we should engage: we had proceeded about 5 miles when our scouting horsemen brought notice that they had descried some of the enemy's cavalry, nor had we advanced half a coss more when I could see their colours and very little further before their tents appeared.

... My intelligence proved very good, for I soon afterwards clearly observed that we were upon the enemy's left flank, within 1,200 yards of which on a rising ground which had hitherto obstructed our view was a village and tope which I ordered to be immediately occupied by part of the left column of the matchlock men. This was a post of great importance, and it was a great oversight of the enemy not to have possessed themselves of it, as we might have paid very dear for dislodging of them.

Having led the line about 200 yards beyond this village, we filed off to the right towards the nullah by sub-divisions; and now (about 8 o'clock) the enemy's artillery opened upon us. The compliment was returned by two guns which I had placed on an eminence to amuse them whilst our army was forming in order of battle.

The corps of cadets and sepoy grenadiers led by Major Haninay and three battalions of the brigade sepoys composed the right wing, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie, these and the European regiment soon gave a full front to the enemy, and whilst they gradually inclined to the right under a severe cannonade, returned the salute with their guns.

The three remaining battalions of our own sepoys, under the command of Major Eyres, composed a second line, and the two divisions of the Najib Fultan covered the flanks of our army. Whilst we advanced slowly towards the enemy, the cannonade on both sides became very smart, and by degrees as the Nabob's regulars, who had marched in the rear of our column, came up, they dressed with the European regiment and became the left wing in place of the matchlock men, who inclined to the left to give them ground and cover their flank; but this wing was not completely formed till 9 o'clock.

Hafiz and his army, consisting of about 40,000, shewed great bravery and resolution, annoying us with their artillery and rockets; they made repeated attempts to charge, but our guns being so much better served than theirs, kept so constant and galling a fire that they could not advance, and when they were closest there was the greatest slaughter: they gave proofs of a good share of military knowledge by showing inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time, and endeavouring to call off our attention by a brisk fire on our centre.

They seemed particularly desirous to distress our right flank, and with that view brought four guns and a large quantity of rockets from a considerable distance to enfilade us, at the same time lining the nullah (which could not for some time be observed for long grass) with some of their troops, in order to rush upon us should our right be thrown into confusion.

Perceiving their intention, I directed a few shells to be played upon them, whilst a battalion from our right was ordered to dislodge the enemy from the nullah. The battalion sent on this service soon performed it, and advanced so briskly after the enemy that, fearing lest they should go too far, I ordered the battalion on the right of the second line to support them.

Never was I more fully convinced of the utility of a second line than on this occasion, for in the course of the day I found it necessary to send all the three battalions which formed it to cover the right flank. It is impossible to describe a more obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy displayed: numerous were their gallant men who advanced and often pitched their colours between both armies, in order to encourage their men to follow them, and it was not till they saw our whole army advancing briskly to charge them, after a severe cannonade of 2 hours 20 minutes, and a smart fire of musketry for some minutes on both flanks, that they fairly turned their backs.

The battalions then formed into separate columns, and with beat of drum and fifes playing the army passed in glory through the Rohilla camp.

And now came on the after-game of the few horse the Nabob sent to the field. No sooner was the enemy irrecoverably broke, than they pushed after them and got much plunder in money, elephants, and camels, &c., &c., &c. Their camp equipage (which was all standing, and proves that we came on them by surprise) with whatever effects they could not carry off fell a sacrifice to the ravages of the Nabob's people, whilst the Company's troops in regular order in their ranks most justly observed, "We have the honour of the day and these bandits the profit."

I wish I could pay the Vizier any compliment on this occasion, or that I were not under the indispensable necessity of expressing my highest indignation at his shameful pusillanimity — indispensable I say, because it is necessary that the Administration should clearly know how little to be depended upon is this their ally.

The night before the battle I applied to him for some particular pieces of cannon which I thought might prove of great service in action; but he declined giving the use of them; and though the honour of the English arms was called in question by the forward rashness of the enemy in challenging us to battle and abandoning their posts, yet did the Vizier urge me to decline the fight, and make another march on the eastward side of the Gurra towards Pealybeet: thus would he have inspired the enemy, whose numbers would have been reinforced with near twelve thousand men hastening under different leaders to their aid.

However, when he found me determined, he promised solemnly to support me with all his force, and particularly engaged to be close at hand with a large body of cavalry to be used as I should direct; but instead of being nigh me he remained beyond the Gurra, on the ground which I had left in the morning, surrounded by his cavalry and a corps train of artillery, and did not move from thence till the news of the enemy's defeat reached him.

To this breach of his faith was owing the danger which followed from the enemy's enfilading the right flank of your army, which might have been attended with consequences that I dread to think of, but from the advantage derived from our second line. This, however, was not all; for if his cavalry had been up to have pressed upon the enemy in their flight, they must have made prodigious havoc; might have totally disabled them from making head again, and rendered any defence of Pealybeet absolutely impracticable, by thinning their numbers and getting between the remainder of their stronghold.

I have been thus particular with regard to the Vizier's conduct that it may be better known how to deal with him in future.

Of the enemy above 2,000 fell in the field, and amongst them many sirdars; of your army little more than a hundred and not a single officer. Standards we have taken without number, and above fifty pieces of cannon, but what renders the victory most decisive is the death of Hafiz Rahmut, who was killed whilst bravely rallying his people to battle: one of his sons was also killed, one taken prisoner; a third returned from flight to-day and is in the hands of Sujah.

I cannot, Gentlemen, better convey to your minds the sense which I have of the conduct of your army on this occasion than by enclosing herewith a copy of my return of thanks signified in the orders of this day. I have to wish that it was in my power most liberally to reward such distinguished gallantry; but since that is not the case, I do most earnestly recommend them to every possible mark of the bounty and favour of Government.

I have only to add that the Gentlemen who showed such alertness and presence of mind in carrying my orders to the different bodies of the army during the course of the action were Captain Allen McPherson, Captain Edward Shewen, Lieutenants William Bruce, and Robert Raine, and Ensigns John and Alexander Murray, and that I am with much respect, &c., &c.,

CAMP ON THE FIELDS OF ST. GEORGE;

A. CHAMPION.

The 24th April 1774.

P.S.—I have the honour to enclose a general return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the several corps engaged at the Battle of St. George.

Extract of Orders, April the 23rd, 1774.

The Commander-in-Chief is so entirely satisfied with the behaviour of the troops yesterday that words cannot sufficiently express his approbation.

He is at a loss to say whether the cheerfulness and attention of his brave officers or the undaunted steadiness of the soldiery claim most applause.

Captain Baillie and the Gentlemen of his Corps, in the service of the artillery, gave great satisfaction, as did the alacrity and distinctness of the officers employed in distributing orders.

To the whole army the Commander-in-Chief gives the fullest measure of his thanks, and will, with much pleasure, commend them to the Administration.

Particular pains to be taken in explaining this Order to the Native troops.

Return of Gun and Howitzer ammunition expended in the Battle of St. George, fought near the Boggah Nullah, on the 23rd of April 1774. Head-Quarters Camp near the Boggah Nullah, 24th April 1774.

	ROUNDS.			GRAPE.			SHELLS.		
	Remaining the 22nd instant.	Expended the 23rd instant.	Remaining the 24th instant.	Remaining the 22nd instant.	Expended the 23rd instant.	Remaining the 24th instant.	Remaining the 22nd instant.	Expended the 23rd instant.	Remaining the 24th instant.
12 Pounders	190	90	100	90	.	90
6 Do.	912	441	471	200	40	160
3 Do.	900	506	394	350	25	325
5½ Inch		24	...	24	100	18	82
Total	2,002	1,037	965	664	65	539	100	18	82

A general return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the different Corps engaged in the Battle of St. George, near the Baggah Nullah, on the 23rd April 1774.
Head-Quarters Camp near the Baggah Nullah, the 24th April 1774.

CAPTAINS		LIEUTENANTS		ENSIGNS		SERGEANTS		SUBADARS		JEMADARS		DRUMMERS AND TRUMPETERS		RANK AND FILE		TINDIES		LASCARS		BIDDARS		WATER-MEN		BELLOCK-MEN		GRAND TOTAL	
Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
THE HON'BLE THE COMPANY'S TROOPS.																											
The 2nd Company of Artillery																											
The 2nd Regiment																											
Grenadiers																											
1	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	4	1	..	1	4	9	11
1	2	14	1	3	14
..	7	6	2	11	12
..	4	4	7	7
..	1	9	1	10
..	1	3	8	10
..	6	8	1	3	3
..	6	8	1	8	10
..	6	13	1	7	17
TOTAL																											
2	1	1	1	1	2	1	..	23	67	4	3	2	5	8	6	6	..	89	93			
HIS EXCELLENCY THE NAWAB'S TROOPS.																											
Grenadier Corps																											
..	4
..	30	70
..	50	100
TOTAL																											
..	80	174	80	174		

N.B. - Captain William Annes's Battalion, of the Artillery, and Captain John Lumsdaine, of the Grenadier Corps wounded. Included in the above, none missing.
 N.B. - No return from the Nabob's troops of Company.

A. CHAMPION.

Return of the enemy's cannon brought into the Park Artillery, 24th April 1774.

	Mounted on carriages.	Without carriages.
Brass, of different calibres	8	5
Iron of ,, ,,	2	2
Iron organ machines	2	...
TOTAL	12	7

N.B.—Eight brass and iron guns with the Grenadier Corps not included.

SAMUEL KILPATRICK,

Brigade Major.

A. CHAMPION.

Resolved that the following letter be written to the Commander-in-Chief :—

To Colonel Alexander Champion, Commander-in-Chief of the
Letter to Colonel Cham- Forces under this Presidency.
 pion.

SIR,—The President has communicated to us the particulars of the victory obtained by the troops under your command over the army of the Rohillas.

We cannot on this occasion neglect expressing, as early as possible, the great satisfaction we received in the news, and the high sense we entertain of your abilities and conduct both in the operations which preceded and in the action itself. So decisive an instance of the superiority of the Company's arms cannot fail of reviving in all its force the reputation they formerly acquired in Indostan, and which ten years of peace had doubtless in some degree weakened in the minds of the Princes of the country. We are happy to find your resolution and military skill were so well seconded by the valour and discipline of the troops, and while we desire you may receive personally the thanks of the Board for the signal service you have on this occasion performed, we request you may in the like manner convey to the officers, soldiers, and sepoys under your command our sense of their behaviour and of our firm reliance on their courage and discipline on every future occasion.

We are also exceedingly happy to learn from the communications which the President has made us that you have, in the whole course of the campaign, been so attentive to maintain the strictest order and discipline among the troops, and that you from the beginning opposed and at last obtained a stop to be put to the devastation of the Rohilla country by the army of the Vizier, a mistaken policy altogether incompatible with the design of the war and repugnant to humanity, and we have a sensible pleasure in testifying our entire approbation of your conduct in this respect. Your preserving such steady order and discipline on entering the Rohilla camp after victory equally merits our applause, and it redounds greatly to the honour of our troops that they did not allow themselves on this occasion to be hurried by bad examples into those excesses which are unworthy of regular soldiers, and which we trust will always be the pride of our army to avoid.

We are, &c., &c.

FORT WILLIAM;

The 9th May 1774.

Fort William, the 23rd May 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

The Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

HENRY GOODWIN, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

NICHOLAS GRUBER, Esq.

Read and approved the Proceedings of the 16th May.

Colonel Champion.

Received a letter from the Commander in-Chief in the following terms:—

To the Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, *President, &c., Council*
of Fort William.

GENTLEMEN,—In a letter of the 27th ultimo, I acquainted the Governor that the army would canton at this place during the ensuing rains. Under date the 2nd instant I repeated the same information with this addition, that having requested the Nabob to point out wherein the army could further serve him before the wet season came on; he declared his opinion that nothing more should be undertaken, and signified his desire that I would canton the troops.

I also told the President that the Vizier is in full possession of all Nafiz Ramit's country: this I mentioned from my own knowledge, and, upon the Nabob's authority, that he was also Master of Only and Bissonly belonging to the son of Dundy Cawn.

But this morning, after the ground for the cantonments had been pitched upon, his Excellency paid me a visit, and to my great surprise, requested I would move on with and canton the army near Bissonly, 18 coss from hence, on the banks of the Yarwastadar River, alleging that he has not yet obtained absolute possession of Bissonly, in which he says there is treasure to a very large amount.

I immediately proposed to detach a part of the troops to put him in possession of Bissonly, after which they could, in a few days, rejoin the army at this place; but I expressed disinclination to canton the troops higher up the country than we now are.

The reasons I offered were that all our ammunition and store boats with the contractor's arrack boats, &c., had been ordered up the Gambury River in consequence of His Excellency's express desire that we should canton near Birelly; that their returning again down the Gambury and getting back into the Ganges would take much time, and not only retard the supplies of ammunition, of which we are much in want on account of the great expense of the 23rd of April, but also subject the officers and soldiers to great distress for want of necessaries and liquors, which are very essential to the preservation of their health in this country, where the quality of the water is often pernicious; that the Yarwaffadar is a river hardly known to us but by its name; that the place of its junction with the Ganges, and how far it is navigable, is uncertain, nor can it be known how the inhabitants of the countries through which it runs might be disposed towards us; that supposing the boats were ordered to continue their way up the Gambury River, or direct to return and proceed up the Ganges till they came on a line with Bissonly, they would, in either case, be above seventeen coss from the place proposed for our cantonments, and it is not certain whether the road to them would be passable in the rains; that we could not afford large detachments for escorts, and that even if we could, it would be to little purpose, unless we were at an absolute certainty as to the station we should occupy in the rains, with regard to which His Excellency might perhaps change his mind again; that our crossing and cantoning beyond the Cossy and Ramganga Rivers, which are very broad and rapid in the rains, would render our communication with the country we have already conquered, and of course with the Nabob's Provinces of Oude, Korah, and Allahabad, very

difficult; and that our supplies of provisions for the army would consequently be very precarious, since the Nabob confessedly depends chiefly on such as will be furnished from his own country.

Besides these reasons I had several others which were not for his ear, viz., that in case it should be the pleasure of the Administration, on any account, to recall their troops, or in the event that I should find it indispensably necessary to return down the country from a want of provisions, or on account of being in too great arrears of pay, the difficulty and danger of re-crossing the said two rivers would be obviated.

All I could say had not sufficient weight with his Excellency; and as the power of control is entirely in his hands, I can only regret that he makes so absolute and so improper an use of it; my chief motive, however, for giving so implicit acquiescence to his every request is to prevent the smallest pretence or excuse for not fulfilling the terms of his letter of requisition of aid, namely, the payment of 40 lakhs of rupees to the Company when he should be put in possession of the whole or half of the Rohilla country, or when an accommodation should take place.

Here I am most heartily to hope, that it is clearly understood between you, Gentlemen, and His Excellency what the half of the Rohilla country is; for otherwise much altercation may arise on this head.

Many circumstances may perhaps concur to render it inexpedient for you to push the conquest of the Rohilla country. My letter to the Select Committee of the 24th April, to which I beg leave to refer you, will pretty clearly show that there is considerable danger in trusting your troops with the Vizier: on actual service you must lay your account with sustaining the whole weight of the war; nay, it is worse, he will feed your commander with solemn promises of support and yet disappoint him.

But supposing the Vizier as firm as could be wished, it is not improbable that a foreign enemy may, after the rains, reduce him to the necessity of retiring to his own dominions in order to protect them from invasion; in this case the Rohilla country will fall a prey to others; for he cannot both keep it and defend his own dominions, unless our Government give him another brigade, which perhaps they may not choose to do.

Now I do not conceive that we are obliged to maintain him in possession of this new acquisition, and if he shall be obliged to evacuate it before the 40 lakhs are acknowledged due to the Company, he will most probably use every endeavour to evade payment, for I am sorry to confess, that His Excellency is apt to equivocate.

It is said that Ahmet Cawn has given his country (which lies between Dundy Cawn's) to the king, and indeed the treatment of the family of Hafiz will perfectly justify the other chiefs in every step they can take to avoid coming under the power of Sujah Dowlah.

It concerns me much to have your instructions, Gentlemen, how to act in case it proves true that Ahmet Cawn's country is actually ceded to his Majesty, and I am to request you will favour me with them as soon as possible.

Whisperers tell me there was a previous agreement between Nizif Cawn, on the part of the King, and the Vizier for a partition of the Rohilla country, and that Nizif Cawn (who we know is in the field and was on his way to join the Nabob till he heard of the defeat of Hafiz) is marching to possess himself of Zabidy Cawn's country, which is the most remote of the Rohilla dominions.

On the supposition of the truth of this news, and that the Nabob should on account of the advantages he has gained by the force of our arms disown any agreement with Nizif Cawn, I would gladly have your directions.

All that could possibly be effected before the rains is already done, excepting to Bissonly, which, notwithstanding what the Nabob said this morning, I am well assured is occupied by part of his troops; when he told me there was immense treasure there I suspected he had disguised intentions, and my suspicions have been greatly strengthened, since he was with me, by an information that the treasure which he pretends is at Bissonly is really in the place and town of Berelly, every avenue to which is shut up by his troops, in so much

that a single inhabitant cannot get out of the place, and that his sole view in requiring me to move is no other than lest it might be known what riches he may find in the place or the means he may use to obtain them.

This much I am under the necessity of declaring, that I am greatly afraid the Vizier's behaviour to the family of the Nabob Hafiz Ramit, and to the inhabitants of his country, will render our connection with him reproachful to us, and tend to lessen that reputation of our justice which had heretofore prevailed in these countries.

As I received my instructions from your Board, I have thought it proper to submit these matters to your consideration, that you may do me the honour of signifying your pleasure concerning them.

I remain with great respect,

Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,

Your most obedient servant,

A. CHAMPION.

Camp near Berclly, the 4th May 1774.

Upon the case stated by Colonel Champion in the above letter, "that Aumed Cawn may have given up his country to the King," the Board are of opinion that we ought still to support the Vizier's pretensions to that country—

But in discussing this case a doubt having arisen concerning the propriety of opposing the King, should he appear himself in person to assert his pretensions to any part of the Rohilla country within the prescribed line of our plan or of our present military operations.

Resolved to oppose the King if he should assert pretensions to any of the Rohilla country.

Reason for it.
should oppose him.

Messrs. Lawrell and Graham object.

The question is now put, how in that case we shall act. Resolved by the majority of the Board that we

Messrs. Lawrell and Graham are of opinion that we should not oppose him.

The majority of the Board record the following reasons for the above resolution.

1.—Because it is well known that the king has no power of his own, but is entirely governed by those who have possession of his person or authority, being in effect the mere instrument to execute and sacretify their designs. This reason induced the Board to authorize General Sir Robert Barker last year to act openly against the Marhattas, although they proposed to execute only the commands of the King, and brought him with them into the field to authorize their transactions. He is now in the hands of Mudgedo Dowla and Nejjif Cawn, the former of whom derives his influence from the possession of the King's person, the latter from the command of his forces, but both are universally regarded as acting entirely from their own authority. The same reasons therefore which would impel this Government to oppose the thing when he came against our ally the last year in person at the head of a Marhatta army equally subsist for opposing him now should he lend the sanction to Nejjif Cawn or any other styling himself his servant.

2.—Because if it is just and lawful to oppose the Minister of the King in the execution of his orders, it is equally so to oppose the King himself in the execution of the same designs; this Government owes no allegiance to Shah Alum.

3.—Because if it be established as a rule that the King in person may command our acquiescence in such acts as we should oppose were he not present, it would prove an infallible means of inviting him to an interposition of his personal authority in every measure which he should be engaged in, and to an actual invasion of the possessions of our ally; nor could we consistently with that principle dispute even his pretensions to the countries or places which are the incontrovertible property of the Company, if he chose to employ the same argument to enforce them.

4.—Because the admission of such a principle, hitherto unknown and unpracticed in any other part of the world, would at once annihilate the right which the Company have acquired by treaty to the sum stipulated for the conquest of the Rohilla country. Since the Vizier might justly refuse to discharge it, if our Commander-in-Chief should refuse to proceed in his operations in case of the King's joining the enemy in person, no provision having been made for such an event in our engagement with the Vizier, which on the part of the Company was expressly for the conquest of the Rohilla country.

Messrs. Lawrell and Graham beg leave to record their objections to the Resolution as follows:—

We are of opinion that we should not oppose the King, should he appear in the field in person to assert his pretensions to any part of the Rohilla dominions, but leave it to the Vizier to satisfy his claim by negotiation; to attack the King with our forces is to step further forth in the cause of the Vizier than we have reason to believe he would do in his own, for whatever opinion we may entertain of the insufficiency of the King's title to the empire, or of the emptiness of his character, the same sacred veneration which is by all nations paid to Majesty is observed towards him by the subject of Hindustan. The principles and tenets of their religion influence them in general to this attachment and allegiance, and the Vizier has in particular a powerful motive in policy for his personal attachment, for he can never attempt to depreciate the title or character of the King (which nothing can testify more strongly than his appearing in arms against him) without virtually lessening his own dignity and reputation as his Vizier—a circumstance which we apprehend would neither suit with his private pride nor his public ambition. We are firmly of opinion therefore that the Vizier would not himself draw his sword in anger against the King, and we know of no such indispensable call upon us as to induce us to do it for him; besides we are yet ignorant what degree of attention or regard may have been paid by His Britannic Majesty's Ministers to the mission of Major Morrison, and we think we should be cautious of taking any steps, in this critical juncture of the Company's affairs, which may be liable to draw down on them or ourselves the displeasure or censure of his Majesty's Government.

JAMES LAWRELL.

J. GRAHAM.

The President remarks on this occasion an irregularity in Colonel Colonel Champion's address irregular. Champion's addressing his letter to the President and Council, when by his instructions he is directed to correspond with the Select Committee. He observes that by dividing his correspondence between the two Boards, he must leave his information to either very imperfect, besides subjecting himself perhaps to receive instructions from each Board separately, which may tend to destroy the general consistency which ought to be preserved in his conduct and operations. It is for this purpose chiefly that the Select Committee was instituted and particularly charged with the political branch of administration, having it still in their power to refer to the Board in cases of great nicety or to which they judge their power does not extend. He therefore proposes that the Commander-in-Chief be desired for the future to address his public letters either to the Select Committee or the President according to his original instructions.

The Board concurs with the President in his opinion and proposal, and To be opened in future by the Select Committee. agree that Colonel Champion be directed accordingly; and in the intermediate time, until the Commander-in-Chief shall have it in his power to conform to this order,—

Agreed that any future letters received from him on the operations of the war addressed to the Board be opened, considered, and answered by the Select Committee.

Friday.

Fort William, the 3rd June 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT :

The Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

P. M. DACRES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

NICHOLAS GRUEBER, Esq.

The Consultation of the 23rd ultimo read and approved.

The Board being assembled to consider the following reference from the Select Committee, an
Select Committee refer a extract of their Proceedings upon the occasion is here recorded,
letter from Colonel Champion. with the letter from Colonel Champion referred to.

Extract of the Select Committee Proceedings, the 2nd June 1774.

Read the following letter from the Commander-in-Chief addressed to the President and Council.

The Committee considering the subjects of this letter as of the greatest importance and of the most alarming tendency, are unwilling to decide upon it by their own authority, especially as their present number consists of two members only.

Agreed, therefore, that it be referred with this day's Proceedings to the President and Council in their Secret Department.

JAMES LALLY.

Sub-Secretary, Select Committee.

To the Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS,

President, &c., Council of Fort William.

HONOURABLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—In an address of the 4th instant I intimated to you a surmise that an agreement had been, some time ago, made between the King and Vizier for a partition of the Rohilla country, and that it was said Niziff Khan, on the part of his Majesty, was marching to possess himself of Zabidy Khan's country.

On the 5th the latter part of this intelligence was contradicted, and I advised the Governor that Niziff Khan had determined on coming to this place, where he accordingly arrived two days before the Nabob and I did.

In several conferences with the Vizier, he assured me that he did not know what business brought Niziff Khan. On the other hand, Niziff told me that when the Vizier was at Cowriagunge, he prevailed with him to go to Delhy in order to influence his Majesty to take the field, and countenance the conquest of the Rohillas, on the express condition that half the country should be to his Majesty; that he, Niziff, accordingly, induced the King to leave Delhy and display the Royal Standard; that his Majesty having, however, been taken ill, was obliged to relinquish his intentions of continuing in the field in person, but commissioned Niziff Khan to represent him and act in his name as if he were present; that accordingly Niziff with his army were in full march to join the Vizier when he received the news of the defeat of the Rohillas; that his business here was to demand the performance of the condition on which the King's troops took the field; that he had sent for a copy of the agreement, and would not declare his business to the Vizier until it came. It was the expectation of being able to send down a duplicate of that writing that made me avoid mentioning this matter in any of my letters since the 5th, but it has not been produced, nor have I had any conference with the Vizier on that head; and I am now to introduce another subject.

The Nabob Feizulla Khan, who, with some of his people, was in battle on the part of Nafiz, and made his retreat good towards the mountains, with all his treasure, which according to the most moderate accounts is said to amount
75 lacks of rupces in ready money, has addressed me by letter offering to

throw himself upon my protection, accompanied with a message proposing to pay the Nabob 20 lacks upon being reinstated in his country, which yields from six to eight lacks per annum.

Determined to deal openly with the Vizier, to prevent the least pretence for a breach of his agreement, I went yesterday morning and signified Feizulla Khan's desire to him.

His Excellency said he would not give him back a span of his country for a crore of rupees; that he had no objection to my protecting Feizulla Khan's person, but that the treasure must be considered as the property of his Excellency, independent of the English; that he would consider of sending a body of his own army with some of the Company's forces in pursuit of the fugitive and his riches. I offered him the Grenadier corps for that service, but he desired leave to think of the matter till the afternoon.

Indisposition having rendered it inconvenient for his Excellency to come abroad, I waited on him again in the evening, and was told that he would think of the subject of the morning's conversation till this day.

Upon my reminding him that that was my second visit in one day, and desiring immediately to know his determination, he was put to the necessity of confession that he had already entered into an agreement to detach part of his own troops, under Elich Khan, with Nizif Khan and his army, to seize the Nabob Feizulla and his treasure; that as they were cavalry, and as the service required the utmost expedition, our infantry could not keep up with them, and therefore it would be unnecessary to send any.

Since the defeat of the Rohillas, the Nabob has plundered the whole country, in so much that in Pealybeet, Birelly, Oulah, and Bisouly he has found jewels and money above and under ground, elephants, camels, horses, and other effects, to the value, I am confident, of above fifty lacks of rupees, besides what the individuals of his army have possessed themselves of; and if he can lay hold of Feizulla Khan's treasure and effects, his acquisition, in ready money, &c., will exceed a crore of rupees.

These are circumstances which I believe were not foreseen, Gentlemen; otherwise I persuade myself you would have made further conditions with the Vizier both on account of the Company and of your army.

The express stipulation that your troops should serve for a certain fixed sum has prevented my interfering; but I cannot help thinking it very unjustifiable in the Vizier to call in Nizif Khan's forces to the exclusion of your brave troops, who reduced the Rohillas to the state of non-resistance, and who, therefore, ought surely to have the preference in any service of advantage. Certain it is that Nizif Khan cannot have been brought into the measure, but upon condition of sharing considerably of the riches of Feizulla Khan, and hopes of further plunder in the country.

It is a matter of very great concern to me, Gentlemen, that no provision was made for your army in the event which has happened; but I hope that if you have not already, in consequence of my letter to the Governor of the 28th ultimo, you will now be pleased to interest yourselves in their behalf; for it must be extremely discouraging to your troops if they are not attended to on this occasion.

By their gallantry they have reduced this country, and, of course, gained the Company half a million of money; they have moreover been the enrichers of Sujah ul Dowlah to an immense amount; before their faces he has seized these riches, and he has not even thanked them for their services.

These matters, Gentlemen, are in my opinion of the highest importance, and deserve your most serious consideration. The good temper and forbearance of your army under such temptation is matter of the greatest admiration, and a source of infinite satisfaction to me; but I must confess I am afraid that, if some mark of favour and gratification for their services is not manifested, it may be somewhat dangerous ever to try an experiment of this kind again, or to put the temper and patience of any part of your troops so much to the proof.

Situated as I am, it falls only to my province to submit these matters to your wisdom and deliberation; and I have only, at present, to add that, upon my honour, self-interest has not dictated a line of this address, to which I have been prompted by a just sense of the Vizier's conduct and a warm regard for troops who have rendered themselves very dear to me, and whose interest I shall ever seek to promote.

CAMP BISSELY;

The 16th May 1774.

I have the honour, &c.,

A. CHAMPION.

Proceedings of the Secret Select Committee from 20th June to 28th
December 1774.

Fort William, the 20th June 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.
Monday. WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq., who being returned from the
awnings resumes his Seat at the Board.
JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.
NICKOLAS GRUEBER, Esq.
MESSRS. DACRES AND LAWRELL at the Committee of Revenue.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 3rd instant.

Read the following letter and inclosure which is received from Sir Robert Harland, His
Majesty's Plenipotentiary in India.

Fort St. George, the 29th May 1774.

GENTLEMEN,—A few days ago I had the honor of receiving a letter from
Mr. Law, His Most Christian Majesty's Minister and
Plenipotentiary in India, dated the 23rd May, and in-
closing copies of your letter to the Council of Chan-
dernagore, dated the 7th March, and of Mr. Chevalier's
answer dated the 24th of the same month, together with a copy of his protest
relative to his withdrawing the French Factory from Dacca.

Admiral Harland complains
of not being informed of the
dispute with the French at
Dacca.

It appears rather extraordinary to me that you should have entered into a
correspondence with Mr. Chevalier on matters of differences between the sub-
jects of the two nations, without making the least communication to me on that
head, especially as you were well acquainted both from me, and from your
superiors, with the Commission of Plenipotentiary with which His Majesty had
honoured me, to enquire into and settle all such disputes as had arisen or
might arise between the trading subjects of both nations, and when I see by
your letter to Mr. Chevalier, that you have transmitted all the papers on that
business to your employers, without acquainting me with such transactions, it
becomes me to demand of you, your reasons for this conduct, that I may lay
them before the Secretary of State for his Majesty's information. Meanwhile I
cannot help taking notice of the great difference between your conduct in this
business and that of the Presidency of Fort St. George on a like occasion as
you will see by the copy of their letter to Sir John Lindsay, which I have
enclosed for your perusal.

Although you have not thought proper to lay this business regularly be-
fore me, yet in justice to the Commission with which I am honoured I think it
incumbent on me to take notice of the following circumstances:—first by order
of your Chief at Dacca, a Jemadar belonging to the French Factory there was
publicly flogged without any application to the Chief of his nation—an act
which would be considered as highly unjustifiable from one gentleman to an-
other; but if taken in a national light, such a punishment ordered by the sub-
ject of one sovereign, to be inflicted on the subject of another, and all circum-
stances considered, I am sorry to say, it has more the look of wantonness of
power than a regard to justice—instead of which, I think I shall be justified
in recommending to you in all such circumstances lenient measures, a strict
regard to justice, and a constant endeavour to conciliate and prove the friend-
ship of a power so well-disposed to be upon amicable terms with our nation.
Such would not only be good policy but perfectly consistent with the intentions
of Government; and second, I cannot help remarking it as a new mode of pro-
ceeding, that you accept of the exculpatory deposition of a person against whom
the complaint was made.

These, with other circumstances as represented to me by Mr. Law, would have made me consider this transaction as an object of personal enquiry on the spot, did not my present orders put it out of my power: therefore I am to desire of you, that you will make enquiries, and procure attested information of the transactions at Dacca, which have given cause for this complaint, and for the proceedings of Mr. Chevalier on the occasion, and transmit them to me as soon as possible: that before I leave this country, which I propose to do in September next, I may be able to give that satisfaction, which His Most Christian Majesty's Plenipotentiary expects of me: and which Justice to his Majesty's intention require, and also that I may be enabled to give information on that subject to His Majesty's Secretary of State.

I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Yours, &c.

(Sd.) R. HARLAND.

P.S.—As the transactions at Dacca may be attended with serious consequences, I have thought proper to send a Frigate to Bengal with this letter.

To the Honourable John Law deLansiston, Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, Brigadier and Governor General of the French Nation in India, and to the Gentlemen of the Superior Council at Pondicherry.

GENTLEMEN,—We have had the honour to receive your letter of the 8th instant. The enquiries which a complaint of such a nature necessarily required have prevented us from sooner presenting to you this our reply.

The King, our Sovereign, having been pleased to appoint Sir John Lindsay, Knight of the Bath, Commander-in-Chief of his ships in India, to be also his Minister Plenipotentiary for the purpose of settling on his behalf whatever disputes or misunderstandings had arisen or should arise between His Majesty's subjects and those of the Most Christian King, we have laid before him the true state of the transactions relative to the *Snow Aurora Tartar*, and beg leave to refer you to him for information on that subject.

FORT ST. GEORGE,
30th August 1771.

We have the honour to be, &c.
(Sd.) JOSIAS du Presi du Council.

Resolved that copies of the whole proceedings on the dispute with the French concerning the complaint of Monsieur DesGranges, their Chief at Dacca, against Mr. Barwell, for the punishment of a Jemadar belonging to the French by the Adawlut at Dacca, be prepared, and, as soon as they are ready, that a reply be sent to Admiral Harland's letter transmitting them to him.

Fort William, the 11th July 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

Monday. WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

NICKOLAS GRUEBER, Esq.

MESSRS. DACRES and LAWRELL at the Committee of Revenue.

Fort William, the 27th May 1774.

TO RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

DEAR SIR,—Inclosed I send you a copy of the letter which I have received from Mr. Chevalier. I have thought it unnecessary to lay it before the

Board, as I hope that the subject may be properly adjusted by a correspondence between us, not doubting of its proceeding from some misapprehension.

You know the invariable principle of this Government to free the weavers from the state of slavery in which they have hitherto been held. If therefore such Muchilcas as Mr. Chevalier mentions, have been published by your orders, the Board will certainly disapprove and order them to be repealed on an application to them on the subject. All that I have to desire, is, that you will issue such orders on the present subject as may empower the French Agent to make their advances, and employ the weavers with the same freedom that has ever been allowed them.

If there are any other circumstances in this affair which may require a further explanation I request you will inform me of them, that I may communicate them to Mr. Chevalier.

I am with esteem, yours, &c.

(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

Fort William, the 29th August 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

Monday. WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

NICKOLAS GREUBER, Esq.

MESSRS. DACRES and LAWRELL at the Committe of Revenue.

TO THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

SIR,—Inclosed I have the pleasure of sending you copy of a letter from His Excellency the Vizier intimating his intentions of making a present of seven lakhs of rupees to the army in the field in proof of the grateful sense he has of their services.

I cannot help expressing great satisfaction at this instance of His Excellency's bounty, which is much the more princely, that it has proceeded entirely from his own free will and liberality, and that too at a time when there was no hope or expectation of the fund.

His Excellency having himself made his intentions public I signified them to the Field officers agreeably to his wishes, for the encouragement of the troops, but I at the same time gave to understand that your assent is necessary, and I flatter me it will be given with great cheerfulness as it will be very agreeable to His Excellency, a proper mark of favour towards the Brigade and at the same time a lasting obligation conferred on,

CAMP AT SUAL,
20 coss from Pillergur,
8th August 1774.

Sir,
Your faithful friend, &c.,
(Sd.) A. CHAMPION.

The Europeans in good health and spirits.

• Copy of a letter from the Vizier, to Colonel Champion, dated the last of Jommaddulawul, and enclosed in that gentleman's letter to the Governor, of the 8th August.

As the English Brigade came from Calcutta to this place on my business and the Gentlemen as well as the Brigade have submitted to the greatest fatigues and hardships in the course of it and have not yet received any recompense or gratuity from me, nor have the gentlemen expressed any wish or importunity on this account, I have therefore determined to give seven lakhs of rupees as a gratuity to the Brigade and for the gentlemen's expenses. I give this letter as my bond that 6 months from this date (the last of Jommaddulawul) the sum of seven lakhs of rupees shall be paid to them. I write this, my friend, for your information.

You may if you please inform Mr. Hastings of this, but I will undoubtedly pay this sum.

Fort William, the 19th September 1774.

AT A CONSULTATION, PRESENT :

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *President*.

Monday. WILLIAM ALDERSEY, Esq.

P. M. DACHES, Esq.

JAMES LAWRELL, Esq.

JOHN GRAHAM, Esq.

NICKOLAS GREUBER, Esq.

Read and approved the consultation of the 29th ultimo. The following reference from the Select Committee being laid before the Board is now read.

Extract of the Select Committee Proceedings of the 17th September 1774. The President lays before the Committee the following letter addressed to him by Reference from the Select Committee. Colonel Champion, received yesterday, with his reply immediately written.

DEAR SIR,—Inclosed I send you the correspondence beteen the Vizier and Feizullah Khan and myself, with the substance of the conversations which passed between Fyzoollah Khan and Mr. Murray, from which last you will clearly observe that Fyzoollah Khan is not his own master.

I am just now, my good Sir, in a situation truly perplexing. The Rohilla Country is completely and entirely conquered. The fugitives are posted in a very strong situation within the districts of the Rajahs. They have all to combat for. Perhaps the success of the event might make Government overlook my going to Lall Daug, but such approbation depends on a chance. The matter is very weighty, and there is more risk than I should choose to run without a necessity, yet it is grating to have an enemy so near, and it will be dangerous should they not be reduced, or no accommodation take place, because so soon as another enemy is in motion to attack the Vizier lower down, we must have troublesome doings; the Nabob, I surmise, is privately disposed even to give Fyzoollah a part of the conquered country, nay to have a family connection by accepting of Fyzoollah's daughter as a wife for one of his sons, yet he will not give sufficient authority to bring matters to the amicable decision he wishes for. I would have less difficulty in this matter but for your desire that I should dissuade the Vizier from giving any of the Rohilla Country to Fyzoollah. I am perfectly firm in the opinion I before signified to you on that subject, but I must not put it in competition with yours. The Vizier says he cannot pay the 40 lacks till he quits the field; he tells us that in a short time the Mahrattas will be in motion. They will call our attention from hence; the Rohillas—if matters are not decided with them one way or other—will take the advantage of our absence, and if we are obliged to go far down may perhaps recover their country; that the 40 lacks will become precarious—the Vizier will either deny payment on pretence that the Rohilla War is not finished or at least he will delay it, alleging he cannot leave the field. If the Committee's answer to my letter of the 29th July was arrived I should know how to proceed with certainty. I am hourly importuned by the Vizier, and I wish to give way to his inclinations as far as I can; it is therefore resolved to move five coss further nearer the banks of the Ganges in order more effectually to distress the enemy, but I will if possible delay an attack till I receive the Committee's answer to my said letter. If I am forbid to proceed the Vizier must come to terms, and the ready money which he may get will pay a considerable part of our 40 lacks. If I am desired to go on I will not hesitate, but whatever happens be assured all is well intended by

CAMP NEAR PETTIGUR,
The 26th August 1774.

Dear Sir, &c., &c.,
(Sd.) A. CHAMPION.

TO COLONEL CHAMPION, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

SIR,—I have received your favour of the 21st and 26th ultimo which both arrived this morning, the latter enclosing copies of your correspondence on the subject of the late negotiations, and of the conversation which passed between Fyzoollah Khan, and Mr. Murray. To this I now reply.

I hope notwithstanding the hesitation expressed in the conclusion that you will have resolved on prosecuting the war to a final issue without waiting for the reply of the Select Committee to your letter of the 29th July, because I think it appears very plainly that Fyzoollah Khan and his adherents lay at your mercy, because I apprehend much inconvenience from delays, and because I am morally certain that no good will be gained by negotiating. If however contrary to this expectation you shall have suspended your operations or from any other cause the war shall not be concluded on the receipt of this, it is my express desire that you do on no account depute any person under your command to treat with the enemy but leave it wholly to the Vizier to conduct every measure of this kind, by his own agents and in such a manner as he shall think proper since he is the principal, and we only accessories in the war; besides by allowing Fyzoollah Khan to treat with both to make appeals from you to the Vizier and from the Vizier to you, you can hardly fail, both of you, to become the instruments of his intrigues, and he will acquire a confidence from such an indulgence which he cannot place on his own strength or consequence.

Indeed I could not read without indignation the conversation of Fyzoollah Khan with Mr. Murray. The language of the former was highly presuming, insolent and evasive, and I think Mr. Murray ought to have left him after the first interview. A circumstance struck me very forcibly in Mr. Murray's narrative: "I came" (says Fyzoollah Khan) "to this place which is the District of Gumial." This intimation which was as wide as East and West from the business before him, too manifestly shows the foundation on which he built his hopes of succeeding by a refusal to accede to the proposition made him, and that he has availed himself of your supposed inability to pursue him, beyond the acknowledged limits of the Rohilla jurisdiction.

Although I have referred you to the Vizier for conducting all negotiations, I by no means wish, that he should lose time by seeking for an accommodation. It will be more effectual, more decisive, and more consistent with his dignity, indeed with his honour, which he has already pledged to abide by his first offers, to dictate the conditions of peace, and to admit only an acceptance without reservation or a clear refusal from his adversary.

I intend to communicate the substance of your advices to the Select Committee for their fuller sentiments on the measures to be hereafter taken; in the meantime to prevent the danger of delay, I desire that you will be pleased to receive these instructions for your guidance.

The 16th September 1774.

(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

Fort William, the 25th October 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.
Monday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.
The HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.
RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.
PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 17th instant.

The following minute, delivered into Council yesterday by the Governor General being referred for consideration to this Department, is now recorded, having been sent in circulation to the different Members of the Board.

GENTLEMEN,—All the members of this Council being now assembled, I

could wish to point out some general plan for carrying into execution the regulations of the new system of Government agreeably to the instructions received from the Company: but upon an attentive review of the various subjects which occur, I find it necessary to select such particular parts of them, as seem to claim your earliest notice, reserving the rest for future consideration, to be taken up in the order, in which their respective importances or particular exigencies may point out. I shall take the liberty to accompany every proposition with a brief relation of such circumstances, and such past transactions, as have any relation to it, and are necessary to be known for the purpose of forming your resolutions upon it. I mean not, Gentlemen to preclude any other member of the Council from offering any point for present deliberation which in his judgment, may claim a preference in point of time above those which I wish to introduce. I only propose this method as the most likely to facilitate the despatch of business, which may be retarded, by undertaking too many subjects at the same instant. It will unavoidably take some time to arrange, and perfect the new system of the administration. In the meanwhile, the current affairs will require your daily assistance to keep them in motion—and in both, (I mean both in forming the new mode of Government, and conducting the daily business) you will find it necessary to consult the records of the former administration, for the sake of due connection and consistency. I desire also to shorten the time, and lessen the trouble of such a search, among the voluminous books of consultations, by the mode which I have proposed of laying before you a succinct view of each subject with reference to the consultations for the successive orders which have been issued, and the advices which have been received concerning them. I think it my duty to add, and I think I may do it without presuming too much upon the experience which I have acquired in the affairs of this Government, that I shall be at all times happy to assist any member of the Council with my communications, upon any point, upon which he may desire to be so informed.

Professions of zeal and solicitude for the public good, are too commonly made use of to be received with implicit credit, but I feel my own honour, and my own interest so intimately blended with the successful issue of the measures of this Government, that I may with truth and without having my declaration suspected, affirm, that I have not a wish even for myself which has not the good of the Company for its immediate object, and my own ultimately as derived from it. I believe I may safely conclude the same for the other gentlemen embarked with me in this great undertaking, and I have the most thorough confidence in your disposition to unite with me in the prosecution of the Company's interests, while I with the strictest sincerity and cordiality declare, that nothing on my part shall be wanting to render that union effectual.

The points which I now beg leave to submit to your consideration, are 1st, the mode of conducting the business of the Revenue, and next, the political system of these provinces.

The general mode which is at this time established for the management of the collections, is as follows—The Provinces are formed into six divisions, each comprehending several inferior districts under the direction of a Chief and Council. These receive their orders from the Board at large and report to them, their proceedings in a separate department called a Council of Revenue, and for the greater facility of dispatching business with the inhabitants, and for the preservation of the ancient forms and rules of office, a Dewan or Minister of the Revenue is appointed to each division, who is joined to the Provincial Council, and keeps all the accounts and records of the country languages. Native Superintendents are also appointed to each district of the Provincial Division, with the title Naibs, and correspond with the Provincial Councils and Dewans. The Dewans also transmit their accounts and proceedings to an office of ancient Institution, lately transferred from the City of Moorshedabad to Calcutta, named the Khalsa, which is under the charge of an officer entitled the Roy-royan, who occasionally sits at the meeting of the Council of Revenue, and is the channel of communication between the Board and the Dewans; transmitting to the latter, the counterparts of the orders of the Board which are sent to the Provincial Councils, and receiving thier answers. The exceptions to this

general system are, the Province of Chittagong, which from its remote situation and small revenue has been left under the single charge of the Chief of the Factory, and the Districts of Pallamow and Ramgur under Captain Carnac, and the Jungulterry of Curruchpore under Captain Browne. These may be properly termed Military Collectorships. They are composed of the wild and mountainous parts of the country, which have been lately reduced to a state of submission to Government, and require the continual presence of a military force to keep them in subjection. The revenue which they yield is inconsiderable, but the possession of them is a security to the peace of the cultivated and more civilized lands in their neighbourhood, which till their reduction were continually exposed to the ravages of the wild and lawless people inhabiting them. With these Military Collectors the correspondence was carried on by the Governor only, but according to the instructions now received from the Company it seems requisite that in future, it should be conducted by the Council at large.

The plan of the general establishment for conducting the Revenue, and the Records explaining the appointment, object, and progress of the Military Collectorships will be found in the following Consultations and papers—

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| No. 1.—Plan and establishment of the six Provincial Councils of Revenue and the Collections of Chittagong. | Consultation,
23rd Novr. 1773. |
| „ 2.—Further regulations to be observed by these Councils of Revenue. | Consultation,
12th Jany. 1774. |
| „ 3.—Captain Carnac's letter to the Governor containing a narrative of the Pallamow and Nagpore countries, dated Ramgur, 12th August 1774. | Consultation,
12th Jany. 1774. |
| „ 4.—Captain Carnac's report of the method in which he has settled the revenues of the countries. | Consultation,
4th Jany. 1774. |
| „ 5.—Further report from Captain Carnac of a settlement of these districts concluded for 3 years. | Consultation,
3rd May 1774. |
| „ 6.—The Council of Burdwan report the death of the Rajah of Ramgur, in consequence of which his son is ordered down to receive the appointment of his father. | Consultation,
20th Sept. 1774. |
| „ 7.—Orders to Patna and Monghyr and Captain Browne relative to settling the boundaries of the Jungulterry District. | Consultation,
4th Oct. 1774. |
| 8.—Captain Brooke's narrative and minute relating to their Districts. | Consultation,
6th Sept. 1774. |
| 9.—The Governor's letter recommending the separation of the districts from under the Patna Council to form the line of the Jungulterry District. | Consultation,
15th Oct. 1773. |
| 10.—Adjustment of the Boundaries of the Bheerboom Jungulterry lands formerly formed by the Rajah. | Consultation,
30th Aug. 1774. |

I must beg leave to conclude this subject, with earnestly offering my advice for the continuation of this system, in all its parts, with such alterations only as the late change in the Government has rendered indispensibly necessary. Innovations are always attended with difficulties and inconveniences. Innovations in the Revenue with a suspension of the collections and a change at this season of the year would be particularly dangerous, as the time of the heavier payments is now approaching. For the same reason, your speedy

determination upon the future mode of managing and collecting the Revenues would prove of essential service.

The Court of Directors have been advised of the formation of the establishment, in consequence of the orders transmitted to us, in their letter of the 7th April 1773, and we may shortly hope to be furnished with their final determination concerning it. I must likewise recommend the continuance of the separation, which was originally made of the Revenue Department, from the other offices of the Government, as the only means by which it can be regularly conducted; and as there is no branch of the Company's affairs on which their interest so essentially depends, I propose that the Council do assemble for the conduct of it in the same manner as was practised by the late Council of Revenue.

It will be necessary to form other subsidiary regulation for separating the Revenue from the Commercial Department, and preventing competitions between them; and to determine what servants shall be employed, in the Revenue branch, that the Board of Trade may be enabled to make choice from amongst the rest, of such as will be required for conducting the Commercial business.

Political system considered. The next point which I have proposed for your consideration is the political system of these provinces.

The alliance with the Nabob Sujah Dowla, the Vizier of the Empire, is the only foreign connection in which this Government can be with propriety said to be engaged. This took place originally by the treaty formed by Lord Clive, at Allahabad, in the year 1765.

By a new treaty with the Vizier dated the 8th September 1773, in consequence of an interview which I had with him at Benares, the monthly subsidy for the extraordinary expense of our forces employed in his assistance, was fixed at the sum of 2,10,000 Rupees for one Brigade, and the Provinces of Cora and Allahabad ceded to him for the sum of 50 lakhs of rupees, of which 20 lakhs were to be immediately due, and were accordingly paid; 15 lakhs were to be paid at the expiration of a year, and the remaining 15 at the expiration of 2 years.

At the same time the Vizier had solicited the aid of our troops, to reduce the Rohilla Country lying on the north of his dominions between the Ganges and the Mountains of Tibet. The immediate plea for these hostilities was the breach of faith, with which the Rohilla Chiefs were charged in the supplies of money afforded by them to the Mahrattas, against whom they had solicited and obtained the Vizier's assistance, under a solemn engagement to pay him 40 lakhs of rupees on the departure of the Mahrattas, and for the refusing afterwards to fulfill that engagement.

This enterprise, the design of which furnished the first occasion of my meeting with the Vizier, formed an article in the original draught of our treaty, but it was afterwards omitted at his desire and I promised that it should take place if it suited the affairs of the Company at any other time, when he should find himself in a condition to resume it. Accordingly, in the month of January 1774, the Vizier made a formal requisition of the assistance of a Brigade of the Company's Forces, for the defence of his dominions, and for the prosecution of his former purpose of invading the country of the Rohillas. For this service he engaged to pay the Company besides the stipulated monthly subsidy 40 lakhs of rupees when it should be concluded. The Vizier's request was granted: the 2nd Brigade was ordered on the service, and Colonel Champion, the provisional Commander-in-Chief, appointed to the command. Having been joined by the Vizier and his troops, he entered the Rohilla borders on the 17th of April, and on the 23rd of the same month attacked, and defeated the army of the Rohillas commanded by the Hafez Rahmat, their leader, who was killed in the action. This victory was decisive, no other enemy appeared in the field; and the Vizier having obtained possession of the greatest part of the country both armies marched on the 7th of May to the city of Bissooly where quarters were prepared for them, and it was intended they should pass the rains there: but the remaining leaders of the Rohillas having assembled forces under the command of Fyzoolah Khan at Najubgur, a town on the northern frontier of the country,

the Vizier apprehending their acquiring too great strength, and that the Mahrattas might return to interrupt the operations before they were brought to a conclusion, prevailed on Colonel Champion to put the brigade again in motion about the latter end of July, and to march with him against the enemy, although the rains were then at their height. The troops enjoyed remarkable good health, and proceeded without opposition to Pottergurr; the enemy flying before them to the skirts of the hills whither the combined armies have followed them. They have lain for a considerable time within a short distance of each other, Colonel Champion waiting for orders from the Select Committee to pursue the enemy beyond the line to which he conceived himself limited by his instructions: the necessary orders were sent, and we have been for some time past in daily expectation of hearing that the war was brought to a conclusion, either by the attack and defeat of the enemy, or by negotiation. The last letters from Colonel Champion which you, gentlemen, have read were dated the 2nd instant, and advise that Fyzoolah Khan had delivered himself up, but that the negotiation was still continued.

The advantages proposed from the expedition were:—1st, an addition of territory and of course of wealth to the Vizier, in which the Company will always participate; 2nd, the completion of the defensive line of his dominions by freeing them from an inconvenient neighbour and by taking into them the whole space included between the Ganges and the northern mountains; 3rd, the employment of a third part of our force, and a saving at the same time of its expenses; and lastly, the stipulation of 40 lakhs to be paid on the conclusion of the undertaking. The retreat of the Mahrattas to their ancient territories, and the violent dissensions which had arisen in their state, were arguments strongly favouring the time which was chosen for beginning the war; and the justice of it is supported by the undoubted refusal of Hafez Rahmat to fulfil the conditions of his treaty with the Vizier; of which the original witnessed by General Sir Robert Barker is in our possession.

Many detached events, such as the claim of the army to a share in the plunder of the conquered country; the donation offered to them by the Vizier; a claim of the King Shah Allam, to a share of the conquered districts, will appear in the course of the correspondence between the Select Committee and Colonel Champion, and do not require further notice in this place.

The 2nd payment of the Treaty money for Corah and Illahabad still remained undischarged by the last advices, but orders had issued for effecting it, and an English Gentleman had been appointed by the Vizier to receive and take charge of it, at Fyzabad, his capital. The monthly subsidy has been paid with sufficient exactness, at least we have had no information to the contrary. The 40 lakhs of rupees stipulated for the performance of the present service, I consider as now due, though the Vizier makes some objections; but the defeat of Fyzoolah Khan's troops, or the conclusion of the negotiation with him, has probably by this time put the Company's right beyond dispute. There remains also a small balance of former accounts still unadjusted. This will constitute the greatest part, if not the whole, of our concerns with the Vizier, when the business on which we have been to this time engaged with him is concluded. I apprehend no difficulty in procuring payment.

The bounds which I had prescribed to myself in this paper and which I have already exceeded will not admit of my entering into a discussion of the benefits depending on the alliance of the Company with the Vizier. These will appear at large on various parts of our records, to which I shall hereafter distinctly refer. They may be reduced to the following abridgement; a secure barrier, a constant occupation for a part of our army, a reduction of our Military expences, and an accumulating fund of future wealth. He cannot long subsist without our protection, and is incapable of himself of becoming an object of our jealousy or apprehension.

For the better communication with the Vizier, and for the maintenance of that confidence which is necessary to perpetuate the alliance between the Vizier and the Company, it has been judged advisable to appoint a Resident at the Durbar as the immediate Agent of the Governor, with whom alone he officially corresponds. The gentleman employed in that station is Mr. Nathaniel

Middleton, with whose discretion, integrity, and ability for the discharge of this trust I have every reason to be abundantly satisfied.

The King remains at Delhi, the ancient capital of the Empire, a mere cypher in the administration of it. With him our connection has been a long time suspended, and I wish never to see it renewed, as it has proved a fatal drain to the wealth of Bengal, and the Treasury of the Company, without yielding one advantage, or possible source of even remote benefits in return. The tribute which he claims from the Provinces hath been withheld from him since his desertion of the Company, and his union with their natural enemies the Mahrattas; and a reference has been made to the Court of Directors for their orders concerning the future payments of it, with every argument urged that can induce them to forbid it.

The Mahratta State after having threatened the whole Empire with subjection, during the active administration of their Peshwa, or Acting Chief Mahderow, has been for this twelve month past the scene of internal distractions which still subsist. On the death of Mahderow, his brother Narain Row succeeded him. He was treacherously slain, and his uncle Rogonaut Row, released from prison and declared Peshwa in his stead. The ministers of the Government to whom he owed his elevation became the objects of his jealousy and acting from that impression he made them his enemies; they formed a powerful combination against him, set up the new-born son of Narain Row in competition against him, and defeated him. He has since thrown himself upon the protection of Tokoojee Holkar and Mahadajee Sindia, two Chiefs of consideration, who were lately in the party of his opponents. The leaders of this opposition, Sookoram Bolboo, the principal Minister Ganjaboy, the mother of the Paishwas Mahaderow and Narain Row, Sheebajee Bonsela, the Chief of Berar, and the Nabob Nizam Alli. The two last may be rather considered as auxiliaries; Moodajee, the brother of Sheebajee, was on the side of Ragonaut Row, till his defeat. Both the brothers are now in Berar. The last letter from Mr. Mostyn, the Resident at Poonah, dated the 22nd August, explains the state of these disputes to that period. They seem yet likely to be of longer duration and whenever concluded will probably leave the prevailing party too weak to undertake any plan of remote conquest, for some time at least to come; of course, we have no cause to apprehend any disturbances from the Mahrattas during the present season.

The Province of Berar, on the south and west sides of the provinces, merits from that consideration, and from the power and independency of its rulers, a distinct consideration. The present Chief Shawbajee Bonsela, is the brother of the late Janoojee Bonsela, who, for many years past enjoyed the sovereignty of the country. His brothers are Moodajee, who has been already mentioned in this narrative, and Bimbajee. The latter possesses little other consequence besides that which he derives from the credit of his family. The two other brothers have been long at variance, but by the mediation and authority of Derriaboy, the widow of Janoojee, and a woman of great spirit and reputed ability, prevented them from carrying their animosities to violent extremes. Their being engaged in opposite factions of the Mahratta State is not a certain proof of their mutual enmity, it being (as I understand) a policy not uncommonly practised among the Mahrattas, for the same family to take different sides in Civil dissensions with a view to its aggrandisement. While I was at Benares the last year, a Vakeel from Shawbajee Bonsela arrived at that place with a letter addressed to me by that Chief, and attended me in Calcutta till the month of September last when he received his dismissal to return to his master, in consequence of orders received for that purpose. The purport of Shawbajee's letter and the verbal propositions made to me by his Vakeel, was to solicit the friendship and alliance of this Government, to which I have replied in such terms as were most likely to encourage him to nearer advances, if he has formed any designs, which may make it strongly his interest to court the friendship of the Company. He is descended from the ancient Rajahs of Satara. The present Rajah is called Ram Rajah. He has no children. It is worthy of remark and may serve to convey some idea of the instability of the present Government of the Mahrattas that it is exercised through two subordinate gradations. The Rajah in whose name all orders of the State are issued

is deprived of all authority. The Peshwah or Prime Minister, is an infant of nine months old; and the actual Minister or Regent who exercises the legal power of both is a man deriving his authority solely from the combination of a few wealthy individuals. From this divided state of the Mahratta Empire, and the interests and pretensions of the several competitors for power amongst them, great political advantages may perhaps be attained to the Company to which the present united system of the Company's establishments in India is well calculated to contribute.

(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

The following letters addressed to the Select Committee having been received from Colonel Champion are now read and recorded.

GENTLEMEN,—I had the honour of addressing you under date the 15th and by duplicate the 18th. I then informed you that Colonel Champion's 5 letters. His Excellency was very solicitous to re-establish friendship with Fyzoollah Khan, his endeavours through his own people failed. Fyzoollah addressed me by letter, saying he was willing to come and pay his respects to, and adjust matters with the Vizier, but that he was apprehensive his effects might be laid hands on in his absence. He offered 25 lakhs per annum to the Vizier and to perform other conditions, if His Excellency would give him the Rohillah country (I believe understood to be exclusive of Zabita Khan's). Having sent the letter to the Vizier, he wrote me to make an offer in his name to Fyzoollah of a Jaghere of 10 lakhs annually in Rohileund, and to let him hold the remainder of the country as a renter, if they could at meeting agree on the terms; provided that Fyzoollah gave up half his treasure and only kept two or three thousand Rohillas for his guard: the rest to be received into the Nabob's service and to be employed elsewhere. I complied with His Excellency's request. Fyzoollah's answer is not yet arrived. As you will no doubt be desirous of receiving frequent advices of the state of matters, whilst the army is at such a distance, I have troubled you with this information of what has passed since my last. I have the pleasure to add that the troops continue healthful and that I am with all due respect, &c.

CAMP MOHANPORE,
24th September, 1774.

(Sd.) A. CHAMPION.

Fort William, the 26th October 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Wednesday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

The HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

The Governor judges it proper to enter the following dissent and protest against the appointment of the Commanding Officer of the Army in the Field to treat with the Vizier in the room of Mr. Middleton.

The Governor's dissent. I dissent from this resolution and protest against the consequences, which may attend it, because it cuts off all communication between the Government and the Vizier, but thro' the channel of the Commander of the Army, which is contrary to the Article of the Company's instructions, because it gives the Commander of the Army the power of deciding in all cases of difference between himself and the Vizier, and by so declared a proof of the prevalence of the Military influence, inevitably tends to dissolve the alliance between the Company and Vizier, who can hope for no redress, from an appeal to the Government, and must therefore either submissively acquiesce in every act of the Military Commander, however violent, or seek for a remedy in other alliances.

By the system hitherto established, the control of the Board has been sufficient to restrain the power of the Military Commander from every dangerous excess, had he been disposed to make that ill use of it, and the Vizier was freed from every apprehension of the kind by his reliance on the interposition of the Governor, to whom he had an immediate appeal. To whomsoever this dangerous trust may be delegated, which is now given to the officer who may chance to be in the Command at the time that the orders of the Council may reach the army, I declare that I cannot consistently with my duty admit his advices as authentic, since it is his interest to conceal from the knowledge of the Council every circumstance and transaction, which, if known, might subject his conduct to blame, or oppose any design which his ambition, his interest, or prejudice might dictate.

The Board have been pleased to complement me with the nomination of the person who should succeed Mr. Nathaniel Middleton in his office, and I have declined it, because I foresaw in his removal the resolution to throw all power and trust into the hands of the Military Commander; the proposal was actually made to this effect before the intimation of any reference to my choice, and with so recent an instance of my own agent recalled without a single proof or suspicion alleged of his misconduct I did not choose to expose any other person whom I should recommend to the hazard of suffering the same causeless disgrace.

(Sd) WARREN HASTINGS.

Fort William, the 28th October 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Friday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

The HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

The book of Standing Orders upon the table.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 26th instant.

The Governor in conformity to his declaration in the minute, which he entered on the last Consultation, now lays before the Board the correspondence laid before the Board. the several original letters, from Colonel Champion and Mr. Middleton to him, and copies of his letters to the latter, and he acquaints the Board that copies of his letters to the former of these gentlemen, are preparing, and shall also be laid before the Board.

ORDERED that all the abovementioned letters be entered in a book apart, in regular order, to be transmitted as customary to the Court of Directors.

The General, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis now deliver in the following protest against the Governor's refusal to give up the whole of his correspondence with Colonel Champion and Mr. Middleton, agreeable to their intimation at last meeting.

Our reasons for protesting, as we now do, against the Governor General's refusal to communicate to this Board, the whole of his original correspondence with the Company's Resident at the Vizier's Darbar, and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces, employed in the expedition against the Rohillas, are founded upon those which induced us to concur in the motion made by General Clavering, and approved of by a majority of the Board, for obtaining a communication of the above correspondence. We beg leave to state those reasons to the Board.

Upon our arrival at Fort William the first material intelligence that came before us, concerning the state of the Company's affairs, was, that one-third of

•their military force was actually employed, under the command of Sujah Dowlah, not in defending his territories against invasion, but in assisting him to subdue an independent state, and uniting it to his own dominions. Inquiring further into facts and examining the proceedings of the late President and Council, as far as the shortness of the time and immediate pressure of other business would permit us, we found that the reduction of the Rohillas was completed, and that our army about the beginning of this month, was stationed upon the skirts of the Mountains of Tibet, at a place so distant from our frontier, and so considerably to the north of Delhi that it is not comprehended in any of the ordinary maps of Indostan. We shall not now enter into the political arguments by which such a measure may be arraigned or defended. It is sufficient for the purpose of the present protest, that the measure itself carries, upon the face of it, a manifest violation of all those principles of policy which we know have been established by the highest authority, and till now universally admitted (even by the late President and Council themselves) as the basis of the Company's Councils in the administration of their affairs in India. Involved therefore in this contradiction between facts and principles, and foreseeing the immediate necessity to which we might be reduced of adopting or departing from the political system, in which the late President and Council have engaged the Company, we thought it our duty to enquire minutely into every transaction, record, correspondence or other documents which had relation to that system. From that enquiry and from the information laid before us by the Governor General, it appears that the assistance now given to Sujah Dowlah is not founded upon any specific treaty, between him and the Company, that it arises from a verbal agreement only, which the late President entered into with him, at their conference, at Benares; that, with respect to the terms of the agreement, the only authority to which either party can appeal, is contained in a letter from the Vizier to the late President: and that the active measures, which have followed from that agreement, were adopted by the late Council with the greatest reluctance. In this situation, other lights into the nature of the negociations and engagements with Sujah Dowla, beyond any that we have yet received, are undoubtedly necessary to direct our judgment. We think a complete communication of the original correspondence between the late President and the Company's Resident at the Darbar, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's troops now in the field, indispensably requisite for the information of the Board. The Governor General has declined laying before us that complete correspondence for reasons which do not appear to us to be satisfactory. The Court of Directors in their letter of the 23rd March 1770, have laid down a positive rule, concerning the Governor's separate correspondence, which evidently applies to the present case. It is therein ordered that, "The Governor singly shall correspond with the country powers, but all letters, before they shall be by him sent, must be communicated to the other members of the Select Committee, and receive their approbation, and also *all letters whatever* which may be received by the Governor, in answer to, or in the course of his correspondence, shall likewise be laid before the said Select Committee for their information and consideration." Besides this particular order of the Court of Directors, which we are bound to consider as a standing instruction to the Board, we think it inconsistent with the general principles of a free Government, that the Chief of any Council shall carry on a secret correspondence with the Ministers or officers of the Government, independent of the Council, and much more that he should be at liberty to refuse to the Council a communication of that correspondence when required by them. It is a kind of trust, which in our judgment cannot, with safety, be vested in any individual. It tends to convert a public Minister and officer, employed and paid by the State, into a private agent, which in fact, the present Resident at the Vizier's Court, is described to be, not only by the Governor General himself in the course of our debates on this subject, but by his minute delivered in to the Board on the 26th instant; and by the Select Committee in their letter to Colonel Champion, dated the 23rd May 1774. It tends to lessen the dignity of the Board and to render the appointment of the present Governor and Council unnecessary. For these and other weighty reasons it appears to us, that we should not acquit ourselves of the duty, which we owe to the Hon'ble Court of Directors and to the East India Company, if we did not

solemnly protest against the Governor General's conduct in refusing the communication requested of him by the Board, as a refusal not founded upon right, and against all the consequences which may attend our not being furnished by him with sufficient lights to inform and direct us to the outset of our administration.

(Sd.) J. CLAVERING.
GEO. MONSON.
P. FRANCIS.

The General proposes the following questions for the deliberation of the Board :—

- 1st.*—That the demand for the 40 lakhs from the Vizier be repeated, and that Colonel Champion, or the officer commanding the 2nd Brigade, be instructed to that effect.
- 2nd.*—That the Colonel or Commanding Officer be also instructed to make a demand for such further payments as may be due from the Vizier on receiving these instructions, and to liquidate whatever accounts may be unsettled with him at the time.
- 3rd.*—That he be further instructed that although he is to make an immediate demand for the whole 40 lakhs, and for such other payments as may be due at that time, yet, if he finds that it is impossible for the Vizier to comply with the whole of these demands, he is to receive what can be allowed in ready money, and settle a kistbundee with him for the remainder, the sum to be received in ready money not to be less than 20 lakhs and the rest to be payable, at different periods, within 12 months?
- 4th.*—That the Colonel or Commanding Officer be further instructed that in case the Vizier shall refuse to comply, with these demands he is to enter a protest against him, declaring that the Company have fulfilled all their engagements with him and within 14 days after the receipt of these instructions to retire with the army under his Command, and withdraw it into the Company's territories?
- 5th.*—That further orders be sent to Colonel Champion, or the Officer Commanding the Brigade, that after having finished the negotiations for the money now due he do immediately withdraw the whole of the forces under his command within the limits of the Province of Oude, and that unless the Vizier should require the continuance of the troops for the defence of his original dominions with the Provinces of Cora and Illahabad he returns with them to the cantonment of Dinapore?
- 6th.*—That Colonel Champion or the Commanding Officer, on quitting the Vizier, shall acquaint him that the Governor General and Council propose to appoint a person to reside at his Court, and to declare that they mean to adhere strictly to the Treaties of Illahabad and Benares, till the pleasure of the Court of Directors regarding the latter be known?
- 7th.*—That he be further instructed, that if he should apprehend any difficulty or danger in his retreat, that then he should suspend his declaration and take the best means in his power for the preservation of the army and advise the Board immediately of his situation?

To be considered and determined next Council day.

ORDERED that each individual member of the Board be furnished with a copy of these propositions in order to consider of it.

AGREED that the Board come to a determination upon them at the next meeting.

Fort William, the 3rd November 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT :

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Friday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

COLONEL MONSON, indisposed.

Read and approved the Consultation of the 31st October.

Received a letter from Colonel Champion as followeth—

Colonel Champion proposes leaving the army at Ramgaut. GENTLEMEN,—I enclose a copy of my address of last night, with duplicate of the agreements therein referred to.

The army counter-marched a short way this morning ; when the Rohillas, discharged from the service of Fyzoollah Khan, shall have left their fortresses and have crossed the Ganges, I purpose to station the Brigade, at, or near Ramgaut till your further pleasure is known : but as I hope to embark on my way to the Presidency, before the end of this month, the temporary command of the army will devolve to Colonel Gallivy.

CAMP NEAR LANPORE,

October 9th 1774.

I have the honor to be &c.,

(Sd.) A. CHAMPION.

The Governor gives in the following narrative to the Board, and a copy of the instructions which he delivered to Captain Brooke on his departure for Fyzabad. The Governor also submits to the Board drafts of three letters which have been prepared : one to the Vizier, one to Nudjiff Khan, and one to Rajah Chut Sing in consequence of this appointment of Captain Brooke, to *advise* them of the same.

The conquests which the Vizier has lately made in the Doab, affording a strong presumption that he might be soon engaged in hostilities with the Mahrattas whom he had dispossessed—an event which would have been productive of troublesome consequences had it taken place during the continuance of the war with the Rohillas,—it occurred to me that a small partizan corps under the command of an active and experienced English officer would prove of essential service to the Vizier on such an occasion, the more specially, as the Vizier had lately dismissed the French officers whom he had engaged in his service for the purpose of employing them in such parts as lay without the line of the operations of our army. I therefore directed Captain Brooke, an officer well known to the Hon'ble Court of Directors, for his general merit and abilities, but more particularly in that kind of military service, to proceed with all expedition to the army in the field and gave him a letter to the Vizier to establish such a corps, and employ Captain Brooke for the command of it. The Vizier much approved of the proposition, but the continued disturbances of the Mahrattas, having prevented them from renewing their attempts on that quarter, he proposed to appoint Captain Brooke to the command of a part of his forces which were (employed) with Nedjiff Khan to be formed and employed in the manner which I had recommended. Nedjiff Khan himself having, in a letter I received from him, expressed an equal wish for this measure, I submit it to the Board for their approval, offering it as my opinion that it cannot fail to produce some advantages whatever be the event of affairs in those parts, by confirming the fidelity and attachment of Nedjiff Khan, which may be of essential use in obviating any adverse designs of the King or of his confidential Minister, Abdel Ahed Cawn, by affording the means of a powerful check and division to the Mahrattas should they again invade the Doab. My instructions to Captain Brooke, which I now lay before the Board, will further explain the nature and object of this

recommendation, and if approved may serve for the substance of the orders which it will be necessary that he now receive from the Council.

(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

TO CAPTAIN BROOKE.

SIR,—You are immediately to proceed with all expedition to join the army in the field. On your arrival in Camp you will wait upon Colonel Champion and deliver my letters; a duplicate of one is already sent by the Dawks, so that you will find him fully acquainted with my intentions respecting you. I also give you a letter for the Vizier to be delivered to him, in person, when you have obtained Colonel Champion's permission to wait upon him for that purpose.

I have in these letters strongly recommended you to command a partizan party, composed entirely of the Vizier's troops, to act separately from his army wherever he may think proper to employ them. The plan drawn out by yourself contains my general ideas of the nature of the service on which you may be employed, and the quarter wherein it occurs to me, your services may be most materially useful to the Vizier. You will mention these proposals to him as the proper measures which the present situation of his affairs suggested to me, but he will be better able to determine on the spot, how far they or other operations may be eligible. You will also be pleased to lay your plan before Colonel Champion for his instructions and advice, and you will pay proper attention to whatever he may recommend either in the execution of it, or any other service you may undertake.

If the Vizier should not have occasion for your services in the manner proposed, the option will rest with you whether to return to the Presidency immediately or remain with the army untill you hear from me; in the latter case I need not suggest to you the offer of your services to Colonel Champion in whatever manner he may choose to employ you. But, if the Vizier (as I expect he will) should embrace the opportunity of employing you in the manner pointed out, you will consider yourself as immediately under his command, and it will be necessary you should appear, as much as possible, rather an officer of his army than belonging to the English troops, because the scene of your service will be beyond the limit prescribed for the operations of our army. You will receive your instructions from the Vizier, and fulfil to the utmost of your ability his intentions for which he will furnish you with an adequate force. As you will be employed on partizan service, you can only receive orders of a general nature, rather expressing the service to be performed than the mode of effecting it, which must be left to your own discretion, and a latitude of action given you for this purpose, because most probably you will be employed at a distance from the army. I recommend Colonel Champion to point out the propriety of these circumstances to the Vizier and to obtain for you a sufficient force to render effectual service. You will therefore submit these instructions to the Colonel's perusal.

Notwithstanding, you are as much as possible to be considered as unconnected with the English army, and under the orders and in the employment of the Vizier, yet you will be punctual in your communications and attention to Colonel Champion while he remains with the army, and if he should think proper to send you any positive order you are implicitly to obey it. It will be his care to avoid sending you any orders which might clash with those you receive from the Vizier. I shall expect your correspondence on every subject you think worthy of my information.

I wish you success and remain &c.,

(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

The Board, although Captain Brooke's appointment does not exactly coincide with the system they wish to adopt of a mere defensive assistance on our part, to the Vizier, yet, as the Governor's credit is in a manner pledged to the Vizier for his appointment, they acquiesce in it, and trust in Captain Brooke's

• discretion for acting with prudence and caution in the exercise of his command, and they approve of the Governor General's instructions to him. It is therefore agreed that the letters be accordingly drawn out and sent, and that they be entered in the Book of Country Correspondence.

Read the following letter from Chandernagore—

Chandernagore, October 30th, 1774.

GENTLEMEN,—I have received the letter you did me the honour to write to me, the 30th of this month, and no one can be more sensible of your kindness of informing me of the nomination that the Government of Great Britain has been pleased to make, of a Governor General and four Councillors to form a Supreme Council at Calcutta. Accept these, Gentlemen, my sincere congratulations on the choice that has been made of every one of you to fill these posts of honour; it is a public proof of your merit and of the justice of your Government, in recompensing it. I cannot sufficiently thank you, Gentlemen, for the desire you have (and which you so well express) to contribute all that lays in your power to promote a harmony and good understanding between the two Governments here and to assist all our operations in trade. You may be assured that you will always find in me the same disposition, and that I shall always be ready to anticipate everything that can promote this end. For my part I know of nothing more disagreeable than national disputes and the greatest satisfaction that I can receive will be to see that all subjects that may give rise to them are carefully avoided; this is not impossible; I even imagine it easy, and the sentiments you have made appear, have already inspired me with hopes.

I have the honour to be &c.,

(Sd.) CHEVALIER.

The General now delivers in his minute on the subject of the propositions debated at the last meeting agreeably to what he then promised as follows—

When I submitted this proposition to the Board I did not expect an opposition would be made to it on the part of the Governor General, and still less could I imagine, he would have deemed that measure a violation of public faith which in effect is the result of his own opinion. I was glad to have his authority for a measure which so perfectly coincides with my own opinion, that however we may differ in opinion with respect to the validity of the engagement itself with the Vizier, yet it pleased me much to find that I had still sufficient lights before me in the correspondence, which we have been only permitted to see, to form my judgment on the performance of the stipulations of the engagement on the part of the Company, and consequently to determine the right of withdrawing the troops. The late Resident, in his letter of the 16th July, has been very explicit on the doubtful point of the engagement, whether or not the claim to the 40 lakhs was then due, and whether the continuance of the troops in the Vizier's service afterwards was independent or not of the right to the 40 lakhs. He says, "I cannot admit of the construction the Vizier puts on the agreement, namely that every condition specified in the letter must be accomplished before the payment becomes due." It adds that the whole country of the Rohillas lying within the boundary, which originally formed the compass of our operations, is, according to my conception, wholly and entirely his, the Vizier's. He thereupon orders Mr. Middleton to insist on the right to the 40 lakhs in ready money, and acquaints him that the continuance of the Brigade afterwards with the Vizier must be considered as an indulgence.

This is the late President's own expression, and as I cannot conceive that an act of indulgence of the late administration can be deemed a right by the enjoyment of it since the 16th July, I flatter myself that the Governor General upon reconsidering his sentiments at that period, will think himself not justified in the imputation he has laid on the Members of the Board who have

been concerned in the proposition for withdrawing the troops out of the country of the Rohillas.

However, it has been objected that the Vizier may be offended at the exercise of this right at present: I should think that not possible, if Mr. Middleton has done his duty in communicating to him the late President's sentiments, and making him understand how he has enjoyed an indulgence he was not entitled to. If he has any gratitude he will be sensible of the favour he has received, and will, at the assurances Colonel Champion is now ordered to give him of the resolution of this new Government, maintain inviolably the treaties which the Company has with him for the mutual protection of their respective ancient possessions.

Mr. Francis' minute on the propositions of last Council Mr. Francis also delivers in the following minute on the same subject which he promised at the last Council. On the General's 4th proposition.

With respect to the fourth article of the instructions now proposed to be given to Colonel Champion, or the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Brigade, and in answer to the objections made to it by Mr. Barwell and the Governor General, I must declare that I am at a loss to comprehend how a demand for money, long since acknowledged to be due, but of which no part has yet been paid, can be offensive to the Vizier, if his intentions be as sincere and upright as they are represented. The mere claim of a debt does not of itself imply any doubt or suspicion of the honesty of the debtor, and since we have on our side fulfilled the conditions, which entitle us to make the demand, I think we should be guilty of a breach of duty to the Company if we did not repeat and insist upon it, until it should be complied with. I do not expect that the Vizier will act so injudicious a part as to give a plain direct negative to so regular and just a requisition. If he should, I consider the base retreat of our army into our own territories, in consequence of such refusal, as the mildest and least vindictive measure that can be adopted by this Government. In return to so gross a breach of faith, I do not see how it is possible for us to act with greater moderation. This however is a case, which may rather be supposed than expected. From the character given of the Vizier not only by Colonel Champion, but by Mr. Middleton (whom Mr. Barwell is pleased to call *the Public Agent of the former Government*, notwithstanding he has been repeatedly described and acknowledged as the private Agent of the late President), it seems more probable that he will endeavour to elude or protract the execution of his engagements than that he will plainly and absolutely refuse to comply with them. The conditions which the late Government have unfortunately suffered him to prescribe to them, considered merely as the terms of a contract (for I do not now mean to insist in a political view, upon the danger and dishonour of submitting to such condition) are so loose and unguarded, that they will always furnish him with a pretence for referring the payment of the forty lakhs, to a future day. In his letter to the President, which we are told has a sanction equal to the most solemn treaty, and which in fact is the only authentic document we have to appeal to, he declares, "That he is the master in these affairs and that the troops shall never quit his service until he shall voluntarily dismiss them." If we recall the Brigade without his consent, or if we confine its operation within any limits disagreeable to him or inconsistent with his projects, he will of course appeal to his letter and tell us, that since we do not adhere to the engagement prescribed to us in one part of the letter, he is not bound to fulfil the conditions stipulated in the other. If we have the Brigade with him, and suffer it to be employed as he thinks proper (which I presume could never be intended without any limitation of time or service) he may still express an apprehension that when he has paid the money the troops will be withdrawn, and therefore that he cannot safely part with so considerable a sum, until he himself shall have granted them their dismissal. By this way of reasoning, which in my opinion may well be supported by the terms of his letter, the payment of the 40 lakhs is made to depend upon an act, which depends upon his own pleasure, and consequently may be deferred *sine die*. By the late President's letter to him of the 18th July last, it appears this is the construction which the Vizier himself then put upon the agreement. In his answer to Colonel Champion's first demand of the 40 lakhs he says that "when

"the English troops have concluded his business, and he thinks proper to dismiss them, he will at the time of dismissing them give them the sum of 40 lakhs of rupees according to his agreement." But even at this moment both Mr. Barwell and the Governor General evidently consider the success of the demand as united with the continuance of the troops in their present situation, when they allege that the recall of the Brigade may furnish the Vizier with a plea for refusing to pay the 40 lakhs, notwithstanding they acknowledge the money to be due, independently of the Brigade quitting or continuing in his service: but they have not yet asserted, in writing at least, that it ought to be continued in his service for ever.

With respect to the Company's being bound to guarantee this newly conquered country to the Vizier, and to support him in the possession of it, I differ widely though with all the respect and deference which I owe Mr. Barwell, from the formal opinion delivered by him, that "the preserving to the Vizier the possession of the Domain lately acquired by him is as much an obligation upon the present Government, as the securing to him any other part of his dominions, and that it is equally within the spirit of the defensive treaty, as if it had been specifically named therein." I am happy to find that so dangerous an obligation is not among the burthens imposed upon the Company by their servants. It is not stipulated nor in any manner intimated in the Vizier's letter. If such a guarantee had been expected by him he would not have failed to have made his claim to it clear and secure by a specific article, or at least by a reference to those formal treaties, by which the Company is bound to assist him in the defence of his other possessions. It appears to me that, in the late expedition, we have assisted him in a rank not so high as even that of alliance. He pays us a subsidy for the hire of our troops, and if the projected conquest takes place, he promises us a share in the plunder. We do not enquire into nor think ourselves concerned in the justice of the cause in which the troops are to act. They march at his requisition and are solely under his command. When the object of the expedition is obtained, the sum which he engages to pay in return for their service becomes due. Beyond the completion of that service, I do not find that the late Government have ventured to involve the Company, at least by any engagements that have yet come to our knowledge. All our advices agree in saying that the Chiefs of the Rohillas have capitulated with the Vizier, and that the reduction of the Rohilla Country is completed. I do not therefore see the least pretence for continuing the Brigade in its present station unless it be to assist him in making further conquests.

My first general argument for agreeing to the fifth proposition is, that it is strictly conformable to the sentiments and injunctions of the Court of Directors deliberately and repeatedly, though very ineffectually communicated to their servants. They have approved of the engagement to assist the Vizier in the defence of the possessions guaranteed to him by the treaty of Illahabad in case they should be attacked, and at present I have no reason to suppose that they will be averse from extending that engagement to the possessions which he has lately acquired by the pacific title of a purchase. On the other hand they have most expressly and uniformly and on the soundest principles of policy, reprobated the idea of engaging with him in schemes of conquest, or of suffering their troops to be employed in distant expeditions. I am not surprised that this consideration should have had weight with the Governor General, who in his letter to Sujah Dowlah, of the 26th November 1773, confesses "that the order of his superiors are peremptory, not to suffer their arms to be carried beyond the line of their own boundaries or those of his Excellency, their ally." But I must confess my astonishment at the declaration made by Mr. Barwell that he "sees no reason why the troops should be debarred acting, if necessary, in securing to the Vizier his late acquisitions." I presume it was not considered by Mr. Barwell, to whose opinion I pay a sincere, and unaffected deference, that the Vizier is to be the sole judge of the necessity and of the mode of employing the troops in his defence: and that if he should declare that his late conquest can not otherwise be secured, than by their continuing to be stationed upon the skirts of the Mountains of Tibet, we must yield to his judgment and assist him in that mode which he shall think most advisable, and most for the benefit of his own affairs. This appears to me, to be the amount and result of all the arguments urged against our agreeing to

the fifth article. In my opinion they lead inevitably to this conclusion: If at this time, the recall of our troops is to be considered as a breach of faith with the Vizier I wait with anxiety to be informed at what time and in what circumstance the recall of our troops without his consent, will not be a breach of faith with him. He has told us in plain terms, "that without his dismissal the English army shall never go," and we, it seems, by the acceptance of his letter, have given it the sanction of the most solemn treaty. For my own part I do not scruple to declare, that if this extravagant engagement had been ratified in all the forms, by which public treaties are usually authenticated, but none of which have been observed upon the present occasion, I should reject it with disdain. The reasons I have stated are alone very sufficient to induce me to agree to the 5th article of General Clavering's proposition. I shall add however as the most urgent and instant motive of my assent, that as long as we suffer one third of the Company's forces to be stationed in the Rohillah Country at the disposal of the Vizier, whose own troops by the returns amount to above a hundred thousand men, we leave that considerable portion of our strength in a great measure at his mercy, and hazard the safety of the State.

(Sd.) P. FRANCIS.

4th November 1774.

Fort William, the 7th November 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Monday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

COLONEL MONSON, indisposed.

ORDERED that it be translated and laid before the Board.

The Governor lays before the Board two bags, one containing one hundred and forty-six gold mohurs, the other containing three hundred and twenty-seven rupees of different sorts, which were presented to him in nuzzurs by different persons from the 1st August to the 31st October. He has not thought it proper to discontinue the custom but has accepted the presents on the behalf of the Company, meaning to deliver for their use at the end of each month the sums so received by him in the course of it, which in his opinion will be preferable to an abrupt rejection of such offers, which are intended by immemorial usage, as pledges of respect and submission, and accepted as an implied assurance of protection.

He submits his intention in this respect to the judgment of the Council and will readily correct it, if they shall deem the subject of so much importance as to prescribe a general rule of conduct more conformable to the design and letter of the last Act of Parliament.

ORDERED that the money be sent to the cash and carried in account to the Company's credit under the head of nuzzurs, and that whatever sums may be hereafter tendered by the Governor, be received and credited in the same manner.

The General conceiving it to be the intention of the legislature, that the Governor General and members of the Council should receive no presents either from the Indian powers or any persons whatever, he has strictly complied since his arrival here, both with the spirit and the letter of the Act of Parliament and has accordingly returned all the presents which have been made to him.

Mr. Francis delivers his opinion on this subject in the following words.

Mr. Francis' opinion on this.

I have not yet received nor do I intend to accept of any nazir or present whatsoever. The prohibition in the Act of Parliament appears to me so strict that I think no choice is left, my own discretion. This however is a point on which every gentleman will judge for himself, and I do not mean to impute the least impropriety to any opinion that may differ from mine on this subject.

(Sd.) P. FRANCIS.

Fort William, the 8th November 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT :

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Tuesday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

COLONEL MONSON, indisposed.

The President gives in the following proposition for the consideration of the Board.

The Governor recommends that the clause in the late instructions given to the Commander of the Army requiring him to withdraw the Brigade into the Province of Oude after payment or security obtained for the sums due from the Vizier, be repealed : and that a discretionary power be left with the Officer who may be in the Command of the Brigade, to continue it in its station at Ramgaut until the Vizier's Government shall be effectually established in his new acquired possessions, or other circumstances shall induce the Officer in Command to believe that the English forces may evacuate that country without exposing it to the danger of fresh hostilities.

He begs leave to observe that at the time when the Resolution was taken for withdrawing the Brigade, it was supposed to be, from the last advices, in the most distant extremity of the Rohillah Country, but we are since assured by authority that it was on the point of returning to Ramgaut, which lies within 60 miles of the borders of the Province of Oude, in which station it will be equally able to perform any service for which it may be required, as if it was quartered within the limits of the Province of Oude, and means may be easily found to induce the Vizier to give his voluntary assent to its entire retreat without much loss of time from the Rohillah Country. That country though conquered is not in a state of confirmed subjection. Fyzoollah Khan has submitted to the conditions imposed on him, and to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Vizier, but he is at liberty and may again assert his pretensions to the territory which has been wrested from him, if he sees no danger in the attempt. His forces were ordered to be transported beyond the Ganges ; but they still exist though disbanded, and may with ease be reassembled if it should suit their former Chief to recall them, before time were allowed them to disperse or to seek other masters. To ensure the permanent possession of the new acquired country, proper officers must be stationed in it by the Vizier to establish his Government, and regulate the collections. These ends may be effected with ease, and the danger of the revolt effectually obviated by the temporary presence of that force by which the country was reduced, whereas the precipitate recall of the English army in opposition to the Vizier, and before the settlement of the country was completed, would be inevitably construed as a sure indication that the present administration of the Company disapproved of the late engagements with the Vizier for the conquest of the Rohillah Country, and was resolved to withdraw its interposition from all future concerns in that quarter. Such a belief at this time might be the cause of a general revolt, and of the loss of all the advantages obtained by our arms which, whatever diversity of opinion may prevail concerning the propriety of the past transactions, the Governor is persuaded is very foreign from the intention of every Member of the Council. He does not form these as certain, but probable

conclusions, and as they may be prevented by a temporary continuance of Brigade at Ramgaut, or in any other station equally convenient for their: If at sent protection of the Rohillah Country; as there is no possible service for it with any other part of the Vizier's dominions; and as the proposition now submitted to the Board is entirely consistent with the instructions already given by each Council to the Commander of the Army, the Governor hopes it will obtain their concurrence. He wishes to take the opinion of Mr. Monson upon this occasion, and is willing to allow it an effect in the decision which may be passed upon the question, as that gentleman is prevented by sickness from attending at the Board, and joined with the majority in the resolution for withdrawing the Brigade.

(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

The Secretary acquaints the Board that in consequence of the minutes of the members present at the Council of yesterday, which have been shown to Colonel Monson, at his desire, he has just sent the following minute on the subject, requesting that it may be recorded as his sentiments on the receiving of Nuzzers and presents.

Altho' I did not suppose it necessary to have made any declaration with regard to presents, &c., as the late Act of Parliament undoubtedly abolished that pernicious custom, which at all times would have been more honoured in the breach than the observance, yet as all the other Members of the Board have thought it necessary to give their sentiments on the subject I find myself under the necessity of stating mine.

Every one who looks into the late Act must clearly understand that the acceptance of all Nuzzers, presents, &c., is illegal, liable to prosecution and penalties. The Nuzzers that have been tendered to me I have refused, with declarations of mildness and civility, nor have I observed that the not accepting them has given the least disgust or uneasiness to the persons who made the offer. On the contrary, I am well convinced that the people will be better pleased to find that justice and right is done them without giving their money, than paying, as they call it for "Master's favor." It may be said the custom is an old one, and marks the vassallage from the sovereignty. It might have been so, but that can be no longer urged, as the custom is superseded by an Act of the legislature which should be explained to the people by the publication of that clause of the Act translated into the country languages.

I therefore in obedience to the prohibition made by the Act, have refused and shall continue to refuse all Nuzzers, presents &c. which may be offered me.

(Sd.) GEO. MONSON.

Fort William, the 14th November 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Monday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

COLONEL G. MONSON, indisposed.

Mr. Francis in conformity to the intention he expressed at the last Council now delivers in his sentiments upon the Governor General's proposal to alter the instructions sent to the Commander of the Army in the Rohillah Country.

Mr. Francis's opinion on the Governor's proposal of the 8th delivered in—

In the consideration of the Governor General's minute of the 8th instant, it gives me pleasure to observe that, in one respect, his sentiments and mine are not so distant as I apprehended.

Mr. Francis's minute.

I might be. He does not affirm nor even intimate "that the preserving what the Vizier the possession of the Rohillah Country, is as much an obligation that the present Government, as the securing to him any other part of his dominions, and equally within the spirit of the defensive treaty, as if it had been specially named therein." The Governor General urges his proposal on particular motives of policy and temporary convenience, independent of any positive obligation that might bind us to act against our interests or opinion. This is the only ground on which I can consider the question; for after having had the honour of laying my sentiments with respect to the whole business of the Rohillah war, repeatedly and deliberately before the Board, I think it cannot be expected of me that I should so suddenly renounce the general principles on which these sentiments were founded. Meeting the Governor General therefore on his own principles I beg leave to say that I do not think his arguments conclusive. Our past advices inform us that the Brigade was to leave the extremities of the Rohillah Country on the 15th of October before which time the remains of the Rohillah army would be sent across the Ganges. This measure, I presume, was resolved on with the consent of the Vizier. He himself therefore must have considered the country as completely reduced to his obedience and the new Government secure from any attempt in that quarter. The retreat of the army to Ramgaut is a measure of his own. If the distance of sixty miles be all the difference between the station recommended by the Governor General and that to which a majority of the Board have determined at all events to bring back the Brigade, I cannot discover any motive, even of convenience, for our hesitating to adopt a measure which conforms to the sentiments of our superiors; replaces the Company's troops within the line prescribed to us by their strict and repeated injunctions; and removes them but sixty miles from that station to which the Vizier himself has approved of the retiring.

I do not understand from what premises it can be concluded that we mean to desert the interest of the Vizier while our army continues with him, and when the Commanding Officer is directed to remain in the country of Oude, if the Vizier should require it for the defence of any part of his ancient dominions. The absolute return of the Brigade to Dinapore is not to take place but upon his plain direct refusal to fulfil his engagements to the Company. Even with respect to the security of the new conquest, whatever the determination of the Board on that subject may be, the mere retreat of the Brigade within the Frontiers of Oude cannot, in my opinion, warrant a conclusion that the present administration is resolved to withdraw its interposition from all future concerns with the Rohillah Country. The utmost that the late Government undertook to execute for the Vizier, has been long since completed. The return of the Brigade to their former situation is no more than the natural consequence of their having performed the service on which they were employed; neither can their retreat, with any degree of justice, be called *precipitate*. Our first instructions to Colonel Champion were not dispatched until the 4th instant. In twenty days they would probably reach him. Fifteen days more are allowed for finishing the particular negotiation entrusted to him with the Vizier: and we have since extended the term prescribed, in order to make an allowance for the Commanding Officer's journey to Fyzabad, and for his return to Ramgaut, which cannot, upon the whole, make less than addition of ten days. The service for which the troops were engaged by Sujah Dowla was finally determined on the 15th of October, since on that day they return from Lall Daung. From that to the earliest day, on which it is possible for the army to begin its march in obedience to our orders, there is a space of sixty-two days during which he enjoys all the countenance and support that can be derived from the appearance of our arms in settling and establishing the (new) Government of his new conquest. In this computation I state the time strictly, and allow all possible advantages, against my own argument. The truth is, that the Vizier has been in possession of the whole country since August last, and of the greatest part of it since April. He has consequently had all that time to regulate his affairs.

What I have had the honour of submitting to the Board is meant as a reply to the Governor General's arguments and not as the foundation of my declining to assent to his proposal. My determination to vote for the recall of the Brigade from the Rohillah Country is founded on motives which I have

already stated to the Board, and hitherto I find no reason to alter it. On the contrary, as I really think it probable that we may shortly be engaged in a war* with the Mahrattas, in behalf of Sujah Dowla. As the country† of the Rohillahs is very remote from that of the Mahrattas, as it lies out of the line of their incursions, as their attack will therefore probably be made upon those parts of the Vizier's* Dominions which lie nearest to us (and which we are obliged by treaty to protect), if not immediately upon our own provinces, I think there ought not to be the delay of a single day beyond the term already allowed for our evacuating a country which we are not bound by any stipulation to defend, and which we cannot defend without neglecting objects, more important to the Vizier himself and in which our own safety is immediately concerned.

(Sd.) P. FRANCIS.

Mr. Barwell agrees to Governor's proposal.

Mr. Barwell agrees to the Governor's proposal for altering the instructions sent to the Commanding Officer.

Colonel Monson.
the following—

Colonel Monson to whom the Governor's Minute of the 8th instant has been sent for his opinion sends in

I am extremely sensible of the indulgence shown by the Hon'ble the Governor General in allowing my opinion to have its consequence in the decision of a question before the Board, notwithstanding I am prevented by sickness attending there. I have already given my sentiments on the subject, and am the more strongly confirmed in them, as the latest advices from Colonel Champion mention that he should see the Rohillahs pass the river before he would march to Ramgaut. The Vizier therefore will be in possession of the country, and our part of the stipulation accomplished.

The Brigade is to remain in the Province of Oude at the requisition of the Vizier for defensive measures.

The Rohillah Country, a conquest made by the Vizier since the treaties of Illahabad and Benaras, cannot be considered within those treaties; if the Company are to defend that country, it is a cogent reason against aiding the Vizier in the conquest of it.

Colonel Champion is of opinion‡ that it is necessary to prepare for the reception of the Mahrattas by posting the Brigade centrally, and putting their stores, &c., in proper order. The most effectual road to prevent the inroads of the Mahrattas is to have our force within our own provinces. I therefore would advise that the Brigade should return to Dinapore unless demanded by the Vizier for the protection of his ancient dominions.

(Sd.) G. MONSON.

The General gives his sentiments upon the same subject in the following minute—

The Council Chamber, November 14th, 1774.

The result of the Governor General's minute now delivered in to the Board, being that the order which has been sent to Colonel Champion to withdraw the Brigade within a certain time out of the Rohillah Country in consequence of the Resolution of the Council on the 4th and 5th propositions, which I submitted to the Board on the 20th ultimo, may be annulled, and that Colonel Champion, or the Commander of the Army, be directed to remain at Ramgaut, where the last intelligence mentioned he was retiring, till the new Government in the Rohillah Country be quite established.

* *Vide* Colonel Champion's letter of the 24th July 1774. Letter from Select Committee, to the Court of Directors, of 24th August, and Colonel Champion's last instructions to Colonel Galliez.

† *Vide* President's Minute of 26th November 1773.

‡ Letter, 17th September 1774.

The arguments employed by the Governor General to recommend this alteration in our resolutions are, first, that the Rohillas might take up arms again and recover their country, if our army left it; secondly, that so precipitate a step would persuade the Vizier that the Governor General and Council were not well disposed towards him; thirdly, that the Brigade not being now wanted within our own Provinces it might on any exigency be soon brought into the country of Oude, as the distance from Ramgaut to the nearest part of the Vizier's dominions is not more than 60 miles.

In reply to these arguments I will beg leave to state that we are not any more obliged to defend the Rohillah Country for the Vizier than we were to conquer it for him. That I consider the verbal promise by virtue of which the late President engaged to march the Brigade to attack the Rohillahs as no treaty: it had none of the requisites of a contract; there was neither witness nor signature to it. But I will go further and declare that if this engagement had been provided with all the formalities of a solemn treaty, I would not have hesitated to have given my vote to have broken it: because firstly, It was an unjust war; secondly, it is exactly the law which the legislature has pointed out to us for our interference when it invested the Governor General and Council with a power of comptrolling the other Presidencies; thirdly, the Directors have repeatedly prohibited the Governor and Council of the Presidency undertaking any schemes of foreign conquest, or departing from the absolute line of the defence of the possessions of the Company together with those which they are engaged to defend by the Treaty of Illahabad; fourthly, because the late President and Council have pledged every thing that can be dear to them as men, never to depart from the solemn promise they made, when they signed their names to the 30th paragraph of their letter to the Court of Directors from the Select Committee of the 10th November 1772 in the following words: "In one point you may rest assured of our unanimous concurrence, that no object or consideration shall either tempt or compell us, to pass the political line which we have laid down for our operations with the Vizier. We have told him and repeated that we will assist him with your force in the defence of his dominion against all invaders, but that we will not engage in any offensive war, nor suffer your army to be carried beyond the borders of his territory and to this resolution we will steadily adhere."

I might add to these four considerations, which it is to be hoped will have some weight with the Governor General, considering the authority with which some of them at least are stamped, that it is to be reasonably apprehended that if the powers of Indostan shall perceive that the Governor General and Council, in imitation of their predecessors in office, do continue to afford protection to the Vizier in maintaining his unjust acquisition of the Rohillah country, they will confederate with the remains of those unhappy people to extirpate the Vizier, and then attack the Company's possessions perhaps at the different Presidencies at the same time.

In regard to the interpretation which, the Governor-General suggests, the Vizier will put on so abrupt a departure of the Brigade from the Rohillah Country before he has fully established his own authority in it, if the Governor General will be pleased to refer to dates, he will find it must be near two months from the day when Fyzoollah Khan capitulated to the time allowed to the Commander of the Army to withdraw the Brigade into the country of Oude, which time will be judged more than sufficient to establish his Government in a ruined country, deserted by its inhabitants and protectors, without other purposes are intended, the drift of which have appeared by the opinion delivered by Mr. Barwell at this Board, namely, that we are equally bound to defend his acquisition of the Rohillah Country against all invaders, as well as his antient domain. If such opinions have been transmitted to the Vizier, it is high time he should be undeceived for his own sake, and for our reputation. This new administration will not exceed, I trust, the powers which have been confided to them by the legislature and the Hon'ble Court of Directors, whose sanction as yet only authorises us to comply with the stipulations of the Treaty of Illahabad.

With regard to the last argument that the Brigade is not now wanted within the Company's possession, and that the distance between Ramgaut and

the nearest part of the country of Oude being so short that in case of an exigency it might easily be transported into that country, I will remark that the new administration can only judge of the necessity of the troops being nearer the Company's frontiers, by the correspondence that has been laid before the Council, by which correspondence, curtailed as it has been, it still appears that both the Governor General and the Commander of the Army thought that the Mahrattas would return upon the Ganges in the autumn. If their conjectures were just, it certainly would be very proper to be prepared for the danger by approaching with the army nearer to the frontiers of Bahar, which frontiers are at present only protected by one battallion of sepoys, and 52 European invalids at Chunagur, by seven companies of Brigade Sepoys at Dinapore, and one company of the latter at Buxar, the rest of the army being stationed as low down as Burrampore, and consequently not able to protect the frontiers of Bahar, in case it should be suddenly attacked by the Mahrattas, the King, or any other power whom we may have provoked.

It is for this reason, as well as my desire to pay obedience to the command of the Court of Directors who have enjoined that their arms should never be carried beyond the line they have so exactly delineated, that I hope the orders sent to the Commander of the Army may not be revoked.

Resolved by the majority of the Board that the paragraph in the instructions to the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Brigade requiring him to withdraw the army into the Province of Oude, after the receipt of the money or security for it from the Vizier, do remain in force.

Fort William, the 21st November 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT :

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Monday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

COLONEL MONSON, indisposed.

Mr. Barwell begs leave to record the following Minute—

The reply made by Mr. Francis to the Governor General's and my objections to the propositions of the Commander-in-Chief in its stile and substance is of such a nature that I reserved to myself at the time the right of animadverting upon it, when I might be at leisure without delaying the public business, which was before the Board, and more immediately the object of its deliberations.

The whole proceedings in the business of the peremptory demand on the Vizier and the positive unconditional recall of the troops from his assistance, I must frankly confess appear to me rather in the light of a reprobation of the measures of the late administration than leading to any real benefit to be derived to the Company, and I think myself justified in this sentiment from the language of the minute before me, which treats the agreement with the Vizier for aid in the Rohilla war as a *loose unguarded* contract which that administration "*unfortunately* suffered the Vizier to prescribe to" them, and then submitted to with all the *danger and dishonor* which attended it. A contract so extravagant that had it even been ratified in all the forms of a public treaty and consequently public faith solemnly pledged for its performance Mr. Francis would have *rejected it with disdain*. I can hardly conceive words capable of conveying a more strong, and possibly the Court of Directors may judge more unjust, censure of the late administration than these, or a more free declaration of the small obligations which Mr. Francis thinks he lies under to treat their engagements either with personal respect or public good faith.

In this place I may likewise notice his observation on the Governor General "of not being surprised at the Company's orders having *less weight* with him, because it appears from his letter to the Vizier he was fully apprised of

them." But why orders should have less weight because they are fully known! with deference to Mr. Francis, I cannot understand, and I hope he will therefore pardon me for calling upon him for an explanation of his meaning, for in my humble apprehension every order receives its weight and consideration from the knowledge it immediately communicates, and is not disregarded in proportion as it becomes known. I have therefore only to remark that all conclusions as to the Governor General's undisguised opinions of things drawn from his correspondence with the Vizier are partial, and may be often mistaken. He must be a shallow politician indeed who, in negotiating with a foreign power, does not know how to conceal his real sentiments at times, and often to urge motives which tho' different from the true ones are better calculated in their operation to produce the effects that may be proposed. The Governor General's sentiments of the Vizier and our connections with him ought only to be taken from his unreserved confidential communications with the Board.

Mr. Francis is pleased to say that, whatever he may think of the Governor General's opinion, he is astonished that I should declare for acting, if necessary, in defence of the Vizier's late acquisitions which he thinks is contrary to sound policy and to the Company's orders. I have already given reasons for my opinion, and I do not flatter myself with being able to add anything of greater force to effect an alteration in his; however I will endeavour to remove his surprise at my sentiments by showing they are grounded on principles similar to his own, and that I think the measure I support perfectly consonant to sound policy and the spirit of the Company's instructions. It often happens with States that their situations are such that, by extending their frontier, they bring their line of defence to more prescribed, of course to more defined, narrow and compact limits; and it is an uncontroverted maxim in politicks that natural boundaries are always the most secure. The territories of the Vizier before his late acquisition undoubtedly stood in that predicament towards that part of the Rohillah country. He had no barrier of any kind. He was not only exposed to the incursions of those people, but also to those of the Mahrattas who, either by force or agreement, were sure to obtain from the Rohillahs a passage thro' their country to attack him, and we consequently were subject from the same cause to be annually called out in his defence. This is not mere speculation, for two successive years previous to the Treaty of Benares, were we in the field to protect him from that quarter, and that upon the old stipulation of Rs. 1,15,000 per month for our whole expences. The Vizier endeavoured to form an alliance with these people to obviate, if possible, the danger from their hostile enterprises; they entered into a treaty with him, broke it afterwards and call'd in his enemies to protect them. In this situation who can deny that it was the soundest policy in the Vizier to attempt their reduction?—how far it was similar policy in us to assist him is another question; but it appears to me that if the tranquillity and security of the Vizier's dominions be the object of our alliance with him, we cannot more effectually secure that object than by aiding to remove a constant cause of uneasiness and disturbance to him, and procure for him natural barriers to his dominions on the quarter where they were most exposed. That the country in question affords this barrier is certain; it shelters him absolutely to the north by the Thibet mountains, and to the south and west by the Ganges, a river hazardous at all times for an enemy to cross. That it was on these ideas the Rohilla expedition was undertaken appears manifestly from the records of the Council and Select Committee, where that country is always mentioned standing in the predicament here defined, and in effect its defence against the Mahrattas was taken up on these very grounds two years past without any particular stipulations for the service or contract for 10 lakhs on its success.

I trust I have sufficiently explained to the Board, and particularly to Mr. Francis, who is surprised at my declaring for the defence of the Rohilla country, the motives upon which I ground my opinion. I think I have clearly shown it was sound policy in the late Board to undertake the expedition, that the defence and security of the Vizier's dominions rendered it eligible, that it had received mature consideration before it came recommended from the Chair, and that if what I have already pointed out are the objects of our alliance with the Vizier often approved of by the Company, the late administration could not have acted more conformably to their interests and intentions.

Much notice has been taken in the course of our debates on these subjects of the expression in the Vizier's letter of his right to retain and dismiss the Brigade—"I am the master in these points and without my leave never shall it depart," and it has been held forth as dictating in the most imperious manner his commands to the Council, but these Asiatic expressions will not alter the nature of the transaction with those who know the fact, that the terms were dictated by the Board and meant to convey to his mind that if he acquiesced to the propositions made the aid to be granted should be effectual; and yet such were the advantages asked for the Company that even with this assurance of solid and effectual support, the Board did not flatter themselves he would have consented, but doubted, so hard were the conditions, his acceptance of the terms proffered. Further, I conceive the expression alluded to, as referring only to the condition of retaining at all times a brigade of our troops for the defence of his dominions when he shall require it, and continue to pay the subsidy stipulated by the Treaty of Banares. The very nature of all such compacts, are that the party requiring and paying for such defensive aid shall be the sole judge of the necessity of demanding it and shall retain it while he thinks the necessity lasts, without however precluding the other party from recalling it to its own defence or on other exigences; the contract is mutual and the conditions so intimately tied together that they necessarily and consequently stand or fall to the ground at the same time: while you retain, you pay; when you recall, the pay ceases. On such terms I confess I wish the Vizier may always retain a brigade of our troops; it would ease the Company of the heavy burthen of one-third of their whole army, and at the same time preserve it equally ready for their service, whenever the urgency of their own affairs should oblige them to recall it.

On the whole, I have objected to the late measures not only on the general grounds but as to the mode of proceeding. At the time the General laid his proposal before the Board, we had accounts of a proposal pending for finishing the war entirely; we were informed that the negotiations with the Vizier for the payment of the sums due from him were in good train, and we were in hourly expectations of hearing something more definitive on these heads. Yet in this situation, without taking time to enquire fully into the origin and nature of our engagements with the Vizier, without even reading the correspondence with Mr. Middleton, which had been called for and were then laying on the table unopened, we enter into resolutions which either precipitate or counteract all the former measures. We call away the Resident from the Vizier's Court, a measure always bearing an hostile aspect, and we order Colonel Champion or whoever should by chance have the chief command, without regard either to his talents or his temper, to demand with the brigade at his back immediate payment of the Vizier or to withdraw from him, leaving him with his new conquests and old dominions to defend themselves. The natural tendency of these steps is a public disapprobation of past measures and a publication to the world of the censure they fix on the late administration; they may give rise to jealousy in the mind of the Vizier and create fears of hostile intentions towards him, and consequently induce him to attempt evading or protracting the fulfilling his engagements, untill he shall be convinced how we mean to act with regard to ours, to endanger the loss of the new conquests and to encourage the invasion of his ancient territories from the notion that we had withdrawn our protection from him, and consequently to involve us in new difficulties whether we abide by our.....treaties to defend him or remain spectators while he may be crush'd. Happily I think part of the mischief will be prevented by the reduction of the country being entirely completed and the payments in a great measure made before these orders could arrive, but still I apprehend enough of bad effects, and once more declare my total dissent to the opinions of the majority of the Board.

(Sd.) R. BARWELL.

Mr. Francis also begs leave to enter the following explanation in reply to Mr. Barwell—

Mr. Francis in order to remove every possible doubt from Mr. Barwell's mind concerning the force and intention of his observations on the political

measures of the late administration, desires leave to observe, that he did undoubtedly mean to assert a strong disapprobation of those measures, and that the terms, in which he has expressed himself, are mild and moderate in comparison of what he really thinks of their conduct. At all events he considers it as his strict right to give his opinion freely in Council declaring at the same time that he meant no personal offence to any man. If this were a contest about *words*, and if *things* of the greatest moment were not at stake, Mr. Francis would wish to recall Mr. Barwell's attention to the studied courtesy and respect, with which Mr. Francis ventured to express a difference from him in matter of opinion.

With regard to that point on which Mr. Barwell is pleased to call on Mr. Francis for an explanation, he willingly gives it to him in the following terms.

"It was to his purpose to show that the late Council had acted in diametrical opposition to the orders and sentiments of the Court of Directors. It did not however necessarily follow, that they were *all* aware that they were doing so. He therefore hoped that the consideration of those orders might still have great weight with Mr. Barwell, though he could not expect that they should have so much weight with the Governor General, who had confessed to Suja Dowla, that he was acting against the peremptory orders of his superiors."

For what reasons the Governor should make such a declaration to the Vizier, would form a separate question. Having once made it, and having really acted up to his declaration, he is precluded from the possibility of reconciling his conduct with the letter or spirit of his instructions from home. In strict consistency of reasoning, the Governor General is bound to avow that he acted upon such principles of policy or evident necessity as, in his judgment, superseded the consideration of any orders from the Court of Directors.

(Sd.) P. FRANCIS.

Fort William, the 8th December 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT :

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Monday. LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

The HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

The Governor General also delivers in the following copy of his address to the Court of Directors and his Minute transmitted to them by the British King—

To the Hon'ble the Court of Directors for affairs of the Hon'ble the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

Fort William, 3rd December 1774.

HON'BLE SIRS,—The accompanying sheets were originally begun in the form in which they now appear of a regular Minute, intended for a record on the consultations but to be transmitted also as a number in the packet by the ship now under despatch, for your immediate perusal. But understanding since that the members composing the majority of the Council have drawn up a similar appeal in a letter to your Hon'ble Court, I consider it my duty to address you in the same form with the proposed Minute as an enclosure, earnestly recommending it to your attention.

In these papers I have confined myself to the subject on which they were expressly written, namely the justification of the late campaign, and the examination of the Acts of the new Council. Not having yet seen their letter, I cannot reply particularly to any other charge which it may contain. Yet I will beg leave to offer a few necessary remarks upon the state of your collections, treasury and expenses, as these are points on which the enquiries of the

gentlemen of the majority, unless conducted with great care, may have misled them, and of which it may be of very material consequence to me to prevent any impression which their representations may make, in default of more authentic information.

That the collections should be less than they were some years ago, is an unavoidable consequence of the loss of inhabitants which this country sustained in the dreadful calamity of the year 1770. It must still be the case in spite of every effort we may make; but the circumstances of this and the other causes which have contributed to the reduction of the revenue (particularly the anticipation of it in the salt districts) have been so often enlarged upon in the

See the following general letters :
 3rd November 1772, paragraphs 7,
 8, 9, 30, 35, and 48.
 3rd December 1772, paragraph 6.
 27th February 1773, paragraphs
 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 36.
 10th November 1773, paragraphs
 3, 32, and 33.
 31st December 1773, paragraphs
 6, 7, 8, and 14.
 15th March 1774, paragraph 10.
 18th October 1774, paragraph 5.

letters from the late Administration, that I will not trouble you with a repetition. The actual receipts of last year (the Bengal year 1180) do however exceed those of the preceding year by three lakhs of rupees, exclusive of the profit on the salt trade, which is quite a new fund, and has amounted independently of the duties, to sicca rupees ten lakhs, fifty-eight thousand, two hundred and fourteen (sicca Rs. 10,58,214), and the very voluminous

proceedings of the Revenue Council will evince how much of our time and attention has been engaged by this branch of your affairs.

The estimates transmitted you by the resolution which show a saving of twenty-two lakhs, ninety-five thousand, seven hundred and seventeen current rupees (22,95,717 Ct. Rs.) in the civil expenses, and of twenty-four lakhs, forty-three thousand, one hundred and nineteen current rupees (24,43,119 Ct. Rs.) in the military, and our proceedings in the Board of Inspection which I beg leave to recommend to your observation, will satisfy you that our best endeavours have been exerted to establish the system of economy and method which you have so repeatedly enjoined; and as the strongest proof of the success of these our endeavours and of the prosperity of your affairs, I submit to your consideration the following short sketch of our present resources compared with our situation a twelve month ago.

At the end of August 1773 our bond debt amounted to current rupees one hundred and twenty-five lacs, fifty-five thousand, six hundred and seven Ct. Rs. 1,25,55,697) and the temporary loan, which we had with difficulty raised, was barely sufficient to supply our present expences. The debt is now reduced to current rupees one hundred and ten lacs, seventy-two thousand, seven hundred and twenty-four (Ct. Rs. 1,10,72,724). Provision has been made for a much larger investment than was procured last year. Seventy lacs of rupees are to be received from the Vizier, of which the greatest part is now in course of payment; and although we avoided drawing any bills upon you last season and have strictly confined ourselves this season to the sum limited by your orders, there is at this time a balance of current rupees eighty lacs, forty-nine thousand, eight hundred and six (Ct. Rs. 80,49,806) actually lying in our treasuries, as particularized in the enclosed account.

I do not expect that the services on which your military forces have been employed (excepting in the single instance of the Rohilla war) will be made an article against me, yet I will not leave this subject unnoticed.

Every military expedition undertaken during the period in which I lately presided in the administration, has been concerted for services of solid utility, and calculated for precise termination.

The campaign of 1773 had the recovery of the districts of Cora for its immediate object, and the application of it to the relief of the Company's wants for its termination, and it was begun and concluded long within the space of a year.

The last campaign has been ended with the most complete success in eight months, and, exclusive of its political effects, has added many lakhs to your pecuniary resources.

Even in the less considerable services in which detachments of your forces have been employed some beneficial end has been carefully attended to, regular plans have been concerted and steadily pursued by Captain Carnac's operations

at Ramgur, that country has been brought into subjection, and a considerable addition of revenue acquired. By the battalion employed in the Jungleterry, a tract of country which was considered as inaccessible and unknown and only served as a receptacle to robbers, has been reduced to Government, the inhabitants civilized, and not only the reduction of the revenues, which was occasioned by their ravages, prevented, but some revenue yielded from this country itself, which a prosecution of the same measures will improve.

The Cooch Behar expedition produced its full effects in the settlement of that country; and even the detachments employed against the Sencarries completely answered the intention for which they were ordered.

Whatever errors may have fallen to the share of the late administration, I trust that they will not be found in points of real magnitude. As to those which may appear in measures of little moment, such are unavoidable; they are necessary to a government so constituted, and crowded with objects so various, as this has been; the first principle of which is despatch: and our records are the best evidences of the regard we have paid to this principle. On these two I shall rest for proof that it will not be my fault if our future records shall present you with minutes of controversy—protests, charges and recriminations—instead of the rapid progression of business, and cordial attention to your interests, even in the anticipation of your commands, which it was my happiness to experience in the labours of the gentlemen who were formerly united with me in the charge of your affairs.

Painful as my situation is likely to prove and unsuitable to my disposition, it is my determined resolution to retain the place which your favour originally assigned me and the legislation has since so honorably confirmed, till your justice shall decide between me and my opponents. My only resources are in the knowledge, however imperfect, which a long and local practice in the affairs of this Presidency may have furnished me, and of which the gentlemen of the majority, even for their own sakes, will not deny me the application, and the experience and abilities of Mr. Barwell, whose support I thankfully acknowledge with the more pleasure as I esteem it to proceed more from a just conviction of the propriety of my conduct than personal attachment.

I beg leave in all submission to observe that this is not a case to which palliatives can be applied. The legislature has enacted that a Council consisting of five members should form a general administration for your affairs in Bengal, and for your political interests in all India. By the manner in which the Parliament thought proper to express the office of Governor General as distinct from the Council, as well as by universal usage, some peculiar power and responsibility seemed tacitly reserved for him above the other members of the Council; but if it shall appear to you that his authority, as the executive and ostensible instrument of your Government, has been overpowered, and that a majority consisting of three members of the Council has been formed, not by an accidental variation in opinion, but by a decided and permanent combination against the other two, it will necessarily follow that the intentions of the Parliament have been frustrated, and the Council in effect made to consist of three members instead of five, and that therefore nothing but a decisive remedy can restore that harmony to the Government which is irrecoverably lost to the parts of which the present is composed, and save your property and the national interests in these Provinces from anarchy and ruin.

I will not quit the ground which I stand on in this address, to appeal to the large portion of my life spent in your service, nor to the important trusts in which it was my lot to be employed from the earliest period of it. I rest my cause solely on the measures which have drawn me into my present vindication; I adopted them for your benefit and for the national honor, and I know they have been productive of both to the utmost reach of my wishes. Relying on your justice and on the consciousness of my own integrity, I shall wait with patience for your determination on the subject of this address, nor shall my care be wanting to prevent your affairs from suffering in the long interval which must be unavoidably left to disorder.

If you should judge me fit to be continued in the chief direction of your affairs, I have already said, and I yet repeat, that I am willing and desirous to devote what remains of the active season of my life to your service. But allow

me, Honorable Sirs, to hope that I may be furnished with means equal to the responsibility, which ought and must be annexed to the first station whosoever shall fill it.

If on the contrary it shall be decreed, either by your Honorable Court or by yet higher authority, that I shall yield my place to any other, I shall submit without a murmur to the sentence; nor shall the severity of it make me lose the sense of gratitude which I feel and owe to the obligations already laid upon me, although it will be impossible for me to forego the conscious pride of having, even in the most obnoxious instances of my public conduct, manifested that principle by an undeviating attachment to the interests of the Company, which I have ever regarded as the interests of my country.

I have the honor to be with the greatest respect,

FORT WILLIAM,
The 3rd December 1774.

Hon'ble Sirs, &c., &c., &c..
(Sd.) WARREN HASTINGS.

I have purposely deferred the reply which I have recorded my intention to make to the minutes entered by the General and Mr. Francis in consultation of the third instant, because I foresaw that in the justification of my own conduct, from the severe censures which were cast upon it in those minutes, and in the opinion which it was incumbent upon me to express of the conduct of the majority of the Board which was the immediate object of them, I should be led into so long a train of arguments and facts, as would require more time to select and arrange them, than I could bestow in the daily pressure of current business. I have yet a stronger impulse for suspending so disagreeable a task, in the hope with which I was willing to flatter myself that some way of accommodation might still be found before the close of the packet to remove the necessity of entering on a subject, which, in whatever form it might appear, must set my conduct and that of the other members of the Council before the Hon'ble Court of Directors in a point of view so alarming as to require their most peremptory decision between us, and must of course stop up every avenue to a future cordiality. Faint as this hope was, I continued to indulge it while a possibility remained of its being accomplished. I now proceed, with whatever reluctance, to the last resource which is left me, an appeal to the Hon'ble Court of Directors, on whose justice I throw myself for the vindication of my own conduct, and of the measures of the late administration, against the reproaches which have been cast upon them, and for the reparation of the violence, which has been offered to the authority committed to me by the Parliament of Great Britain, in the late acts of the majority of the Council.

Mr. Barwell's observation on Mr. Francis's minute being a sufficient refutation of the arguments contained both in that and the General's, I shall decline replying in form to either; but as the Rohilla war has been the declared source of the most violent measures adopted by the majority of the Council, I shall briefly recapitulate the grounds and objects of that enterprise, and then proceed to answer the various arguments which have been urged in condemnation of it.

In the beginning of the year 1772, the Mahrattas invaded the country of the Rohillas which, after a short but ineffectual opposition at Sukkertoll, was left at large exposed to their ravages. The Vizier alarmed at their approach to the only part of his dominions which was easily accessible by such an enemy, applied with such earnestness to Sir Robert Barker, who was at that time with him, for the assistance of an English force, and the General thought the necessity so urgent, that of his own authority he sent orders to the first brigade, which was stationed at Dinapore, to march instantly into the Province of Oude. The Board disapproving this irregular proceeding refused their confirmation of it, and the brigade having reach'd the length of Benares remain'd there till the beginning of June and then returned to its former station. The Vizier availing himself of this movement offered his protection to the Rohillas and entered into a general treaty of alliance with the chiefs of that nation, and a separate

one with Hafiz Rahmut Khan their principal, who, in their name and with their authority, engaged to pay him 40 lakhs of rupees for that support, whenever the Mahrattas evacuated the country. Translations of both treaties are recorded at length in the consultation of the 23rd of July 1772, and the original of the latter is in the actual possession of the Secretary, attested by General Barker, who was present at the ratification of both.

On the approach of the rainy season, the Mahrattas evacuated the country, and the Vizier demanded the stipulated recompense from the Rohillas, but they evaded the payment.

In the latter end of 1772, the Mahrattas having extorted from the King a grant of the districts of Korah and Kurrah which had been ceded to him by the Company for the express purpose of maintaining his dignity, were preparing to take possession, and as this acquisition would have made them masters of the whole tract of country lying between the rivers Ganges and Jumnah, and bordering upon the Province of Oude, the Vizier again applied for assistance to repel such dangerous neighbours.

The proceedings of the late Council in their Secret Department of the 1st of February 1773, treat this subject very largely, and show how much they considered not only the safety of the Vizier, but even of the Company's possessions to be endangered by this formidable encroachment of the Mahratta State. It was ultimately concluded, to comply with the requisition of the Vizier, by sending the first brigade for the protection of his dominions against any attempt which the Mahrattas might make on them, and also determined to prevent their design on Korah, by taking prior possession for the Company, who had certainly the best title to it when the King could no longer keep it. It was not to be supposed the Mahrattas would submit quietly to the loss of a territory which they had used the most perfidious means to obtain, and every precaution was therefore necessary to guard against their efforts to recover it. The Company's orders of the 28th August 1771 expressly allowed the necessity of departing, on some occasions, from the limited plan which they had for a long time past enjoined, and in consequence the Rohilla country north of the Ganges was included within the line of action prescribed to the General in his instructions, because if the Mahrattas, either by the defeat, or, which was as likely to happen, by the desertion of the Rohillas to their cause, should gain a footing in that country, nothing could oppose their entering into the Province of Oude and laying it waste, in spite of any attempts of our forces to prevent them. The map which accompanies this will demonstrate this truth, more powerfully than any verbal argument.

It was not to be supposed that the Mahrattas whose ambition for some years past had aspired to universal conquest, and who had extended their arms from the center of the Balaghaut to the northern extremity of Indostan, should sit down contented when they had added the Duab, Korah and Allahabad to their dominions. On the contrary, there was every reason to apprehend, and it was publicly reported in their own camp, that they would next carry their operations into the country of the Vizier, and even into the Company's own possessions.

On the grounds which I have described, it was agreed to maintain the Province of Korah against the Mahrattas and afterwards to extend our arms beyond the prescribed line of the dominions of our ally into the Rohilla country, by a discretionary latitude allowed the General as above mentioned, which he accordingly made use of by marching the brigade as far as Ramgaut, and we have the strongest reason to believe that it was attended with every immediate advantage which we had projected from such a measure, as the Mahrattas lay during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our army, but without daring either to cross the river or to approach the borders of Korah; and before the setting in of the rains of that year, their domestic troubles obliged them to return into their own proper dominions.

Of the resolution to enter the Rohilla country for its defence against the Mahrattas, the Court of Directors were first advised in the general letter by the Resolution of the 31st of March 1773, which arrived in England long before the departure of the transports.

The effectual protection thus afforded the Rohillas, and the departure of the Mahrattas, having established beyond all contest the right of the Vizier to the 40 lakhs which had been stipulated for this important service, and which by the terms of the engagement were really due the preceding year, on the retreat of the Mahrattas from their country, he demanded payment of Hafiz Rahmut Khan, who refused it. The Vizier also accused him of having secretly encouraged the Mahrattas and sent them a supply of money, and, if I mistake not, General Sir Robert Barker in some of his letters mentions the same circumstance. The plea of justice thus coinciding with the principles of sound policy, which dictated to the Vizier the necessity of securing himself against the perfidy and intrigues of the Rohillas, who from their situation were most capable of hurting him in his contests with more powerful enemies, and from their natural weakness and the jealousy inseparable from it, would ever seek for their safety in fomenting or joining in attempts against him, he formed the design of invading and reducing their country. As his own strength was unequal to such an undertaking, he solicited the aid of this Government for effecting it, and made an offer of 50 lakhs of rupees to be paid on its accomplishment.

As this proposal was urged in the warmest terms, both in person to Sir Robert Barker and in his letters to me, and this had long been a favourite project of the Vizier, the Board judged with me, that it might afford a fair occasion to urge the improvement of our alliance, by obtaining his assent to a more equitable compensation for the expence attending the aid which he occasionally received from our forces, and to free the Company from the embarrassment to which they might be subjected by retaining the property and possession of the remote districts of Korah and Allahabad. For this purpose it was agreed that I should write the following letter to the Vizier which I beg leave to quote at large, because it fixes the source of these engagements, which took place by a progressive train of measures and terminated in the Rohilla war, and will mark at least that this was not the effect either of a precipitate and unweighed resolution or a tame acquiescence in the Vizier's schemes of ambition, but the result of long deliberation originally devised and consistently employed as an instrument of promoting the interests of the Company of perpetuating the dependence of their ally, and converting it to the channel of solid utility.

Fort William, 21st April 1873.

"I have received Your Excellency's letter mentioning the particulars of your operations against the Mahrattas. You promise to the General that whenever the Mahrattas should be driven out of the Rohilla country and Hafiz Rahmut Khan shall fulfill his agreement of 40 lakhs of rupees, you will give half that sum to the Company, and that should the Rohilla Chiefs be guilty of a breach of their agreement and we thoroughly exterminate them and settle Your Excellency in the country, you will in that case pay the Company 50 lakhs of rupees in ready money, and exempt them from the King's tribute. Upon the same subject the General has also written to me fully. Every circumstance which you have written to me I consider as a proof of the cordial attachment which subsists between us, and of the confidence and reliance which you place in the friendship of the English Company; but the points which you have proposed require much consideration, and the previous ratification of a formal agreement, before I can assent to them, otherwise I may incur the displeasure of my employers.

"It is true that I have long thought that the union of the Rohilla country with yours, either by a sure and permanent obligation of friendship, or by reducing it to obedience, if they should render such an attempt justifiable by an act of enmity or treachery, would be an advisable point for you to attain, because by that means the defensive line of your dominions would be completed, by including within it all the land lying on that side of the river Ganges, and you would be in no danger from an attack on that quarter, whenever the Mahrattas should commit disturbances in another.

"But it appears to me that this is an object not to be obtained by an occasional view of that country, and its distance from the province of Bengal will not admit of the continuance of the English forces longer than the period which remains of dry weather. You will please to remember they were sent for your

assistance, and to defend the province of Korah against the Mahrattas. Thus far only I am authorized by the commands of my superiors to employ them beyond the limits of their own possessions, and even this is the cause of a heavy loss and risk to their affairs, especially in the expence of their troops and stores, and in the absence of so great a part of their force, which was originally destined for the sole defence of the countries dependant on Bengal. You have frequently repeated in your letters the remark, 'that to wait till the enemy was at your door, and then to write for the assistance of our forces, could answer no good purpose, but that every year the same cause would require their return to the same service, and pass without effecting any purpose of real advantage.' My friend, all this is true, but it proceeds from the want of proper measures having been previously taken, and from the imperfect footing on which affairs between us have been established.

"The concern which the Company takes in your safety, and the duties of friendship which their commands and our own inclinations equally enjoin us to observe inviolably to their allies, and especially one so closely united by an approved attachment to them, would not suffer us to withhold our aid when your affairs require it. But it has always been with reluctance that we have suffered the army to pass the frontiers of our own country, because the loss and inconvenience attending it was certain, and altho' joined with your forces, there is no cause to fear the most powerful efforts of our enemies, yet the events of war are at the disposal of the Almighty, and the only fruits which the most splendid successes can afford us, are the reputation of having retained the faith of our alliance in opposition to every incentive of self-interest and self-defence.

"Thus circumstanced, we are precluded from deriving any benefit from your support, and ours can only afford you a relief from present danger, without any provision of future security. For these reasons I have often wished for a personal interview with you, for the purpose of removing difficulties and perpetuating the alliance with Your Excellency on terms more suitable to our mutual interests: Your Excellency also hath repeatedly expressed the same inclination. I therefore write, that if your affairs will at this season admit of your giving me a meeting, I will hasten to obtain it as soon as I am able, after the receipt of your letter in reply to this; if otherwise, I must wait for it at some more distant period, as the affairs of this Government will indispensably require my presence at this place after three or four months, and it is uncertain when I shall again have an interval of leisure for such a journey.

"In the meantime Your Excellency and the General are at a great distance from the Province of Korah, and as the affairs of that Province require the presence of a person on the behalf of the Company to regulate and take charge of it, until it shall be hereafter determined in what manner it shall be finally disposed of, I have judged it advisable to depute Mr. James Lawrell, a gentleman of the Council of Calcutta, on this service, and he will set out accordingly in a few days, which I hope you will approve."

The assurance thus held out to the Vizier succeeded. He proposed in reply a meeting with me at Benares, which took place accordingly. I found him still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as I had before done, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success, but objecting with great force the orders of the Company restricting us from such remote schemes of conquest, to which therefore I could not assent without such conditions obtained in return for it as might obviate their displeasure and win their sanction to so hazardous and unauthorized a measure.

I fear not to quote these expressions, addressing myself to fair and unbiass'd judges who will not infer my real sentiments from the style and arguments of a political negotiation.

I told him that the Company had drawn themselves into fresh distress by the enormous load of their military expences, one entire brigade being kept up for the sole purpose of maintaining a connection with him, since it was useless and unnecessary to the protection of our own provinces, that if he wished therefore to avail himself of our aid, either in preventing or even in repelling the designs of his enemies, he must first agree to bear a more equal share of the burthen of the expence by paying the whole charge of the forces lent him for this service while they were so employed. To this, after much contention, he

assented, and the sum of 2,10,000 rupees, which the General computed to be the amount of the expence, was fixed as the monthly subsidy to be pay'd for the brigade, when it should pass the borders of the Province of Bahar on his requisition. Having obtained this point, which I considered in the light of a perpetual military fund, I easily yielded my assent to the Rohilla plan, on the stipulation of 40 lakhs for its accomplishment, 10 lakhs being deducted from his first offer on account of the difference which had taken place in the subsidy.

This agreement was no sooner made than he suddenly repented, desired to decline the war with the Rohillas, till a more favourable conjunction when he should be less embarrassed by other engagements, agreeing however to the monthly subsidy whenever his future occasions should oblige him to require the aid of our forces. Thus the Rohilla plan remained rather suspended than wholly abandoned, although it was left optional in our Government to reject or assent to it on a future occasion. Messrs. Lawrell and Vansittart, who were with me at the time, and to whom I made a daily communication in writing of the substance of every conversation which passed between the Vizier and myself, will vouch for the literal truth of this narrative, as corresponding with what I then repeated to them, and I believe it will appear from it, that although I had not engaged the Government by any express obligation to comply with any future application of the Vizier to support his pretensions on the Rohillas, yet as the most essential article of the Treaty had originated from this design, and had been yielded to in consideration of my agreement to engage in it, it would have been dishonourable to decline the undertaking, when proposed under circumstances as favourable to its success, and to the general interests of the Company, as they were when I first offered to engage in it.

Soon after my return to Calcutta the Vizier renew'd the proposal for invading the Rohillas, and repeated his desire of engaging in it on the conditions before agreed on. A variety of arguments concurr'd to favour it at this particular time; none to oppose it. The Mahrattas were so much occupied by their own dissensions that they could not even defend their own possessions in the Duab, much less were they likely to interrupt our operations against the Rohillas. The King had no means of interference, but by his General Nudjuf Khan, for whose attachment we had stronger security in his interest and his fear of his rival Abdulahed Khan, than his master had in his allegiance. The Rohillas were too weak to resist so powerful an attack, and as their country was open and undefended, either by defiles, woods or fortresses, and in its greatest extent did not exceed 200 miles, its entire subjection did not require any length of time.

To these inducements, which apply only to the success of the undertaking, other motives equally powerfully engaged our attention to it, as a measure necessary to the interests and safety of the Company.

All our advices both public and private, represented the distresses of the Company at home as extreme. The letters from the Court of Directors called upon us most loudly for ample remittances and a reduction of our military expences; at the same time such was the state of affairs in this Government that for many years past the income of the year was found inadequate to its expences, to defray which a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to a hundred and twenty-five lakhs of rupees, had accumulated. The Board bestowed much labour and time in the retrenchment of their expences, but much remained yet to be done, and the regulations which they had already formed required time to produce any visible effects. By allowing the Vizier the military aid which he required, a saving of near one-third of our military expences would be effected during the period of such a service; the stipulation of 40 lakhs would afford an ample supply to our treasury and to the Currency of the country. The Vizier would be freed from a troublesome neighbour, and his dominions would be made more defensible, while his alliance with the Company subsisted, by being completely shut in between the river Ganges and the Mountains, and his dependance on the Company would be increased by that extension of his possessions, as he himself was incapable of defending even his ancient possessions without our support.

For a more ample discussion of these arguments, I beg leave to refer to the consultation in the Secret Department of the 26th November 1773, in which it

was concluded after a long debate to consent to the Vizier's requisition. As a precaution against any effects which were to be apprehended from the Vizier's irresolution, the conditions originally accepted for this engagement were dictated to him in the form of a letter to be written by him, in which a clause was inserted that whether the country was conquer'd or a peace concluded between him and the enemy, the stipulation for the payment of the 40 lakhs should become equally due. Of this engagement I shall speak more hereafter.

On the 24th February 1774 the brigade arrived within the territory of the Vizier, on the 17th of April the united forces entered the borders of the Rohilla dominions, and on the 23rd of the same month engaged and defeated the Rohillas with the death of their leader Hafiz Rahmut Khan. From that period the conquest of that country may be dated, no material opposition having been since made.

On the 6th of October the war was finally concluded by the treaty with Fyzoolah Khan, 15 lakhs of rupees which he engaged to pay to the Vizier in ready money, were to be immediately appropriated to the payment of part of the stipulation of 40 lakhs due from the Vizier to the Company, and we are informed that the Vizier is returned with expedition to Fyzabad for the express purpose of discharging the remainder. The subsidy had been punctually paid to the end of September by the last advices received on that subject from Colonel Champion, dated the 24th of October.

I now proceed to answer the objections which have been urged against the propriety of this undertaking. These may be reduced to the following heads—

- 1st.—That it was contrary to the express peremptory and repeated orders of the Company.
- 2nd.—That it was contrary to the repeated declarations and promises of the Board.
- 3rd.—That it was unjust.
- 4th.—That it exposed the Company to the hazard of an indefinite or an endless war.
- 5th.—That it might have involved the Company in a war with the Mah-rattas, and may still draw on us their future resentment.
- 6th.—That by a removal of the third part of the whole military establishment to so great a distance, our own Provinces were exposed to danger.
- 7th.—That by aggrandizing the Vizier it might render him a dangerous neighbour, and deprive the Company of the benefits of his alliance.
- 8th.—That it was resolved on precipitately without a formal treaty; the conditions of it appearing only in a letter from the Vizier, where they are loosely expressed and liable to evasion.
- 9th.—That the conditions which the Vizier expresses that the brigade should never depart without his permission, was an instance of arrogance in him and of an unbecoming submission in the late Administration, and might prove the cause of their being detained for ever.

In the above articles I have not confined myself to the public records, but have endeavoured to collect the substance of all I have seen or have heard upon this side of the argument, and have chosen to clothe it in my own language; that which I have found prepared for me not being in every instance such as I allow myself to use, even in retaliation of personal injury. much less in application to measures which immediately regard myself, I shall reply separately to each.

1st.—I have read over with great attention all the letters which have been received from the Hon'ble Court of Directors since the year 1769 and long ago abstracted all the paragraphs written within that period upon the subject of the Company's political concerns, those having been given me for my special guidance in my negotiations with the Vizier the last year at Benares. I find nothing contained in any of these which expressly applies to the case in question. I meet with injunctions, "to avoid new connections," to endeavour "to keep peace in Bengal and with the neighbouring powers," and to

Vide Mr. Francis's Minute entered in Consultation of the 3rd November.

General letter, 11th May 1769, para. 346.
30th June 1769, paras. 1st and 3rd.

confine our views to the security and tranquillity of Bengal, not to acquire further possessions, but to advert to the good management of those which we have, "to incline to those few chiefs in Indostan who are in a condition to struggle with the Mahrattas," "to defend the King's person and the district of Korah and Illahabad" which is mentioned as an exception to their limited plan, "to make known to the powers of India, that it is by no means the intention of the Company to encroach upon their neighbours or to acquire an extension of dominion by conquest," "that they regard with a jealous eye the encroaching power of the Mahrattas," and "that it would be bad policy to take part in any operations which might weaken the few remaining chiefs who are in a condition to oppose their encroachments." But the following extracts are so pointedly apposite to the subject, that I shall take the liberty to quote them at large.

Instructions to the Commissioners, para. 2nd.

General letter 15th September 1769, para. 28.

"It is with the most serious concern we learn from your late advices, that the incursion of the Mahrattas had spread such a terror and despondency into the minds of those powers which were the remoter barrier of our possessions, that the irresolution and timidity of the most potent of them have given rise to such successes as have encouraged the Mahrattas to invade the dominions of the King and lay claim to a part of the territory of Sujah Dowla, but the conduct of the Rohillas and Jauts is rather a matter of concern than surprise to us, as the King and Sujah Dowla neglected that occasion to unite with those powers effectually, to repel the common disturbers of the empire and confine them within the limits of their former possessions. To whatever causes this general timidity or supineness may have been owing, we find ourselves equally affected, and the tranquillity of the provinces endangered thereby; but as the projects of the King or the conduct of the Vizier are at present too mysterious for us to decide on the motives of their inactivity, and as we know not what alliance may be formed to justify us in carrying our arms beyond the bounds of their dominions, we are prevented from proposing any plan for your guidance in this respect, but should your subsequent advices enable us to form a more certain judgment of the expediency of departing from the plan we have laid down, we shall communicate it to you by some early conveyance how far we may be disposed to carry our arms beyond the bounds of the Provinces or the territories of our allies and become the parties in an offensive war. In the meantime we trust your sole objects will be the security of our possessions and those of the powers with whom we are connected both by treaty and interest; and as this appears to have been the guide of your conduct upon the Mahrattas invading the Province of Korah, we with pleasure approve the measures you have taken for defending the dominions of the King and Vizier from their inroads and depredations, more especially as those measures are not only justified by necessity, but are within the line which we have prescribed for your conduct in such a conjuncture."

General letter to Fort St. George, 24th November 1772, para. 10.

"The line of neutrality is still recommended, but the Board are authorised to depart from it, whenever the interests of the Company shall be endangered, or shall materially require it."

The directions promised us in the letter of the 20th August 1771, have never yet been sent us, nor have we yet since received any further lights to guide us on this important subject, which I presume to place to the account of the troubles which have embarrassed the Company at home.

From the above quotations and the consistency which strongly marks all the orders on this subject, I apprehend it will clearly appear that the principle primarily insisted upon by the Hon'ble Court of Directors respecting their political and military operations, was to avoid the extension of territory, and this we have never attempted.

The prohibition of military expeditions, undertaken beyond the prescribed bounds of their own provinces and those of their allies, on prudential and cautionary motives or other causes, independent of territorial acquisition, is only to be inferred from the tendency and tenor of their reasonings on their former subjects; it is evident that it was not from inattention that their orders never expressed a prohibition of this kind, but that they rather avoided it from a

conviction that it might *sometimes* be necessary, and because it would have been difficult to mark the limitations of it. This conclusion I draw not only from the two last paragraphs of their orders which I have quoted at length, and which were dictated by the experience of past advices, and a more intimate consideration of the subject, but even from their orders so far back as the 30th of June 1769, in which having declared against an extension of possession in the 1st paragraph, they add in the 3rd their "opinion that the most prudent system they could pursue and the most likely to be attended with a permanent security to the provinces, would be to incline to those chiefs of Indostan who yet preserve an independence of the Mahratta power and are in a condition to struggle with them." But in the two last of the above quotations there is no occasion of logical surmises to discover the intentions of the Hon'ble Court of Directors; they tell us plainly that it is their wish "to confine their views to the security of their own possessions and those of their allies, but that they foresee the necessity in certain cases of carrying their arms beyond those bounds, and of becoming parties in an offensive war," and they promise in an *early* communication of their instructions with regard to the lengths to which they will allow this doctrine to be extended. In their letter to the Presidency of Fort St. George they authorise them in express terms "to observe no longer the neutrality so heartily wished for by them" in case they should judge it necessary for their interests to depart from it, and it is not to be supposed that the Court of Directors would recommend one line of conduct for their Government of Fort St. George and an opposite one for Bengal, much less that they would admit of such a deviation from their former pacific plan on merely political motives attended with a heavy expence, and yet prohibit it under circumstances which, in addition to the same motives, have every consideration of economy to recommend it with the prospect of an increase to their finances, at a time when their distresses both at home and abroad so urgently required such an increase, and their most peremptory commands (as I have already observed) rendered it the first object of our attention.

I presume to affirm, both for myself and the other members of the late Council, that no period in the Company's annals has been more evidently characterized by an exact submission to their commands than that in which I have had the honor to preside in the administration; and for the truth of this I dare appeal to the Hon'ble Court of Directors.

But in cases to which their commands do not specially apply, to adopt such measures as at the same time approach nearest to the spirit of their general instructions and tend most to the advancement of their interests, is the fairest test both of our obedience and fidelity. We might have suffered the Mahrattas under cover of the King's grant to take possession of Korah and Illahabad, to have allied themselves with the Rohillas or established themselves in that territory, and lain with their armies unmolested on the borders of the open country of our ally the Vizier, till they had completed every preparation for invading it. Such a forbearance might perhaps have been vindicated, by the plea that the Company had promised at the distance of two years preceeding it to furnish us with their instructions for a different conduct, and that, wanting those instructions, we took for our rule their latest orders on the subject, which enjoined us to confine our views to the bare security of our own possessions and those of our allies.

This might have been a sure way to guard our characters against legal imputation, although in fact it would have been inconsistent with the security required; but it is not by such cold and prudential cautions that the British name has acquired such a lustre in India, nor that the British Empire in Bengal is likely to be perpetuated, neither is this the conduct which the Company demands of us. Their orders are enforced by a more liberal spirit, and allow in such cases as are not reducible to fixed and invariable positions, a discretionary latitude for the zeal of their servants to exert itself for their security. I cannot better illustrate this than by the following extract of their general letter, dated the 30th June 1769, paragraph 5th—"We esteem ourselves bound by treaty to protect the King's person, and to secure him the possession of the Korah and Illahabad districts. When we wrote the 11th November 1768, we apprehended the consequences of keeping the brigade at Illahabad

would be creating in Sujah Dowla a jealousy that would involve us in fresh troubles, having at that time no cause to esteem him an enemy, but impressed as you were with an opinion of his hostile intentions and growing strength at the time of the dispatch of the 'Valentine,' we shall not blame your conduct for deferring the execution of your orders for its removal, nor shall we at this time attempt to give positive directions for your conduct, which in such critical cases ought seldom to be done, and in which the situation of affairs may be varied by unforeseen events at the very moment we are writing; but having given you with as much precision as possible, a general view of the system by which we wish to have our affairs regulated, we must leave it to you to improve to the utmost of your power every opportunity of drawing towards that point, and whenever you think yourselves obliged for our security upon emergent occasions to adopt measures of a contrary tendency, you are to give us very full reasons for such a deviation, and endeavour to return to the path we have marked out as soon as circumstances will admit."

2nd. The second objection is partly true: the Board has repeatedly declared in their general letters to the Court of Directors, their intentions to adhere to the defensive plan recommended to them, and confine their military operations within the limits of the Vizier's territories; and such were their determinations when these letters were written, but at those times they had not fully experienced the inconveniences which attended our engagements with the Vizier in the prosecution of that system, nor had the remedy occur'd which since presented itself in the conditions offer'd for prosecuting the Rohilla enterprize, and which has been successfully applied. Our treaty of alliance obliged us to support the Vizier, when his possessions were threatened with invasion at a heavy increased military expence, and the exportations of our currency with our troops; for three successive years these inconveniences had recurred, and it is impossible to say how often they might recur: at last an occasion took place when, by a slight deviation from the defensive plan, our alliance with the Vizier might be converted into solid advantages, the employment of our troops made to save near a third part our military expences, and the success of their operations to bring a large flow of Currency, not only into the Company's territories, but into their Treasury. In effect the very same reasons which before urged us to shirk every military expedition, namely the expence attending it and the exportation of our Currency, now operated in the contrary direction, and recommended the employment of our army for the purpose of reducing our expences and adding to our Currency.

The preceding argument respects only the general subject of foreign expeditions. It has been urged also, as an argument against the particular case in question, that the Board, when they adopted the measure of the Rohilla war, were convinced of the impropriety of it from the declarations made by them repeatedly in their letters to the Court of Directors, of their wish and hope that it might not take place. Upon this I beg leave to offer the following reflections.

A consistency of measures is difficult to be preserved among a body of men, because an accidental majority may occasionally decide for contrary resolutions, yet such a case has never happen'd at our Board. A consistency of opinions is not to be expected. The proposition of the Rohilla war, after having passed the Select Committee, was debated for three successive days in Council, in which the Board met, as I recollect, both morning and evening to discuss it: no two members agreed exactly in opinion, and it was difficult to reconcile them; at last they came to a final agreement to leave it to me, to accommodate my own as nearly as I could to the collective sense of the whole, which was done with much management, and the proposition was agreed to in the manner in which it stands in consultation, the 26th November 1773.

My sentiments were the same invariably from the beginning, as will be seen from my report to the Board of my proceedings at Benares, and my minute entered in the consultation above referred to. Private letters are not commonly admissible as authorities, but on this occasion I cannot produce a stronger both of my own fixed opinion from the first movement of this proposition, and of the apprehension which influenced the Board, and I confess myself also, against it, than the following extract of a letter which I wrote

to Mr. Sullivan by the first dispatch after my return from Benares. "I was glad to be freed from the Rohilla expedition, because I was doubtful of the judgement which would have been passed upon it at home, where I see too much stress laid upon general maxims and too little attention given to circumstances which require an exception to be made from them; besides this, an opinion still prevails of the Vizier's great power and his treacherous designs against us, and I cannot expect that my word shall be taken as a proof of their non-existence. On the other hand, the absence of the Mahrattas and the weak state of the Rohillas promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home, added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces that saved so much of their pay and expences."

When the measure was determined upon, and we had come to a general agreement, I was averse to introduce any new subject of debate, and therefore easily acquiesc'd in the expression of a wish entertain'd by the Board which might be construed as inconsistent with the resolution we had taken. My sentiments of the propriety of the expedition had undergone no change, but I will not deny that I felt myself influenced by the same fears which operated on the other members of the Council, that the propriety of the measure might not be seen in the same light by our constituents which we knew, from the temper of the times, might not only draw upon us their severe resentment, but aggravate the load of popular odium which has of late fallen on their servants, and, if I mistake not, these reasons were assign'd in express terms upon our proceedings.

3rd. The engagements between the Vizier and the Rohillas which have been already quoted, sufficiently evince the justice of the attack upon them; they agreed to make him an acknowledgement of 40 lacs of rupees upon certain conditions; he performed these conditions and they refused to pay any part of the money they had promised.

4th. No political transaction can be mathematically demonstrated to be totally free from danger: the probable advantages must be weighed against the probable disadvantages; when the present measure was undertaken there was every reason to expect that it would speedily be brought to a happy conclusion, and the event has proved that our expectations were well grounded.

5th. The Mahrattas did not possess nor had any claim upon any part of the Rohilla country on the north of the Ganges when we undertook to assist the Vizier in the conquest of it. They might with more reason have attacked us for opposing them in their designs on the Korah district, of which they had obtained a grant from the King. But, in fact, a timid conduct would have been more likely to have involved us in a war with them, than either of those measures; had they been allowed to subdue the Korah district and the country of the Rohillas, the Vizier's territories would have been open to their incursions, their numerous horse might have plundered it in spite of the efforts of our infantry, and their continued ravages might have obliged him to come to an accommodation with them as was once apprehended, on terms which would have afforded them an easy entrance into our own provinces. In short we are much better secured against their attacks than we should otherwise have been, and the better we are secured, the less will they be disposed to attack us.

6th. In reply to this objection, I will in the first place affirm that merely for the defence of our own provinces, two brigades, upon the present establishment, are sufficient; a third is necessary to add to our influence among the powers of Indostan, to support our alliance with the Vizier, and to answer other exigencies, which may happen at a more remote period of time. Upon the late occasion, when the Rohilla expedition was undertaken, our apprehensions of an invasion from the French had entirely ceased; the dissensions among the Mahrattas fully employed them at home, and are mentioned among the secondary inducements in favour of the undertaking. There was no other enemy from whom we could have the least apprehension of danger: such was the occasion to be embraced for effecting our purpose by a temporary employment of a third part of our forces, and under such circumstances even without reckoning upon the acquisition which was the immediate object of the enterprise, to reduce the Company's military expences by employing that proportion of their troops

which was superfluous for the purpose of their own defence, was a great and manifest advantage; but when the stipulated acquisition of 40 lacs and the political advantages resulting from the measure are superadded, the visionary idea of danger, which did not exist even in imagination at the time the expedition was undertaken, and can have no weight as an objection; especially as from our knowledge of the open and defenceless state of the Rohilla country, we were morally certain that the undertaking would soon be brought to an issue. By our ancient treaty with the Vizier we are bound to assist him with our forces within his paternal dominions, and the distance between their borders and the remotest part to which our troops have marched is only 200 miles. I will only add that so long as no immediate danger threatens our own Provinces, it is my earnest wish that one of our three brigades might be constantly employed with the Vizier, as well to save so large a proportion of the expence to the Company, as to prevent the ill consequences of total inactivity to the army.

7th. The addition of territory acquired to the Vizier instead of raising him to be a dangerous neighbour, serves to render him more dependant upon us than before, as he has more occasion for our assistance to enable him to maintain it, and to support him against the claims of other powers. If his increase of wealth be an object of jealousy, let it be considered how largely the Company share in it. From September 1773 to September 1775 the sum we have to receive from him by our late engagements amount to 130 lacs of rupees.

8th. I have already remarked that the first proposition for the Rohilla war was made by the Vizier in a letter which I received from him in June 1773, that it was employed afterwards in the negotiations at Benares as an instrument for winning his consent to the payment of the full expences of our troops employed in his service, and that it was not finally resolved on till the 26th of November, after the most ample discussion in the Select Committee and in the Council: it was not therefore precipitately resolved on. It is true that no formal treaty was executed for the conditions on which we were to assist the Vizier, nor did the occasion, which was only temporary, require it. The multiplication of treaties weakens their efficacy, and therefore they should be referred only for very important and permanent obligations. The form which was dictated to the Vizier for the letter, which was to describe the conditions of this engagement it is true, is not of itself sufficiently clear, but it is explained by my letters which accompanied it, and the reference therein made to the conditions which had been formerly proposed at Benares, as they stood in the three first articles of the draft, which had been prepared for the treaty, before the Rohilla expedition was suspended, for the fuller elucidation of the subject. These articles are here subjoined; the two first had been agreed to by the Vizier, to the third he objected, wishing rather to engage for the payment of the whole sum at once, when the conquest was completed. It is fortunate that the latter mode was adopted; the completion of the conquest being actually effected, and the stipulation, although objected to by the Vizier when first demanded after the defeat of the Rohillas, having since been acknowledged by him to be due.

The three first articles of the first draft of the Treaty.

1st. "Whereas the Rohilla Chiefs in the month of June 1772 entered into a treaty with the Vizier in the presence and with the concurrence of General Sir Robert Barker, by which they engaged [to pay him 40 lacs of rupees for his assistance against the Mahrattas, and which treaty they have treacherously broken. It is therefore agreed that a brigade of the Company's forces shall join the Vizier and assist to punish them, and that he shall pay the whole of its expence. By a brigade is meant two battalions of Europeans, one company of artillery and six battalions of sepoys, and the expence settled at sunant rupees 2,10,000 per month. The Company's troops shall not cross the river Ganges, nor march beyond the first of the hills. The Vizier shall retain, as his own, that part of the Rohilla country which lies on the north-east side of the Ganges; but in consideration of the Company's relinquishing all claim to share in the said country, although it is to be conquered by their joint forces, the Vizier engages to make them an acknowledgement of 40 lacs of rupees, and in future to defray the whole expence of the Company's troops, agreeable to the date above mentioned, whenever he has occasion for their assistance,

notwithstanding it is stipulated in the second article of the Treaty of Illahabad, concluded by the Vizier and the Company on the 16th August 1765, that he shall pay only their extraordinary charges."

2nd. "The Vizier may retain the brigade aforesaid on the above mentioned terms as long as he shall require it, unless it shall be necessary to recall it for the defence of the Company's own territories, and he may employ them for the protection of any part of his country, but they shall be kept together in one body and not dispersed on different commands, except such detachments as the commanding officer shall judge necessary in the time of actual service. He may return the whole or a part of the said brigade whenever he has no further occasion for their services, and he shall cease to defray their expences as soon as they shall enter the Province of Bahar. But as the Company cannot risk the credit of their arms, by allowing a smaller force to remain with the Vizier than half a brigade, it is provided that he shall retain one-half of a brigade, or return the whole. Upon their dismissal they shall return with all convenient expedition, and to prevent any future disputes from arising on this subject, the time of their march to the borders of his Province, shall be computed by the rate of 5 coss per day from the place where they commence their march.

3rd. "The Vizier engages to pay the 40 lacs of rupees stipulated in the first article, by monthly payments of 4 lacs, to commence from the end of the month Kilbi-ul-awul, or 10th of June 1774, but should any accident (which God forbid) obliges our forces to retire from the Rohilla country and prevent the Vizier from obtaining possession of it the said 40 lacs shall not be demanded."

9th. It was neither arrogant nor unreasonable in the Vizier to require that since his entire dependance for the success of the enterprise which he had projected was on the brigade of the Company's forces, the brigade should not abandon him while he was engaged in it nor while the issue of it remained incomplete; nor can I devise any other condition which could have removed his apprehensions. If the Board judged the proposition reasonable, it certainly was not unbecoming in them to assent to it. It remains therefore to examine whether it was reasonable, and whether this power granted to the Vizier was liable to danger or inconvenience.

I have already shown that the removal of the brigade to such a distance could not prove of danger to our own provinces, because it was not wanted for their defence; that it could be productive of no inconvenience because it occasioned an entire suspension of the Company's payments during its employment. It is not to be denied that there are possible cases in which it may be wanted for the protection of Bengal, but these are out of the reach of all probability and too remote to be quoted as an objection to the present engagement.

I am not apprehensive that the Vizier will insist upon keeping the brigade continually with him; my fears are that he may dismiss it, as there is every reason to wish for its continuance with him, and none, no not one, for its recall. When the brigade was formerly employed with the Vizier and the share of its monthly expences defrayed by him was only 30,000 and afterwards 1,15,000 rupees per month, he never showed earnestness for its continuance with him beyond the duration of the particular service for which it had been wanted, but was ever ready to propose its return; it is not likely therefore that he should be more solicitous now for its perpetual residence in his country at an expence to him of 25 lacs a year, which he must pay, and which his income, with the late additions to it, can barely afford. He knows that whenever he shall require the presence of the brigade, it will be for our interest to grant it, and he will therefore part with it when his own occasions, which in this instance must be confined to the defence of his own dominions, no longer require it, that the charge of its maintenance may be shifted from his account to the Company's and that he may be subject to that burthen only when he is an immediate gainer by it.

This may suffice to show the little risk we ran, had we absolutely engaged the brigade to him as long as he might chuse to retain it. But in the present case (as I have already explained in the preceding article) it was understood by both parties and indeed is inseparable from the nature of the engagement and the original conditions of our mutual alliance, that we might recall it, if required for our own protection, not only without any imputation of breach of

faith but (unless it was done in so precipitate a manner as to defeat the purpose of the expedition) even without affording him a pretext for refusing the payment of the 40 lacs.

I have been thus explicit in vindicating my conduct in relation to the Rohilla war for the sake of obviating any impression which a partial representation of this measure may make upon the minds of my employers, as I know that the majority of the Council, which has condemned it, will labour to paint it in the blackest colours which they can lay upon it, as an excuse for the precipitation with which they have proclaimed their reprobation of it, and violated the engagements on which the right of the Company to participate in the fruits of its success essentially depended. But it is not on the propriety of my conduct that I shall rest for proof of the impropriety of theirs, which is equally incompatible with the interest of the Company whether the transactions of the late Administration shall be approved or condemned by our superiors, whose judgement only can decide upon it. A recapitulation of the principal acts of the new Council will amply suffice for this purpose.

The three members who came passengers in the *Ashburnham* from England arrived at noon of the 19th of October. The next day I met them in Council, which was adjourned to the 24th, both to afford time to Mr. Barwell to join us, and to myself to prepare the business, which might be proper for the immediate cognizance of the new Board. To this effect I drew up a minute describing the nature and state of two subjects, which were undoubtedly the first in point of importance, the establishment of the revenue and the transactions in our political system. If I could have conceived a more regular or a more candid way of leading the Board into the knowledge of past affairs, without the influence of my own particular judgement or prepossessions, I would have adopted it. This minute I laid before the Council held on the 24th of October. On the 25th the General moved and the Board (Mr. Barwell only dissenting) resolved to require that I should produce the whole correspondence between me and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, my agent at the Vizier's Court, and Colonel Champion, the late provincial Commander-in-Chief, both official and private, for their inspection: I offered the first and refused the second, for reasons which appear in my minutes. To what I have already recorded on this subject I will further add that there are few persons in the service of any considerable trust or rank in it with whom I have not maintained that distinct mode of intercourse. My predecessors have ever followed the same rule, and I am persuaded would have thought it a dishonourable breach of confidence, had they inserted on the records of the Company, any letters which had been addressed to them as extra-official and private, without the consent of the writers of them. Lord Clive, Mr. Verelst, Mr. Cartier, General Smith and General Sir Robert Barker are able to contradict me if I have misquoted their practice, and I shall be glad to appeal to them for the truth of it, if there can be a doubt upon the subject. A circumstance exactly in point to the present matter in dispute, happened in the course of Colonel Smith's correspondence with the Select Committee in 1766, when by some mistake the subject of a private letter from the Colonel to the President was only alluded to in a letter from the Select Committee, upon which occasion the Colonel asserts his sentiments of the sacred rights of private correspondence in the following words: "I have been made accountable to a public board for an unprejudiced discussion of facts which ought never to have transpired beyond the breast of the right honourable person to whom, and whom only, they were addressed." And the Select Committee, by their silence, acquiesced in those sentiments.

The same subject was resumed the next day the 26th. On my refusal to deliver the correspondence in the manner in which it was required of me, Colonel Monson moved, and the General and Mr. Francis agreed that Mr. Nathaniel Middleton should be recalled from his station, and it was resolved by a subsequent resolution of the same majority, that the negotiations of this Government should be thenceforth committed to Colonel Champion (who ought by a parity of reasoning to have been recall'd too) or to the officer who on the receipt of the orders, should chance to be the first in command of the brigade in the field. To these acts Mr. Barwell and myself dissented, and I entered my protest against all the consequences to which they were liable.

The sentiments and intentions of the majority with respect to the Rohilla war and the future destination of the army were sufficiently manifested in this meeting, and left me less room for surprise at the propositions which were made at the next, which was held on the 20th. These propositions, which had been previously drawn up by the General, having undergone some alterations in substance and form stand recorded as follow.

The General proposes the following questions, *viz.*

1st.—"That the demand of 40 lacs from the Vizier be repeated and that Colonel Champion, or the Officer Commanding the second Brigade be instructed to that effect.

2nd.—"That the Colonel or Commanding Officer be also instructed to make a demand, for such further payments as may be due from the Vizier on the receiving these instructions, and to liquidate what accounts may be unsettled with him at the time.

3rd.—"That he be further instructed, that although he is to make an immediate demand of the whole 40 lacs, and for such other payments as may be due at that time, yet if he finds that it is impossible for the Vizier to comply with the whole of these demands, he is to receive what can be obtained in ready money not to be less than 20 lacs, and the rest to be payable in different periods within 12 months.

4th.—"That the Colonel or Commanding Officer be further instructed, that in case the Vizier shall refuse to comply with these demands, he is to enter a protest against him declaring that the Company have fulfilled all their engagements with him, and within 14 days after the receipt of these instructions, to retire with the army under his command and withdraw it into the Company's territories.

5th.—"That further orders be sent to Colonel Champion or the Officer Commanding the Brigade that after having finished the negotiations for the money now due, he do immediately withdraw the whole of the forces under his command within the limits of the Province of Oude, and that unless the Vizier should require the continuance of the troops for the defence of his original dominions, with the Provinces of Korah and Illahabad, he return with them to the Cantonments of Dinapore.

6th.—"That in quitting the Vizier he shall acquaint him that the Governor General and Council propose to appoint a person to reside at his court, and to declare that they mean to adhere strictly to the Treaties of Illahabad and Benares, till the pleasure of the Court of Directors, regarding the latter, be known.

7th.—"That he be further instructed, that if he should apprehend any difficulty or danger from the Vizier in his retreat, that then he should suspend his declaration and take the best means in his power for the preservation of the army, and advise the Board immediately of his situation."

I prevailed upon the majority to defer coming to any conclusion upon these propositions until the next Monday's consultation, this being Friday, both to allow time for each to come prepared with his opinions upon them, and for the gentlemen of the majority to read all the proceedings which had any relation to the subject, and of which I had furnished them with a complete list of references in my minute recorded on the consultation of the 25th.

On Monday the 31st the Council being assembled, I delivered in a minute containing my opinion on each proposition. Mr. Barwell did the same, both expressed an assent to the three first, but objected wholly to the 4th, 5th, and 7th, and to the last clause of the 6th.

The sum of our objections to which I crave leave to refer as the force of them must be lost by an abridgement, was that the 4th was too peremptory, and left no room for the Vizier to propose any other alternative, in case his present means for future resources should not enable him to comply literally with the demands which were made upon him. That the 5th was a direct violation of the engagements which had been formed with him by the last Government, and

would afford him a just pretext to declare his also void, and to refuse payment of the 40 lacs; besides the danger of losing the new conquered country by so precipitate a retreat from it. That the last clause of the 6th was an alarming suggestion of the invalidity of the public treaty, which ought not even to be supposed till it were pronounced by the Company; and that the 7th left it to the option of the Commanding Officer of the Army to declare war with the Vizier.

The other gentlemen brought no opinions in writing, but resolved on all the propositions except the last clause of the 6th which was omitted.

It is proper to remark that an army, joined by the Vizier's, had pursued the remains of the Rohilla forces which had reassembled under the command of Fyzulla Cawn, to the extremity of the country and continued encamped more than a month within a very few miles of them, which interval had been employed in negotiations till the 2nd of October, when Fyzulla Cawn repaired in person to the English camp, and as it appears from Colonel Champion's letters on the faith of some assurances given for his safety. Since the negotiations continued the enemy remained in arms and our army still advanced nearer to them making preparations for an assault in case terms of peace could not be agreed on. Thus far our advices had reached us when the General introduced the propositions above mentioned. Yet at this crisis of affairs, without waiting for the event which a very few days must have determined, the majority came with their resolutions decided for withdrawing the brigade from the service in which it was engaged whether it were completed or not, and to compel the Vizier to the instant adjustment of all his accounts dependent with the Company, or to abandon him altogether.

One reason alledged by the majority for the demand, which had with so much perseverance been made for Colonel Champion's and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's letters, was, that without them, and specially without those I withheld from them, their knowledge of the state and circumstances of the Rohilla war, which was to enable them to judge of the propriety of continuing the army in that quarter, or to determine its removal, would be incomplete: yet they had neither taken time to read the series of the former political records which I had recommended to their perusal, nor the letters of Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, with which I had promised to furnish them, although these were surely as necessary for their information as the private letters addressed to me, the contents of which they could not know, and I had declared to them contained no information on the points on which they wanted it.

Soon after we heard that the Vizier had consigned over the 15 lacs which Fyzulla Cawn had engaged to pay him in ready money to Colonel Champion, in part payment of the 40 due from him, and had hastily set out on his return for his capital with Mr. Nathaniel Middleton for the declared purpose of acquitting himself of the remainder, and that the brigade was in orders to march back to Ramgaut. Fearing the consequences of the orders which had been lately issued, I thought this a fit opportunity to induce the majority to moderate that for the immediate recal of the brigade, and proposed, that as our payments were in so fair a channel of acquittance and Ramgaut lay at little more than 60 miles from the border of the Province of Oude, to which they had destined its future station, a discretionary power might now be entrusted to the Commander of the Army, to continue it at Ramgaut for a short period, until the Vizier's consent could be obtained for its entire removal, or until he himself should judge it might leave the Rohilla country without hazard of losing it by a fresh invasion or insurrection.

I think it incumbent upon me to remark a small geographical error, which I have committed in my report of the situation of Ramgaut, which I found laid down in my own handwriting upon an old map in my possession at the distance which I have described, but having since received a more correct map of that quarter from Captain Barwell, the Surveyor-General, which accompanies these papers, I find that it is near 40 miles more remote from the territories of the Vizier, an error of little consequence I apprehend to my argument, but I mention it that it may not be imputed to me as a deception.

My proposal was rejected; for the reasons both for and against it, I beg leave to refer to my minute in consultation the 8th November, and to the replies of the majority in consultation of the 14th.

As a doubt is expressed respecting the nature of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's appointment as Resident or Agent for the Governor at the Court of the Vizier, it is necessary I should say a few words to reconcile the propriety of styling him my particular agent, and at the same time considering his appointment in the nature of a public one. By the Company's orders of long standing and now repeated, all correspondence with the country powers is directed to be carried on by the President, and the intention of appointing a Resident with the Vizier was for the purpose of facilitating and perfecting this correspondence; which being the particular province of the Governor, he was my especial agent, and his appointment was at the same time a public one, as it related to the public service, and was conferred upon him by the Board, though at my recommendation.

That the objects of my remonstrance may not be lost or mistaken in the long narrative and arguments with which I have introduced them, I beg leave to repeat, I ground my charge against the members who form the majority of the Board on the recal of my public agent at the Court of the Vizier, on their precipitate resolution of abandoning the Vizier, and of withdrawing entirely from his alliance unless he complied in the given time of 14 days with their demands in the exact form and mode in which they were prescribed to him, on their resolution to withdraw the brigade from the Rohilla country, even if he did comply with those demands, whether the conquest of it was secured, or it was in danger of being wrested out of his hands; and, lastly, on the extraordinary licence which they have given to the commander of the brigade, of forcing the Company into a war with their ally under cover of taking measures to preserve the army from danger.

Actions so evident in their nature and bearing such strong appearances of determined hostility, though proceeding from the most just causes of provocation, seldom fail of producing suspicions of worse intended, and in the means which fear suggests for self-defence too often prove the cause of working up a slight complaint into the most fatal excess of a declared rupture: but under the circumstances of the present Government nothing could have so evident a tendency to precipitate this conclusion.

The jealousy with which a new administration is naturally viewed by those who are connected with it is of itself sufficient to render even their indifferent transactions liable to misconstructions; but what sentiments must have struck the Vizier, when with the first notification of the constitution of the present Council, he received advice of the recall of the public minister of this Government from his presence, and of the resolutions respecting the payment and the removal of the brigade. He will have concluded that a majority of the new Council had combined to overthrow my authority and to raise their own on its ruins, and had determined to force him to a rupture in order to depreciate the measures I had taken. It will avail little that these proceedings are tempered with solemn professions of an inviolable attachment to former engagements; such assurances accompanying the actual breach of engagements, are more likely to destroy confidence than to inspire it, as they too manifestly infer the conviction of an irregularity of conduct, which requires such declarations to explain and palliate it.

I have been too long versed in public affairs to look for a concurrence of all men's opinions in any one proposition however expedient, nor am I so much addicted to my own as to take offence at an opposition to it, where that opposition proceeds from a judgement unbiassed by personal animosity: I appeal to the minutes of the majority for proofs of the temper which swayed their resolutions. Had a mere sense of duty impelled them to declare their disavowal of the expedition in which they found a part of the army engaged against the Rohillas, or if they had judged the continuance of that force beyond the line of the Vizier's possession inconsistent with the orders of the Company, the path which they should have pursued lay very plain before them, by which they might have amply manifested their own fidelity and guarded the Company's orders against the like violation hereafter. In many cases I understand it to be a proposition of law that *quod fieri non debet factum valet*—and I believe it was never more applicable than to the present occasion. The measure was an act of the past Administration, it was on the point of being concluded; all the

dangers and inconveniences to which it could ever have been liable were past; of the conditions which had been agreed to on the part of the Company to this engagement nothing remained but to bring the war to a period, to place their Ally in the secure possession of the new conquest, and to retire within their former bounds :—the payments which formed the conditions of the Vizier's part of the engagements were just due, nor had any reason yet appeared to justify the suspicion that he would have failed in the performance of them.

Under such circumstances I presume that the members of the new Council, who disapproved of the enterprize, ought to have recorded their disapprobation of it, to have declared their determination not to give their consent to the employment of any part of the Company's forces beyond the line which they judged to be prescribed by the orders of the Court of Directors after the service in which they were then engaged should be accomplished, but to have permitted the brigade to have remained in the Rohilla country, so long as that service and the engagements subsisting between this Government and the Vizier required it, leaving the responsibility of the measure to the members of the last Administration who formed it, and under whose authority it was brought to the crisis in which the new Government found it.

The same temperate conduct might have been observed with respect to Mr. Nathaniel Middleton : his appointment as Resident on the part of the Government at the Court of the Vizier might have been confirmed, and the relation of it transferred from me to the Board at large.

Such a conduct without the smallest sacrifice either of their integrity or duty would have accommodated their sentiments to the faith of Government; the alarms unavoidably attendant on a change of Government and the consistency of its measures so totally new, would have subsided; the Vizier could have had no pretext to refuse or withhold the sums which were due from him, and the Rohilla war would have ended with honour, with unsullied faith, with the restoration of that lustre to our arms, which an inaction of many years had almost obscured in the minds of the people of Indostan, with a great addition of wealth to supply our almost impoverished resources, and without a single inconvenience or cause afforded to regret it.

Let the reverse of this conduct be examined in the first acts of the new Council.

By their violent recall of my agent from the Vizier's Court, they have proclaimed the annihilation of my authority in that branch of the Government in which the Company, for obvious political reasons, have ever thought it necessary to invest their Governor with the ostensible power, and which in their very first orders to the new Administration, they have directed should be continued to be conducted through him.

They have disregarded the faith of our engagements which even in the most violent revolutions have ever been transmitted as sacred from one government to that which has succeeded it; they have exposed the conquest which the British arms have acquired for the Vizier, to be wrested from him, with the loss of our military reputation; they have risked the loss of the pecuniary resources, which were stipulated for the Company as the fruits of their successes, and they have precipitately withdrawn the brigade from its station, where its whole expence is borne by the Vizier, to become again a heavy and useless burthen upon ourselves.

To the public acts manifesting the temper of their proceedings, I may quote another.

It will be difficult to explore the source of measures, so uniformly violent and personal before the gentlemen could have acquired a knowledge either of the affairs of the Company or of myself, unless we trace in it a preconcerted intention to provoke me to a resignation of the Government, or to lead me into a warfare of scurrility inconsistent with my character and station. If these however have been the objects of the majority, they will find themselves disappointed, for with respect to the former, I have determined to sacrifice my own feelings, and abide the decision of my employers, on the appeal which I have made to their unbiassed judgement; and with respect to the latter, I will venture to say, that I shall be armed with a sufficient defence in the exercise

of my own moderation. But this very disappointment in the first, and I will suppose, grand object of their views, must necessarily occasion a recourse to other causes, to vindicate their conduct, and I am ashamed to call the public attention to a subject so exceedingly frivolous as that which I am now compelled to enter upon in my own further justification. They accuse me of having failed in paying them the honours due to them. Their accusations on this head is confined to the following particulars. Only 17 guns were fired on their arrival. The troops were not drawn out to receive them. They were met at my own house and not at the Council house. There was a delay from Friday to Monday, three days, in the order for issuing the new Commissions in public orders. And lastly, the proclamation of the new Government was not made with sufficient parade. To these 5 articles I must reply separately.

1st.—The orders given for the salutes were that 17 guns should be fired for the Chief Justice and the Judges, the like number for General Clavering, 15 (as ordered by the Court of Directors) for Sir Edward Hughes, and 13 for each of the members of the Board, if they came separately; if they should all arrive at the same time, the highest salute was ordered to be fired for the whole, and this was agreeable to the practice which hitherto had been observed, I had no other rule to go by. They did arrive together and were accordingly saluted together with 17 guns.

2nd.—If they had landed at the Fort the garrison should have been under arms to receive them. It appeared to me unmilitary to draw troops out of a garrison to compliment their landing at a distance from it.

3rd.—If I could have divined their expectations of being received, not at my house, but at the Council house, or if I could have imagined that this was esteemed a matter of any sort of significance, I certainly should have answered their wishes; but the circumstances neither occurred to myself, nor was suggested to any other person. I thought then, and truly I think still, that the deputing the senior member of the Board to wait on them on the river and to attend them to town and the assembling of all the other gentlemen of the old Council at my house for their reception, ample marks of attention and respect to them.

4th.—The delay of three days in issuing the Commissions was occasioned by a request of mine, dictated by my feelings on first perusing them. I had before received private intimation of their purport, but my information was not complete, and I was hurt at the extraordinary reduction of my authority which was to take place, and the apparent inconsistency of investing the second person in the Administration with greater ostensible powers than the first. While I was agitated by these considerations, I requested this time to determine within myself, whether I should accept of this Government or conclude the period of my services to the Company with the close of the late administration before they were published; and when my request was acquiesced in, I did not expect to have found it stated as an exceptionable part of my conduct.

With respect to the want of parade in proclaiming the new Government, the members of the Board have themselves to blame for the deficiency in this particular; they formed a majority and might have ordered what pomp and ostentation they pleased: but it is extraordinary that they should agree to measures and then throw the blame of them upon me. I am averse to parade myself and have never used it. I proposed a written advertisement as the usual mode of proclamation here; they thought a military attendance necessary, which was accordingly ordered to attend the sheriff, whom I thought the proper officer to publish a Civil Government. But it may be necessary to remark, that if there was any deficiency of respect in my conduct, it could not be personally intended against them, since the new Government was its object, and I myself had the highest interest in the honours paid to it being the head of that Government.

Upon the whole I must remark that I paid them higher honour than ever had been paid to persons of their rank in this country; as high even as had

been paid to Mr. Vansittart and Lord Clive when they came in the first station as Governors; men whose names will ever stand foremost in the memories of the people of this country and who merited as much from their employers as any who have filled, or are likely to fill, that station. I wrote letters severally to the three gentlemen at Madras, bespeaking their confidence, as a measure necessary to the safety of the Company. The Board sent their senior members down the river to meet them, and as a mark of personal respect from me, one of the gentlemen of my staff attended them: the whole Council assembled at my house to receive them on their landing. What more could I do without derogating from my own rank? But they seem to have considered themselves as the Government, and to have required the honours due to it entire, to be paid to their own persons, forgetting that they were only a part, and that it was from the head they expected such concessions.

I now once more make my solemn appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors, from the measures already decided by the majority of the Council, and protest against every future act of the same unvaried majority, declaring that I hold myself no longer responsible for the consequences which the interest of my employers are liable to suffer, while I am deprived of the means which their commands, which the Parliament of Great Britain, which (if I presume not too rashly on the information communicated to me) even the gracious intention of my Sovereign, have committed in an especial manner to my charge for the security of those interests, and the support of the national Honour and Dominions in this great and valuable branch of the British Empire.

Fort William, the 19th December 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT:

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.
Monday. LIEUT.-GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.
The HON'BLE JOHN MONSON.
RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.
PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

Read the following letter from Colonel CHAMPION,

TO THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.,

GOVERNOR GENERAL, AND COUNCIL OF FORT WILLIAM.

GENTLEMEN,—It was not till my return to this place a few days ago that Colonel Champion sends in I had the honour of receiving your favour of the 20th the Vizier's Tuncaws. October with the proclamations which accompanied it. As Colonel Gailliez agreeably to my directions received from me opened the letter in camp, I presume he made due notification of your authority to the division of the army under his command.

Some time before I left camp I received a letter from the late Administration under date the 29th August to which it was my wish to have replied earlier, but circumstances having denied me a seasonable opportunity, I am now to have the honour of addressing you, gentlemen, on the subject of that letter, namely, the obligation which the Vizier of the empire put into my hands for seven lacs of rupees payable to the troops who were employed in the conquest of Rohillah Dominions.

When the Vizier sent me that obligation I thought it necessary to inform Mr. Hastings of it and accordingly did myself that pleasure by letter 8th August, desiring his consent to the army's receiving the money; he thought proper to lay my letter before the Select Committee and they submitted it to the consideration of the Board, who gave it as their opinion that the army is excluded from receiving the said sum by the late Act of Parliament.

Though the paper does not mention or bear express reference to plunder, yet it is certain that in offering that money the Vizier had in view the satisfying the Company's troops for their share of plunder as well as the gratifying them for the hardships they had undergone in the course of the war.

It is not for me, gentlemen, to offer any strictures on the Act of Parliament. I am unacquainted with matters of law and with the interpretation of statutes,

Mr. Barwell delivers in the following Minute upon this occasion and desires that it may be recorded :—

When such formal appeals are made to our superiors, I cannot help lamenting the occasion from which they proceed, nor repress the deep concern it fixes on my

Mr. Barwell's minute.

mind to view the prospect before me. When I met gentlemen selected by the public voice to discharge a trust of such national importance as the superintendence of the interests of the Crown of Great Britain and of the East India Company, I met them in the sanguine hope that one spirit would have animated the collective body and united us so firmly in pursuit of the great objects of our appointment, that dissensions could not have found a place in our Councils. How great then is my unhappiness and disappointment to see in an instant this agreeable, this honorable scene my imagination formed, prove a chimera—a mere chimera—for, on the moment of our entering on the administration, a scene of contention commenced—and to my mortification I found my attention immediately called to measures of the late Government that could not be retracted, having already operated and produced the beneficial consequences they were planned to effect. We might indeed risque these advantages to the State by an ill-timed impatience to contract its political connections—a risque I deemed incumbent on myself, if possible, to avert and on mature thought I have no reason to doubt the justness of my sentiments, or the propriety of that support I judged due to the Governor-General in our late debates. My ultimate object was obviously the benefit of the State, not contracted by nice examination of the literal confined meaning of any one particular order, but directed to the general good within our grasp, and offered to us in the state and posture of our political connections at the time we entered on the Government. Further, I considered, and I foresaw no possible advantage to the Nation or to the Company, in debating the propriety of past measures submitted long since to our superiors, and for which neither myself nor any of the gentlemen of the present administration (the Governor excepted) were responsible. The benefits of the measures alone were left to us unburthened with responsibility. Why, then, not secure them? What necessity for rendering them precarious by a precipitation that appears in degree to lose the object, while it inflicts the severest censure on the late Government? A principle of action that I flatter myself will fully acquit me in the public opinion whatever decision it may pass on the sentiments I have delivered.

It is with diffidence and with the utmost deference to the judgement my superiors may give on a policy that terminates prosperously for their affairs, I adventure to confirm opinions already pronounced. I am conscious it is not my province to take upon me to approve or condemn measures which have come before their tribunal; but this has been rendered unavoidable, in the present instance, from their being made the subject of debate. Thus situated I have carefully considered and weighed every circumstance. I have marked with attention the rise, progress, execution, and happy consequences resulting to this Government from its connections with the Vizier, and pronounce from conviction the late administration fully justified, and its measures entirely consonant to the first principles of sound policy. As this is *my opinion*, I must coincide in the Governor-General's letter of appeal. It is from all the information I have obtained a candid exposition of facts. It is unexceptionable in mode and form and authorized by the Court of Directors. This, I apprehend, is not the case with the appeal of the members in opposition; not having seen it I cannot speak to the matter; but it is at least exceptionable in form, and the first instance within my knowledge of a part of the administration formally separating itself. Opposing sentiments, I have often seen recorded on the proceedings of the Council, but I never before saw them addressed to the Direction in letters from the several members. I will not therefore attempt to extend known privileges, or to assume now ones to my station. I approve and would affix my name to the Governor-General's appeal, but as the request is improper, and its irregularity would determine him to decline it, I take this method of expressing my entire approbation and joining thus far the Governor-General's address to the Court of Directors.

(Sd.) R. BARWELL.

but I cannot for a moment give myself leave to think that this new law precludes the army as a body from any of the rights of war. I cannot suppose it could be intended that British subjects serving in a military capacity in Asia should be denied the advantages common to British soldiers in other parts of the world, and at all rates it occurs that such an innovation of established custom could only be affected by an express and positive clause.

The Nabob's obligation was received on the 8th August, two months and twelve days before the existence of this new penal law was known in Indostan, for it was not published by you, gentlemen, at Calcutta till the 20th October, and even supposing it meant to exclude the army from future benefits of this nature, it would with all due submission in my humble opinion be a singular hardship on the Company's troops were it to operate against them by retrospection.

This much escaped me, gentlemen, before I had perfectly recollected that the army has now an advocate, I cannot admit, more zealous to promote their interest, but of far greater influence and much more equal to the task of pleading for them; he, I am persuaded, will support their every right, and being better able to devise the means; to him therefore I commit the cause.

At the same time that I put the above obligation into your custody, gentlemen, I beg leave to present to you a separate note of hand of the Vizier's for fifty thousand rupees which, though it is expressed to be for the behalf of the Brigade in general, His Excellency did me the compliment of desiring me to divide amongst the field officers as I should think proper.

Besides these two papers, I commit a third to your charge; it is a tuncha, for three lakhs of rupees which the Vizier did me the favour of desiring my acceptance after he had sent me the two papers for the sum of seven lakhs and a half.

Before I left the army, these three lakhs were repeatedly offered and in particular His Excellency's minister informed me that he had instructions to pay them out of the fifteen lakhs which he secured from Fyzulla Khan. This circumstance I mention to you gentlemen to show that the Vizier's offers of these donations were spontaneous and the effects of gratitude for the services rendered him, but I refused the money because when the note was sent to me I had in my own mind determined to add it to the General Fund; it was my resolution to convince my followers and companions in the field, that I only desired to share with them in the advantages as I had done in the honours of the war, and I can with great truth assure you gentlemen that I perceive much more pleasure and self-approbation in throwing these three lakhs into the common fund and taking my chance of drawing a proportion than I should have had in receiving ten times the sum in any other manner.

Having now in this respect discharged my duty to the army and to my own reputation, I am to intimate to you gentlemen my wishes of returning to England this season and to desire your leave to resign the commission which I have the honour to hold in the Company's service.

Attached as I am to this country where I have spent by far the greatest part of my life, I cannot divest myself of that *amor patrie* which warms the breast of every Englishman, and I took an early opportunity of signifying to Mr. Hastings my intentions of returning to my native country should any Officer be sent from England to take the command of the army.

This event has now taken place, and though it is impossible I could construe it into an indignity offered by the gentlemen in the direction towards myself, since they could not have even surmised my succession to the command, and although I should deem myself happy in serving under a Lieutenant-General of His Majesty's forces, yet when I reflect that I have already had the honour of holding a station which the King has not thought unworthy the acceptance of an officer of so devoted a rank, and that I cannot arrive at a greater dignity, there no longer remains a field for that ambition which should animate me as a soldier: it is therefore time to close the scene, especially as my health has been so much impaired during the course of the late war that it would be dangerous for me to expose it longer to this unfriendly climate, and I shall retire with so much the more satisfaction that the army falls under the patronage and protection of an officer of so distinguished a character. Nor on this

account only do I most heartily congratulate them, but also for that there is in view another gentleman ready to second their General, and step forth with dignity to lead them to the field of honour.

I have long, very long served the Company. I will not say, nay I have not the vanity to think gentlemen that I have done it with extraordinary abilities, but I have the satisfaction to know that I have done it with great fidelity. In serving them I have ultimately served my country and my King whose glory I have ever had at heart, and it is a matter of inexpressible pleasure to me that I consign the reputation of the British arms in this part of the world to my successor with unimpaired lustre.

Before I take my leave gentlemen, let me beg, if there is no impropriety in the request, that I may be favoured with copies of the proceedings of the late Administration and extracts of your consultations relative to the Rohilla war, especially such parts thereof as regard my conduct or correspondence, and your honouring me with answers to such of my letters addressed to the late administration as have been received since you assumed the reigns of Government, will greatly add to the obligation.

I have now only to add, gentlemen, my most hearty wishes for success to your endeavours in discharging the duties of the important and conspicuous stations to which you have been called forth; may the result of your deliberations bring new aggrandisements to your country, glory to your King and honour to yourselves.

FORT WILLIAM,

The 13th December 1774.

Gentlemen, &c.,

A. CHAMPION.

Agreed that this letter also lie for consideration.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LESLIE called in and the questions above entered being entered, he replies as follows, *viz.*,—

- 1st.—I would beg leave to distinguish between the real inhabitants and the acquired ones. By the acquired ones I mean the Rohillas or Afghans who conquered the country and became the masters of it. I believe the Gentoo inhabitants were not oppressed, the ryots have been much cherished by him as they ever were under any former Government, except at the time of the march of the army through their country, but that they returned to their plough immediately and seemed to be as happy as ever.
- 2nd.—The day before our march from Shawabad the country upon the opposite side of the river Gurrah was in flames, and upon my enquiry into the matter I learned it was by order of the Vizier that he had sent several detachments of his light cavalry for that purpose, but I believe the inhabitants of those villages had withdrawn themselves from them and taken sanctuary at Shawjehanpore.
- 3rd.—I have already explained this, the Rohillas were the conquerors of the country and a very different people from the native inhabitants, the Rohillas being Mussulmen and the native, Hindus.
- 4th.—The native inhabitants after I left Bissouly between that and Simbu were all at their habitations and had returned to their cultivations of the country; when I went down towards the banks of the Ganges it was highly cultivated, but about Puttergur which was the place of arms and retreat of the Rohillas before they retired to Loll Dang as their last resource there was no cultivation but of sugar.
- 5th.—I protest I have heard a great deal of severity exercised on the families of the Chiefs of the Rohillahs, but I cannot positively speak to any of them but from hearsay, I am afraid there was too much reason to give the world a liberty to say that they were ill treated. There was one instance in which I thought it was necessary that I should interpose; I had been sent into Pelyboet where the wife and family of Hafiz Rhamut were, and after a series of conversation with his sons at which Major Hannay and Mr. Murray were present, I had a message from the Begum to request that I would speak to her.

I returned for answer that I was sorry it was out of my power as my conduct was prescribed to me, but that I would receive any message she would send to me; she sent her son in return to acquaint me that the business he wanted to speak to me on was to beg that I would intercede with Colonel Champion, to protect her from any insult which might be offered her by the Vizier. In consequence of her request, I went to Colonel Champion and begged that he would give every sanction in his power and address the Vizier upon the occasion which the Colonel promised to do. This is the only occasion I had to apply to Colonel Champion on the subject; I hear that many others did exist. I have heard a great deal reported of this kind. I believe a great deal of it and had reason to disbelieve a great deal, as the reports were so improbable I did not give ear to them. The messages from the Begum mentioned no instance of severity or ill treatment to her; at that time there would nothing have happened as it was the very day we marched to Pellybeet.

6th.—Those are the.....vague reports which I wished in general to inform you of, but indeed there were particular ones which were attended with such circumstances that I could scarce give any credit to from the situation of the parties. There was a particular one at Bissouly, one of the daughters of the Rohilla Chief of that place, whom they said he had committed violence upon and that she in consequence poisoned herself, and knowing the situation of the Vizier at that time I thought it almost impracticable which made me to give very little credit to the stories which I heard at the time of such a nature.

7th.—Upon my word so little as I am acquainted with those points, I can't possibly give an opinion but upon conjecture, and which every other person is fully as capable of as myself. But from the general character of this race of people, who took possession of that country from the native inhabitants, they made them till their ground left them a subsistence and kept the rest for themselves. I can't tell what their conduct was to their conquered enemies as they conquered none within my knowledge of them except the inhabitants of that country whom as I mentioned before they kept in subjection.

8th.—The Ganges running through the Rohilla country becomes at this time of the year I believe in some places fordable, and continues so till the end of March or beginning of April, at which time the snow melting upon the adjacent mountains swells the river and it is not passable but by boats. There are several forts from Hardwagaut to Ramgaut, they are all defensible as is the country all down that side of the river, having in general very high banks; the opposite side is quite flat and is universally known to people in the neighbourhood because there is a continual intercourse between the countries on both sides of the river.

9th.—I don't believe if our army was posted there that the Mahrattas durst make an attempt to enter in by any part of that river or any other power of Indostan. I mean by our army the brigade that was stationed there. If they did it is very clear they might make a retreat, as our army could not come up with cavalry. If they should cross the river it must be with their horses only; they could not have any equipage, appointments or subsistence, and it must be merely for a day as they could not bring any appointments or subsistence along with them.

10th.—I can't possibly say with regard to the amount of the sum the Vizier possessed himself of, but report I believe made it a great deal more than it really was, though I am convinced it amounted to a very considerable sum; report made it from 1, 2 to 3 millions of money. I believe the principal articles of it to have consisted in bullion and specie. There were a number of camels and elephants, but these were very inconsiderable in comparison with the former.

The General now begs leave to propose some questions to Colonel Leslie—

Q.—I observe that you mentioned in reply to the 1st question that the Vizier behaved well to the ancient inhabitants, and I now desire to know how they behaved to the Rohillas?

A.—The prisoners who fell into the hands of the Vizier which I believe to be very few are now entertained in his service; there are some of the sons of Hafiz Rhamut, two particularly whom I know and have often seen riding in his suit. He generally took one of these out with them all the time he was at Bessouly; their appearance was good and I think the same as the rest of his cavalry, and they appeared contented, but no doubt he kept a watchfull eye upon them.

Q.—Are there any fords lower than Ramgaut on the Ganges?

A. I am satisfied there are several fords between Ramgaut and Illahabad. I have crossed at Illahabad frequently myself.

Question from the Governor—

Q.—What is the general breadth of the river from Hardwa to the southern extremity of the Rohilla Country?

A.—I did not come down by the river, but from Hardwa to Weynagaut (about 12 coss) the river appeared to be about as broad as at Calcutta; at Ramgaut it is broader and thence continues all the way downwards the same way and size as down Bahar and interrupted by sands and islands. By the river I mean the body of water which when I saw it was about as broad as it is here.

Questions by the General—

Q.—What is the distance from Shawbad the frontier of the Province of Oude to Lalldang the extremity of the Rohilla Country?

A.—I believe it to be about two hundred miles.

Q.—Do you know the latitude of Lalldang?

A.—The latitude I think is 30 degrees 48 minutes north.

Q.—How far do you reckon it to be from Lalldang to Delhy?

A.—Delhy I believe is in 28.

Q.—Whilst the army was in the Rohilla Country could it have prevented a Mahratta army entering the Province of Bahar?

A.—The Mahrattas might have entered the Province of Bahar by many inroads, as the brigade was at too great a distance to prevent them.

Q.—If a Mahratta army had entered the Province of Bahar at that time do you know of any troops that could have opposed their coming to Cassembuzar?

A.—If they had made their entrance by the Province of Corah, I really don't know what disposition the Vizier had made of his troops to oppose their passage; if they had come further down the country, I don't know of any troops nearer than Barrampore, nor what disposition Governor Hastings had made to oppose their passage to Cassembuzar; certainly if the Vizier had not made a proper disposition of his troops in the lower country they could have penetrated as far as Cassembuzar.

Questions by the Governor—

Q.—Did you hear of any Mahratta troops being in the country or near it, or expected there at the time our troops entered it?

A.—After our retreat to winter quarters there was a report that Fyzulla Cawn waited a junction of the Mahratta force and expected a considerable number of Mahratta troops with whose aid he intended to take the field again, and I think the time he expected them to come was about the time that the river would become fordable, but the report lost its credit immediately from the divisions that existed among the Mahratta Chiefs.

Q.—Did the army consider the war in which they were engaged as one that did honour to the British name or such as disgraced it?

A.—I cannot answer for the opinion of others upon this subject, I can only answer for my own.

Q.—Who provided the contingencies of the army?

A.—The Commissary General; at the beginning of the campaign they were supplied by the paymaster until the arrival of the Commissary General's Deputy.

Q.—Did you ever know in any army that the person who provided the contingencies had the controul of them?

A.—There were many controuls upon the persons who supplied the armies I have served in, but I do not recollect any agent of supplies controuling his own accounts.

Q.—Had you any map of the Rohilla country furnished by the Governor when you went to the army?

A.—No, I believe there were very few extant. I applied to the Governor for such as he had of the upper country, *i.e.*, of the upper parts of Bahar and Province of Oudh and he informed me the only one he had he had promised to Captain Toone.

Q.—Do you know if Colonel Champion was furnished with maps of the country?

A.—I believe he had some maps of the country, I have seen scraps of them but he did not communicate them to me.

Questions by Mr. Francis—

Q.—How long since the Rohillas have been established in that country?

A.—About fifty years.

Q.—When you were sent into Pelybeet did the Begum send the trinkets and ornaments of the women to you desiring your acceptance of them, and what answer did you send her?

A.—The Begum did send her trinkets and ornaments. When Major Hannay and Mr. Murray and I were sent to Pelybeet we went as three Commissioners in conjunction with three of the Viziers to examine the Treasury and search for military chests of the beaten army. We searched the treasury and every other place, but the zenanas which we were forbid to enter; the women of the zenana sent their trinkets from a supposition that they were a part of the treasure, which we returned to them, acquainting them that we did not come in search of their trinkets but for the treasure deposited there.

Q.—Did the Vizier afterwards take away more trinkets and ornaments from the women?

A.—I believe he did; I am pretty sure he did take them away the next day.

Q.—Was it the enormity of the reports circulated concerning the Vizier's conduct to the families of the Rohilla chiefs which made you think them improbable?

A.—No, it was not; they were the circumstances of the reports.

Q.—Is not the Vizier, notwithstanding the unhappy state of his health, notoriously addicted to women and accustomed to gratify the sudden impulse of his passions at any rate?

A.—I believe he is as addicted to women as most people, and that he would go as far to gratify them.

Question by the Governor—

Q.—Was he at this time in a condition to gratify his passions?

A.—From the accounts I had of him I don't think he was.

Questions by Mr. Francis—

Q.—Do you believe the Vizier ever entered the zenanas of any of the Rohillah Chiefs?

A.—I don't know, I believe he did.

Q.—Is not the family of a noble Moor dishonoured by a man's forcibly entering the zenana and seeing the women?

A.—Yes, I believe it is.

Q.—Were you employed in our army in the year 1773, when it acted in defence of the Rohillas against the Mahrattas?

A.—No.

Q.—Did the Vizier make any suitable allowance for the maintenance of the families of the conquered Chiefs or were they abandoned to distress and misery for want of the common necessities of life at any time?

A.—The Vizier has I am told settled allowances, Jaghiers upon most of them, but I believe not sufficient to keep them in that way of life they are brought up in, but upon my word I don't know what distresses they have been brought to as they are confined within forts, but the report of the world says they suffer great distress.

Q.—Did the Vizier make use of any and what contrivances to possess himself of all the treasure in the treasuries of the chief towns to the exclusion of the English troops?

A.—The Vizier took all the treasure he could find in the towns without regard to the Company's troops.

Q.—Was it the English troops or those of the Vizier which conquered the Rohillah country?

A.—I believe the Company's troops were the principals of the conquest, and I am sure they were.

Q.—Is the Vizier able to defend and secure his new conquest without the constant presence of our brigade in the Rohilla country?

A.—If you confine it merely to that his own troops will be sufficient to defend it.

Q.—How far is Ramgaut from the frontiers of Oude?

A.—About 70 or 80 English miles.

Q.—When you were sent to join the brigade were you informed of the object of the expedition, that is, whether it was to invade or to defend the Rohillas?

A.—I knew it was ordered to join the 2nd brigade and Sujah Dowlah's army, but I did not know the nature of the service on which I was to be employed.

Q.—Was it commonly said or believed in the country that the Rohillas had been sacrificed to the Vizier by the English Government.

A.—No, I never heard it, but the Rohillas said if we had not been in conjunction with Sujah-ul-Dowlah they would have been an equal match for him, and it was owing to the power of the English troops that he conquered them.

Questions by the General—

Q.—Were the Rohilla Chiefs whom you said were now confined taken in battle or did they surrender themselves by capitulation?

A.—They surrendered at discretion.

Q.—How long do you suppose the army would be on marching from Lalldang to Calcutta?

A.—Near three months, two at least.

Colonel Leslie desires time to consider further on this last question, and as it becomes a part of his duty he will do it with the greatest exactness.

The Governor desires to add this question for Colonel Leslie's consideration.

In what time he imagines a whole brigade or part of it would be able upon an emergency to come to Calcutta by water at the different seasons of the year, and Colonel Leslie is desired to consider this question in its full extent.

Major Hannay called in.

To the first question.—To the best of my knowledge I saw no signs of oppression to the inhabitants of the new conquered country, but from particular enquiries which I had an opportunity of making of the country people they said they had met with no treatment that they could complain of; that from the treatment they had met with, they had no reason to fear greater severity from the Vizier than their former masters.

To the second question.—I believe both the Vizier and the Rohillas were concerned in burning the villages. I was informed that some days before our arrival at Shawbad the Rohillas had burned some villages towards Mamdy, in the Vizier's ancient dominions.

To the third question.—I have learned from many people that it is only within 50 years, that the Rohillas have become masters of the country to the north of the Ganges, that they were originally Afghans, came into Indostan under a Surdar named Daud Cawn and that they conquered that country from the Hindoos and that since that time they have followed no other profession than that of arms, and the ancient Hindoos have cultivated the country, the Rohillas are Mussulmen of the sect of Omah, and that the cultivators of the country are Hindoos. I suppose the proportion to be about 9 Hindoos to 1 Mussulman.

To the fourth question.—Several of the native inhabitants of course had followed the Rohillas to Pattergur and Lalldang, but the proportion of them was very small, and several of them to my knowledge returned before the war was finished, to their former habitations. At the time that I went upon an expedition from Bessouly to Sumbul, Meradabad and Rampore, the country appeared to be in good cultivation, the inhabitants were employed in tilling it. It is in general one of the best cultivated countries I have seen in Indostan, and very well inhabited, and the people appeared to be as busy at this time as if there had been a profound peace, and under no kind of apprehension from the conquerors. At or some time after the battle of St. George Eugée Cawn was returning from Delhi to join his master the Vizier, and had taken possession of all the country from Anopshare and Ramgaut to Rampore, and established Fousdars and Collectors of the revenues of it before the arrival of our army at Bessouly, and to maintain these Fousdars in the execution of their duty it was only necessary to leave 500 Nudjiff Cawns there and 5 companys of regular sepoys and some hundreds of the Burrah Fultan, in all not amounting to 1,500 men, who kept the country in perfect quietness untill our army arrived and after the march of our army to Pottergur.

To the fifth question.—I was generally inform'd and from my own observation I am led to believe that he treated them with a great deal of severity, for instance he deprived them of all the ornamental part of their dress and did not provide them with such accommodations as I thought their rank entitled them to expect. The reports that prevailed in camp were various, but were not conveyed to me from such authority as to warrant my offering them to the Board.

Mr. Francis begs leave to propose the following question in this place as it has immediate relation to the last.

Q.—Do you know or have you heard whether they were at any time reduced to distress for want even of a subsistence?

A.—I have heard that their subsistence was scanty, but this is one of the reports I have heard and have not been able to ascertain the truth of, to my own satisfaction.

To the sixth question.—I have heard while I was at Bessouly frequently that he had violated one of the daughters of Mohuboola Cawn, but I never gave credit to it, nay I believe it impossible from the state of health he was in at that time. I may say further that when I heard this report, I was at a good deal of pains to investigate the truth of it, and tracing it back, I could carry it no further, than it was a report that prevailed among the guard at the door of the zenana, and from the situation of this guard to the zenana it was impossible they could be acquainted with any circumstances that past within, as the

apartments of the women were at such a distance from the gateway where the guard were placed. There was another motive which induced me to disbelieve the report which was that a few days after this happened the women were carried to camp where he would have a much better opportunity of doing it, without detection had he been disposed to it or able.

Question by Mr. Francis.—

Q.—Do you know or believe that the Vizier entered the zenanas of the wives of any of the Rohilla Chiefs?

A.—It is impossible for me to answer with any degree of precision from the zenanas being spacious places consisting of many apartments many of which are not occupied by women. I never knew of his going into any of them at Pellybeet; I can positively say he did not for he never went into the Town of Pellybeet; at Bessouly I have heard that he went frequently into the zenana there, but to the best of my remembrance it was after the women were removed to camp, and that he was fitting up the zenanas for the reception of his own family during the time he was going to Puttergur.

To the seventh question.—Their national character has in general been the want of sincerity, to elucidate which, I beg leave to mention one instance. At the time that Mahomed Ally was their chief, he prevailed upon the Almora Raja and the other hill Rajas to assist him in his rebellion against the King Mahomed Shaw, that they did assist him with 20,000 men, that upon the approach of the imperial army they found themselves so much inferior in point of strength that they judged it imprudent to give him battle, and prevailed upon the Almorah Raja to admit them into his country the access to which is so strong that a small number of troops may defend the pass against a very numerous army, they continued there till an invasion of the Mahrattas required that the army of the empire should be returned against them. As soon as ever the army of the empire quitted the Rohilla country, then the Rohillas seized the country of the Almorah Raja, their ally, carried away most of the handsomest women of the country captives, among others the daughter of the Raja whom Ally Mahomed took himself and she was the mother of the present Fyzulla Cawn. This is mentioned as an instance of their insincerity, farther it is a proverb in Indostan, that they pray with one hand and rob with the other. Their manner of making war is much the same as is practised all over Indostan; towards their conquered enemys they have generally been bloody, those whom they have saved they commonly made captives of, and in the late campaign I have been very well assured by many of the prisoners that their intentions towards us were very bloody, that they had orders to give no quarter.

To the eighth question.—I have never understood that it was fordable at any place below Anopshuri, and I have taken great pains to make myself acquainted with your subject by enquiries of Nudjiff Cawn, and after the war was finished of many of the Rohillas. I have understood that it is easy forded at no place, but in the month of March and beginning of April it may be forded at several places between Hardwa and Anopshuri, but it is not fordable long after that period on account of the melting of the snows and rising of the rivers. I have been told by Nudjiff Cawn that he was astonished at the Rohillas suffering the Mahrattas to cross the Ganges when they invaded the country of Zabita Cawn to the mouth of the Ganges, as he assured me that every one of the fords might easily have been defended. I was with the Vizier a few days after they had crossed the Ganges, and he blamed the sirdars very much for suffering them, using this expression, "He was sure Zabita Cawn was not the son of old Nazim O'Dowlah or he would not have suffered them to cross the Ganges." It is the general opinion of all the Indostan soldiers with whom I have talked on the subject that the Ganges is not to be forded but by surprise; the fords are very well known.

To the ninth question.—I think it would be so dangerous an enterprize that they would hardly undertake it; and if they did, in case of a defeat they would be totally ruined having but a small tract of country to march over

before they come to the Ganges, and if a victorious army pursued them closely they must either perish in it or fall by the sword.

To the tenth question.—I believe it impossible to ascertain what the sum is, but it is generally supposed and I do very believe to have been considerable, consisting chiefly in specie, plate and jewels; by considerable, I mean upwards of a crore of rupees; this is my own opinion, others have estimated the sum at a great deal more.

To the eleventh question.—I recollect to have learnt from Sir Robert Barker, that when he marched up to Ramgaut with the Vizier to the assistance of the Rohillas, and had come near to the Mahratta army, their conduct was so doubtful and had so much the appearance of treachery, that he had come to a resolution of attacking them if they did not fully declare themselves by their actions; and to the best of my remembrance he would have done it but that he was misled by a guide. But this is a question which Colonel Champion or Colonel Goddard can better reply to as they were present, I was not but only heard it from General Sir Robert Barker.

Questions by the General—

Q.—Do you know who has the commission to receive Nujiff Cawn's pension which is to be paid by this Presidency?

A.—It is a question I cannot well reply to. I know whom he intended to appoint his agent, but the confirmation of the appointment I understood depended on the Governor.

Q.—Who was the person intended with the Government approbation?

A.—I was.

Q.—What were you to receive for it?

Major Hannay ordered to withdraw.

The Governor General observes that the questions which he proposed and which were assented to by the Board related only to the Rohilla war, but the questions now put by the General tend to reveal some transaction of Major Hannay himself, which if of a private and lawful nature the Board have no right to enquire into, and if of an unlawful nature they ought not to be put to Major Hannay himself, he therefore objects to this question being put.

Mr. Francis.—I think the question proper and necessary and that the Board have a right to make the enquiry. I cannot suppose that Major Hannay has done anything criminal in this business, because the intended appointment was to have the sanction of the Governor, and had been communicated to him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

Mr. Barwell thinks the question improper, it has no public object, and therefore objects to it.

Mr. Monson sees no impropriety in putting the question to Major Hannay, as he understands that these gentlemen were called before the Board to give the most ample information and cannot suppose that there was any thing improper in the appointment of Major Hannay to be Agent to Nudjiff Cawn as it was to receive the Governor's sanction.

Resolved that the question be put.

Major Hannay called in again and the question put to him—

A.—I have long known Nudjiff Cawn, he is a man for whom I entertain a friendship and should embrace any consistent opportunity to testify my friendship to him. I wish to explain what I mean by the Governor's confirmation of his intention of appointing me his Agent. I thought it was improper to accept of that appointment without having first applied for and obtained leave from the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor not thinking myself an adequate judge how far it was proper for me to undertake such an office.

Question by the Governor—

Q.—I desire Major Hannay may inform the Board what answer he received from me either directed to himself or the Commander-in-Chief.

A.—I don't positively recollect what the answer was, but I think it was that there was no money due at that time to Nudjiff Cawn, but when the Governor should be acquainted with the pleasure of the Court of Directors he would then determine whether the Jaghire was to be paid, and in the meantime it was needless to confirm an appointment which might never be exercised.

Questions by the General—

Q.—Do you not know that Colonel Champion made representations to the Vizier of cruelties exercised by his troops in the Rohilla country?

A.—I have heard Colonel Champion say that he had remonstrated to the Vizier against the burning of any villages, but I was not present at any such remonstrance. I further heard him say that he had used his offices with the Vizier to persuade him to treat the captive families of the Rohilla chiefs with more humanity and tenderness, and that upon these occasions the Vizier denied having treated them with severity.

Q.—Do you imagine that Colonel Champion would have made such representations to the Vizier if he had not been persuaded that the facts were true?

A.—The burning of the villages was evident, and I can say with confidence that Colonel Champion would not have made application to the Vizier for the remedy of evils which he did not believe to exist.

Q.—Whether you don't think that the Commander of the Army was in a situation to be better informed of transactions of that nature than yourself?

A.—With respect to the burning of the villages and matters of that nature with all deference to the Commander-in-Chief, I humbly conceive that I had a good opportunity of being acquainted as any one; with respect to the treatment of the captive families, I conceive he must have had better opportunities of information than me, as he might have received letters from them on the subject which I did not.

Q.—Whether you imagine that the army whilst it was in the Rohilla country could have prevented the Mahrattas from entering the Bahar province by the country of Corah?

A.—I understand that the Mahrattas must come into the Corah country by the Culpee Gaut, and as their march from their own country to Culpee is a very considerable greater distance, our army would have been time enough to oppose their passage of the Jumna.

Q.—Was the brigade complete when it entered the field, particularly the Europeans?

A.—Not quite complete.

Q.—How was it by the last returns you have seen?

A.—Not quite complete.

Q.—How many men did the European battalion want?

A.—I will send a particular account tomorrow from the latest returns I have seen.

Q.—What troops had you belonging to the Company and the brigade establishment?

A.—The latter part of the campaign the troop of cavalry; we had also two companies of grenadier sepoy from the 3rd brigade.

Q.—Whether the cadets form part of the effective strength of the second regiment or not?

A.—It was only in October last that they joined the regiment. They did duty before with the sepoy grenadier corps; they are not included in the establishment.

Q.—Who supplied the contingencies of the army?

A.—At the beginning of the campaign they were furnished by the paymaster, but latterly by the Commissary General.

Q.—Is it usual for the same person to supply contingencies and to control the accounts of them?

A.—I don't recollect any instances of it in Europe.

Questions by Colonel Monson—

Q.—What induced the Vizier to enter the zenana at Bissouly after the women had been removed from it?

A.—To look for treasure was his first motive, and to set up the zenana for his own women was his secondary.

Q.—When you went as an agent in behalf of the army into the fort of Pillybeet to look for treasure were you precluded from going into the zenana?

A.—I was.

Q.—Do you imagine if you had been allowed to have gone into the zenana, you would have found treasure?

A.—I do imagine I should have found some, as I was informed by a son of Hafiz Rahmit Cawn that there were some thousands rupees there, I think about 10,000.

Questions by Mr. Francis—

Q.—Do you conceive the country of the Rohillas to be completely and quietly reduced to the Vizier's subjection?

A.—I do.

Q.—Do you apprehend that it is necessary for the English troops to remain there in order to secure and establish the Vizier's government over his new subjects?

A.—I do not consider it as absolutely necessary that they should continue in that country, but it would be of great advantage to the Vizier's affairs that they should be in some part of the Province of Oude, the nearer the frontiers the more it would contribute to the Vizier's advantage.

Question by the Governor—

Q.—Do you imagine that the possession of the Rohilla country would be at this time in danger by the opinion that it might be invaded without any interruption or opposition from the English brigade?

A.—The unsettled situation of the Pattans and the Rohillas that were made to cross the Ganges into the Duabe makes me believe that if the brigade were withdrawn and they were thoroughly convinced that the Vizier would not be supported in that conquest, they would endeavour to wrest it from him.

Questions by Colonel Monson—

Q.—Do you know the bundebust that the Vizier has settled for the whole of the Rohilla country?

A.—No, I do not.

Q.—What is the reputed revenue of the Rohilla country?

A.—Upwards of 70 lacs.

Q.—You said that several of the prisoners had informed you that they intended to give us no quarter; do you not think it natural that they should form such a resolution against a nation which without any provocation invaded their country with an avowed design to conquer it for a Prince whom in their corruption the Rohillas particularly feared and detested?

A.—Under such circumstances as here represented I should regard it by no means an unnatural resolution for the Rohillas to have come to, but I understood that they never accused us of entering their country without provocation, and what I understood from them to have been the provocation, that brought us into their country, was their not having fulfilled their engagement they had entered into with the Vizier to pay him 40 lacs of rupees, nor did I understand that the conquest of the country was meditated if they should have paid the treaty money and the expences of the war.

The Board having no further questions to put to Major Hannay he is desired to withdraw.

Fort William the 28th December 1774.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT :

Secret Dept. The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, *President*.

Wednesday. LIEUT.-GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

The HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

The Consultation of the 21st read and approved.

Colonel Champion having sent in the following letter which is now read.

HON'BLE SIR AND SIRS,—Last night I received your favor of the 19th, and have to wish that Mr. Hastings' consciousness of the credit due to his conduct, to his sentiments and to

Colonel Champion. his manner of communicating them had been sufficient to have prevented the possibility of his receiving the sense of my address of that date in the manner he appears to have done.

I gave myself the liberty of supposing he had declined producing the correspondence from regard to ordinary politeness in consideration of many of the letters having been addressed familiarly, and by the reference made to him I meant no more than a return of the like compliment; but although I have already waived every other objection, he was pleased to insist on making the reference on his part a matter of tenderness towards me. Under such a construction, I cannot think of withholding the letters, and unequal as I acknowledge myself to Mr. Hastings in the talent of writing, I shall let my sentiment and conduct speak for themselves without seeking to anticipate opinions.

When, for the reasons assigned in my letter, I requested the favor of a previous perusal of your questions regarding the Rohilla war, I always understood that I was to give the answers verbally, because I know the effects of one question frequently produces another. My complaints are now less painful though my health is far from being re-established, but I am so much recovered that I shall with pleasure wait upon you whenever it may suit your convenience.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

A. CHAMPION.

The 21st December 1774.

Colonel Champion called in and examined on the Rohilla War.

Colonel Champion in compliance with a summons now attending is called in and the Governor General's questions of the 19th instant being put to him he replies to them severally as follows:—

To the 1st question.—It appeared so to me.

To the 2nd question.—The Vizier.

To the 3rd question.—The Rohillas are in possession of it as conquerors only, the native inhabitants are not of the same sect or religion.

To the 4th question.—The native inhabitants are still remaining, and the country is in a flourishing state.

To the 5th question.—It appeared to me that he was guilty of cruelties to the families of the Rohilla Chiefs but as to the instance I must refer to my minute.

To the 6th question.—I did hear such a report, but as to the grounds, I have none sufficient to prove the accusation, but the report of it was made to me.

To the 7th question.—They are a brave race of people, they make wars as the Indians generally do. I have no particular accounts of their conduct to their conquered enemies.

To the 8th question.—The Ganges is fordable in many places, I believe in April, May and part of June. I have little knowledge of the fords, but I believe they may be defensible by a European force, but not by the country powers. I believe they are universally known. Rynegaut is one, Ramgaut another, and there are two other places, the names of which I do not know.

To the 9th question.—If our army was upon the spot I don't think they would venture to cross, but if the army was at the distance of 100 coss, I believe they would venture, and with our army pursuing them, I think they would recross themselves but not with safety to their baggage.

To the 10th question.—I have heard (have an account) but that account was given me by Hircarrahs that the amount of the plunder was about $1\frac{1}{2}$ crore of rupees, and I believe that the amount was a crore and a half of rupees; it consisted in gold, silver and jewels.

To the 11th question.—I cannot charge my memory with any thing of that sort.

Questions by the Governor General—

Q.—Do you know whether the Vizier received any letters from Hafiz Rhamed Cawn and the other Rohilla Chiefs under their respective seals about the time of the commencement of the campaign?

A.—To the best of my recollection he did.

Q.—Did you receive such a letter from the Rohilla Chiefs at the same time?

A.—I think I did.

Q.—What was the purport of them?

A.—To the best of my recollection they were affording an accommodation.

Q.—What opinion did the Vizier express upon the offer?

A.—That he would hear of no accommodation.

Q.—Do you recollect whether the letter expressed anything like an acknowledgement of a breach of treaty committed by the Rohilla?

A.—I don't recollect.

The Colonel is requested to lay before the Board a copy of the letter addressed to him by the Rohilla Chiefs, with his answer to it.

Questions by the General—

Q.—When did you receive your instructions?

A.—About the 19th or 20th of February, in Calcutta.

Q.—Was any mention made in those instructions of the object of the Rohilla War?

A.—I think there was.

Q.—Was any previous intimation made to the Rohillas that the Government had taken offence at any part of their conduct?

A.—I don't recollect that there was.

Q.—Do you believe that you should have remembered it, had such an intimation been made by yourself?

A.—Certainly.

Q.—When the Vizier began plundering and burning the country, did you make any representation to him upon it?

A.—I did.

Q.—Did you represent to the Vizier your opinion of the ill treatment of the prisoners?

A.—I did.

Q.—Were not some of the families of the Chiefs left destitute of necessities for their subsistence?

A.—No.

Q.—In what way were they ill treated?

A.—It was reported to me that they were in want.

Q.—Did you inform the Governor, Mr. Hastings, of the Vizier's conduct towards the country and the prisoners?

A.—I did.

Q.—How did the Governor take your representations?

A.—To the best of my recollection he wrote to the Vizier to be more moderate in his behavior.

Q.—Did the Governor seem to be pleased at your making this representation to him?

A.—I refer to the Governor's letter written in answer.

Q.—When you expostulated with the Governor on the disgrace and dishonor which this war brought on the British Arms, what answer did he make to these expostulations?

A.—I cannot charge my memory, but beg leave to refer to the correspondence.

Q.—Did you apprehend during the campaign that the Mahrattas would come towards the Ganges in autumn?

A.—I received some information from the Vizier that he was in expectations of it.

Q.—Whilst the army was in the heart of the Rohilla country do you think you could have covered the Province of Bengal from an invasion of the Mahrattas, had they entered by the way of Corah?

A.—I request to have this question given me in writing that I may return an answer.

Q.—Did you hear that Nudjuff Cawn had engaged Sombre, Redman, and other English deserters in his service?

A.—To the best of my recollection no.

Questions by the Governor—

Q.—What is your opinion of the character of Nudjuff Cawn, and of his attachment towards us?

A.—I believe him to be a good man and firm to our interests.

Q.—Do you know how Major Polier came to be employed at the siege of Agra?

A.—No.

Q.—Do you know of any cannon or small arms sent to the Vizier?

A.—I know of some cannon, but as to small arms, I can't say.

Q.—How many cannon were there and of what sort?

A.—Four, and I believe them iron 18-prs.

Q.—How were the contingencies of the army furnished?

A.—The first part of the campaign by the paymaster, and the latter part by the Commissary General.

Q.—What was the cause of the change in the mode of supplying the contingencies from the paymaster to the Commissary General?

A.—I understood that it was by order of the Company.

Q.—Do you know nearly how many boats the Commissary General had with stores?

A.—No.

Q.—When he sells the stores who purchases them, or makes the bargain for the Company?

A.—The stores are supplied by indent, I cannot say who makes the bargain.

Q.—Who fixes the price of the stores?

A.—I cannot say.

Q.—Who comptrolls the accounts after they are purchased?

A.—The Commissary General.

Q.—Do you know if any lead was indented for?

A.—No, that I recollect.

Q.—When did you acquaint the Governor with having received an obligation from the Vizier for seven lacs as a present to the army?

A.—I believe it to be the 8th of August.

Q.—When did you acquaint them of your having received the obligation for 50,000 rupees?

A.—I never did mention it to the best of my knowledge.

Q.—When did you acquaint them of your having received the tuncaw for the 3 lacs?

A.—Not till I came to Calcutta.

Q.—Did you ever mention in your correspondence with the Governor, that advantageous conditions might be procured for the Company by making peace with some of the Rohilla Chiefs?

A.—I did.

Q.—Do you recollect what conditions might have been obtained for the Company by making peace with them?

A.—I refer to my correspondence for the particulars.

Q.—When you made the propositions to the Governor, did he not order you not to negotiate, but to pursue the war till the Rohillas were entirely conquered?

A.—I cannot charge my memory with this, but refer to my correspondence.

Questions by Mr. Francis—

Q.—Whether you have received from the Vizier any part of the 40 lacs, stipulated to be paid by him to the Company on account of the Rohilla war?

A.—No.

Q.—Do you know whether he has paid any part of that sum to any person for the use of the Company?

A.—No.

Q.—What do you apprehend is the annual amount of the revenue acquired by the Vizier, by the conquest of the Rohilla country?

A.—I understood it to be between 70 and 80 lacs.

Q.—Whether your letter to us dated the 19th instant and now shown you, communicated to the Governor General, before it was sent into the Board and whether he made any objection to its being sent?

A.—No.

The Governor begs leave to ask Mr. Francis, and desires he will inform the Board, why he asks this question as it is so pointed to himself.

Mr. Francis.—I did understand that one of the letters sent in by Colonel Champion had been previously communicated to the Governor, I do still understand so from the Colonel, and I asked merely to ascertain what the letter was, and to prevent mistakes, I now beg leave to ask the Colonel, whether any letter of his to the Board since his arrival at this Presidency was previously communicated to the Governor.

A.—The letter wherein I required my resignation was shown to the Governor.

Questions by General Clavering—

Q.—When you was ordered by the late President and Council to make your demand on the Vizier for the 40 lacs did he acknowledge the money to be due?

A.—Yes.

The first demand having been made as the Colonel apprehends about the middle of July.

Q.—Did you ever repeat that demand afterwards?

A.—No; to the best of my recollection, I did.

Q.—What reason did he give for not paying you?

A.—That he had no money in the field, but when he returned to Fyzabad it should be paid.

Q.—Did he not promise to pay it with the money he received from Fyzoola Cawn.

A.—He did promise it.

Q.—Did he perform it?

A.—No.

The Board having no further questions to put to Colonel Champion he is desired to withdraw and the Secretary ordered to deliver him the question which he desired to have in writing.

The Governor General now observes that any question must have an object and therefore begs Mr. Francis will inform the Board, what is the object of the two last questions which he asked Colonel Champion.

Mr. Francis replies, I asked the first of these questions, for the reason I have assigned; I asked the second in consequence of the Governor's question to me, to show that I did not causelessly ask the first.

Reconsidered the letter of Colonel Champion in continuation 19th December.

Agreed that he be accordingly permitted to resign the Company's service.

Proceedings of the Secret Select Committee from 16th January to 28th
February 1775.

Fort William, the 16th January 1775.

AT A COUNCIL, *present*.

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *Governor-General, President.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

THE HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, ESQ.

PHILIP FRANCIS, ESQ.

The Consultation of the 11th instant, read and approved.

Remarks on the letter written by GENERAL CLAVERING, COLONEL MONSON, and MR. MONSON, and Francis's address, FRANCIS, to the Hon'ble Court of Directors, and dated the 30th November 1774.

4. The Court of Directors were advised by all the despatches of the year 1773 that our forces had been employed in the Rohilla country in repelling the invasion of the Mahrattas, which threatened the safety of the Vizier's dominions, and they were advised by the Despatches of the 12th October 1773 by the mercenary packet, that a proposal had been made by the Vizier and actually encouraged by the late Council to put him in possession of that country, but that it had been laid aside by the Vizier himself and reserved to be "determined by future occurrences." The Court of Directors therefore had certainly sufficient grounds for the *knowledge* of the new system of external policy which the late administration had adopted, if by the new system is meant the extension of the Company's arms beyond the line of the Vizier's territory for its security, and had sufficient grounds to *suspect* the design of reducing the Rohilla country for the Vizier, if that be the system alluded to.

5. If these were the sentiments of the majority, if such was their "Idea of the character of their Colleagues" and such their determination to "unite in the support of my administration," to "cultivate the friendship and confidence of their Colleagues," and "to promote a general harmony in our Council," what could have happened in so short a space as five days which had been as they express it "totally engrossed by the first forms and multiplicity of instant business"—to eradicate their too partial opinions, to determine them in a subversion of all my past measures, and my future authority, to preclude every avenue of personal confidence, and to sow the seeds of irreconcilable discord and disunion in our *Councils*. They found this Government engaged in an enterprise which they disapproved, and without informing themselves fully of the objects and circumstances of it, without making an allowance for errors in the judgment of others or suspecting them in their own, they at once condemned the entire measure and set down the authors of it for marks of unceasing persecution.

9. No expedition was intended, and therefore it was not necessary to include it in the Treaty,—"*The sale of Corah and Illahabad.*" "*The pecuniary terms on which the Company shall yield him the assistance of their arms?*" Is this the language of candor, and is it in these expressions, which nothing but the mercenary prostitution of the Company's arms and influence can justify, that I am to read the unbounded confidence which the members of the majority reposed in the integrity, wisdom, and ability which had guided the measures of the late administration. They knew of the *sale* of Corah and of the *pecuniary* terms on which the Company were to yield the Vizier the assistance of their arms before they left England, and they certainly approved of both, or it is not probable they should have retained the strong impression which they had received of the characters of their colleagues, and the wisdom and ability with which the Company's affairs were conducted under the late Government.

Brave and independent are the epithets of Declamation, and require no reply; but they are not very consistent with the description given of the Rohillas in the 39th paragraph.

I must beg leave to accept to the word *nation* applied to the Rohillas. They are a tribe of Afghans or Patans, freebooters, who conquered the country about sixty years ago, and have ever since lived upon the fruits of it, without contributing either to its cultivation or manufactures, or even mixing with the native inhabitants. The Rohillas are Mahometans, the Natives, Hindoos, and have only changed masters.

The Company never included the Rohillas in the line of defence against the Mahrattas but mentioned them, it is true, among the powers capable of opposing the Mahrattas, and therefore expressed an inclination to support them. I have given reasons in my minute of the 26th November 1773 why, I think, the Company were misinformed in this opinion of the Rohillas, and it is no disrespect to them to suppose the late administration capable of correcting the informations obtained from their predecessors, with the acquirements of more recent and authentic discoveries.

The conversation between the Vizier and myself was generally private, but Mr. Lawrell was present during one conference and Mr. Vansittart at two others, and both will recollect that the design of reducing the Rohillas formed a part of the first draft of the Treaty. I have assigned good and (I presume) uncontrovertible reasons for conducting the business of my negotiations with the Vizier in person and singly with him, but I never failed to communicate immediately what had passed between us to Messrs. Lawrell, Lambert and Vansittart, who were daily and almost continually with me, either verbally or generally in writing, as I made it a rule to note down all the particulars of our conversation, as soon as I was able, after we parted; and this the gentlemen severally read. The General also was constantly informed in every meeting which I had with him of what had passed between the Vizier and me.

11. The 10th paragraph concludes with a maxim equally prudent and candid. "On matters of such delicacy and moment we will not trust ourselves with the partial power of extracting." But this precaution seems to have been forgotten, in what immediately follows, where the majority in mentioning the deficiency of my report on the subject of the Rohilla expedition suppress the particulars related by me, and barely mention the Vizier's laying aside the design, but take no notice of the reason assigned for it. My words to the Council on this subject, are—"We offered to make a consideration for this service of 40 lakhs of rupees besides the stipulated sum for the expenses of the troops, but he afterwards laid aside this design *fearing that it would disable him from fulfilling his encouragements for Corah and Illahabad*," after which are enumerated the enclosures, Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 13, which all relate to this subject, and which render it unnecessary for me to be more particular especially as the design had now been laid aside by the Vizier.

12. "When you refer to the short paragraph from which these passages are taken, you will be led to conclude that the President had communicated to the Council the whole of what passed between himself and the Vizier, on the subject of the Rohilla expedition,"—so he did. I have already observed that I informed Messrs. Lawrell, Vansittart, and Lambert, who were deputed with me by the Board of every circumstance that passed during the whole course of the negotiation, but it was unnecessary that these circumstances should be recorded, when they had become entirely foreign to the terms of the Treaty. The Rohilla expedition *was laid aside*, or more properly, it had not been adopted, for the Vizier's proposal on this subject had never been ratified. It is true an option remained with the Vizier to renew this subject, but an option also remained with the administration either to reject or assent to it. It so happened that he did renew the subject; but at the time of concluding the Benares Treaty, it appeared probable to me that he would not renew it; and where was the occasion for loading our records with the particulars of transactions which had been voluntarily laid aside by the Vizier who was the interested party in them, especially as they had been unreservedly communicated by myself and the members who had been with me to the other members of the administration in private intercourse. If he had renewed the proposal, it was then time enough to enter upon a public discussion of this matter, when it became a measure of administration and was decided upon by them. This is precisely the case with the measure in question, advantages were drawn from the Vizier's eagerness to pursue it which were happily retained by the Company, when the object

of them had been struck out of the Treaty. If he never had renewed it, these advantages would have remained with the Company; when he did renew it, I thought it but common justice to point out to the Board the concessions which this consideration had induced him to grant. There were no *positive engagements* entered into relative to this matter. It remained with the Board to determine what influence these circumstances should have in their decisions, and the question "whether the Vizier should or should not be assisted in attacking the Rohillas" remained *open and entire* for the decision of the Board. If these circumstances had some weight in the judgment of the Board it does not follow that they were *positive engagements*. The word *secret* is next used, surely not for candid purposes, and is applied to my having withheld from the Court of Directors information respecting the Rohilla expedition, when I had no information to communicate to them, but that the expedition was laid aside.

In the strictures which the gentlemen of the majority make upon past transactions, having a complete view of everything that has happened, they reason upon events respecting my conduct before they had taken place, and seem to condemn me for not having seen into futurity. When the Vizier, after being so eager to adopt the Rohilla expedition, all at once gave it up, although he had conceded part of the terms upon which it was to have been undertaken, it did not appear to me probable that he would have renewed the proposal or that future circumstances not lying within the reach of human foresight would happen to recommend it; but the gentlemen of the majority, knowing that the Rohilla expedition was afterwards adopted, accuse me for not having entered into a full discussion and explanation of that subject, at a time when I had little reason to expect it would ever take place. I certainly thought it possible and this is the plain meaning of the words used in my report upon the subject, *viz.*, "that the measures to be pursued for his security in that quarter must be determined by future occurrences." That is, if the Rohilla would pay the 40 lakhs due from them and join in a scheme of defensive alliance with the Vizier, the measure to be pursued for his security in that quarter, would be to afford the Rohillas protection. If, on the contrary, they gave encouragement to the enemy or refused to pay the 40 lakhs, the measures to be pursued for his security in that quarter would be, to drive out the Rohillas, and reduce the country occupied by them, within the line of his dominion.

13. In my minute of the 26th November 1773, I had explained my embarrassment with respect to the expectations I had given to the Vizier, that the project of the Rohilla expedition should meet with the same favourable disposition in your late Government to encourage it, whenever it could again be with prudence resumed, and he desired it. I had expressed also my doubts of the expediency of engaging in such an undertaking, while the current of the times rendered the slightest duration from the beaten track of affairs, personally hazardous to our reputations. The Board adopted these sentiments in the following resolution:—

"The Board after due consideration of the matter in reference from the Select Committee and of the President's representation concur heartily in wishing to avoid the expedition proposed without entering into a discussion of the propriety of such an enterprize on general principles. The Board see in their full force all the circumstances of doubt as to its present expediency which the President has so clearly set forth; and they are also sensible of the embarrassment which he lies under from what passed on the subject between him and the Vizier at Benares. They are equally solicitous to save the honor of the Company and watch over its interest, and for that reason they approve of the letter now before them which seems equally calculated to save both. The conditions, if accepted, would undoubtedly secure the greatest possible advantages from such an enterprize; but they appear to them more calculated to drive the Vizier into a refusal, which is what they trust in, as its most probable and almost infallible consequence; and which they wish for, as the proper result of their proposition in the present circumstances of affairs."

Let this minute be compared with the short and mutilated extract of it, as it stands in the letter of the majority, and they will be found to convey the most opposite senses. An uninformed reader, who should take his knowledge of

this transaction from the latter, would conclude that I had urged the measure solely on the ground of the promise which I had made to the Vizier, and on the hope that the conditions which I had proposed were so hard as to induce him to reject them ; and that the Board had assented to it on no other considerations even while they declared their disapprobation of the measure. The fact is, that the Board rested their wish to avoid the expedition solely upon their doubts of the consequences which might personally affect us, at the same time that they were sensible of the advantages that it would secure the Company.

That I had cause for my belief that the Vizier would reject the condition is plain, since the Vizier actually did reject them, although the encouragement offered him by the success of his operations in the Duab, and the total inability of the Mahrattas to interrupt him in his further pursuits, induced him afterwards to declare his acceptance of them.

14. No. The Board wished to decline the undertaking for the reason which has been often repeated. But it surely was not necessary that they should frustrate the success of it, if it did take place. This precaution was taken to insure its success and to prevent any interruption which it might receive from the rains, if it was delayed till their approach, which would have happened had the Board required a repetition of the application to be made to them for the march of the Brigade when they had already expressed their assent to it.

16. "We had rather attribute the apparent change in the Vizier's resolutions to the duplicity of his character than suppose it possible that the President was from the first acquainted with his real intentions, and that he made use of artifice to draw or extort from your Council an involuntary concurrence in his measures. Your assistance is proposed to be yielded to the Vizier on terms so disadvantageous to him that he cannot be expected to accept of it. That conditional engagement being once extorted from your Council, they can no longer recede from it, when the Vizier almost immediately accepts the conditions."

I am sorry to see the names of Clavering and Monson subscribed to such unworthy insinuations, because I do not believe that even the heat of party contention can have so far warped their minds from the consideration of that justice, which every man of honour will yield to the honour of others, as to make them really believe me capable of so base an artifice as they have imputed to me without the slightest grounds to support it. I will not answer it.

17. "Considering that the Vizier himself expressly says, *that it is his resolution to employ the Brigade in the reduction of the Rohillas*, this last intimation from the Select Committee appears to us wholly unaccountable,"—why does this intimation appear unaccountable. The Select Committee were of opinion that although the Vizier had declared his intention of making a conquest of the Rohilla country, yet he would not actually undertake it, but would employ all the remainder of the fair season in his operations in the Duab.

18. An appeal to the passions is an insult to the understanding. Such are the allegations of "barbarous and unnecessary devastation of the country,"—the "cruelty with which the Vizier treated his unhappy prisoners,"—"the brutal outrages offered to their wives and daughters though of the highest rank,"—"his wanton enormities," and the declamatory quotation from one of Colonel Champion's letters on the same subject. I believe it will appear from the evidence of Mr. Nathl. Middleton's letters, and from the examination of Colonel Lesslie and Major Hannah, strongly corroborated even by the letters and depositions of Colonel Champion, the Vizier's principal accuser, that he has been unjustly traduced in the reports which have prevailed of the enormities committed by him in the course of the war. I believe it to be a truth that he began by sending detachments to plunder. This I pronounce to have been both barbarous and impolitic, but too much justified by the practice of war, established among all the nations of the East, and, I am sorry to add, by our own, in an instance which the Vizier has a right to quote in vindication of the charge against him, of a detachment employed in the war, in which we were engaged with him in the year 1764, to burn and ravage his country. It fell to the lot of Colonel (then Major Champion) to execute this commission, and how well he discharged it, and how little his feelings were at that time affected by the same scene of barbarities and *wanton enormities* against which he has lately so pathetically exclaimed, will appear from the following copy of a letter

from him on the subject, to the late President, Mr. Vansittart, which I quote, not meaning to reproach him with having done the duty assigned him, but to prove that the principle which dictated to Colonel Champion the severe charges with which he has laboured to load the Vizier in the late campaign, was either personal animosity, or the desire of persuading the Board to grant him the power which he repeatedly solicited, to control, and, in effect, to command the Vizier. I pretend not to look into the hearts of others, but I exercise the right allowed to all mankind of judging of intentions by facts, and I appeal to Colonel Champion's correspondence with the Select Committee, and the Board, for the grounds on which I form my judgment, and on which every man who reads them may judge for himself. The letter above alluded to, is as follows :—

Extract of a letter from MAJOR CHAMPION to HENRY VANSITTART, Esq., dated the 20th June 1764.

“Two separate parties have been sent into the enemy's country, the one of which went as high up as Buxar, and according to the directions given me, there are destroyed upwards of a thousand villages. Had not the rain, &c., prevented us, which occasioned our return, we should have done very considerable more damage. I am now marching in the borders of the Deva, to the boundary of the Sircar country, to endeavor to bring in the zemindars, as not one of them of any considerable note is yet come in, nor has a rupee been collected from this country.”

The cruelty with which the Vizier treated his unhappy prisoners forms the second charge against him. It is not even asserted (except in the instance which I shall proceed to in the 3rd charge) that they suffered by actual violence, but that they were ill subsisted, and I believe this to be true. Mr. Nathl. Middleton, whose letters contain the strongest character both of candour and truth, says that the Vizier did allow them too moderate a subsistence and that ill served, his commands, though frequently repeated being in this as in every other instance ill obeyed. The 3rd charge is indeed of the blackest die “of brutal outrages offered to the wives and daughters of the Rohillas though of the highest rank.” The only authority which the gentlemen of the majority had for this horrid accusation, at least I recollect no other, was a letter from Mr. Nathl. Middleton, who mentioned it only as an instance of the falsehoods which had been propagated to injure the Vizier, adding that the unhappy victims of his brutal lust, who could not survive their shame, but had put a violent end to their own lives, were still living, and that the Vizier had never seen them. Colonel Champion's answer to the question proposed to him by the Board on this subject, namely, “whether he had heard the report and if he believed there were grounds for it,” is a striking instance of the little *inclination* he had to shew favor to the Vizier, but amounts to the strongest conviction of the falsehood of this abominable history. “He said,” he did hear such a report, but “as to the grounds, he had none sufficient to prove the accusation, but the report was made to him.” The charge of oppressing his new subjects has also been laid against the Vizier, and totally refuted by the depositions of Colonel Champion, Colonel Lesslie, and Major Hannay, who all declare the country enjoyed, even in the height of war, a state of perfect tranquillity.

19. This contains a charge against me for suppression. In answer, I say that these details, if declamations are details, have appeared long ago in Colonel Champion's letters to the Select Committee, complaining of the cruelties exercised by the Vizier, and in the repeated calls which they made upon him, to produce the instances of them, which he replied to by repeating the same declamations, but producing no instances, at least none which in my judgment can warrant the smallest part of his invectives against him. The following is his reply :—

Select Committee's Proceedings of the 1st July 1774. *Extract of a letter from COLONEL CHAMPION to the Select Committee, dated the 12th June 1774.*

“In compliance with the Board's desire I am now to mention a very unpleasant subject, the Vizier's treatment of the family of Hafez Rhamut, &c., the inhumanity and dishonour with which they, M'hebullah Khaun, his brother

Fitulah Khaun, late proprietors of this city and country, and their families, have been used, is known over all these parts; a relation of them would swell this letter to an immoderate size, and withal prove very disagreeable reading. I send you translations of two letters, and copy of a third, which, affecting as they are, will convey but a faint idea of the treatment these unhappy people have met with.

"I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery, and my requests to the Vizier to shew lenity were frequent, but as fruitless as were those advices which I almost hourly gave him regarding the destruction of the villages, with respect to which I am now constrained to declare, that though he always promised as fairly as I could wish, yet he did not observe one of them, nor cease to overspread the country with flames, till three days after the fate of Hafez was decided. But gentlemen, in all points excepting such as immediately respect the operations in the *field*, he is *solely empowered to prescribe*. The reputation of the British name is in his hands, and the line which has been laid down for me is very clear.

"The above families have been despatched to Fizabad that their maltreatment might not be so generally known to us. I have, however, frequent accounts of them, and it will give me the most sensible pleasure that you stretch forth the hand of benevolence effectually to relieve them from so indescribable a misery, and that you may the better devise the means of so doing without subjecting them to greater misfortunes I am to inform you that every application of mine in their favour, though professedly taken in good part by the Vizier, yet only served to procure them more rigorous treatment."

The two letters which he enclosed are too long to extract, they are inserted in the consultations referred to in the margin, and will be found to contain no proofs.

21. Although it is not material to prove what part of the private correspondence of Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathl. Middleton were withheld from the Board, when I have publicly refused to communicate it, yet it is of consequence to me to refute misrepresentations. I never asserted that my chief reason for withholding the correspondence was "that they related to a difference between the Vizier and Colonel Champion."

My declared reason for withholding this correspondence was, that I could not in honour reveal it; and in relation to Colonel Champion's letters I added that I thought a greater degree of delicacy due to him, because our correspondence had not been always cordial on many points; and we had several times expostulated with each other on these topics with the freedom of private friends, and in a style which, though decent in every degree, is yet different perhaps from the formal addresses of official correspondence.

26. To blacken my conduct and to excite indignation against me facts are perverted, misrepresentations employed, insinuations thrown out of the blackest perfidy committed by me, in acts neither known nor even alluded to, and opprobrious epithets and invectives applied to the measures of which I had lately the chief direction. Instances of all these kinds of argument occur in this short paragraph.

It is a perversion of facts to say that "the British arms and honor were absolutely at the Vizier's disposal." That "an absolute surrender has been made of the honour and interest of the Company." We agreed to assist him in subduing the Rohillas. It was necessary to draw the line between the authority of the Vizier and our Commanding Officer. The service to be performed was entirely the Vizier's; it was therefore consistent and unavoidable that he should direct the objects of it; but the execution of military operations was expressly vested in our Commanding Officer; of course the safety of our army and the honor of the British name and arms were entirely confided to his conduct and discretion.

It is a misrepresentation to say, that "the Vizier dared to tell the Presidency that he is the *Master* of the Company's army." His words in a literal translation of his letter which was made by myself, and is alluded to in this expression are these. "But I am the Master in these affairs, and the power of

retaining or dismissing the English army is mine,"—an idiomatical expression, perpetually occurring in the Company's records, and meaning simply, that the Brigade was not to stay or depart without his consent. What follows is pure insinuation and inapplicable abuse; I quote the passage to prove it.

"Confounded by appearances which we are unable to account for, we look in vain for ostensible causes adequate to such effects, and confess that every inquiry that we make fills us with equal diffidence and surprise. We shall not, however, anticipate any conjectures which may arise in your minds when you review the whole conduct of this dark and mysterious business from first to last, and reflect upon the absolute surrender which has been made with so little apparent compensation of your honor and interest to the vindictive or capricious projects of Sujah Dowla."

What are the effects which fill them with equal diffidence and surprise? What business is it which they call dark and mysterious? Who made an absolute surrender of the honour and interest of the Company? No one. I look in vain for the necessity which impelled the majority to deviate into such reflections for the justification of their conduct in recalling the Brigade at the crisis of the war, and in dissolving the appointment of my agent at the Court of the Vizier; but if the justification of their conduct can only be supported by "a strong and deliberate censure of the preceding administration," this mode of exciting the passions and surprizing the attention, which is calculated to sway with uninformed and inattentive readers, I trust will not influence the judgment of those who are to decide both upon their conduct and that of the preceding administration.

23-29. These paragraphs seem to contain some criminal charge, but I confess I scarce know how to apply them. They *did* arrive on the 19th, but too late for business and without the packet. We *did* meet on the 20th, and spent the whole morning, as they say, on settling the proclamation of the new Government which I say, too, ought not to have been a matter of much debate. At my desire we adjourned to the Monday following, Mr. Barwell not being arrived; but it was not till the next day, Tuesday the 25th, that I gave them any sight into the political state of the country. Why their situation during this interval was anxious or disgraceful I cannot conceive. There was only a vacuity of two days, Friday and Saturday, and these not unemployed by me or them. I was wholly occupied all that time in preparing the first points of business, necessary for their information, namely, the state of the revenue and situation of our political affairs. The first required some instant determination, and was brought on the first on Monday, and the debates on it took up the whole time of that meeting. The last which required no immediate resolution was brought on on Tuesday, but might with equal effect have been totally withheld, as the members of the majority came prepared with a decided resolution, to reprobate the whole system, and to take the speediest measures to overturn it in the very crisis of its accomplishment.

39. This is not a fair state of my argument which I desire may be taken in my words in the minute of the 26th November 1773, not in this mutilation of it. I never conceived the Rohillas to be *weak—divided and defenceless*. The words so connected convey the idea of utter disability. I said they were too weak to be a match singly opposed to the Vizier, that their jealousy of him would therefore make them ready to arm themselves against him, and that they would seek their safety in involving the Vizier in wars with powers more formidable than themselves.

40. To this opinion of Colonel Champion's I shall subjoin the following of General Sir Robert Barker's, which I consider as at least equal authority.

The General agrees with the President that the Vizier's dominions would become compact and not sufficiently open to invasion. It is from the apprehension of invasion that cements the Vizier's friendship with the English, and makes him that staunch ally we find him.

My own opinion upon this subject is very fully explained in my remarks on the 42nd paragraph.

41. This method of separating the parts of a proposition, and refuting them singly without adverting to the relation with each other, is new and embarrassing. I own that the conveniency of possessing the Rohilla country was not sufficient reason for invading it. I never said it was; but if they had afforded a just provocation for invading their country and we saw advantages in invading it, though neither cause was alone sufficient to produce that effect, yet both united would certainly justify it, and the most rigid speculator would approve so fair a conclusion.

I hope I shall stand acquitted in the breasts of all reasonable men for maintaining the opinion quoted against me in the conclusion of this paragraph, but I adopt it even in the words of my opponents, and if I am "the Chief of a great State" alluded to by them, I shall be always ready to profess that I do reckon the probable acquisition of wealth, among my reasons for taking up arms against my neighbours. "I never in any period of my life, though long engaged in public affairs, gave my consent for taking up arms in an *unjust cause*, and I never shall, but in cases of very notorious enormity give my consent to take up arms in an *unprofitable* one.

42. The answers which have been given by Colonel Champion, Colonel Lesslie, and Major Hannay to the questions put to them by the Board at once clear up the obscurity and reconcile what appears to the gentlemen of the majority contradictions in that part of my minute, respecting the acquisition of the Rohilla country to the Vizier. It has been asked them if they thought the Mahrattas would venture to cross the Ganges and enter the Rohilla country when an English army was ready to oppose them. To which they have all answered, they did not think they would, and if they did, that they could not retreat without the loss of their baggage; therefore I say that the Vizier's possessions by this acquisition *make a compact state, shut in effectually from foreign invasions*, if he has an English army to assist him. It has also been asked these officers, if they think that without our assistance the Vizier's army would prevent the Mahrattas from crossing the Ganges and entering the Rohilla country. To which they answered that they did not think it would; and therefore I say that this acquisition, *by bringing his frontier nearer to the Mahrattas for whom singly he would be no match, renders him more dependent on us*.

With our aid, the Vizier's State joined to the lately acquired country, both bounded by the Ganges and the northern range of mountains, forms *a complete compact State shut ineffectually from foreign incursions*. But without our aid he cannot bring into the field a force capable of defending it, and therefore this very acquisition renders him more dependent upon us. A fort may be impregnable, with a proper garrison, which might be easily assaulted and taken, if there were not suitable troops to defend it.

44. The rupees of the currency of Oude have a fixed standard. The rupees received by Mr. Lambert in payment of the first sum of the Treaty money were not all of the currency of Oude. The difference is certainly due from the Vizier, and ought to be demanded. It will appear, I believe, upon examination of the Paymaster's accounts, that the rupees received from the Vizier on account of the monthly subsidy for the troops have yielded 111 current rupees per cent.

45. I am informed by the Paymaster-General that the disbursements of the troops which marched to the service of the Vizier during the three first months of your campaign (the subsequent accounts not having been yet received) amount as follows:—

	R	a.	p.
For February 1774	2,06,069	9	0
For March 1774	2,60,752	14	6
For April 1774	2,46,376	1	7
Current Rupees	7,13,198	9	1

That is upon a medium current R2,37,773, which is less than the amount due by my estimation for the monthly subsidy. The hire of boats and the

price and conveyance of stores and field equipage are as much a part of the military disbursements as the soldiers' pay, and are included both in General Barker's estimate on which the amount of the subsidy was fixed, and in the disbursements. Mr. Middleton's allowances had nothing to do with them; he had no military charge, and his appointment even preceded the order for the march of the Brigade. The troop of cavalry was not raised expressly for this service, but proposed and raised long before the service took place, for the purposes of a guard to the Governor, for occasional service against the Sineassies, and for attendance on the Commander-in-Chief when the army took the field. I am astonished to find the charge of recruiting added to the increase of disbursements occasioned by the Brigade being employed in the northern countries. It is from these countries that all our recruits are raised and the expense of bringing them into the Provinces has always been considerable; this expense is saved, when the Brigade can recruit on the spot.

46. My minute was not written for the information of the gentlemen of the present administration, but to inform the late Council of every circumstance and advantage attending the Rohilla war, with which they were not before fully acquainted. The ground of quarrel had long since been considered by them and was notoriously known to be just. It had furnished the occasion of my journey to Benares. To have entered on a matter in which we were all agreed would have been multiplying words to no purpose.

48 to 50. In answering the second objection to the Rohilla expedition as stated in my minute of appeal, I have endeavoured to defend the conduct of the late administration from the charge of the inconsistency. I will only further add that I think even the extracts which the majority themselves have made from their letters will suffice to vindicate them from the accusation. They at first steadily refuse to co-operate with the Vizier in any operations beyond the limits of his own dominions. In the meantime the Mahrattas reduce the Jants, invade the Rohillas, and threaten Corah. Their power becomes daily more alarming, till at length the Council resolve to prevent them from gaining a footing either in the Corah country or the Rohilla. They say they are impelled by indispensable reasons to become parties in these contests, but at the same time lament that it is a drain of the wealth of this country, and cannot be productive of any advantage to the Company. Afterwards such engagements are made with the Vizier as procure advantages to the Company and prevent the drain of the wealth of Bengal, and then the objections, which they before lamented, no longer subsist; with respect to attacking in 1774 the very people whom we had defended in 1773, both these measures tended to one uniform object—the prevention of the Mahrattas from establishing themselves in that country.

* 52 to 56. I presume I have sufficiently obviated all the reasoning of these paragraphs in my minute of appeal.

57. This is a practical quotation, and the inference drawn from it invidious and uncandid. I detest and despise all professional reflections as illiberal, and the effects of a malevolent heart or narrow understanding. My social connections have lain as much, if not more, in the military than any other line, and I know many of that profession whom I love and honour for qualities which would have equally entitled them to my esteem, in whatever station of life I had found them. Let my minute be read (it is too long to be inserted), and it will appear that my objections had no relation to the military character of the officer who might be in the command of the Brigade, but to the power which that command conveyed with it, and which of course gave him absolute control and sovereignty over the Vizier, if every other avenue of communication was cut off between the Vizier and this Government. My objection would have been the same whatever might have been the profession of the person intended for so unconstitutional a trust, and I presume that such were the reasons which impressed the majority of the Board, with the like conviction of the propriety of employing an intermediate agent in a line independent of the Military Command, or for the ministerial agency with the Vizier.

* 52. The chasm in my correspondence with Colonel Champion will now be supplied, as he has engaged to furnish the Board with all my letters to him, and I shall with equal fidelity lay all his before them. The suggestions excited by the chasm in this part of my correspondence will vanish with the perusal of them.

60. "We hold it beneath us to enter into a refutation of loose invectives or general insinuations. Look to facts, gentlemen, and we are convinced you will find, it is your civil servants who have involved the Company in offensive wars, and in schemes of conquest by which no public interest could be promoted." This and the concluding sentence of the last paragraph have much the air of insinuations thrown out to the disadvantage of the *Civil* branch of the service, and with great injustice. The fact is (since facts are appealed to), that the first proposition of the Rohilla war came from the Vizier and General Barker, a circumstance of little importance, but as it stands properly opposed to an assertion too peremptorily made, since it was intended to brand the objects of it with infamy, unless it had been grounded on certain knowledge.

63. "The fact however differs from the representation,"—I believe not.

The date of this Treaty is no proof of misrepresentation, nor can I understand what this charge alludes to, since the facts asserted in this paragraph are undoubtedly true (except one) and prove the truth of my representation. The exception which I mean is the assertion "that the Mahrattas have not since renewed their invasions of the Rohillas." They invaded them the next year, and were driven off by General Sir Robert Barker.

64. The passage of the letters of the Select Committee from which the quotation was taken, was expressed allusively, not in the terms of an affirmation and upon a subject totally different from the present. The words are these: "Yet we judge that the Rohillas who have sought their safety in an alliance with the Mahrattas to which they were of necessity compelled, would, when left to themselves, attempt at least to re-establish their own independence." This quotation will be better understood by the words of the original minute of the Select Committee in their proceedings of the 7th January 1773, of which it is an abstract, intended to convey the same sentiments in their letter to the Court of Directors: "It is however still more probable that the Rohilla Chiefs, who have sought their present safety in treacherous alliance to which necessity compelled them with the Mahrattas, will, from the same principle, abandon their cause, &c." The Select Committee, in these reflections, aimed only to prove that the fears of the Vizier were ill-grounded, when he expected that the Rohillas would abandon themselves wholly to the Mahrattas. The idea of justifying the treacherous conduct of the Rohillas never had a place in our thoughts; we considered the Rohillas as acting merely on the principle of occasional convenience, or temporary necessity, uniting at one time with the enemies of the Vizier, either to avoid a present danger apprehended from them, or to distress and divert him from forming designs against their security, and at another time uniting with the Vizier to oppose the same enemies, when their successes became an object of greater danger to them, than the suspected intentions of the Vizier, and he could repel them. This is consistent with the opinion which I have always declared of the Rohilla policy, and when that policy is manifested in acts of open perfidy, they certainly become the "just objects of war and conquest," though not on vindictive principles.

65. It would have been little consistent with prudence in the Vizier to possess himself of the dominions of the Rohillas at a time when the Mahrattas were capable and at hand to dispute it with him and his protection of the Rohillas was necessary to defend that avenue to his own dominions; and as little consistent with equity to take that advantage of their distress because they had not at that time afforded him provocation for it.

66. We are not bound to assist the Vizier with our troops for the defence of any part of his dominions should it be incompatible with our own security, and on this principle I apprehend the Board would decide, in any requisitions which might be made to us by the Vizier for our assistance. As far as may be consistent with our own security, I am clearly of opinion with Mr. Barwell, that it will be politically necessary to protect the Vizier's new dominions, if he shall be at any time unable to defend them by his own force, which is not very likely to happen, unless the assurance of a neutrality on our part should encourage the Mahrattas or any other power who may become equally formidable to direct their whole strength against that quarter, presuming on their superiority to the Vizier's forces alone and unsupported by ours. But I am

clearly of opinion that such an event is not likely to happen, if it is believed that our forces will march to oppose them. In this opinion I am supported by those delivered by Colonel Champion, Colonel Lesslie, and Major Hannay, in their examinations before the Board on the 19th and 28th ultimo. If the Company's interest requires it, and no cause forbids it, I shall not look for the obligation of a treaty to compel my assent to it.

67. "The first of the above measures (*i.e.*, the purchase of Corah and Allahabad) necessarily makes the king your enemy." It probably has produced that effect, which we have not felt nor ever shall. He owed his existence and all the power and wealth he ever possessed to the British generosity, and he repaid it, with acts of hostility. But why are objections raised at this time against the *purchase* of Corah and Allahabad. Right or wrong, it is passed; it is irrevocable, and has not the slightest connection with the measures of the majority, unless on the principle fundamentally laid down by them "that the justification of their conduct can only be supported by a strong and deliberate censure of the preceding administration." To the opinion of Colonel Champion quoted in this paragraph, I beg leave to oppose those delivered by himself, Colonel Lesslie, and Major Hannay, in the late examination, to which I refer.

68. "At the risk of making all Hindostan your enemies," this is a new consequence drawn from the support afforded the Vizier, and too portentous to be affirmed or admitted without a reason produced in support of it. I cannot guess at any, and cannot therefore answer it.

69. I have already said that the cession of Corah and Allahabad, which is styled by the majority a *sale*, a *purchase*, and the subsidy fixed for the maintenance of our troops while employed in the defence of our ally, which they have branded with the appellations of *pecuniary* terms and *hiring* out the troops, &c., were known to the gentlemen of the majority before they left England, and at the time in which they profess themselves to have been impressed with the highest idea of the "wisdom and ability with which the Company's affairs had been conducted under Mr. Hastings." While it suited their present purpose or passion to favor the measures of which I had the conduct, the most exaggerated applause was not thought to overrate them, but the same measures are now become their ridicule, and the ruin of the British interest at Bengal is inferred from their effects, because "the justification of their conduct can only be supported by a strong and deliberate censure of the measures of the late administration."

The reasons which have been alleged for the *sale* of Corah and Allahabad have not been controverted. I believe they never will, and I shall therefore pass over this subject as decided; but it may be necessary to say something in vindication of the stipulation for the monthly subsidy, against the new construction that has been forced upon it, and the inferences deduced from it. By the original Treaty formed with the Vizier in 1765, we are under obligations to assist him with our forces (with the reserve already mentioned) whenever he required it, and he is obliged to pay the extra expense. This engagement has proved a source of vast expense to the Company and made the Vizier's alliance a burthen to them. It compelled them to keep up a larger force at an expense exceeding the proportion of the rest, than the defence of their own possessions required, and they derived no other advantages from it, than in the security which their own provinces eventually received from the security of their ally. To remove this heavy load, it was proposed to raise the subsidy to the full amount of the expense of a Brigade, estimated at what it ought to be. This was effected by the Treaty of Benares; and at once removed all the objections, placing the alliance between the Company and the Vizier on a ground of reciprocal advantage, and at the same time rendering the employment of the Company's arms an object of interest instead of disadvantage. The subsidy is not new nor an act of the last administration. It has its foundation in the original alliance with the Vizier, but the modification of it has been improved; the sum paid in 1765 for it was Rs30,000 per month, and it is now fixed at Rs2,10,000, which is just seven times the first amount.

Here I cannot omit making one general reflection which occurs in reading the address of the majority, which is, that their grand and principal objection

to the measures of the late administration seems to be, that we allowed the Company to acquire any pecuniary advantages from our political arrangements. The ceding of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier is objected to as a *sale*, because 50 lacks of rupees were stipulated to the Company on that account. If we had given up these without any consideration in return, this objection could not have been made. The subsidy for defraying the whole expenses of our troops employed with the Vizier is reproachfully styled *hiring* them. If the Vizier had only paid the extra expenses, it would *then* have been less reproachful; but if we had made the Company pay the whole expenses, in the language of the majority it must *then* have been entirely irreproachable, and we should have acted for the glory of the British nation. Our agreement with the Vizier concerning the Rohilla war is dishonorable, because the conditions were *mercenary* and *pecuniary*—that is the Company were to acquire 40 lacks of rupees from it. Had there been no such acquisition to the Company, the majority would have held these dishonorable epithets. Upon these points I leave the Company to decide between the sentiments of the majority and the motives which influenced our conduct.

If I have expressed the opinion ascribed to me in these words—"It is highly useful to the Company to hire out their troops to Sujah Dowlah, in order to save the expense of their pay, and to preserve their discipline *by keeping them in the continued practice of war.*" Which words by the line drawn under them I suppose to be mine, I hereby retract and disavow it. I am of opinion that the best military establishment will lose its spirit and discipline by long inaction, that it is necessary to both, that the troops should frequently take the field, and not enjoy too long an interval from active service. This maxim I have often avowed, and I believe upon record, but a *continued practice of war* is suitable only to a piratical state or a herd of savages. The refutation of this maxim is extraordinary: "We fear the time is approaching very fast, when the India Company and the nation will know the extent, and feel the force of it"; and this called, *speaking plainly, and apprizing the Company of their danger.*

70. The particulars of this paragraph which appear improperly introduced on this occasion, have either been misunderstood or misrepresented. If it has been admitted in Council, "that the plan for letting the lands has in a great degree miscarried, and that this country is unable to bear the expenses of the investments together with that of the Civil and Military establishments," the admission is not founded on truth, the plan for letting the lands has not miscarried, and is still in our opinion the best which could have been adopted; what deficiencies have happened in it, have proceeded from eventual causes, which have been fully explained, and which no general plan could prevent. It has been said that this country was unable to bear the current expenses of the Civil and Military establishments, to furnish the Company's investments and supplies of treasure for China and Bombay, and to pay off a bond debt of near a crore and thirty lacks of rupees accumulated in the course of former years without a reduction of its expenses and an addition to its resources. It was from this reason that so much pains was taken by the late administration to retrench the current expenses, and that their political measures were successfully calculated to furnish additional resources.

71. The employing of our troops with the Vizier does not suppose the *destruction of nations*, but on the contrary the preservation of them, at least of his country. The express purpose for which the Vizier can by Treaty apply for our troops is for the defence of his dominions, and that most probably against the Mahrattas, for there is no other enemy likely to attack them. Colonel Champion, Colonel Lesslie, and Major Hannah, have given it as their opinions that since his acquisition of the Rohilla country, this would be effected by our army appearing only in his support, as the Mahrattas would not dare to cross the Ganges, if they were opposed by an English army. The consequence is, that as often as the Vizier was under apprehensions of an invasion, he would call for our troops, and we would have it in our power to ease the Company of part of their military expenses. It is true that this resource is temporary, but I hope the difficulties of the Company will also prove only temporary. It is to remove them that we have proposed these expedients, and every expedient

• which lessens their disbursements, and adds to their resources, must contribute to produce this effect.

72. This paragraph I shall reply to in the sense to which I understand it to allude obliquely. The conquest of Agra was effected by Nudjiff Khan, assisted by some sepoys of the Vizier's. Major Polier, who had been employed by the Vizier with my permission in conducting the works of Fyzabad, had charge of these sepoys, or some other occasional command, I forget what, given to him by the Vizier, and he was present at the siege. This Government neither assisted nor countenanced the conquest of Nudjiff Khan, since the reduction of Agra was attempted and accomplished before our interference could have availed on either side. My wishes, however, I own to be favorable to Nudjiff Khan, because I believe him to be attached both by inclination and interest to the Company and a natural enemy to the Mahrattas; had I the smallest idea of its being possible that the Vizier should become an enemy to us, this would be an additional motive with me for wishing to maintain a constant connexion with Nudjiff Khan.

73. If I understand the scope of this argument, and I declare that I mean not to misconstrue it, it aims to prove that if the natural resources of Bengal have failed, the existence of the British Empire in India is at its crisis, and the attempt to save it by external remedies which are unnatural will but precipitate its dissolution. Surely this is not a just way of reasoning; if the internal resources of a State fail it, or are not equal to its occasional wants, whence can it obtain immediate relief, but from external means, which in the present case will certainly afford that relief, and prove the surest aid to lenient remedies which the wisdom of Government may apply for the restoration of its constitutional vigor? No concealment has been made by me or by the late administration of the true state of this country. Our advices have been honest, full and explicit. We have told our employers that we had encountered great difficulties and that we hoped to surmount them, and I trust that they will already have seen these hopes in part realized and ample grounds afforded to look for the establishment of a confirmed system of Government and of commercial and territorial resources in Bengal, which it hath hitherto wanted; such a state it is yet capable of receiving, although it may suffer, as I fear it will do, an interval of almost two years lost in anarchy and distraction.

The solemn asseveration at the close of this address as it contains no argument requires no answer, and should pass unnoticed by me if it were not that such a positive pledge of their "Honor and everything that can be dear to honest men," may sway with many in opposition, to all reasoning; and I must confess it appears to me to be introduced with a view to this effect. I must therefore express the surprise I feel, that the gentlemen should hazard so sacred a pledge upon the truth of facts so various and unascertained that it is impossible for human reason to decide on many of them, much less for these gentlemen, to whom the subjects were entirely new, to receive in so short a time such information as they could affirm, upon a pledge of honor, to be truth; and in effect it will appear from the above remarks that they actually have been mistaken in many of the *facts* and *inferences* which relate to the state of the Company's affairs. For myself I will declare that with certainly a fuller knowledge of the circumstances than they can possibly have attained, and with as earnest a solicitude to abide by truth, I will not venture to pledge my honor, that error and mistake may not have a place in what I have written, but I will make this sacred pledge of my "Honor and everything that is dear to me as an honest man" that my endeavours, both in my minute of appeal and in these remarks, have been to free my conduct and that of the late administration from the misrepresentations which have been cast upon them, and by a fair statement of the motives and effects of our measures to lay the truth before our employers, and enable them to decide with justice between us and our accusers.

Having finished my observations on the several arguments made use of by the gentlemen of the majority in their letter of appeal, I think it necessary to conclude with one striking remark which is opposite to the whole substance of it, namely, that though it is professedly drawn up for the defence of their measures, and the condemnation of the late administration only, as involved

in that defence, there is not a single word in their address which in my understanding defends or even aims to defend their measures.

The recall of the Brigade, at a time when we were in hourly expectation of hearing that the war was concluded, and before the conquest was secured; the dismissal of Mr. Nathl. Middleton, the public Minister of this Government at the Court of the Vizier, and the dictatorial license granted to the Commanding Officer in the field to provide against any attempts which might be made on the safety of the army, are measures against which I have protested; and which I affirm to be equally injurious to the faith of Government and the interest of the Company, whether the measures which they have laboured to depreciate be right or wrong.

Remarks on the separate letter of GENERAL CLAVERING, COLONEL MONSON, and MR. FRANCIS to the Hon'ble Court of Directors.

4. I shall never be deficient in the true returns of civility, but I presume that the gentlemen of the majority will not expect from me any acknowledgements for these expressions of personal respect; I shall desire that Captain Brooke may be re-called if his appointment is considered as repugnant to the principles or policy adopted by them, because, under the influence of such an opinion, the design of his appointment must be defeated.

5. I do not know what my words are which have been construed as a declaration that Major Polier was employed in the Vizier's country on the surveying service *only*, neither do I recollect whether I ever mentioned his name to the Board at any time to which this paragraph can refer. It is certain that it never was my intention to conceal the real footing of his residence which was publicly known with the Vizier. This I have fully explained in my minute in consultation on the 19th December; and to save both the gentlemen of the majority the trouble of a scrutiny into the transaction of which they have expressed their suspicion, I take this occasion to inform them that Major Polier did assist at the siege of Agra; that he informed me of it in a letter which he wrote to me at the time; and that to the best of my recollection, I expressed my satisfaction in reply that the Vizier had found this additional use for his services, to those for which I had recommended him. I will further declare that I approve of the Major's conduct in this instance, and that had my consent been previously required, I should freely and cheerfully have given it, not knowing of any possible objection which could be made to it.

7. I must take upon me to justify Mr. Barwell, by affirming that the majority had taken their resolution before "they had consulted all the records by which it could any way be affected"; that much assiduity and attention have been since employed to trace and collect the facts and opinions which they have offered in justification of their resolution is undoubted; but I appeal to their own words and to the records for proof, that they could not have obtained that complete information at the time in which they had taken their resolution.

On the 25th of October I read to them the concluding part of my minute entered on the consultation of that day, respecting the political state of this Government, and this contained a connected list of all the proceedings which were necessary for their perusal, to enable them to form a complete knowledge of the subject. The only parts of these references which were called for and read at the Board were the passages of the general letters of the last year, to the Court of Directors, which related to the Treaty of Benares and the Rohilla expedition, the Vizier's requisition for the march of the Brigade, and my report of my transactions at Benares. Yet on this scanty information, if they waited even for this, they at once formed their decision; and as they themselves affirm in the 33rd paragraph of their appeal, "they should have thought it their duty to proceed immediately to the recall of the Brigade, within the Company's territories, or at least within the original dominions of the Vizier, but for the vehement opposition made to that proposal by the Governor General. He urged that there were a number of records and letters still to be consulted, &c."

Of the letter addressed to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, one part only requires annotation. The rest having, as I presume, been fully answered in my minute of appeal, and in the preceding remarks.

Much stress is laid on the contents of the last general letter from the late Council as containing facts and opinions not according with the date of it, and arguments are accumulated to prove that the letter was written later than the date. This charge is in part true; that part of the letter to which this objection particularly applies was most certainly written after the assembly of the new Council, and written as I can vouch with a design of answering the objections *which* might be or had been made to the propriety of the Rohilla expedition. The date was a mere form necessary to authenticate the letter, which was to be signed by the gentlemen of whom the late Council had consisted, and who were no longer a public body after the proclamation of the new Council. This is not the only instance of facts in their own nature perfectly indifferent which have been produced against me and against the late administration with all the solemnity of the most criminal accusations.

WARREN HASTINGS.

The General, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis also deliver in a copy of their address to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors which was sent per Dutton in reply to the Governor General's letter and minute by the British King, which is now recorded as follows:—

1st.—We had no opportunity of making remarks on the Governor General's appeal to the Hon'ble Court of Directors by the last ship, dated the 3rd December; nor have we now sufficient leisure from public business to enter into and maintain a voluminous argument with the Governor-General concerning measures on which we have already delivered our opinion, and on which it appears to us that no new lights have been produced. Something, however, seems necessary to be said in reply to the charges brought against us by the Governor General, lest, by our silence, we should appear to abandon any of our declared opinions or to admit the exactness of the Governor's representation by not disputing it.

2nd.—What we have now to submit to the consideration of the Court of Directors shall be collected closely and brought, if possible, into that clear point of view in which it may be seen distinctly and judged of with precision. It is not our interest or inclination to perplex the cause, depending before the Court of Directors, either with the nicety of logical refinements, or with the introduction of matters totally foreign from the subject; and their attention may be distracted by a multiplicity of words, when it is our highest interest that it should be steadily fixed and confined to things.

3rd.—The argument against the Rohilla war was fully stated in our last address. We meant to make use of all the materials then in our possession; one important observation, however, on the conduct of the late administration was omitted. The Governor General in his minute of the 26th November 1773, in order to relieve his Council from the embarrassment they were in, upon the receipt of Suja Dowla's demand of the Brigade, and in order to elude that demand without violating the Governor's private engagements with Suja Dowla, fortunately falls upon an expedient, which he conceives will remove all difficulties. It is in substance to yield to the Vizier's demand, but upon such rigid terms, as he will probably revolt at, and as may induce him to drop all thoughts of prosecuting the design.

4th.—From these premises it would naturally follow that the hard terms which the Governor proposes to insist on in favor of the Company, should at least be new and unexpected by Suja Dowla; yet by the Governor General's report of the negotiation at Benares, it appears beyond contradiction that the above terms were no other than what the Vizier himself had previously offered upon the condition of our yielding him our assistance in the intended war against the Robillas. The sum of two lacks ten thousand rupees is settled by the Treaty of Benares for the monthly pay of the Brigade whenever they might be employed in his services, and he offers to make the Company a consideration for their service in the Rohilla war of 40 lacks of rupees.

5th.—This being indisputably the fact, we are at a loss to comprehend in what new articles the supposed harshness of the conditions which were to induce Suja Dowla to relinquish his design could be understood to have consisted. We have no other difficulty in attributing this management to a pre-concerted collusion, but that it seems too gross to answer the purpose of deceiving.

6th.—The real secret of the measure betrays itself to us from day to day. It is not of a nature to be long concealed. The Vizier's correspondence with Mr. Hastings is well worth the attention of the Court of Directors; they will see at once that many of his expressions convey more than could have been meant for their information. "When we concerted this expedition together, as I was determined to extirpate the Rohillas, I could not listen to any proposals of peace. Consider, my friend, that it was my absolute determination to extirpate the Rohillas and that I requested an English force for that purpose." In our opinion it is needless to look for further evidences of the nature of his design or of the approbation it received from Mr. Hastings. It cannot now be a question whether from the first he meant to extirpate the Rohillas or not, or whether Mr. Hastings was originally apprised of that design in its full extent.

7th.—It is not our intention to enter into a refutation of the laborious train of arguments by which the Governor endeavours to support the general expediency and justice of the Rohilla war. We willingly submit the whole to better judgments than our own. The only new document introduced by the Governor General on this subject is an extract of a private letter which he wrote to Mr. Sullivan by the first despatch, after his return from Benares. Our cause is too powerful to make it necessary for us to dispute with him upon the weakness and impropriety of referring to such a record in the discussion of a great public measure; let us see what the extract, such as it is and so produced, contains.

8th.—In substance it amounts to this, that although there were arguments which dissuaded him from the Rohilla expedition, yet there were others which would have made him very glad of any occasion to employ the Company's forces, that saved so much of their pay and of their expenses; on one side he fears the judgment which might be passed upon the measure at home, where he sees too much stress laid upon general maxims, and that his word will not be taken against the prevailing opinion of the Vizier's great power and treacherous designs against us. On the other side he states the favourableness of the opportunity afforded by the absence of the Mahrattas, the weak state of the Rohillas, which promised an easy conquest of them, and his idea of the Court's distress at home, added to his knowledge of their work abroad.

9th.—On this statement of the communication of the Governor's private sentiments to his friend, we observe that if it contains more intelligence than he transmitted to the Court of Directors, he must defend himself to them for communicating to Mr. Sullivan what he withheld from his superiors. If the communication was the same to both parties, we know not to what purpose the above extract is now produced. The public declarations of his constant approbation of the Rohilla expedition from September 1773 to this time are as well authenticated as those which before the period he had uniformly made against every measure of that nature. We date the change of system from April or May 1773.

10th.—We shall avail ourselves however of this part of the private correspondence to prove, under his own authority, that from his knowledge of the Company's distresses both at home and abroad, he would have been glad of any occasion to have employed their forces. The Company are in distress,—their troops must be employed. No man, we think, can mistake the meaning of such declarations. Yet when other immediate purposes are to be served, Mr. Hastings is not reserved in his description of the flourishing state of the Company's affairs here, and of the salutary effects which his administration has produced.

11th.—In November 1773 they certainly had not produced those effects; since that time there have been supplies of money received from Suja Dowla's

Treasury, which undoubtedly must have given a temporary relief to this distressed Government; admitting that these supplies have been substituted from motives of irresistible necessity in place of those solid and permanent resources by which the Government of a rich commercial country ought naturally to be supported, we desire that in an argument, such as the present case may be taken, to apply effects to their true causes, and not to confound objects which have not even an artificial relation to each other. An instance will illustrate our meaning. We have lately resolved to send 10 lacks of rupees in specie to Bombay; the immediate power of supplying such a sum is a symptom of a flowing treasury; the necessity of sending in specie is too clear a proof that our trade to the westward is ruined. A man who understands the subject and has no interest in making it obscure, will find nothing contradictory in these facts, or in the reasoning deduced from them. To say that a commercial country flourishes where making war is the only resource it has left, appears to us an absurdity in terms; but inconsistent principles of action must of necessity be defended by inconsistent argument and by a different language held at different times which no sophistry can reconcile.

12th.—In the present instance we are candid enough to give the Governor notice of the dilemma to which his own declarations reduced him. From all that we have hitherto observed of his way of acting and reasoning we are thoroughly convinced that everything he says and does in support of what he has already said and done will only involve him in a labyrinth of contradictions from which he never can extricate himself.

13th.—On this footing we are content to leave, for the present, the arraignment of the Governor General's conduct respecting the Rohilla war, and the defence of our own. Much undoubtedly has been done *quod fieri non debuit*; whether that be a reason for confirming what has been done, or whether this or many other acts of Mr. Hastings' administration can be confirmed on any principle are points which we willingly submit to the decision of our superiors.

14th.—If the charge appears to be now personally levelled against the Governor distinguished from his Council, let it be observed, that he has voluntarily taken the whole burthen upon himself. He says that after a debate of three successive days both morning and evening, the late Council at last came to a final agreement to leave the proposition of the Rohilla war to him. No two members agreed exactly in opinion, and it was difficult to reconcile them, whereas the sentiments of the President were the same invariably from the beginning.

15th.—In strict right, this candour of the Governor General will be no justification, though in equity it may be considered as some excuse for the late Council in assenting to measures which their conscience condemned; but with respect to the Governor General the exemption he allows to his Council is fatal to himself. If a doubt can possibly remain in the mind of any unprejudiced person, considering the real motives on which he has acted, if such premises as those which we think we have established by a constant reference to undisputed facts can be presented to the mind of the Court of Directors without an unavoidable conclusion that more has been done than yet appears. In short, if the proofs already extant do not amount to demonstration, we for ourselves have no doubt that a little time will necessarily produce other explanations, by which all those measures, which at present cannot be supported by ostensible motives, will be completely accounted for, and all opinions on the subject reconciled.

16th.—The few remaining points of the Governor General's minute and address to the Court of Directors which we think proper to take notice of shall be briefly considered and dismissed. He is pleased to point out to the Court of Directors in what manner it was our duty to have acted upon our own principle of adhering to a defensive system for the future. To this we say, that the measures we resolved on were the result of deliberation, and that our idea of the rectitude and necessity of those measures is confirmed by reflexion. We might indeed have concerted with the Governor in what manner the same measures might be carried into execution with the least diminution of his

personal credit with the country powers, and we should probably have done so, if it had been possible for us to attribute his conduct to error of judgment.

17th.—The Governor thankfully acknowledges the support which he receives from Mr. Barwell, “and with the more pleasure, as he esteems it to proceed rather from a just conviction of the propriety of his conduct, than from personal attachment.” The happy reconciliation alluded to took place some months before our arrival.

18th.—Nothing we confess can be more meritorious than a sacrifice of private animosities to the public service. Apparently no man possesses this merit in a higher degree than Mr. Barwell. There have been times in which he did not judge so favourably of the propriety of the Governor’s conduct as he does at present. We do not wish to revive the memory of those times, much less to interrupt an union which we are bound to think can have no foundation but the public good. As for ourselves, we are ready to confess that we have no merit of this sort to plead to the Court of Directors. We had no enmities to sacrifice. We had no mutual compliance or concessions to make to each other. We set out upon one principle. We have but one object in view, and in this instance differ about the means. On this subject we should only add that we are far from desiring to deprive the Governor of the assistance he receives from Mr. Barwell.

19th.—We are charged with a resolution supposed to have been formed long before our arrival of forcing Mr. Hastings to resign the Government; with some men, we trust that an acquaintance with our personal characters will be sufficient to acquit us of so bare and absurd a design; with others, we are sure of being sufficiently vindicated by their certain knowledge of our first sentiments, in regard to Mr. Hastings repeatedly and uniformly declared in England, and supported by the steps we took on many occasions to remove or soften every objection, which we apprehended might arise in his mind from the new situation in which he was placed by the Act of Parliament, or by the Company’s instructions, and which might have inclined him not to continue in the Government.

20th.—To Mr. Hastings himself our deference is of a different nature but equally complete. No man, we believe, is better acquainted with the great leading motive which is supposed to influence or control the conduct of mankind. Whenever he shall inform the Court of Directors, in what sense it was our real interest to drive him from the Government, we pledge ourselves to prove to the world beyond the possibility of a doubt, that no event whatever could be personally more distressing to us nor less for our interest (understanding interest as he does) than that which we are accused of endeavouring to promote.

21st.—Some inattention to ceremonies on the part of the Governor in the mode of our reception is supposed to have had a share in creating, or confirming in us those hostile resolutions which we are accused of having formed against him. The first objection we make to all the Governor has said on this article is, that it is a defence without a charge. We leave it to our superiors to judge what sort of consciousness is implied in so hasty an anticipation of charges, not advanced against him.

22nd.—Our second objection would be to his statement of the facts, if we thought it worthy of ourselves or consistent with the prosecution of business of a far heavier nature, to defend to the last at peril. As for the rest, we hope it will be thought too much to be believed on no better evidence than Mr. Hastings’ own affirmative that we are capable of engaging in measures, which if they are such as he describes, may subvert an Empire, merely to revenge an act of ceremony for which the slightest concession from Mr. Hastings ought to have been so sufficient an excuse, that we could not have decided accepting it without betraying an injudicious appearance of want of hospitality to him, and disgrace to ourselves.

23rd.—If the charge of a personal failure in the respect due to Mr. Hastings had had any foundation whatsoever, we think it ought not to have been described by so gross a term as that of a *warfare of scurrility*. The expression which he applies to himself and confines the description are on record, and

referred to by himself. Our superiors will judge whether they have reference to the public measures of the late administration, or personally to Mr. Hastings, and whether, supposing them to be directed against measures only, they were or could be too strong for the occasion.

24th.—We shall reserve our observations on Mr. Hastings' state of the revenues for a separate minute. In this branch of information the Governor has many signal advantages over us. The subject itself requires the strictest care and attention, and as every official light is either directly withheld from us, or extorted by us with pain to ourselves and communicated with a studied perplexity and reluctance, all our enquiries on this head are attended with uncommon labour. Truth however will we doubt not ere long find its way to the public view; and if we have any apprehension for the consequence of our enquiries, it is not of being unable to prove even more than we have advanced or suggested, but lest the general state of this country should appear to be such as may alarm the Company and the nation for the approaching and instant ruin of Bengal.

25th.—We now proceed to the observations, which we think necessary for the information of the Court of Directors, upon some events and proceedings, which have taken place here since the dispatch of the British King, and we are the less solicitous about taking up so much of their time, as whatever we say in these minutes tends to shorten the general letter.

26th.—With regard to the conduct of public business, let us take notice once for all that on the principle which we attribute to Mr. Hastings, it is highly to his interest to make use of all those superior means which his situation affords him, to retard and perplex the dispatch and progress of that business, for he then has a pretence for complaining that urgent affairs are delayed or neglected, and for attributing that neglect or delay to the affected embarrassments and distress, with which his new colleagues endeavour to perplex and afflict him.

27th.—On the principle which the late Governor attributes to us, it is manifestly our interest to promote the despatch of public business, lest we should be charged with endeavouring to retard it. The presumption in this respect, so far as it may be founded on the novelty of the business and our own want of knowledge, is apparently against us. We cannot therefore have a greater personal interest than to obviate all objections on this head by a constant application to acquire knowledge and to despatch business; let us now look to the facts.

28th.—As we have never yet declined attendance, when summoned, upon any * * * * * Councils, it will be incumbent * * * * *
* * * * * since our arrival in this country has been preferred by us to personal ease or relaxation, or that particular business has been delayed by our minutes or debates. It will appear by the consultations that we called upon him repeatedly to inform us what urgent business remains unfinished, and offered to sit night and day till it is despatched. We now most urgently repeat that offer.

29th.—The only extraordinary matters of deliberation, which have come before this or the Revenue Board, and which have taken up a considerable portion of our time, were either such as could not possibly be avoided or hastily dismissed, or such as the Governor-General himself has thought proper to introduce. The complaint of the Molungees was not searched after or encouraged by us. We found it existing and the complainants at our doors crying for justice. We consider their complaint as not only of great importance in itself, on the score of the injustice done and justice due to the petitioners, but as a matter, the investigation of which will furnish the Court of Directors with some important light upon the general management of this branch of their
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30th.—The proceedings of the Revenue Board will help to show the Court of Directors what immediate interest the Governor had to protect the contractors, the principal of them being the Banyan of Captain Weller, who lived in the Governor's family, and who is admitted to have had a share

* The pages of the folio are in such a decayed and tattered condition that it is impossible to fill in these blanks.

in the contract. We ourselves have reason to believe that the profits of the contract were chiefly ingrossed by Captain Weller, and that a considerable share of them has been appropriated since his death to the use of his widow, who is in England. To this affair and to another wherein the Governor's own **Banyan**, **Cantoo Baboo**, appears to be concerned, but which has not yet been regularly enquired into, we impute the resentment shewn by the Governor towards Mr. Fowke, by whose assistance, not voluntarily offered but requested by General Clavering, some of these discoveries were made. Much time has been lost by the Governor in pursuing his unjust attack on Mr. Fowke, whose unblemished character and knowledge of the language have recommended him to General Clavering for the investigation of the complaints and petitions presented to him by the Molungees.

31st.—A great body of these people to the number of 250 have been near three months in Calcutta soliciting and waiting for justice. In consequence of an examination at the Board of the parties and our opinion thereupon, a suit is ordered to be instituted in the Supreme Court of Judicature against the contractors for the fraudulent and oppressive conduct with which they are charged.

32nd.—The facts as they appear to us on the examination are these: The Molungees who had been used to work for the merchants previous to the contract for 50 and 55 rupees per 100 maunds were compelled by the contractors to work for 40 (Sepoys being quartered on them); and afterwards to deliver, at the rate of 112 maunds and upwards as far as 125 maunds for every hundred, by means of a fraudulent contrivance to increase the measure; combining the diminution of price with the advance on the measure, it appears plainly to us that these wretched people are defrauded of not less than 29 rupees in the value of 125 maunds of salt; such a fraud, considering the small proportionable value of the commodity, is of itself enormous. The means by which it is perpetrated imply and produce every effect of avarice and extortion, supported by arbitrary power, and neither checked by shame nor restrained by the common dictates of humanity.

33rd.—When the year was up, sepoy were again sent, evidently with a view to force them to yield to an adjustment of accounts, in which the contractors falsely took credit for the highest price of their labour. When they come up to Calcutta to complain they were sent by the Roy Royan to the contractors' houses under pretence of redressing their wrongs, where they were seized and carried back to the salt works by a guard of sepoy. On the consultations of the Calcutta Revenue, it appears that these poor people had fled from their habitations and had abandoned the collieries to take refuge in the woods, where many of them have been devoured by tigers. Every day we are convinced will throw such new sights on this subject, that what we have now stated will appear but an inconsiderable part of the whole abuse.

34th.—We had much opposition from the Governor and Mr. Barwell on the resolution to prosecute in the King's Court. Both the offence, which is oppression of the highest order, and the offender who is a Banyan, appear to be most particularly the objects of that reformation which the Legislature had in view in the institution of the King's Courts. If such offence and such men were only to be tried as they proposed by the Revenue Council with no legal power of awarding damages or inflicting punishments, we may venture to say, that the Legislature would have taken much trouble to no purpose, and that the Company has been put to an unnecessary expense by the establishment of a Supreme Court of Justice. Our opinions on this part of the subject appear more fully in our respective minutes in the Revenue consultations to whom we refer.

35th.—If the Court of Directors should find leisure to read all the minutes entered on our consultations on this and other occasions, they will find such doctrines asserted and maintained by our opponents, as are not only repugnant to every English principle, but to those common dictates of reason and justice, which cannot be totally disregarded in any form of Government whatsoever without ruin to the State.

36th.—It is said for example that the Molungees* are in a state of vassalage and may be compelled to work at whatever price the master imposes on them. This doctrine is not confined to the poor salt-boilers, but seems to be extended to the ryot, to the manufacturer, and in general to all the first sources of infernal industry. If such opinions were merely speculative we should take little notice of them; we fear it will be found that they have been carried into practice and had a considerable operation. We have reason to believe that the great want of inhabitants in Bengal, and more particularly in the province of Behar, is more owing to the exercise of the powers which these opinions establish, and other causes which a little time will produce, than to the famine so frequently alleged or appealed to by Mr. Hastings, in accounting for the failure of the revenues.

37th.—On this everlasting theme of Mr. Hastings, we shall only for the present observe in general, that under any tolerable form of Government the effects of the famine must long since have ceased to be felt in a country where nature asks nothing of the governing power but not to study to resist and defeat her operations. The world will soon see that it is oppression of the most violent and pernicious nature which has reduced this fertile country to a state of depopulation.

38th.—While the examination of the Molungees was depending, we received information that the contractors, Boloram and Govind Ram Mitri, had defrauded the Company of more than two lakhs and a half of salt. The information was so particular, specifying in each golah where the salt is the over plus quantity which the contractors had not declared, that we could not avoid giving credit to it. Two of the Company's servants have been sent down to weigh the salt and every precaution taken to prevent its being previously removed that we could suggest; but the difficulties attending this investigation are such and so numerous that we begin to renounce our hopes of establishing any discovery of importance upon legal proof sufficient to convict the contractors.

39th.—The Court of Directors will consider and make allowance for these difficulties. They arise in part from the nature of the business, the obscurity of interpretation, the perplexity of accounts, kept in a barbarous language between very artful men on one side and very ignorant men on the other, and the great distance of the golahs from each other. The principal impediment of all arises from the immediate interest which many persons have in concealing frauds of this nature and defeating all enquiry into abuses; enough however will assuredly be done to satisfy the Company that extraordinary frauds and abuses have been practised and countenanced to the prejudice of this branch of their revenue.

40th.—The charges against Mr. Fowke were introduced and urged by the Governor himself without sufficient attention, as we conceive, either to the forms or substance of justice. The Court of Directors will judge of the propriety of those charges, and whether being once before us they could have been dismissed in the summary way recommended by the Governor. The last point, foreign from the ordinary course of business, and which has taken up any considerable part of our time, was also introduced and in a great measure forced upon the Board by the Governor General.

41st.—We mean the summoning and examining of the field officers on Monday, the 19th of December, at the Council. To prevent the loss of time, which that examination must necessarily create, and to avoid any interruption of the daily course of business, Mr. Francis was the member, who moved that the Board should proceed upon the examination that evening; we sat upon it from six till an hour after midnight and returned to the Revenue Board at ten the next morning.

42nd.—On Friday, the 23rd, Mr. Francis also moved at the Revenue Board, that it may meet again in the evening. We met accordingly, but instead of despatching any urgent business were employed near four hours in settling the establishment of Mr. Elliot's new office, proposed, urged, and carried by the Governor General in a manner which we conceive will do him little credit with his superiors. The Revenue consultations of that day will show

* Note.—*Malangi*, Molungee, corruptly Molungee, H. Beng., &c. A salt-maker, a labourer employed in manufacturing salt.—*Wilson's Glossary*.

plainly in what manner our time was employed. These two are the only instances of our meeting in the evening. The Governor General has never once requested our attendance for that purpose.

43rd.—In the proceedings of the Revenue Board of the 30th of last month, the Company will see a very extraordinary petition to the Council from the Rannie of Burdwan. The high rank of this lady, whose late husband's ancestors have from time immemorial enjoyed the zemindarry of that district, entitled her, as we think, to some decent consideration and respect from this Government. The Company will see in Mr. Barwell's minutes with what terms of gross insinuation a Councillor of this State permits himself to treat a woman who is one of the first subjects of it.

44th.—This is not the way in which we support our opinions in Council, when we have the misfortune of differing from our colleagues on great questions. Such cruel, irregular hostilities do not belong to that honorable though distressing war in which the public conduct of the late administration has unavoidably involved us. We leave it to the mercenary auxiliaries of Suja Dowla to ruin individuals, to burn villages and violate the sacred retirements of the zenana.

45th.—We do not enter into the truth or falsehood of the charge against Mr. Graham and the Dewan of Burdwan of an embezzlement of above 11 lacks of rupees alleged to be the property of her infant son. It will be her business to make good the truth of her allegations. We are not so unjust as to give credit to charges against the honor or innocence of any man before the proofs are produced, neither does the Rannie's petition require it of us; let the prayer of the petition be considered, and we submit it to the judgment of the world, whether it could possibly have been refused without a barefaced denial of justice, or without throwing suspicions even upon the characters of the persons accused, more injurious to them than as we hope can arise from any future investigation of the truth.

46th.—We have adopted the several motions made by Colonel Monson for granting the prayer of the petition, as not only regular, beyond dispute in point of proceeding, but as conformable to every principle of reason and justice. Nor are we unwilling to admit the truth of Mr. Barwell's assertion, that the proposition made by Colonel Monson, for granting the prayer of the petition is diametrically opposite to the proceedings of past Governments. A widow desires to be heard in behalf of herself and infant son. She produces a charge of singular magnitude, and offers to make it good. The favour she desires of the Board is that she may be freed from terror and confinement, and allowed to attend in person at the Presidency to prosecute her complaint. Former Governments might have refused to grant such requests. We for our parts shall never seek or encourage inquiries into past transactions, but when petitions of this nature and consequence, and so fairly introduced, are brought before us, we must renounce every idea of decency as well as of justice before we can refuse them.

47th.—We are not alarmed at the formidable consequences held out on this and many other occasions to deter us from doing what we think indispensibly our duty; as if the permitting a widow and her son to remove from Burdwan to Calcutta, which we presume could not have been refused with any shadow of reason or justice, implied and must be understood by the natives as a determination to repeal all former decisions and must be attended with ruin to the collection. We for ourselves have no apprehensions of consequences so totally disproportionate to the cause assigned for them. But, admitting them to be unavoidable, we desire it may be considered what sort of Government this country must have been subject to, when an act apparently so regular and so much of course as that in question, is thought likely to endanger the safety of the State.

48th.—Mr. Barwell's objections to the temporary removal of the Dewan, militate directly in our opinion against the principles on which the Court of Directors acted in ordering the sudden removal and confinement of Mahomed Rezahawn. Mr. Barwell thinks it very improper, first, to punish a man by depriving him of his honors and employments, and by such decisive acts using influence on his fears. We leave it to him to reconcile this doctrine, if he can,

to the above resolution of the Court of Directors; with respect to us it does not stand in opposition to that act of the Revenue Board which is now in question. A temporary suspension is no punishment, and to prove a charge of embezzlement against the Dewan of a province, while he continues in the actual possession and exercise of his power, let it be ever so well founded, we know to be difficult in any country, but in this country impossible. As to the Paishkar or steward, we consider it as a family office, which ought not to have been taken out of the disposal of the zemindar or his representatives.

49th.—With respect to the persons recommended by General Clavering to supply the vacant offices, it is observable that Mr. Barwell remembers their having formerly been in competition for these very offices, whereas the Governor says, they are persons unknown; besides many other advantages our colleagues have that of a superior local memory over us. At the Revenue Board held on the 30th December, they seemed to be perfectly informed of all the past decisions and acts of Government respecting the zemindary of Burdwan, and the resolutions formerly taken for the benefit of the Rannie and her son. In the Council of the 4th instant they would give no answer to a very obvious and pertinent question concerning the above proceedings. Neither of them were present. Colonel Maclean's resignation of your service for the reasons he alleges will we imagine be considered in England as a remarkable event. He owed us no explanation of the motives of his private conduct, nor shall we hazard any conjectures concerning the real object of his mission. On this head every man will naturally compare the professed motives of relinquishing a post of such rank and advantage as that of Commissary-General, with Colonel Maclean's understanding, and draw a conclusion for himself.

50th.—In our conduct to him as members of the Supreme Council we desired nothing but that some decent appearance of regularity might be observed in the proceedings of the Board. The business of his resignation was introduced at the Board on Wednesday, the 21st of December. General Clavering thereupon moved that before he was permitted to resign the service, he might lay before the Board of Inspection, which was to meet the next day, his accounts and demands on the Company. If he had been confined to the office which the Court of Directors originally gave him he could have had no demand allowance nor accounts to settle. Soon after his arrival here, he was employed by the administration to supply the army with a variety of contingencies; the accounts of which he was himself to control. The above obvious and regular motion of General Clavering is called by the Governor *an unprecedented injury done to Colonel Maclean, to detain him by violence in the service for a debt due by the Company to him*; and by Colonel Maclean himself it is supposed to amount to a *ne exeat*. False argument may be refuted, but a total want of reason is unanswerable.

51st.—When the Directors see a fact asserted under Colonel Maclean's own hand, and the same fact adopted and made use of in argument by the Governor, *viz.*, that he has never had a shilling of the Company's money in his possession, they may observe perhaps with surprise that in consequence of an unlimited letter of credit given to Colonel Maclean by the late Board of Inspection on the 12th of June last on the Factories of Patna and Cassimbazar, his agents have received 9,000 sicca rupees, which are yet unaccounted for. The sum indeed is not considerable, and might easily have escaped Colonel Maclean's notice or * * *, but the circumstance of the unlimited letter of credit on two factories being totally forgot or not taken notice of by the Governor or Mr. Barwell, will serve to show in what an irregular manner the Company's money affairs have been conducted. To Colonel Maclean personally we have shown every proper mark of respect.

52nd.—The idea which we have conceived of his abilities must naturally be confirmed in the minds of the Court of Directors by the number and variety of different characters which he undertook to represent at the army. In point of rank he appears as Colonel in Suja Dowla's country; he appears as a merchant, having carried a considerable quantity of merchandize with him, which could not find entrance into that country without a particular Dustick or permission. This merchandize he conveys in boats, which he thinks it reasonable that the Company should pay for. Arrived at the army he becomes

an agent to make a bargain with himself on behalf of the Company. He then charges the Company 15 per cent. for his trouble, and last of all, in quality of Comptroller, controls the same accounts which he delivers in in his quality of agent. We are bound by our duty to take notice of these transactions, and do not mean to intimate a censure on Mr. Maclean. When such irregularities are permitted, it is more the fault of the Government which permits than of the individual, who profits by them.

53rd.—If we may depend on the declarations thrown out at the Revenue Board, by the Governor-General, on the 20th of last month, the appointments of the new Councils will not be unattended with censure on his part. The true and natural vindication of the resolutions taken by the Board on this subject will arise from a comparison of the appointments recommended by the Governor and of those agreed to by the Board. A list of each is annexed to this minute; for the rest we beg leave to refer the Hon'ble Court of Directors to the consultations of the Revenue Department.

54th.—They will be informed by the general letter that Mr. Fredrick Stuart finding his hopes frustrated of being appointed Public Resident at the Vizier's Court and in order to recover his health has resigned the service.

55th.—The preference given to Mr. Bristow does not imply the least reflection on any other recommendation. With respect to appointments in general, when names and personal characters are in question, we rather wish that our choice should be determined by preference than by objection. On this subject our idea and principle is, that if it be a matter of total indifference with respect to the service (as in the case of the Sheriff), every Member of the Board may fairly and honorably follow his inclination. Where offices of trust and importance are to be filled up, we think it incident to the conscientious discharge of our duty, to consult and be guided by our own discretion, as far as may be consistent with a due regard to rank and seniority. The Court of Directors will undoubtedly take notice in which of the two lists of Councils, *viz.*, that proposed by the Governor and that resolved on by the Board, the greatest attention was paid to the claims of standing and service.

56th.—With respect to Mr. Bristow, we shall only observe that in point of rank he stands next but one to Mr. Fredrick Stuart, that he is considerably above Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, and that his family and connections are such as we believe will be no disgrace to his office. His own zeal and abilities will we doubt not in a little time remove the personal objections made to him by the Governor General, and confirm the propriety of the appointment. To us he appeared to possess a qualification for this office, which the Governor himself must have thought material, since he recommended Sir John D'Oyly to assist Mr. Fredrick Stuart, who himself is not acquainted either with the Persian or Indostan language. Mr. Bristow has been some years Persian translator to the Khalsa.

57th.—On this subject we shall only observe further that we yielded at once to the Governor General's recommendation of Coonje-beharry to be Dewan of Dinagepore, and that his nomination of Mr. Elliot to a newly created office was accepted. The difference of opinion which appears on the Revenue consultations, on that occasion does not affect Mr. Elliot, of whose personal merit and qualifications we all had the same sentiments. If he prefers honor to emolument, as we are thoroughly persuaded he does, a difference of opinion which went only to the amount of the salary and which was determined before his name was mentioned will not weigh in his mind against the pleasure of knowing that his character united every opinion in his favor.

58th.—By the Governor General's answer to our minute concerning Major Polier, it appears that that officer had no instructions or authority to assist, as he did, at the reduction of Agra.

59th.—The examination of Colonel Champion furnishes for the present but one subject of remark. The Company's right to the 40 lacks in consideration of their assistance in the Rohilla war was acknowledged by the Vizier before Colonel Champion left the army, and long before the instructions of the Board could reach the Commanding Officer. It appears also that Colonel Champion has not received any part of the above sum.

60th.—We know not on what intelligence the Governor could found the following assertion contained in his minute of the 3rd of December, *viz.*, “that soon after our instructions to Colonel Champion were dispatched, the Vizier had consigned over the 15 lacs, which Fyzulla Cawn had engaged to pay him in ready money, to Colonel Champion in part payment of the 40 lacs due from him.” We know with certainty that there could be no foundation for such intelligence, and we hope that the Court of Directors will observe, that on the 6th of December Mr. Hastings signed his name to a postscript to the general letter in which it is affirmed with unquestionable truth that no part of the 40 lacs had then been received.

61st.—We must further observe that Colonel Champion in his letter of 13th of December last expressly affirms that before he left the army, the 3 lacs for which the Vizier had given him a Tuncaw had been repeatedly offered to him, and in particular His Excellency’s Minister informed him that he had instructions to pay them out of the 15 lacs which he the Vizier received from Fyzulla Cawn. The whole business of the Vizier’s pecuniary engagements and payments to the Company seems to us to be involved in an affected confusion, which we are taking pains to clear up, and do not doubt of succeeding, provided the necessary documents are not withheld from us. In this place we shall only take notice that the 15 lacs of rupees which Mr. Grady was to have received from the Vizier were on account of the Treaty of Benares, and have no connection with the other 15 lacs which the Vizier received from Fyzulla Cawn, and which he promised to pay over to the Company immediately, in part of the 40 lacs due for the Rohilla war. This observation will be found more material, perhaps, than the Court of Directors at first sight may be aware of.

62nd.—Since writing the above we have seen a private letter from Mr. Nathaniel Middleton of the 21st December 1771. in which he says that he has the 15 lacs in his possession, but finds a difficulty in procuring boats to convey the money to the Presidency. He also mentions the declining and precarious state of the Vizier’s health. We have not yet seen any letters from Colonel Galliez to inform us of what steps he has taken in consequence of the instructions of the Board to negotiate with the Vizier.

63rd.—On the arrival of Colonel Champion at the Presidency the Board required a sight of his whole correspondence, of which we have obtained a promise after some complimentary apologies had passed between the Governor and him on the reciprocal delicacy of either of them discovering what might affect the honor of the other. This correspondence ought regularly to have been communicated to us by the Governor General in the first instance while the recall of the Brigade was under debate; at present we are not very anxious to see it, especially as it is said by Colonel Champion to contain matters not fit for the public eye.

64th.—The above letter of Colonel Champion informs the Board of his having received an obligation from the Vizier of 7 lacs of rupees for the troops who were employed in the conquest of the Rohilla dominions; of half a lakh for the use of the Field officers, and of three lakhs for himself. At his examination it appeared that he had informed the late administration of the first present, but had not mentioned the two latter till he arrived at the Presidency when he acquainted the Governor with it. As all these presents were received, after the period limited by that clause of the Act of Parliament which restrained all officers from taking presents, we have agreed to acquiesce in the Governor’s proposal, of referring the 7 lacs to the Court of Directors, for the reasons mentioned in our minute of the 31st of last month, to which we refer.

65th.—The fatal consequence of indulging troops with the hopes of plunder have been too often exemplified in this country. The Rohilla war with respect to the share we took in it had no other object; and to judge from the correspondence which has been laid before us it should seem that plunder had ingrossed the attention not only of this Government but of the army from the commencement of the campaign to the end of it. We do not mean to intimate the most distant reflection on the conduct of the Brigade, far otherwise. We

admire and commend the exact discipline they observed under the disappointment of hopes, which it was natural enough they should form from the nature of the service. We mean to fix our censure upon the Government, which unnecessarily employs their military force on service which of course suggests hopes of expectations utterly unfit to be proposed to or entertained by a regular army.

66th.—We could wish to avoid mentioning the Vizier's letter of complaint against Colonel Champion as well as that delivered by the Field officers in the name of the army, but it is fair to say that the accusations which they both contain, ought not to make any impression as Colonel Champion has not yet had time to deliver in his answer to either. He has given a direct contradiction to the Vizier's assertions, which the Colonel calls "infamous untruths."

67th.—We find by the Vizier's letters that 2,000 stand of arms and two eighteen-pounders were sent to the Vizier with stores by Mr. Hastings, and that Major Hannay was appointed Agent to receive Nudjif Cawn's pension of 2 lacs.

68th.—We have each of us received letters from the King and his Ministers complaining of the detention of his tribute, and demanding the whole arrears due to him. As individuals we might confine our answers to the usual assurance of respect and attachment referring the subject of His Majesty's letters to the Council. As Members of the Government, we find ourselves laid under an extraordinary embarrassment by the resolution of the late Government, to restore to Nudjif Cawn his pension, which by the Treaty of 1765 was to be paid out of the 26 lacs granted to the King, in consideration of the grant, of the Dewannee to the Company.

69th.—The letters received by General Clavering from several of the Company's military officers entrusted with separate commands will be found very deserving of notice. They contain accounts of military expeditions and hostilities carried on against a number of different Rajas and Zemindars without any authority from the present Government or any direct communication to us of the plan, or execution of them. Most of these measures appears to have been directed by the Provincial Chiefs of Patna and Burdwan, a considerable time after our arrival here. In some places the Rajas are reduced to obedience and give hostages. In many others the villages are burnt, and the corn cut down and destroyed. Ensign Scott having received orders from the Chief of Patna to seize or expel Raja Fulla Shah, pursues him into Suja Dowla's dominions, and makes three of the Vizier's subjects prisoners of war. Captain Crawford by order of the Chief at Burdwan entered Pateoom on the 5th of last month with six companies of sepoys, took the capital, levelled the town and cleared the country, in order to make the post tenable. On the 9th he attacks and drives the natives before him, after which the whole country fled into the mountains. He says that he is endeavouring to sow dissension among their Chiefs, so as to induce them to submit, or enable him with ease to root them out.

70th.—We do not pretend to determine at present whether measures of this nature be necessary or not, but we think it very extraordinary that military expeditions of such importance and leading to such consequence should be undertaken, not only without the orders but without the knowledge of this Board. We are sorry to be obliged to conclude this article with declaring that as far as we are able to judge, the general principle, which seems to have animated this Government, as well with respect to the natives of the Provinces, as to the neighbouring States, has had too near a relation to the expressive words, so often made use of, *extirpate, exterminate, root out and annihilate*.

71st.—The remainder of the observations which we are at present enabled to make on Mr. Hastings's representations of the state of this country is reserved for a separate minute. Our enquiries hitherto have been directed, and as much as possible confined to great and interesting objects; our application to them has been equally laborious and incessant. To obtain that complete information which we wish to give to the Court of Directors on all these difficult and complicated questions requires not only uncommon activity on our part but some allowance of time in which it may be exerted with effect. If

we had leisure or inclination to enter into details of an inferior importance, we are very sure that there is hardly a line of the Governor General's address to the Court of Directors, in which we might not easily detect and find some inaccuracy in matter of fact or contradiction in argument. We decline the weary task not only because we think it unworthy of us, but as it is really in itself unnecessary. Facts of a transcendent magnitude ought to engross our attention; when once *they* are established beyond contradiction, they include the probability of inferior abuses, and at the same time make it superfluous to push that probability into proofs.

72nd.—Neither shall we endeavour to lessen the effects of those appeals, which Mr. Hastings indirectly makes to the generous passions of the Court of Directors. “His long services.”—“The important trusts in which his life has been employed.”—“His gratitude for the obligations already laid on him; and his profound submission to their future sentence.” If our judgment of every single branch of his administration since the power of doing signal mischief or signal service to the Company was entrusted to him, should appear to be well founded, we should be sorry to preclude him from the use of the only resources which his cause will have left him. If pleas of this nature can be properly introduced and admitted in the refutation of positive charges, we are content to allow him all the benefit he can desire from them. It is not for *us* to say that a mode of defence, which seems rather addressed to the mercy than to the justice of the Judge, is irregular in Mr. Hastings's situation; we indeed have yet no services to plead. On the other hand, we do not appeal to the candor of our superiors nor can we attempt to engage their future favor by a pathetic acknowledgment of former obligations. The true condition of this country cannot long be concealed. Effects will be felt before they are accounted for. When that happens, we foresee no difficulty in determining by what means and by whose misconduct a rich and flourishing State reduced to the hazard at least of beggary and ruin. The great and alarming question will be, by whose future services and by what future exertion of virtue and ability such a State can be recovered. Common men are not equal to the occasion.

J. CLAVERING.

GEO. MONSON.

P. FRANCIS.

Minute from GENERAL CLAVERING, COLONEL MONSON, and MR. FRANCIS.

The Governor General has not confined his address to the Hon'ble Court of Directors to the single subject of the Robilla war, but has entered generally into the measures he has taken for the service of the Company, the success of his endeavours and the prosperity of their affairs. Far from entertaining a wish to place these objects in a less flattering point of view to the Company, we feel it as a heavy misfortune to ourselves, and setting aside all professions of zeal for the public, to be obliged to declare and maintain an opinion very different from that advanced by the Governor of the natural state of the Company's affairs. We are well acquainted with the invidious nature of the office we undertake in maintaining our opinions, and the disadvantage we lie under, when we dispute the truth of propositions, which we ourselves, and every man in England, as well from interest as inclination must wish to be true.

But in what manner is it really our duty to act. Are we to suffer the Company to continue unacquainted with their situation and let the storm gather till it bursts, or are we to take upon us the immediate odium of discovering to them the real difficulties in which their affairs are involved, and the imminent danger with which they are threatened. In this apparent alternative, we think that the consideration of our own personal honor, personal safety, and above all things of our real duty to the Company leave us no choice.

When we refer to the consideration of our personal safety we mean to establish our immediate claim to one general vindication of ourselves against

all consequences, that when the present administration took the Government upon them, almost every natural resource of the country was already exhausted. As to the effect which any present discovery of truth may produce at home, we can only say that the distresses we allude to, are so instant that no artifice whatever on one side nor tacit acquiescence on the other could possibly conceal them much longer from the public view.

With regard to the state of the bonded debts, we beg leave to observe without entering at present so deeply into the question, as we mean to do hereafter, that if the Company's finances were in that prosperous state, which they are described to have been in by the general letter from this Presidency of the 22nd of August 1774, and if their credit was so good that their bonds have a considerable premium, and if the Treasury was so full, or the probable receipts were so much superior to the probable issues as to admit of the entire discharge of near 26 lacks of principal debt before the end of the year, we then think ourselves entitled to affirm that the operation from which Mr. Hastings claims so much merit was a poor and inadequate measure of finance compared to what might have been done with the same resources.

Taking the above suppositions as data, we are confident that the late administration were in possession of means to reduce the interest upon the whole debt to 5 per cent. or even lower without the least violence or breach of faith to the public creditor. The savings on the head of interest, together with any surplus monies which might have been spared from current service, should then have constituted a sinking fund, the strict appropriation of which to the discharge of the principal would immediately have supported the credit of the Company's bonds, and might eventually have reduced them to nothing. Instead of this prudent and obvious measure the late administration have contented themselves with reducing the interest of 15 lacks from 8 to 5 per cent., and have resolved upon a discharge of principal debt which we doubt very much whether our present funds are equal to, without such distress to Government, as may create the necessity of a new loan. We propose to take up this subject afresh and do every thing that our actual credit and resources will admit of to repair the mischief which has been done and to lighten the general burthen of the debt. For the present we are willing to declare that if our means were more copious than they are likely to prove, we should be very cautious of proceeding rapidly to the annihilation of such a mass of fictitious property in a country where great and urgent distress is the want of circulation. We wish very much to be instructed by the superior knowledge of the Court of Directors on this important question, *viz.*, whether within proper limits, and at reasonable interest, a public debt may not in many senses be beneficial to this country, and not burthensome to Government.

With regard to the past or future provision of the investment we shall only say in this place, that the case of advancement of the Company's commercial interest is a point which we have at least as much at heart as Mr. Hastings. The Court of Directors will see, in some of the late consultations, what extraordinary pains have been taken by us, and by us only, to prevent the least coldness or want of cordiality between our Board and the Board of Commerce. We have touched in our other minute upon the management of the Salt Trade; for the present we neither assent to nor deny the truth of what Mr. Hastings has asserted concerning the profits of that trade to the Company, in the course of the year 1773.

Without entering into general arguments against a monopoly of any of the great articles of consumption, even in the hands of Government, we believe the footing on which this particular monopoly is exercised, may indeed strain and extort a short-lived revenue from a source of wealth not yet quite exhausted, but we fear that *that very strain* and extortion tend naturally to the destruction of future revenue. The present monopoly, however, with all its supposed advantages, was not acquired without drawing a considerable charge on Government. The late administration by ordering the Molungees to be delivered over to the Government contractors disabled the former zemindars and renters of the salt districts from making good their contracts and thereby

• become answerable for the balances of those contracts. We are informed that in the year 1773, the salt of the Injillee districts was set aside in order to pay off part of those balances.

We have already made some general observations on the nature of the service on which the Company's military forces have been employed. Our information on this subject is not complete, as we have not yet seen the correspondence between this Government and the officers employed in military operations in Ramgur, the Jungleterry Country and Cooch Behar. All that we know is that military operations have been and are actually carrying on in many parts of the frontier country without the authority of this Board.

The true and just object of all expeditions of this sort should have been merely to check and keep in awe by the occasional presence of a Military Force such of the Mountaineers and other inhabitants of those frontier districts, as had been accustomed or were likely to make inroads into and disturb the peace of our provinces. The people we speak of were not however in so wild and barbarous a state as they have been represented. The accounts we have heard of them imply in general a condition of industry and simplicity of manners, united with a natural desire of independence. To subvert their state and much more to extirpate them on account of the licentiousness of a few disorderly people was neither necessary nor expedient. As for the trifling revenue which may have been brought to the Company's account in consequence of the subjection of these countries, we only desire that the Company's Accountant may compare it with the ordinary and extraordinary expense of the troops employed in the expedition and make his report of the ultimate profit to the Company. At the same time we do not mean to affirm that these countries have not yielded much more considerable sums than what has been brought to public account or that the various expeditions into them have not been profitable in any sense whatever, or that under a regular form of Civil Government the acquisition of these districts, if it could be gained without violence or injustice, might not become highly beneficial to the Company. The first thing, however, is to consult the population and improvement of those immense tracts of rich lands which at present, as we understand, lie uncultivated and deserted in the midst of these Provinces.

From what has been written already on the subject of the Vizier's debts to the Company, the Court of Directors will be able to form a judgment of the probability of their being acquitted; our most strenuous endeavours shall not be wanting to realize the amount of our just demands on the Vizier, but we must desire that the Company will not reckon such debts among their actual wealth, until they are actually paid.

We also desire that the following facts may be attended to:—

(1) Colonel Champion declares that he has received no part of the 10 lacks for the Rohilla war. (2) Mr. Grady was to have received 15 lacks of the Vizier on account of the Treaty of Benares; he has brought down with him but 10 lacks of Vizieri rupees; the remaining 5 lacks were to have been paid by the Raja of Benares. Why they have not been paid might perhaps appear from Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's correspondence with the Governor, but no explanation whatever has been given to the Board. To show the Court of Directors that we have done everything in our power to obtain a satisfactory information on this subject, we beg leave to refer them to our letter to Mr. Secretary Stewart entered on the last consultation and to Mr. Grady's report thereupon. (3) Mr. Nathaniel Middleton in his letter to the Governor of the 21st December 1774 says that he has got the 15 lacks in his possession, but does not specify upon what account. We presume it must be on account of the Rohilla war. (4) Considerable draughts have been made on this Presidency, on account of the pay of the second Brigade, which was to have been completely provided for by the Vizier's monthly subsidy. We have seen draughts on this account to the amount of above a lakh-and-a-half. We have already apprized the Court of Directors of the nature of the extraordinary charges beyond the amount of the subsidy, which we apprehend must be borne by the Company and consequently set against the promised profits of the Rohilla war. The

liquidation of these perplexed accounts appears to us a most important object, and shall be taken up and forwarded as far as depends on us with the utmost despatch.

We now proceed to an article in the flattering representation of the Company's affairs, on which we presume the Governor General must have rested his principal hopes of finding favor in their sight.

In his address to the Court of Directors of the 3rd of December 1774, he asserts that there was at that time a balance of current rupees eighty lacks, forty-nine thousand eight hundred and six, actually lying in the Company's Treasuries.

The first general observation we have to make on this supposed balance is, that considering the various savings which are said to have been made by Mr. Hastings, the detention of the King's tribute which instead of being set apart to answer any future demand of the King has been thrown into the general Treasury and constitutes part of Mr. Hastings's balance, together with the external supplies of money received from Suja Dowla, of all which Mr. Hastings has availed himself to swell his balance in hand, and when in addition to these articles we take into the account the arrears of pensions due to the young Nabab and others, which not being paid of course tend to swell the balance in hand, it seems impossible to us to account for the comparative smallness of this balance, but by some extraordinary expense, and an extraordinary failure in the revenue.

The several sums we speak of amount to no less than one hundred seventy-three lacks, thirty-nine thousand, four hundred ninety-two Sicca Rupees, according to the annexed account of particulars taken from the last statement; though regularly they do not enter into a cash account, yet they ought in our opinion to be set against Mr. Hastings's balance, if that cash account be meant to give the Company a true idea of the state of their affairs. This just and regular way of stating the account would produce a real but most alarming balance against the Company, not to be reduced, we fear, but by irrecoverable balances in the collections and desperate debts.

Setting aside for the present any further consideration of this part of the subject, and without insisting that a cash account taken at the most favourable period proves nothing but the bare existence of so much cash in the public purse at the period, we should at all events have been happy to find an unappropriated fund in hand of eighty-lakhs-and-a-half to answer the various immediate exigences of Government, but the account dated the 30th November and signed by Mr. Croftes which the Governor General has inclosed to prove the reality of so large a balance actually existing in the Company's treasuries, appears to us to have been formed on a principle so erroneous as must inevitably lead to a false conclusion. The account upon the face of it is liable to an objection which we think ought at once to destroy the credit of any evidence which it professes to contain.

The first great inaccuracy which must immediately strike every man the least conversant with such accounts is the confusion of dates. The balance of cash in the Treasuries of the Provincial Councils are drawn out to different periods, some to the 14th of October, others to the 13th and 30th of September, whilst the balance of the Khalsa Treasury is taken at the distance of two months later, *viz.*, the 28th of November.

This circumstance alone destroys in our opinion the credibility of the account, as the first principle on which it ought to be formed is an exact correspondence of dates. Nothing can be more palpably absurd than to join together in one account sums remaining in different Treasuries, which from the continual demands made upon them are ever fluctuating, and then to bind the total with the cash remaining in the Khalsa Treasury at an after period, which Treasury is itself constituted by the remittances from the (other) inferior Treasuries.

For these reasons the account transmitted home by the Governor General is absurd in its formation and must be fallacious. In effect it is much worse in our opinion than no account at all. Between the 30th of September and the last of November, considerable sums were remitted to the Khalsa Treasury by

the Provincial Councils, yet these sums are not deducted from the balance of cash remaining in the districts, as they ought to have been, whilst the amount respectively forms a part of the money in the Khalsa Treasury, so that it is doubly introduced, and constitutes a false balance.

We have received from the Khalsa Office an account of remittance from the subordinate treasuries between the respective periods to which their balances are drawn out on the 28th of November. With the assistance of this account, and taking the several balances in the different treasuries as they are stated by Mr. Croftes, we have drawn out a corrected account by which the general balance

Current R67,56,310-3.

on the 28th November 1774 is reduced to current rupees sixty-seven lacks fifty-six thousand, three hundred and ten, three annas. Credit is given for all those bills which pass under the transfer account as so much ready money received into the Khalsa. We do not mean, however, to answer for the real existence of even this reduced balance, but we affirm that the principle on which our account is drawn out is under the present circumstances more likely to shew a true state of the Company's balances in hand than that which has been transmitted to them.

We are nevertheless sensible that this account, after all, may be liable to objection; nothing but an exact correspondence of dates can give an exact balance; but in order to arrive as nearly as possible to the truth, we have drawn out another cash account on Mr. Croftes' principle, that is taking the balances in the Provincial Treasuries at the latest periods to which, even now, they can be obtained. This account reduces the total balance on the 28th of November 1774 to Current R62,25,066-14-6. We have further objections to the propriety of the account produced by Mr. Hastings and some of them of another nature. It seems probable to us that part of the balances in some of the subordinate treasuries may have been remitted in the interval to other subordinate treasuries, as for example from Dinagepore to Moorshedabad. If many such remittances have been made, they also ought to be taken in diminution of the general balance; besides this we object to the accomptants swelling the general balance of the Khalsa by the article of bills receivable, which amounts to above six lacks. We think that the Public Treasury of a State ought to receive no payments but in specie; at all events remittances by bills of exchange should not be reckoned part of the existing cash until those bills are paid.

After having, as we think, completely invalidated the credit of the account produced by the Governor General, we are ready, if he should still adhere to the truth of it, to waive all our objections provided he will agree to make himself answerable to the Company for the actual existence of a balance of Current R80,49,806-6-0 in the Company's treasuries on the day, on which he asserts that that sum was actually laying in those treasuries.

No part of the salaries due to the Governor and Council, the Judges, or the Board of Trade, has yet been paid here. If they are not paid before the signing the general letter, they will amount to about four lacks and-a-half, and as the account is ordered to be drawn out, they must be in course of payment in a day or two.

On the inspection of your territorial revenue, we cannot but lament the fatal regulations established in 1772, which from two years' operation to the 30th April 1774 have accumulated Sicca R67,66,081, a balance in arrears amounting to sixty-seven lacks, sixty-six thousand, and eighty-one sicca rupees. According to the annexed statement, what part of this great sum may be recovered this year cannot be ascertained; we are apprehensive it will not exceed 14 or 15 lacks. The bad effect of this system will not be felt in its full extent till the expiration of the five years for which the lands were let. Admitting the Governor General's assertion that the receipts of 1180 exceed those of 1179 by the inconsiderable sum of three lacks of rupees, it does not follow that the provinces of Bengal and Bahar are in a flourishing state, or that they have paid the assessment made by the Committee; the increase of revenue must be attributed to the increase of territory since the year 1772 by the conquest of Cooch Bahar, Jungleterry and other districts. We mention these circumstances at present to shew that we have not been inattentive to the important object,

and hope soon to give the Court of Directors such a statement of their Dewannee and ceded lands as may make them clearly comprehend that intricate business, and enable them to send us precise orders on this essential branch of their affairs.

J. CLAVERING.

G. MONSON.

P. FRANCIS.

Minute from Mr. FRANCIS.

The delivery of the minute which Mr. Francis has prepared on the subject of the Bank has waited only for the answers to his queries to the Bankers and Provincial Councils, entered on the proceedings of the Revenue Board of the 14th of last month, without which it could not be completed. They are but just come in, and he is prevented from considering them by a multiplicity of other business still more important; from what he has already had an opportunity of observing, he thinks it will appear to the conviction of every man who understands the true principles of such an institution that this Bank neither has nor could possibly produce those great public benefits which would be sufficient to justify an innovation of such magnitude in the mode of remitting the revenue of Bengal to the Presidency.

P. FRANCIS.

Secret Dept., Fort William, the 6th February 1775.

Monday.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT :

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *Governor General, President.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

THE HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

Read and approved the consultation of the 3rd instant.

The following letter from COLONEL GAILLIEZ having been received last night was immediately sent in circulation to the Members of the Board; and the Council being met this morning to consider it, the letter is now read.

HON'BLE SIR AND SIRs,—It is with the utmost concern I inform you of the death of the Vizier, who departed this life about an hour ago. Mr. Campbell and Captain Stuart attended and dressed him till he died, but for two days past he took no medicine inwardly from them. The mother and the rest of his family about him in their too great anxiety would not admit of anything but from themselves to be administered to him.

His eldest son and presumptive successor, the Nabob Mirza Amanny, has applied to me for your support in his just rights, and my assistance with the troops if necessary, which I have assured him of, until I am honored with your commands, and instructions for my guidance on this occasion. I shall therefore remain here and give him every assistance and protection to the family, in my power.

At present all are in the utmost tranquillity in the town; and I flatter myself that my presence here will be the means of preventing much disturbance from arising.

I have the honor to be,
with the highest respect, &c.,

FAYZABAD,
The 26th January 1775. }
At 7 in the morning.

P. GAILLIEZ.

Mr. Francis lays before the Board the following Minute which he has drawn up on the subject of the Governor General's and General Clavering's Minutes respecting the reduction of the bonded debt, recorded in Consultation 26th January :—

The importance of the different propositions laid before the Board, by the Governor and General Clavering for reducing the Hon'ble Company's bonded debt, will I hope excuse

Mr. Francis's Minute.

the liberty I take in submitting to the Board my opinion upon the general principles, which I think should determine their judgment in considering and adopting any measure of this nature; this or any other general principles, being once established, will serve as a guide to us in comparing the respective advantages of the above propositions, if they should be found to differ materially or perhaps enable us to unite the operation of the two schemes, if they should appear to tend in effect to one and the same object.

By the thirty-third article of our instructions, the reduction of the bond debt is stated to us as an object of the utmost consequence "to the Company's prosperity," and we are directed "to pay every attention to it, consistent with the safety and protection of their possessions, and with the requisitions that shall be made to us for their investments."

By this reservation, I understand it to be the intention of the Court of Directors that we should first provide for the current services of this Government, and for the investment; and that we should keep some reserve of money in our Treasury, to enable us to meet any unforeseen difficulties which might affect the safety of their possessions. The wisdom and propriety of this instruction speaks for itself. When the several objects above mentioned are provided for, we are instructed to apply our attention to the reduction of the debt.

In order to give due and regular obedience to this article of our instructions, we ought in the first place to be furnished with an exact comparative estimate of the current services; debts in course of payment, and probable demands for the present year on one side, and of our actual means and probable resources on the other; to apply any money to the discharge of principal debt, before this estimate is made and before we know upon solid grounds, what our available surplus is likely to prove, would I conceive be as inconsistent with prudence, as it would be manifestly contradictory to our instructions. Till the amount of such available surplus is known and established, we can form no judgment of the degree in which it may be possible for us to diminish the principal debt. Let it be supposed, however, for the present, that it may amount to ten lacks or any other given sum. The question will then be in what way it ought to be applied, so as to give the greatest possible relief to the general burthen of the debt; that is whether we should make use of this sum to assist us in reducing the interest upon the whole debt, or apply it at once to pay off an equal quantity of the principal.

Considering it merely as a question of finance, and without entering at present into many other important considerations, which a wise Government should constantly have in view in every operation of this nature, I submit my opinion to the Board that, while your bonds at eight per cent. are considerably above par, you ought in point of accuracy to endeavour to reduce them all to the lower rate of five per cent. at which some part of the debt now stands, and that to begin paying off part of the capital before you have reduced the rate of interest would besides producing great mischief in many other respects be an unthrifty way of proceeding with reference to the proffest purpose of lightening the burthen of the debt.

By paying off a million at par, the whole annual saving to the Company is eighty thousand rupees; you are also ten lacks less in debt. But on one side this is no saving of expense to the Company, and on the other it obliges you to stop short in the reduction of debt, and so wait till you have another accumulation of surplus in your treasury, before you can carry your operations any farther. Try the other way with the same means, offer an option to the holders of the oldest bonds at eight per cent. to the amount of ten lacks to be paid off at par, or to subscribe in their bonds, and to receive new ones at an interest of five per cent. and let the whole effect of the two schemes be compared.

Your actual debt at eight per cent. amounts to about seventy lacks admitting that there is at this time a considerable plenty of ready money (whether accidental and temporary, or otherwise, is not now the question) either in the Treasury or in the hands of individuals who have immediate means of employing it to greater advantage than by lending it to Government at a reduced interest, which I believe is unquestionable the fact, I presume it may be reasonably expected that the first subscription will be filled immediately. Mr. Barwell has given us his opinion that a subscription on these terms cannot fail of succeeding, and has himself offered to lend Government five lacks at five per cent. If, however, the subscription were not to fill, the worst that can happen is to pay off the ten lacks at par, or such proportion of that sum as may not be subscribed.

Supposing[†] the first subscription to fill, you may proceed at proper and convenient intervals to open another subscription to the same amount, and so on successively, till you have reduced the interest on the whole seventy lacks to five per cent. Supposing these successive operations to take place at intervals of a month, I apprehend that the whole effect of or gain arising from the operation, in the course of the first year, may and ought to be estimated in the following manner.

Ten lacks standing reduced on this day month from eight to five per cent. gives a saving of three per cent. on that sum—

	R
For eleven months equal to	27,500
The same repeated next month gives three per cent. for ten months	25,000
So on for nine months	22,500
for eight months	20,000
for seven months	17,500
for six months	15,000
for five months	12,500
Total	1,40,000

At the end of twelve months you will by this means have made an actual saving of one lack and forty thousand rupees, which may be called the gain of the first year, and you will have redeemed a perpetual annuity of two lacks and ten thousand rupees, being three per cent. upon the whole debt, the present value of which may be fairly computed at $12\frac{1}{2}$ years' purchase, considering the interest of money to be at eight per cent., and amounts to no less a sum than twenty-six lacks and twenty-five thousand rupees (26,25,000). When all this is done you have your ten lacks still in hand together with the savings on the head of interest, amounting in all to eleven lacks and forty thousand rupees, which you may either apply to a further reduction of interest, if that should be thought advisable, or to a diminution of the capital debt, if the latter should be preferred. When that question comes before the Board, there is one general consideration, which I think ought to have weight in the decision of it. If the debt, be then at or above par, it seems to follow that we should proceed upon the plan of reducing interest. If it be at discount, we ought to take means for bringing it up to par. To do this you must begin to reduce the principal debt, and to reduce the principal debt with the great possible advantage to the Company, you should apply your savings or other unappropriated money to the purchase of the bonds at the market price on the Company's account, supposing the gain which may be made by that mode of proceeding to be worth the Company's attention, which it certainly would be if the debt were at any considerable discount.

Hitherto I have taken it for granted that we may reckon upon a surplus sum equal to ten lacks entirely at our disposal, after all indispensable services are provided for. Let it now be supposed that we have no such means in our possession; still, though we have no money, we may have credit, which for the

immediate purpose in question may be equally effectual. It appears to me from the premium on the present bonds, that this Government has sufficient credit to borrow money at a reduced interest. A resource of this nature cannot be applied to the discharge of capital debt otherwise than by creating a positive saving on the head of interest, which may constitute a sinking fund and be gradually applied to reduce the principal. The *immediate* use to be made of *credit* can only relate to the reduction of interest. If these general principles should be found true, as I am persuaded they will be, I must of necessity be led from my own premises to a conclusion in favor of General Claverling's proposal of beginning our operations with a reduction of interest. Supposing our actual resources to be greater than I have taken them to be, that increase of power will enable us to reduce the rate of interest so much the sooner and so much the lower; but it does not subvert the general principle on which the proposal is founded.

I have thus far considered nothing but the Company's advantage in their quality of debtor. In strict right the public creditor will not have reason to complain of suffering any hardship or injustice, when we leave it to his choice to accept of a lower rate of interest or to be paid off at par, if our means would admit of it. We ought undoubtedly to annihilate the debt at once without furnishing the creditor with any just pretence of taxing us with positive injustice, whether it would not be felt immediately by him as an act of rigour and ultimately by ourselves as an act of imprudence, may deserve to be considered. Let me now be permitted to place the question in another point of view. In deciding upon public measures of such great extent and consequence the Government of this State should take other objects into their contemplation; besides the merely not violating the contract with their creditors, I submit to the Board and am ready to support my opinion, that taking every circumstance into consideration, the paying off the whole debt at once, supposing it possible, or by great instalments at short intervals, which, if we may depend on the hopes held out to us of our probable resources, might possibly be done, would be distress to the creditor, ruin to the country, and of course I presume no benefit to the Company considered as the State or governing power. And yet I am for reducing the burthen of the debt as long as it is a burthen both interest and principal, but let us take care that it be done gradually, lest we drive every man to live upon his capital, which is bad, or to carry it out of the country, which is worse; in the present state of Bengal he has no other alternative. There are no open channels of trade now existing in which such great sums, as you would by such measures suddenly throw into the hands of individuals, can be employed; and as for land, supposing all other objections to our colonizing here to be removed, let it be remembered that the value of land depends upon trade; no wise man will cultivate the soil for more than a subsistence, unless he has a market to carry off the produce and to encourage him to make the utmost of his estate. In short, till the impediments that destroy all free commerce in this country are removed, I am of opinion that money will be of little value and land of still less, compared to what they might be, if the means and end of improving both were left free and open to the respective owners. A strong presumptive proof, that no such channels of improvement are at present open, will rest upon an event of the certainty of which I presume no man has a doubt, *viz.*, that the public creditor rather than accept his principal will submit to almost any reduction of interest. The conclusion to be drawn from such a fact as this, will be confirmed to us by the knowledge we have, that at this period private loans at nine and ten per cent. interest on the best personal security in this country are now negotiating in Calcutta.

If all this be incontrovertably true, I presume it will not require much argument to prove that any measure which transfers from the public treasury of the State into the pockets of individuals a capital sum, which the latter must either live upon or carry away, cannot tend either to the immediate or future benefit of Government. A prudent man who is obliged to live upon his capital, will of course lock it up, and expend as little of it as he can. This way you put a check upon expence and ruin the little circulation you have left; others who are not bound by any local ties to Bengal will of course carry

their capital into some other country where they may either live upon the interest it produces or find other channels open to improve it. There is one general caution more, which I submit with the greatest deference to the Board. Let us take care how we neglect the present favourable opportunity of reducing the interest of the debt. There is now an accidental plenty of money in Calcutta. If I judge right of the general state of this country, it cannot stay here long, and it is admitted that the streams of foreign wealth, which used to flow into Bengal, are either dried up or diverted into other channels.

From these facts the consequence to be apprehended is that in a little time the money will be gone, and then you will not have it in your power to reduce either principal or interest.

If after all, it should appear to be the real object and purpose of Government by this and other measures of a similar nature to drain the country of everything valuable whether specie or manufactures, and to loosen those ties, by which the attachment of a number of wealthy individuals is secured to the Company, in order to evacuate the country and leave it in misery and confusion, I shall never concur in the wisdom or policy or justice of such measures, but I foresee that I shall be forced to admit that the means are proportioned to the end. Whenever the necessity or utility of aiming directly at such an object shall be avowedly a question before the Council, I hope I shall not want firmness to stand forth on behalf of the East India Company, whose servant the law of Great Britain had made me, and to declare my opinion that, as it is clearly not their interest to ruin this territory, if they wish to keep it for themselves, so neither is it their true interest to reduce the value of it to nothing, if they mean or expect to relinquish it on any advantageous terms to Government.

I come now to the consideration of the two schemes before the Board, and though General Clavering's was the first delivered, I persuade myself that he will allow me to give the first attention to that of the Governor General. The Governor General informs the Board that on Monday the 23rd January the balance in the Treasury was Rs36,06,105 current rupees, and that twenty lacks are actually received from the Vizier, though not yet brought to account. Supposing these sums to constitute our immediate and actual resources, I beg leave to make the following observations upon them. The first is general; that supposing this fund to exist in specie in the Company's Treasury, I cannot admit that any part of it is properly applicable to the discharge of debt, until I see an estimate of ways and means compared with current services, and probable demands, and until it appears upon such satisfactory evidence, as the case permits, that after providing for those services and demands we shall have a surplus to be disposed of at the discretion of the Board. Proceeding regularly and officially, I cannot allow that any authority, however respectable, is sufficient to supply the place of this evidence.

2nd.—On examining the particulars of the balance in the Treasuries, I find that credit is taken for 11,28,958 sicca rupees, four lacks of which consist in grants and ten lacks in bills receivable. Without questioning the credit of these securities, I am of opinion that they ought not to be reckoned among our certain resources until they are realized in specie, and the money actually paid into the Company's Treasury.

3rd.—The state of the Treasury must from its nature be fluctuating. The Board therefore, in my opinion, cannot safely reckon upon any available surplus, but in consequence of such an estimate as it already mentioned.

The Governor General observes that the amount of the bonds now in course of payment but not yet paid, being near nine lacks, "will probably remain for many months as a deposit in the Treasury, in consequence of the proprietors not knowing how to employ it, but if they should demand it, the money is ready to be paid."

I do not dispute the probability of this conjecture, but I beg leave to observe that considering this sum as a *Deposit*, it can be of no service to Government, unless we resolve to employ money which is not our property, and which the right owners may demand at pleasure.

4th.—I am informed by the accomptant of the Khalsa that the sum of 8,99,702 current rupees, which is appropriated to pay off bonds now in course of payment, makes part of the balance in the Treasury. This sum being only a deposit cannot properly be reckoned among the Company's resources and ought to be deducted from the balance in the Treasury.

5th.—I understand there are other deposits and other sums reserved or appropriated now laying in the Treasury; whatever the amount of these several sums may be, it cannot be considered as part of the Company's disposable money, and if it makes part of the balance in the Treasuries, should be deducted from that balance.

As to the prejudice, which a loan of five per cent. professedly made to pay off an equal quantity of debt at 8 per cent. may do to the Company's credit, I can only say that I do not feel any apprehension of that nature, and that if I was placed in the Company's situation this is the very method which I should think it prudent to adopt in order to support credit and to avail myself of every advantage to be derived from that credit, combined with my actual resources.

The remainder of the Governor's minute is answered in effect by the general arguments which have preceded these particular observations.

If there should appear any weight in the foregoing arguments, or any truth in the conclusions deduced from them, the propriety and advantage of our acting upon the plan recommended by General Clavering will of course be established without any direct or particular reasoning in favor of it. After showing that every other system of Finance with respect to the reduction of the debt would be disadvantageous and imprudent, and that the general principle of beginning our operations with the reduction of interest with a view to a gradual reduction of principal by the establishment of a sinking fund is in every sense the most beneficial to the Company, I cannot hesitate about giving my consent to a plan which I see with pleasure is conformable to all my own principles.

I approve of the mode likewise as I find it stated in the General's minute of the 25th January. If it should be found defective in any particular, it may easily be corrected or improved.

The notice given to the holders of bonds now in course of payment but not yet presented, *viz.*, that new bonds bearing interest at five per cent. would be given them to the amount of their old ones (the interest to commence from the date of the new ones) if they chose to subscribe to the former on those terms, seem to me very proper and necessary. As we know that private loans are actually negotiating at a high interest, it was to be apprehended that the holders of the above bonds or their representatives might be induced to lend their money on that private security rather than let it lie dead in the Treasury. In that case the money might be drawn out and applied to private uses before the owners were apprized of the intention of Government to receive it for the public.

My opinion upon the whole is clearly in favor of General Clavering's scheme. I have endeavoured to support it by arguments, which in my judgment approach as near to demonstration as the nature of the subject will admit.

If I should appear to be mistaken, I am persuaded that my superiors will, at all events, judge favorable of the rectitude of my intentions.

FORT WILLIAM,
The 6th February 1775. }

P. FRANCIS.

Ordered that this Minute lie for consideration.

Mr. Francis moves that all such persons, British subjects, as are now resident out of the limits of these provinces without permission from the present Government, and not employed on public service be re-called; and that Colonel Gailliez be directed to signify these orders to any such persons residing in the dominions of the Nabob of Owde and its dependencies, and to see that they are carried into execution.

189 F. D.

Estimate of the probable Resources and Disbursements

Revenues calculated of the amount received into the Khalsa Treasury at Fort William from 1st May 1773 to the 30th April 1774, viz.,—
Dewanny Suba, Bengal—

From Moorsnedabad Division	Sicca R	32,26,595	11	10	
Dinagapore do.		29,05,434	1	13	
Dacca do.		28,52,455	14	2	
Burdwan do.		7,44,901	4	11	
Calcutta do.		23,46,084	5	11	
Tippera Province		1,31,908	0	0	
Hissoreel		58,202	15	17	
Customs exclusive of Salt Duties		3,97,200	10	10	
Salt Duties		6,95,571	12	5	
					1,34,48,354 11 19
Ceded Land, Calcutta Division		10,58,404	10	2	
Burdwan do.		38,83,904	8	3	
Chittagong do.		3,91,673	12	15	
Hussore Thaseel		1,84,057	7	10	
					55,18,040 6 10
Subah Behar calculated on the amount received for the Behar year 1181 or from 1st September 1773 to September 1774 received in	Sicca R	15,25,100	9	0	
Received in Patna	Sonnaut R	25,84,921	1	0	
Deduct batta 5-4 per cent.		1,35,708	6	0	
					24,49,212 11 0
					39,74,313 4 0
General batta amount received for the Bengal year 1180					53,471 2 0
Salt net profit on the sale of salt for one year					10,59,310 14 10
					2,40,53,490 6 19
Deduct disbursements account of					
Dewanny Suba, Bengal—					
Stipends and allowances—					
Nabob Mobaruk-ul Dowlah		16,00,000	0	0	
Ateram-ul-Dowlah		90,625	0	0	
Rawal dien Hussein Cawn		56,250	0	0	
Jagrut Sent		1,05,000	0	0	
Rajah Goordass		1,00,000	0	0	
Munny Begum		1,40,000	0	0	
Nudjeef Cawn		2,00,000	0	0	
Rajah Derage Narain		7,200	0	0	
					22,99,075 0 0
Charges, collections		2,26,942	11	4	
Charges, general		1,39,339	12	3	
Boats		39,842	1	7	
Charges, Dewanny		13,212	5	0	
Charitable donations		11,220	0	5	
Postabundie		47,000	0	0	
					27,76,631 13 19
Ceded Lands Charges collections		1,20,141	11	10	
Poolbundee		2,39,082	12	2	
					3,59,224 7 12
Subah Behar monthly allowances		95,368	0	9	
Pensions at R4,000 per month		48,000	0		
Charges, general		46,431	2	6	
Travelling charges		18,311	7	3	
Charges, collections		78,086	14	9	
Charges, Dawks		23,117	3	9	
Sonnaut R		3,09,324	13	0	
Deduct batta 5-4 per cent.		16,239	8	10	
					2,93,085 4 2
					84,28,941 9 13
					2,06,24,548 13 6
Deduct the amount to be paid this year out of the Revenues of the Salt District for the discharge of balances Mds. 662,614-9-8 at 60 Sicca rupees per 100 Mds.					3,97,588 8 12
	Sicca R	2,02,26,980	4	4	
Batta 16 per cent.		32,36,316	13	6	
					2,34,63,297 2 0

of Fort William Presidency in the year 1775.

Charges of Fort William Presidency calculated from the General Account of Charges from the 1st August 1773 to the 31st July 1774-

Charges, general	Sicca Rs.80,770	0	0	
Charges, works	1,05,981	3	0	
Store-keeper of the works	1,05,482	9	0	
Custom House	29,257	4	0	
Mint charges	29,160	13	0	
Zemindar and clerk of the market	33,248	0	0	
Import ware-house-keeper	48,974	13	0	
Export ware-house-keeper	24,854	15	0	
Naval store-keeper	13,258	4	0	
Charges, Court of Requests	1,255	7	0	
Charges, Durbar	1,22,082	11	0	
Mayor's Court charges	15,773	4	0	
				14,05,094 8 0
Charges of the Factories —				
Putna Factory	1,54,444	0	0	
Dacca do.	18,779	3	0	
Cossimbazar Factory	3,32,604	11	0	
Chittagong do.	32,336	7	0	
				5,38,164 6 11
Charges, Marine—				
At Chittagong	17,776	15	0	
At Fort William	4,38,331	11	0	
				4,56,108 10 11
Charges, Military, including those of Military Paymaster-General, and Military Store-keeper and exclusive of the advantage arising from the monthly allowance from Suja-ul-Dowlah received for extraordinary contingent charges				82,00,000 0 0
£100,000 ordered by the Court of Directors to be laid out on the fortifications, &c.	10,00,000	0	0	
Deduct the following charges included in the above—				
Charges, Works	1,05,981	3	2	
Store-keeper of the Works	1,05,482	9	9	
Cantonments at Barhaupora	1,15,632	4	0	
Charges building at Cossimbazar	45,285	11	2	
	3,72,381	12	0	
				6,27,618 3 11
				1,12,26,985 13 9
Commission on the Revenues, about	5,00,000	0	0	
Commission account to the 31st August 1774 not yet paid, about	2,30,000	0	0	
				7,30,000 0 0
Lord Clive's jagheer			2,58,631 0 0
Interest on bond debt			6,50,000 0 0
Allowances to the Governor General and Council	6,50,000	0	0	
" to the Chief Justice and Judges	2,60,000	0	0	
" to the President and Members of the Board of Trade	1,70,000	0	0	
				10,80,000 0 0
				1,39,45,616 13 9
Bombay Presidency remittances in specie, &c.			18,00,000 0 0
Fort St. George Presidency remittances in 1773-74 in goods and stores			4,03,000 0 0
Canton Residency remittances in 1773-74 in bills			3,00,000 0 0
Balam Bagan do. do. in goods, &c.			7,31,000 0 0
Fort Marlbro Presidency remittances in 1773-74 in goods, specie, &c.			2,28,000 0 0
St. Helena remittances in 1773-74 in stores			10,000 0 0
				34,75,000 0 0
Investment			80,00,000 0
				2,54,20,616 13 9
Estimate of Annual Disbursements				
Extraordinary Disbursements which may be expected will take place in the course of this year, viz.—				
Bonds advertized to be paid off and on which no interest is to be allowed after the 31st December 1774, about	21,00,000	0	0	
Interest due thereon computed at	1,00,000	0	0	
				22,00,000 0 0
Restitution fund, 1 anna due and is the last dividend	3,48,000	0	0	
Colonel Munroe, last dividend due to him	58,000	0	0	
				4,06,000 0 0

Estimate of the probable Resources and Disbursements

Goods and Stores from Europe as per year 1773-74—suppose	7,60,000 0 0
Drafts on Europe—suppose	£1,80,000	} about	20,00,000 0 0
Certificates to Captains and officers of Europe ships—suppose 8 ships at £5,000 each	£40,000		
Calcutta Customs as per year 1773-74 about	3,82,214 6 9	
Duties on coinage in the Mint about	18,500 0 0	
Interest on Balances due from the auring Assinics about	1,75,000 0 0	
Dustoor on goods auring	54,000 0 0	
		<hr/>	6,29,714 0 6
Opium—1,309 chests sold for	7,31,890 0 0		
1,200 chests suppose will sell for at R550 per chest	6,60,000 0 0		
	<hr/>	13,91,890 0 0	
Cost of 2,500 chests to be deducted	4,79,168 0 0	
		<hr/>	9,12,722 0 0
Estimate of Annual Resources	2,77,65,733 8 9
Extraordinary resources to be expected in the course of this year but which cannot be considered as annual supplies, viz.—			
Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowlah received—chests into the Treasury said to contain	5,00,000 0 0		
Received—chests at Moorshedabad said to contain	5,00,000 0 0		
On the way from Patna in the care of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton	15,00,000 0 0		
On the way from Benares in the care of Mr. Thomas Motte	5,00,000 0 0		
Further receipts expected from Sujah-ul-Dowlah in the course of this year	40,00,000 0 0		
	<hr/>	70,00,000 0 0	
Cash Balance the 25th December 1774	9,258 8 0		
Treasury do. do.	19,63,370 8 0		
Khalsa Treasury—Dacca Division, 13th November 1774	2,92,986 8 1		
Burdwan do. 15th December	6,44,508 10 11		
Patna do. 18th November	3,87,077 14 0		
Moorshedabad, 30th October	2,24,029 13 4		
Calcutta Committee, 25th December	58,191 8 13		
Dinagepoor Division, 13th December	11,53,262 8 6		
Resident at the Darbar, 30th November	2,672 12 4		
Boglepoor Division, 14th November	12,868 15 4		
Khalsa Treasury, 25th December 1774, ready money	13,40,734 0 9		
Bills receivable	6,76,957 0 0		
	<hr/>	20,17,691 0	
Sicca R	47,93,287 10 12		
Batta 16 per cent.	7,66,926 0 8		
	<hr/>	55,60,213 11 0	
	<hr/>	75,32,842 11 0	
		<hr/>	1,45,32,842 11 0
		Current R	4,22,98,576 3 9
			<hr/>

FORT WILLIAM,
The 1st January 1775.

of Fort William Presidency in the year 1775—concl'd.

Salt fund remaining for the discharge of old salt balances for the Bengal year 1179 or to the 30th April 1778 (as mentioned in the general letter to the Court of Directors from the Revenue Department, the 25th March 1778)		Sicca Rs.25,683 2 13		
Batta 16 per cent.		1,32,109 4 5		
			9,57,792 7 0	
Ditto for the Bengal year 1180 or to the 30th April 1774				9,57,792 7 0
Opium Fund amount to be paid to the members of the administration if it meets the approbation of the Court of Directors, 12 members for 11 months at Sicca Rs.3,000 each per maund in Sicca Rs.3,96,000			8,59,360 0 0	
Accounts Deposits due this day on that account			1,38,642 1 9	
Accomptant-General of the Mayor's Court due this day on that account			1,49,692 3 6	
Commission on the Revenues unappropriated balance the 30th April 1774			3,89,194 12 10	
				59,58,474 0 1
				8,13,79,090 13 10
Balance unappropriated				1,09,19,485 5 11

Current R . 4,22,98,576 3 9

Errors excepted,
L. DARELLY,
Accomplant.

CHARLES CROFTES,
Accomplant-General to the Revenue Department.

Fort William, the 14th February 1775.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT.

The HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *Governor-General, President.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

The HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

Read and approved the Consultation held yesterday.

To the HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General, &c., Council of Fort William.

GENTLEMEN,—On the evening of the 27th past I was furnished with a translation of a letter received by the Governor General from the Vizier as far back as the 28th November.

Colonel Champion in refutation of the Vizier's charges against him.

I acknowledged the receipt of it next day, and expressed my concern that it had not been convenient to favor me with an earlier perusal. It contains charges highly injurious to my honor, and it would therefore have been satisfactory that an opportunity had been given me of ushering these aspersions into your presence with their refutation.

I know the Vizier's character intimately, too well I know his littleness of soul to be surprized at his stooping to any meanness; but I cannot help expressing my astonishment at the appearances of a certain management with which this letter is strongly marked.

It must have been written about the middle of November. The Vizier and I parted on the most friendly terms on the 14th October. Not only had he often personally thanked me for the services I had rendered him, but he did so by letter after he had left camp. When I told him of my intentions to return to Europe he said he should lament my absence as that of his best of friends, and I have already informed you in another address that I was urged to accept of a more convincing proof of his approbation and satisfaction after the conclusion of the settlement with the Rohilla Chief.

How then shall I account for the appearance of the present extraordinary letter.

Observe if you please, gentlemen, the first part of it till you arrive at Bissonly, then cast your eyes on a letter, which His Excellency wrote to Mr. Hastings from Pulybeet.

No. 1-A.

According to the translations one is an exact transcript of the other. Now the Vizier had duly received an answer from Mr. Hastings to the letter sent from Pulybeet. The war was over early in October. There remained no more towns to plunder—no new discovered hoards of treasure to dig up—no unhappy man to rob of his wealth—no miserable woman of her raiment. Why then does His Excellency sit down in November to copy a letter to which he had received a satisfactory answer six or seven months before. There is something mysterious in this business; perhaps in the sequel we may see more clearly.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate what passed at Pulybeet. I communicated the circumstance to Mr. Hastings the very day it happened, and I afterwards gave him my sentiments on his own letter as well as on the Vizier's complaint.

28th April.
Two letters to the Governor, 14th June.

It would now therefore perhaps suffice to refer to what has already passed on that subject; but it may not be out of place to remark that the compliment which the Vizier pays me of having suffered myself to be lorded over by the gentlemen he mentions, will I am confident upon enquiry meet with the polite retort from each of them as it does from me.

After all what did the complaint amount to? Only to this: 1st, that a demand was made on the part of the English troops, to take an account of the riches which might be found in Pulybeet, and that this demand was not agreeable to His Excellency; 2ndly, that he was displeased with the deportment of Colonel Leslie and the other gentlemen.

With regard to the 1st, we may in politeness begin that the demand was disagreeable to His Excellency; we are not surprized at it because he is less a friend to us than to himself, but it does not therefore follow that any apology is due. On the contrary I wish it may not be thought that other Commanding Officers would have caused the search to have been more particular.

With respect to the behaviour of the gentlemen, I have already acquitted them of impropriety, so far as fell under my observation, and dare say if they are called upon, they will answer for themselves in confutation of His Excellency. But why as I have already said, why is this complaint reiterated at this time of day?

Two letters to the Governor, 14th June.
See also No. 1-B.

I cannot help admiring the confidence with which His Excellency has advanced that there was not so much as four or five thousand rupees in Pulybeet; the report of four crore being concealed there, I always thought extravagant, but His Excellency has gone so far in the other extreme, that it is impossible he can even expect to be credited. According to the accounts of trusty and intelligent spies the fact proved to be that the Company would have been considerable gainers by the offer, which, he says, he made of giving up all the riches in the Fort for the 40 lacks.

As we are now on the subject of plunder, permit me to offer my attachment to the army in apology for begging of you to attend to it a little further.

According to the letter and to the meaning of my instructions I had authority to proceed to the reduction of the Rohilla country if the Vizier required it with the Company's troops only.

Supposing then, gentlemen, that the Nabob had found himself sufficiently engaged in the *Doab* and that I had effected the Rohilla conquest, can it be alleged that the Company's troops would have taken charge of the riches found in the Forts and Cities merely on account of the Vizier; and that they must have afterwards delivered them over to His Excellency? Impossible! and it follows of course that his being present would only entitle him to a proportion. I submit therefore whether the giving up the rights of the army was not in effect sacrificing the interest of our nation, inasmuch as the riches of the individuals contribute to the support of the State.

But passing over this remarkable complaisance to the Vizier as inexplicable, we shall march from Pulybeet and accompany His Excellency towards Bissonly, dragging in triumph the disconsolate Begum and children of the brave but unfortunate Hafez, the widow of his eldest son Enniut Chan, the wife of his eldest surviving son, Mahubbet Chan, and some hundreds of miserable captive women or carts.

Leaving Berrilly and Oulah behind us, and trusty slaves of His Excellency to see the inhabitants indiscriminately plundered for the behoof of their master, we arrived at Bissonly, when the whole army were witnesses of scenes that cannot be described.

No. 1-C.

But not to dwell on the enormities or excesses of His Excellency, I shall proceed to answer the charges brought against me.

In doing this, gentlemen, I must trouble you with a narrative of all the transactions relative to Fuzulla Chan; and in proceeding I shall deduce from the facts such arguments as naturally arise to support the propriety of my conduct during the campaign.

The Vizier says that after our arrival at Bissonly I carried on an underhanded correspondence with Fuzulla Chan. I received and answered several letters from the Rohilla Chief, but His Excellency is an economist of truth when he says I did so clandestinely.

14th May.

The first letter received from Fuzulla Chan was in these words—

“After the death of my father these gentlemen, the Rohilla Chiefs, took possession of my ancient estate and gave me a trifle for my subsistence. This is as evident as the sun: surely it is known to you. I therefore from necessity supported myself with difficulty. The person who designed the war is no more; regarding your sacred friendship and sincerity I request without other intervention that the degree

No 2D.

of friendship with you may be confirmed. Your goodness and celebrity is everywhere known, and that you the English dispossess no one; this trouble therefore is given that in case I am reinstated in my ancient possessions, whatever is conferred upon me I will pay you as much without damage or deficiency as any other person will agree to do: and in all matters I will regard you as my master and benefactor till death, but no other person. My agreements on no account will I depart from, and, God willing, I will perform them with my heart and soul."

"Whenever you require it I shall attend you: and perform my duty, and my firm alliance. I hope in God that by your means I shall receive justice, which goodness I shall hold in remembrance while I have life. I would have sent a faithful person to you to have explained all particulars, but the roads not being free prevented me; if you will send a man to me, mine accompanying him shall attend you."

14th May.

I received at the same time a letter from Ahmed Chan Kan Suman.

"Long before this Tittle Chan Kan Suman, deceased, performed his duty to the English Chiefs; at his death I was left singly, and Hafez Rhomut Chan took that opportunity to seize half my country and conferred it on my brother Azum Chan, by which I attained not my hereditary estate. I therefore withdrew my connection with him, but he carried me with him forcibly. When the Nabob Vizier's letter to console me was received, I wished to join him and you. I declare my desires, but what could I do; for Hafez would not let me go; this will have reached you from others. Throughout Hindostan, there the English beneficence is sounded, and it is manifest to all that they dispossess no one of his right. It is therefore requested that on our the Rohilla's particular compassion may be shown, and whatever thought just bestowed by God's assistance from the dues of fidelity and duty, I will never deviate the breadth of an hair."

"As Fuzulla Chan has true esteem for me, I quitted him not, but accompanied him to this Fort from Your Honor and clemency; a reply to this address is intreated; it was necessary that it should be made; may you ever prosper."

These letters commenced the correspondence; and if His Excellency had not by the cruelty and inhumanity of his conduct in general, and by a piece of treachery towards other Chiefs, which I shall hereafter have occasion to mention and to prove under his own seal, I say if he had not by such means as these impressed the natives with a just and deep-rooted distrust of his honor, it is probable I should not have been troubled with their addresses, but to continue.

Next morning I waited on the Vizier and showed him the above letters. At the same time I offered him the corps of Grenadiers of the army to accompany a body of his troops to reduce the fugitives, and in the evening repeated the offer in person; how he received it may be seen in my letter to the Governor and Council, 16th May, on which date by advice of the Vizier I sent the following answers to the Rohilla Chiefs:—

TO FUZULLA CHAN.

"Your letter is received and gives me pleasure; the particulars are clear; my reply is this; this country is not taken into the possession of the English; but in consequence of engagements, the English army is come to the aid and assistance of the Nabob Vizier, who is now master of this country. Agreeable to your desire I communicated the particulars of your letter to the Vizier and this is his reply—that he did not choose that any Patan Chief should have settlement in this country. I therefore said no more; but if you or Ahmed Chan should at any time wish to come to me, for ye and your family and to Ahmed Chan and his family I will give protection that no person shall give you the smallest molestation, but of your country and effects the Nabob Vizier is now master. Your desires are made known to him; and if ye can settle your affairs agreeably to his pleasure it will be very advisable, and in the agreement I also shall be very glad."

To AHMED KHAN.

“Your representation is received and the particulars known; all that ye have written in excuse for your conduct, I have communicated to the Nabob Vizier, and his determination is this: that no person of the Rohilla tribe shall have residence in this country. I write to advise you explicitly of the Vizier’s pleasure that ye may act according to it; should ye at any time wish to come to me, for yourself and family I will afford full protection, but your country and effects are now the property of the Nabob Vizier.”

From these replies, gentlemen, it is evident how implicitly I obeyed the orders I had received to consider the Vizier “as the master.”*

16th May.
No. 5.
* See paper marked P.

On the 24th a letter arrived from Fuzulla Khan in these words—

“Previous to this I addressed you with a representation of my condition, from which it will be evident to you—just now I have received a letter from the Nabob Vizier. I have returned in reply to it, that through your mediation I will come into him. This trouble therefore is given to beg you will write me of whatever you have determined in my favour; that acting agreeably to it, and arriving by your means, I may obtain an interview; from whatever promises and agreements I make, I will not deviate the breadth of an hair.”

No. 6.

This letter speaks more plainly than the former the distrust which the Vizier had caused in the minds of the fugitives by his conduct to their kindred.

In consequence of a communication of it to the Nabob, his Minister Elich Cawn waited on me; and pursuant to the pleasure of His Excellency the following reply was written to the Rohilla Chief:—

No. 7.

“I now advise you that the two following proposals are offered to ye—1st, the Vizier will not confer on ye or any other Rohilla person, one foot of land in this country, but he will give you an equal quantity with what ye possessed here in the country of *Doub*, provided ye will now pay him twenty lacks of rupees. On this condition come satisfied. The second proposal, should ye not accept of the first, is this, that you with your family domestics, treasure and effects, but without troops, come in and meet me, after which you will proceed directly into the English districts wherever may be best, and remain there till the pleasure of the Board in this particular is written to me. The reason of this is that the Vizier does not chuse ye should remain here. I now give you promise of protection and send you a pass under the Vizier’s seal, and one under my own—whichever of these you chuse to accept,—act agreeably; but should neither of them be agreeable to you, you are your own master; therefore send the passes back to me.”

24th May.
No. 8.

This letter was dispatched in the morning, and in the afternoon I received one in reply to mine of the 16th:—

“Your gracious letter is received and the particulars comprehended. You write that this country is not come into the possession of the English; but in consequence of engagements between the English and Vizier to give him assistance, their troops came into this country of which the Vizier is now Lord,—that agreeably to the letter having told all ye particulars to the Nabob, his pleasure is this—that no Chief of the Rohilla tribe shall have settlement in this country; therefore that in this matter I should attempt no further. The case is this: I have never acted in such manner that the Vizier should have taken hatred to his heart against me, but it was the disturbances of other Chiefs, which afflicted his noble heart; in that I am guiltless; therefore I trouble you, that if this country is not in your possession, the management of it finally will be put into the hands of others; it is therefore better to accept it from me if it is in the Nabob’s dominions; foregoing every other connection I will take it through your means. I am in hopes that the Nabob’s favor being

159 F D.

regained that this country will be put under my charge, and whatever any others may offer for it, I will bind myself to perform. In reply to letters received from the Vizier, calling me into him, I have replied that whatever may be his pleasure regarding me he shall advise you of it; that by your means I may come to his presence,—your bravery and generosity is as evident as the Sun; and whoever loses his country by war is again replaced in it: I wish to take it (the country) purely through you, thereby your favor; let us not lose our country; in the dues of friendship and fidelity, I will never fail, and while I live I shall be obedient to your commands. Abdulhun Cawn and Hudahme Aula I have sent to you. In the matter of my offer for receiving the country of my father whatever is my ability to give they will represent to you; agreeably to that shewing the dues of lordliness and compassion your fame will resound through the world.”

The offers which the Vakeel made in the name of his master are mentioned in my letter to the Governor of the 28th May.

From the reinstatement of Sujah-ul-Dowlah in his own dominions the powers of Hindustan had conceived the English to be a people of unparalleled magnanimity as celebrated for their justice and humanity as for their bravery and generosity; this is evident from the style of the letters which were addressed to me.

I thought nothing could be more honorable to our nation than the support of so exalted a character; and whilst it could be done on terms so advantageous as an annual increase of near four hundred thousand pounds to the revenues of our ally and an immediate acquisition of above three hundred thousand pounds to the Company for their influence in affecting an accommodation perfectly consistent with their engagements to the Vizier, who would have thus derived more than a reasonable advantage from that manner of terminating the war, I supposed it very unlikely that the Vakeel's proposition should be received with indifference.

They were not its true agreeable to the Vizier; they were not favourable to his ambitious designs, nor to his inhuman plan of *extirpation*. I informed the Governor of Sujah having received them with disdain, and when I candidly told His Excellency that I should act in the matter agreeably to the orders of Government, he anticipated the answer which I received by saying “*that Mr. Hastings will tell you as I do.*” But though His Excellency gave himself the liberty of divining this, how was it possible that I should believe that we were to consult the Vizier's interest and aggrandizement only? I could not as a Company's servant give place to such an idea.

I know that Sujah's acquisitions in plunder have exceeded the expenses of the campaign, even including the forty lacks which he had promised to pay to the Company. I had with regret observed that the part which the English took in the war brought their national character into the highest disrepute. I had remarked and all the officers of the army had remarked that His Excellency's haughtiness increased with the power which we put into his hands.

Independent, therefore, of the immense pecuniary considerations which I have mentioned, nothing could be more consistent with what I conceived to be the interest of the Company, than embracing the opportunity which presented itself, of having a standing army of fifteen or twenty thousand, and in case of emergency fifty or sixty thousand Afgans ready to assist in repelling any of the powers to the westward of the Ganges, or to crush the growing insolence of the Vizier himself.

Knowing that we owe establishment in this country to the want of unanimity amongst the natives, I had always understood it to have been an axiom in our system of politics that it was our part to endeavor at keeping the power of the country Princes as much upon an equipoise as possible, lest by lengthening the sword of one he should destroy his neighbour and become formidable to ourselves.

Thus, gentlemen, as has been already observed, I was induced to think it

* *N. B.*—It was upon this principle that a deputation was a few years ago sent at a great expence to the Company to limit the forces of Sujah Dowlah when they were far less numerous than at present.

very improbable that the overtures of the Rohilla Chief would have been totally disregarded ; nor could I ever be possibly* reconciled to myself had I presumed to have withheld them from the knowledge of Government.

Conclusion of a letter to the Governor, 28th May.

I therefore referred the proposals to the administration through the Hon'ble the Governor and I reflect with real satisfaction on having done so.

"I shall be extremely glad if upon due consideration of them any means can be devised by which the public good may be promoted. I wish for nothing so much as that some measure may be adopted that will strike all the powers in the East into admiration of our justice in contrast to the Vizier's conduct."

In the meantime, however, I wrote the following answer to Fuzulla :—

"I acquaint you that your agreeable letter by your Vakeel is received and gives me pleasure. The contents are clearly understood ; in your business I have had a great deal of conversation with the Nabob Vizier, but he will not consent that either you or any other person, Rohilla, shall have one foot of land in this country. But the Vizier offers you the same quantity of country you have possessed here in the Province of Doab. If you chuse to accept of this it is well ; if not there is no other choice. Had the Vizier accepted of your proposal, it would have given me much pleasure. But in regard to the country, the Vizier is Lord ; further correspondence on this matter will be fruitless, on which account I write you explicitly."

With this letter I desired the Vakeel to return to his master telling him I could do nothing in his affairs of my own authority, but that I could make his offers known to the gentlemen at Calcutta, and afterwards advise Fuzulla of their pleasure.

The Vakeel however sent the letter by another person and entreated permission to remain in camp till I should hear from the Presidency, which I granted as intimated to the Governor.

28th May.

I had no further intercourse with Fuzulla until the 7th June, when in consequence of a report that Lieutenant Redman and two other European deserters were with him, I desired that he would send them forthwith to my Camp.

No. 11.

On the 8th of the same month being advised as well through His Excellency as by other intelligence that the King had invited over the Rohilla ; and the Vizier and myself being of opinion that the consequences of their joining His Majesty would prove prejudicial to His Excellency's future peace, especially in case of a Marratta war, of which he seemed very apprehensive, I addressed Fuzulla as follows :—

Hearin : at this time that letters are arrived with you from His Majesty wherein he strongly enjoins you to come to him without any apprehensions, I write ye that having clearly represented your condition to the Board at Calcutta, and in a friendly manner having recommended the settlement of them to the Governor, I wait impatiently for replies. In this case I think it necessary and advisable that ye do not comply with the King's desires until answers come from Calcutta. Whenever they do come they shall be immediately transmitted to you ; in this matter there shall be no neglect on my part."

No. 12.

To this letter, gentlemen, is probably owing the present peace of the Empire. To it is certainly owing that the Nabob is undisturbed, and that Fuzulla Khan is now the mere dependent of His Excellency ; for if that Chief had not, as he afterwards complained, been lulled into inactivity by the hopes which he entertained from the interposition of our Government he would have crossed the Ganges at Baify Gaut and Chandy Gaut whilst the river was fordable.

He had according to our advices made very early application to Timur Sha for assistance, which the Vizier was apprehensive would be granted. His Majesty Shaw Allum it was said had invited the Marrattas; he stood chiefly in need of money to prosecute his designs. Fuzulla was master of a large sum; the inferior Chiefs were also possessed of riches. The Seiks were ready to join them. In short they must at least have easily established themselves in the Doab, and have been able to have kept the Vizier in a state of disquietude during the remainder of his life: this letter had the desired effect and the listening to it proved the cause of much self-disapprobation to the Rohillah.

Nothing further passed between Fuzulla Khan and me till the 25th June, when on receipt of new advice regarding Redman, a copy of which was sent to the Governor, I again demanded the deserter.

No. 13.

No other circumstance occurred regarding the Rohillahs till the 7th July. On the morning of that day, I received a message from the Nabob desiring me to send away the Vakeel, for which his reasons may be collected from what follows.

After the fall of Hafez, the Vizier, as has been elsewhere observed, became extremely arrogant. It is well known that even his people carried themselves haughtily to the English officers; and we shall hereafter have occasion to mention a very remarkable and daring instance of it; great pains were taken to impress the natives of Hindostan in general and the Vizier's own subjects in particular with the highest ideas of his late and great acquisition of power and magnificence.

I have been told that in a Title-nama, published in many parts of his country on account of the victory, the English troops were not so much as mentioned, and it is an undoubted truth that several officers when on their way to the army (one of them now in town) were asked if the English had been at the defeat of Hafez.

The circumstance of the English being in his pay and under his absolute direction, was circulated with great industry—nay so indiscreet was His Excellency in the use of the command which it had been thought proper to confer on him over the Company's troops that our own sepoys could not help observing the difference between those and former times, now the Sahib Loque (gentlemen) must run at his nod, and must halt at his nod.

As the Vakeel's remaining in camp was therefore not favorable to the Vizier's views with which these reports were spread abroad, and tended to render the Vizier's unlimited authority over the English army doubtful to the country powers, His Excellency requested his dismissal.

I had been directed to consider our Government in a secondary point of view only; and having myself no particular desire for the Vakeel's presence, I indulged the Vizier in his wishes; and immediately directed him to return, promising to acquaint his master of the answer which should be received from Calcutta.

It happened to arrive that very day; and I gave the Vakeel the following letter to carry to Fuzulla as a final answer:—

"I laid the state of your affairs before the Board, and impatiently waited their answer. Accordingly this day it arrived, and they write that the Rohilla country being in the possession of the Nabob Vizier, and he the Ruler thereof, whatever he may chuse to do in the settlement of it, it would not be proper for them to interfere in. I in consequence advise you that as they have written that they cannot interfere, that without their concurrence I alone am not able to do it. I have exerted the effects of friendship, and ability in your concerns, as Abdatohum Chan, who is here, is well convinced of. Having now dismissed him, he will return to you, and, telling you all particulars, will assure you that I have done every thing I was able, but now I can do no more."

No. 14.

Early in the morning of the 8th July the Vakeel took his departure lamenting his want of success; and presaging the disgrace into which he actually fell with his master and his tribe,* for not having immediately returned in consequence of my letter to Fuzulla of the 28th May, and being thereby in some measure the cause of their not crossing the Ganges, and decoying them into imaginary security.

* The Vakeel continued a considerable time in disgrace, and His Excellency was so much satisfied of the services of this man that he conferred a jagir of Rs.5,000 per annum upon him after the peace.

On the 9th, having received advices that supplies of grain were sent to Fuzulla's retreat from the districts of Zabita Khan, the first Amrah of the Empire, I wrote him desiring he would peremptorily forbid his people to furnish the enemy with provisions. I had very early signified to the Governor

No. 15.

how exceedingly disagreeable I found my situation. The unhandsome manner in which I must be pardoned to say, I thought myself treated on account of the notice I took of the impropriety that had appeared to me in reposing a greater trust in the Vizier than in the Company's Commander-in-Chief, had determined me to return to the Presidency, as soon as the rivers should have swelled, either to have matters put upon a more becoming footing or to have taken my leave for England; which in case of failure in this particular I had resolved to do even if no successor should arrive.

Accordingly I had made preparations for my journey downwards and had declared my intention of quitting camp on the 25th. In the meantime, however, Mr. Middleton, the Resident at the Vizier's Court, brought me a message expressive of His Excellency's wishes that the army should take the field; next

16th July.
17th "

day I waited upon him, and the following is the substance of the conversation which passed.

"My reason for sending Mr. Middleton was this: Mr. Hastings has hinted to me to effectually settle this country as soon as I possibly can; that in case another enemy should appear after the rains, and perhaps both the *Marrattas* and *Timur Shahomay*, I may be able to withdraw my troops from this country without any risque of its being attacked; and on this account, if the Colonel approves, we will move towards Fuzulla Khan, who cannot escape, and may be got at without much difficulty."

No. 16.

"I replied that as the season was so far advanced, and the camp equipage extremely bad, I wished to avoid moving now, as it would be attended with the loss of a number of men, but advised the Vizier to send more troops to Moradabad; that I would now advance some Battalions; and if the enemy came down from their present situation, would march with the Brigade to oppose them," adding that, "*if I remained here, I would move with the army towards them at the latter end of the rains, and before they could get away; all this was approved of.*"

On the 19th I advised the Select Committee of these circumstances and informed them that I believed I should be under the necessity of marching, although I was apprehensive the consequences would prove fatal to the troops.

In the interim I took every possible measure towards a sudden movement, but I heard nothing more from the Nabob himself on the subject till the 23rd, when he acquainted me that he had sent forward part of his own troops, and desired the Brigade might

No. 17.
24th July.

also march. In the evening I sent my interpreter, and the next morning waited upon him myself, as well to represent how precarious it was to march at that season, as also the disadvantages with which I thought our movement would be attended; but finding him bent on the expedition I gave into his measure, and took the precaution enjoined by the administration of requiring a letter from His Excellency expressing the necessity of taking the field, which

24th July.

he accordingly sent me. The same day I addressed the Select Committee acquainting them of these circumstances, and also issued orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness to march.

No. 19.

I paid His Excellency a visit and informed him that in consequence of his requisition the Brigade should be got in readiness to march as soon as possible.

25th July.
Nos. 19 and 20.
No. 20.

The same day another Vakeel arrived from Fuzulla in my camp, but he was instantly dismissed. I was taken ill. Colonel Gailliez, the Second-in-Command, was also extremely indisposed. I reminded His Excellency of his being

26th July.

No. 21.

near three months of arrears of subsidy to the troops, and observed that it was necessary to supply them with money before the march.

27th July.
No. 19.

Continued ill; ordered the troops to march the 29th in the morning.

Directed the camp equipage to be sent forward to Chandausy. Colonel Gailliez and myself very unwell; supply of ammunition not yet arrived from the boats; at night there-

28th July.

fore countermanded the march of the army.

My illness considerably abated; addressed the Select Committee; ordered the army to march on the 30th at 3 o'clock in the morning. I was informed that our carriage cattle

29th July.
No. 19.

had been obliged to make two trips for the camp equipage.

The army accordingly broke ground and marched to the encampment at Chandausy; and if you consider, gentlemen that, we were unprovided with the necessaries requisite for

30th July.
No. 19.

the security of our ammunition and stores, that great part of them being in the boats distant about 40 miles, the carriage to Bissonly at that unfavourable season was attended with much trouble and delay as well as risque of damage. That many of the younger gentlemen of the army, whose allowances in the field, however handsome they may be thought, are barely sufficient to indemnify their expenses where the necessaries of life bear so exorbitant prices, had from motives of economy dismissed their coolies in confidence of our continuing in cantonments during the rains; that several hundred of the contractors' drivers and in particular those attached to the Magazine and artillery had either deserted or been discharged by his agent; that it was with great difficulty even the Nabob's influence in the course of several days procured so many of these necessary people as enabled us to proceed. I say, gentlemen, these circumstances considered, it appears that the army was in motion with uncommon alacrity.

I confess I was however extremely embarrassed in mind lest my desire of pleasing the Nabob should subject me to reprehension.

Accordingly you find that in my letter to the Select Committee, 29th July, I studiously endeavored to apologize for venturing to take so much upon me.

"I deliberately weighed in my mind whether I should acquiesce in the Nabob's request of moving higher. I discovered that my hesitation gave him much dissatisfaction, and it was very perceptible that if I had persisted in remaining here, he would have been impressed with doubts and jealousies of the sincerity of our attachment towards him, which I was apprehensive would never be effectually effaced; but indeed his conduct in advancing this army above thirty coss in front of our troops without my concurrence rendered a movement on my part absolutely necessary for the reasons mentioned in my address of the 19th, &c.; and I hope therefore that the motives which have prevailed with me to comply with His Excellency's requisition will secure to me the honor of your approbation."

Nor will you be surprized, gentlemen, that I was anxious for such approbation when you shall have considered the causes which I had to be doubtful of obtaining it and the inward disquiet which these doubts occasioned.

1st.—I remained in a state of disagreeable suspense as to the effect which the Treaty of partition of the conquered country between His Majesty and the Vizier might have.

The Board had said "that we cannot entertain so bad an opinion of the Vizier as to suppose him capable of acting in avowed breach of Treaty; but if any plea of that

23rd May.

kind should be made for contesting *our right* to occupy any part of the Rohilla country *yet unconquered*, it would be proper to put the question to him whether such Treaty does exist or not; if he should acknowledge such a Treaty, you must undoubtedly cease from further hostilities in abetment of his breach of faith.

The King had sent me a copy of the Treaty which had been sworn to on the Koran—"perhaps," said His Majesty, "the Nabob has forgot his oath: it is fit you should remind him of it."

When I showed His Excellency the Treaty he acknowledged its authenticity; he had not forgot his oath, but he braved it; he alleged that the counterpart in his possession expressed a condition that His Majesty should take the field in person and that his failure in that particular annulled the Treaty.

But when the original counterpart which he put into the hands of my interpreter came to be examined, it appeared that there was no such stipulation, nor indeed did it ever exist even verbally, as may be understood from Nigif Chan's declaration on that subject when he said "he had no doubts of the Vizier's abiding by his engagements."

I sent copies of both to the Committee having been repeatedly desired to correspond with them only; and as the above sentiments of the administration seemed very favourable towards His Majesty, it was not clear to me that so frivolous an excuse would have been sanctified in breach of so solemn a Treaty. I therefore made a reference to the paragraph above quoted; and desired the Committee would give me explicit instructions regarding the import thereof; nor was I a little anxious for a reply.

2ndly.—After I had agreed to take the field and before we marched, but when it was too late to retract, I discovered that the Vizier had grossly imposed upon me regarding the letter which he had pretended to have *just* received from the Governor; for although I had not been favored with any address from Mr. Hastings on that subject, yet believing that His Excellency had really got such a letter, it was the most prevailing argument with me, and I urged it accordingly in my letters to the Select Committee in justification of my conduct.

But upon finding that the letter which the Vizier pretended to have *just* received was no other than one he had got in May, congratulating him on the victory, and "the *ardour* of his *courage*," and casually recommending the settlement of his affairs in the Rohilla country, I was much concerned because the Governor's advice could not apply to the present time; and if the expedition should be disapproved it would not be in my power to quote Mr. Hastings' authority in favor of the undertaking.

3rdly.—The Board had already declared the 40 lacks due to the Company.

"Considering our right to the sum stipulated for the present service, *as now fully acquired*, we have recommended to the President to make *immediate application* for the payment of the forty lacks;" a formal demand had accordingly been made for the money*; this was in effect avowing that they had already performed all that was incumbent on them. Consequently that no further service was due from their troops, without new stipulations for the advantage of the Company and I intimated some time before pretty plainly that this was my own opinion.

Had I not therefore great reason to be apprehensive lest I should be told by the administration that my acquiescence with the Vizier's desires had rendered it impossible for them to make such stipulations with His Excellency; and I would ask, gentlemen, whether the treatment which I received in the course of correspondence left me the smallest room to doubt that if any unfortunate accident had happened during the second campaign, "of my own undertaking,"

for such it would be termed, every argument would be laid hold of to screen others from and saddle me with the indignation of the Company.

From what I have already said, I think it must appear that I had very forcible reasons for the disinclination which I informed the Select Committee I should have at marching, and that in overcoming all these powerful causes of my embarrassment, I manifested even a superlative degree of attention to His Excellency's wishes. But—

4thly.—This will be still more evident from the circumstance of my having marched while the troops were near three months in arrears of pay; for though I had made application to His Excellency on the 26th to pay up at least a part of the arrears, I had no success; he contented himself with signifying pleasantly to some of those about his person, “that he had then no silver except in bars; and that although he had bars he had no implement of coinage.” The only observation that occurred to me on this head was that if he carried the bars from his own Provinces, I was sorry he had not brought the necessary utensils; and that if he found the bars in the Rohilla country, to have been consistent in his plan, he should have forgot that he had them.

But to enforce the argument arising from my having marched whilst the troops were so much in arrears.

Be pleased to recollect that, according to my instructions, I had full authority not only to discontinue the operations, but to countermarch with the army in the event of His Excellency's suffering himself to be in arrears of subsidy for the space of one month after the day on which it should have been paid.

Now whilst it is evident that by adhering to the orders of the Board my conduct could not be liable to challenge, it is equally obvious that by acting thus, in direct contradiction to them, I showed a condescension to His Excellency, which independent of every other consideration is fully sufficient to destroy the calumnies with which this insidious man would stab my reputation; for if I had been disposed to thwart his inclinations, I might have embraced this opportunity of doing it in security.

Having therefore clearly established the falsity of the malicious insinuations which have been directed against me on account of the objections made to the movement from Bissonly, I shall now proceed to show that those which regard my subsequent conduct are no less slanderous and void of truth.

Under every possible disadvantage we took the field in submission to the caprice of this ungrateful ally,—every difficulty was struggled against with uncommon perseverance as you, gentlemen will be well convinced even from
 ————— minutes of occurrences taken down by one of my Aid-

See also a paper marked L.

Our march was as expeditious as the season and the scarcity of provisions would admit. His Excellency did me the favor of a visit almost every morning; he told me of his expectations that the Marrattas would make war on him as soon as possible. A report also prevailed that Timur Sha had determined to take the field against him. His Majesty Sha Allim was likewise exceedingly dissatisfied, and ready to adopt any measure to humiliate the Vizier; in short, according to all advices, there were great appearances of a general flame.

The Nabob seemed therefore exceedingly uneasy lest the Rohillas should retire into the country between the mountains, and gain time until his attention should be called off by the Marrattas to the defence of his own dominions, in which case he would have enemies in front and rear, and all his ambitious schemes would fall to the ground. His Excellency, therefore, on the 12th of August, proposed to me to make overtures of accommodation to the Rohillas. The propositions were—that Fuzulla should deliver up half his effects to the Vizier who would give him a district sufficient for the maintenance of 15 thousand men in the country which His Excellency had lately taken from the Marrattas.

Correspondence between Fuzulla and me had ceased from the 7th July, when the Vakeel was dismissed, till this day that I addressed him agreeably to the Vizier's desire, inclosing a copy of His Excellency's letter making the above propositions.

On the 14th I advised the Committee of the Vizier's wishes and proposal of settling matter amicably with the Rohillas.

On the 15th I received a reply from Fuzulla declining to accept the country taken from the Marrattas in the Doab: observing that in case of their approach he must either break his engagements with the Vizier and join them, or they would take the country from him; he therefore tendered half his effects to the Vizier for a settlement in the Rohilla country equal to that which His Excellency offered in the Doab.

Having communicated Fuzulla's letter to the Nabob, His Excellency on the 17th of August addressed me thus:—

"I have perused the copy of Fuzullah Khan's letter that ye sent me and understand the particulars. Do you write him a reply to this purport that of whatever effects he has he will give me half, and that I will give him country in the Doab which I took from the Marrattas for the maintenance of 15,000 men, and that him and me will enter into mutual agreements, to which the English gentlemen shall accede; that in future if the Marrattas attempt to take the aforesaid country, I will join and assist Fuzulla Khan to oppose them; this matter firmly agreed on and determined, I enter into by means of the English gentlemen. Do you write to this purport to Fuzullah Khan that he may be satisfied, I am ready to give the foresaid quantity of country and to aid and assist him against the Marrattas; never, never, will I be neglectful in this matter."

Accordingly I wrote to Fuzulla Khan inclosing a copy of His Excellency's letter recommending him to accept of the conditions, or at least to come and discourse on the subject.

In reply he observed that he was unable to write so much as he had to say, and requested I would send my Secretary to hear from him and relate to me all particulars. His desire being communicated to the Vizier, His Excellency wrote to me on the 20th recommending a compliance with it, and containing the necessary instructions. In consequence of which I directed my Secretary to proceed immediately to the Rohilla Camp; and in order to obtain as much information as possible regarding the enemy's post, I availed myself of this opportunity of sending Lieutenant Bruce, the Field Engineer, to make his observations, that we might profit thereby, in case the enemy should oblige us to attack them.

On the 21st of August the Engineer sent me an account of the road to Lall-dang.

"After crossing the Nulla at the village Bujonrie, distant from your camp about $4\frac{1}{2}$ coss, we entered a low jungle in which are two deserted villages the wells of which afford plenty of good water continuing our course northward, three coss further we arrived at the large village of Rumangur to the north-westward of which is an open space (I think sufficiently large to encamp the Brigade), and *this must be the last stage*. Altering our route to N.-N.-West along the foot of the hills, *an almost impenetrable jungle lines each side of the road*. Another difficulty the troops will have to struggle with, is the *want of water*, except at a river two coss to the westward of Rumnagur. *We did not meet with a drop of that element during a distance of eight coss* when we arrived at the Rohilla encampment; the opening here is of very little extent, and must have been cleared by the Rohillas after their flight to Lall-dang."

At the same time that these two gentlemen were in the enemy's camp Elick Chan, the Vizier's Minister, had Agents there offering all his influence to effect a settlement; this tended to give the Rohillas confidence; at the same

time that Lieutenant Bruce being recognised by people who had seen him surveying, created suspicions of our intentions.

Fuzulla Khan, however, declared his willingness to come to an interview with the Vizier, but his Chiefs would not consent to his leaving their stronghold. They proposed to send his eldest son accompanied with some of their own number; but His Excellency having refused to receive them, and the gentlemen being recalled on the 24th, correspondence dropt, and I resolved to move nearer the enemy in order, if possible, more effectually to distress them.

On the 26th, attended by the Quartermaster-General, &c., I went twelve miles to reconnoitre the country between the Ganges and the jungles, leaving the road which the Engineer had travelled to Lall-dang several coss on the right.

On the 27th a body of the Nabob's troops were ordered by my direction to proceed along the banks of the river towards Chaundy Gaut. The 28th I advanced with the Grenadier corps, five coss, and the Brigade under the command of Colonel Gailliez marched three coss. I strengthened the advanced division of the army and gave the command of it to Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie.

In consequence of an advice which I had early given to the Vizier, a party of Nigif Khan's troops had come across the Doab, and posted themselves on the opposite banks of the river at Chaundy Gaut to prevent all supplies to the enemy from the western side of the Ganges.

On the 29th I rode out fourteen miles to reconnoitre the Ramnagur road. On the 30th ordered the Quartermaster-General to pitch upon a spot of ground for the Brigade to encamp upon, between Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie's camp and the hills; and the Brigade accordingly took up that ground the next morning.

First September, accompanied by the gentlemen of my family, I spent the day with His Excellency upon the banks of the Ganges.

All this time His Excellency was busied in intriguing with the Rohillas. Elich Khan and the Abyssinian Mahomed Bushin Khan, by the Nabob's desire, had set their emissaries at work; and in this manner the Nabob kept up a constant intercourse with the enemy.

In consequence of which on the 2nd September His Excellency transmitted me a letter which he had received from Fuzullah Khan professing obedience, and His Excellency also informed me that the Rohilla Chief had sent a trusty person to him to explain all matters.

This day I ordered two Battalions of Grenadier sepoys to hold themselves in readiness to attend me early on the 3rd on a party of observation, but on account of a severe fall of rain that morning I was obliged to countermand the order. On the 4th, however, I went escorted by the said two Battalions of Grenadier sepoys five coss, and with a body of the Nabob's best horse, advanced two coss further, when I arrived at an *almost impenetrable jungle where only one horseman could pass*. I desired the Nabob's Bildars and Tavildars might be employed to cut a road through it.

Very severe rain on the 5th; the 6th I again rode out to examine the Ramnagur road. On the 7th His Excellency transmitted me a copy of the answer which he sent to the letter he had received from Fuzulla Khan on the 2nd, imputing that if he did not accept of the former terms further discourse was needless. Notwithstanding all which His Excellency's Agents were still employed. Severe rains on the 8th and 9th. On the 10th, having visited His Excellency, he acquainted me that the situation of the Rohillas was very hard; that after the rains ceased the water from the hills would kill them, "perhaps," added His Excellency; "*with these new gentlemen*"

new measures may take place." This was not the only time he had expressed himself in that manner: the advices which he had early received from the Presidency created him no small uneasiness; he became more anxious, however, to settle with Fuzulla, and in order to effect it he doubled his Agents and his industry.

On the 11th I received a reply from the Select Committee to my letters of the 19th and 24th July, and upon the strength of the approbation of my conduct in moving from Bissonly without waiting for an answer to my address of the 29th July, I sent immediate notice to His Excellency that I would press upon the enemy as soon as possible.

His Excellency visited me on the 12th, and without taking any notice of my message of the preceding day, told me that the Rohillas were in the most distressed situation; that the Chiefs threatened to desert Fuzulla; upon my advising him to offer them service he replied that he had done so, and also security to all who would quit the enemy's camp.

But nothing can more clearly demonstrate how wishful the Vizier was to avoid an attack and bring the Rohillas to an agreement; nothing can more incontestibly prove that the delay's which he would impute to me were really his own than the following circumstance.

On the 13th I resolved to ride out next morning to observe what progress the Nabob's Bildars and Tavildars had made in cutting the road; and to penetrate as much further as I could into the jungle for the sake of observation, expecting also to have an opportunity of surprizing some of the enemy's advanced posts.

Pursuant to this design I applied to His Excellency for a strong body of his troops to attend me. His Excellency returned for
 No. 38. answer "that he had put himself under a course of physic which would continue *six days*, for which time he begged that I would defer the attack, as then he should be *able* to accompany me."

Although I thought this a very unmilitary preparation, I was willing to leave His Excellency to his own mode of whitting his courage; but thinking it necessary for me in the meantime to obtain as perfect a knowledge as possible of the ground we should have occasion to act upon,
 No. 38. I replied that I only meant to go in front to examine the road, and therefore desired His Excellency would send the escort demanded. Before my note had reached His Excellency, he sent a message importing that he was treating, and on receipt of my note he returned another, desiring I would be governed by his pleasure and defer the expedition.

This day two Embassadors came from Fuzulla to the Vizier on the invitation of His Excellency. Fuzulla's Vakeel
 No. 38. brought me also a letter, and informed me that the Vizier had made proposals of accommodation to his master, but that he would trust the English only. I observed that it was probable his Master would not have many days to consider, and sent himself and the letter to His Excellency.
 No. 39.

On the 15th I acknowledged the Select Committee's letter of the 18th August and advised them of the Vizier's mode of proceeding.

"His Excellency has several persons employed in endeavouring to settle with Fuzulla, or to detach the Rohilla Sardars from the common cause; but I am afraid he discovers too much anxiety, and renders the enemy more backward in coming to terms than they otherwise would be."

September the 16th, after some conferences with the Vakeels, His Excellency acquainted me that he would make Fuzulla Collector of the Revenues of Rohilchund, allowing six lacks for his expenses, and desired I would therefore address the Rohillas to that purpose, which I did accordingly.
 No. 40.

His Excellency had so many schemes and so many agents to conduct them that it was impossible to know his real intentions, but it was evident that he was departing from his former resolutions. We had some time before

refused to receive Fuzullah's eldest son accompanied by some of the principal Chiefs, and he had now not only admitted two Chiefs without the son but sent several Sirdars to invite and conduct them to his camp.

On the 17th I acquainted the Governor of these circumstances, and on the 18th took occasion to repeat the offer of the service of the troops and to inform His Excellency that they were in readiness.

The two Vakeels remained in his camp, and were entertained several days by Bushier Khan, &c., by order of His Excellency.

On the 19th I received a letter from Fuzullah, in answer to that which I had addressed to him on the 16th by desire of the Vizier, and having transmitted it to His Excellency, he sent me the following reply :—

“The letter of Fuzullah Khan which you sent me to peruse, I have received and clearly understand. I desire the death of no Mussulman, and therefore have fixed on this plan which I now write. Do you acquaint Fuzullah Khan from yourself that the Nabob Vizier will settle a jaghir of ten lacks of rupees per year on him of the Rohilleund country, and he shall keep two or three thousand men as household servants along with him. That troops of the Nabob shall be stationed in the country, that the troops and Chiefs of Khutur Rohilleund shall be taken into service, but shall not remain with him. If this is agreeable to Fuzullah Khan do you write him to come into you. When he comes I will have an interview with him, and if he desires it shall rent or supervise the whole Rohilla country which shall be settled face to face. But whatever effects he may have half shall be given to me; and the troops of Khutur or Rohillas that are with him shall not remain.”

Thus, gentlemen, you find that in emerging from his Hebdomadal purgation the Vizier became a most devout and excellent Mussulman. The near approach of “these new gentlemen” seemed also to operate powerfully on His Excellency.

Agreeable to his wishes I sent a copy of his letter to the Rohilla Chief; and recommended to him to accept of the Vizier's proposals—at all events to return a speedy reply.

From this time we had very heavy rains for several successive days; and no answer being arrived from Fuzullah, I wrote him a note on the 25th demanding an immediate reply.

Afterwards on the same day an answer was received from Fuzullah, importing that if the Vizier would not grant either of his former requests fate must determine between them.

I saw no longer any prospects of peace, which I accordingly wrote to the Select Committee the same day that the above answer came to hand.

On the 26th the Vizier favored me with a visit, when it was resolved to move the army nearer to Lall-dang as the most probable means of “*bringing the Rohillas to terms.*”

I ordered the troops to hold themselves in readiness to march the 29th in the morning; and the division under Colonel Gailliez to take the ground occupied by the Grenadier Corps.

Well assured of the great advantages the enemy had in the strength of their situation, sensible that nothing but the strictest observance of good order could ensure our success, and having reason to be suspicious lest the troops, mindful of past neglects, should suffer their discontent to get the better of their moderation and impell them to disperse in search of plunder, I assembled the field officers at head-quarters. Some proposed to stipulate with His Excellency for twenty, some for fifteen, and the most for ten lacks in lieu of plunder, and that the troops should be acquainted of it before the attack.

I told the gentlemen that if His Excellency should offer five lacks, I thought that it would be advisable to accept of them both on account of the imminent danger which would insue from any disorder of the troops, and the small probability of discovering the riches of a people accustomed to bury their treasure, declaring however my wishes that the Vizier might offer a larger sum. The gentlemen satisfied of my good inclinations said no more on the subject.

In conformity to the injunctions of the administration, I desired His Excellency to signify in writing that it was now his pleasure the army should proceed to attack Fuzullah in his entrenchments: His Excellency accordingly did so.

Board's instructions, paragraph 4.

And though I was unable to mount my horse without assistance, having been confined to my tent by a severe illness from the 19th, I advanced with the front division of the army 4 coss towards the enemy.

Mention being made to His Excellency of the plunder, he observed that he had certain intelligence where the riches of the enemy lay buried; that he knew the English could never discover the treasure; and therefore he would not give them one cowrie,—a circumstance which I thought it prudent to conceal carefully from the knowledge of the troops.

On the 30th I proceeded four coss further: the Brigade under Colonel Gailliez taking up our last ground.

This day I received a letter from the Select Committee of the 8th September "expressing their satisfaction at the Vizier's intention of terminating the war by an accommodation, and their hopes that His Excellency would be disposed to *conciliate their affections to his Government by acceding to lenient terms.*"

30th September.

Being now arrived near the Rohillas who were very strongly posted and had thrown up works in their front, it became necessary to advance by regular approaches; and before evening a work was established sufficient to cover 1,200 men: but it was agreed to give the enemy the option of accepting the terms offered by His Excellency, or stand the consequences, which was accordingly done in the following letter.

No. 49.

"This day I am arrived with my army near the foot of the hills; but as friendship has been formed between us, I perform my part, and tell you that ye still have opportunity of coinciding to the Nabob Vizier's offers, which were before sent ye; and of coming hither, this is the best advice ye can follow. There has been discourse between the Nabob Vizier and me; when the Nabob said and confirmed that whenever you would accede to his proposals that something should be settled for every Chief with ye. Now the Nabob Vizier has said and has written this conformably to your request. My advice is this: do you now come here and agree to this, for I do not desire that the blood of the people be spilt. Motives of friendship induce me again to write ye on this subject. If ye will not accept of this, and will not come, the fault is not mine, as I have done everything in my power. Now for what may insue ye and your Chiefs are answerable. In case ye consent and come in, write me and I will send a proper person to conduct ye: in this there is neither prejudice or danger. If ye will not agree let me certainly have your reply this day."

No. 50.

In the meantime however our works were carried on with all possible diligence. Bush fighting all this day between small scouting parties of both armies. A few more of the Nabobs and of the enemy said to have been killed. Advised the Committee of the posture of affairs, and of the last offer made to Fuzullah.

No. 48.

Next morning, the 1st October, the Rohilla Chief sent an unsatisfactory reply. I reconnoitred the road several miles in front; many shots fired by the enemy. Pitched upon a spot for establishing our second works.

No. 51.

About noon a man came from Fuzullah to inform me that he would certainly come in next day. I could not give myself leave to rely implicitly on his assurance; but having informed the Vizier of the circumstance he expressed satisfaction at the news.

159 F. D.

Very early on the following morning I advanced with a strong body of the combined armies to the ground which had been pitched upon for our second approach. From thence I dispatched Fuzullah's messenger to inform his master that I was so far advanced with the army to pay him a visit at Lall-dang. All industry used to establish our post. Many shots fired in the jungles on our flanks.

About two hours after the messenger's departure a Chief came to inform me that if our advanced parties were re-called Fuzullah would come out. At noon notice being brought that he was approaching; I sent a field officer and the Persian interpreter to escort him through our advanced parties, and on his arrival immediate advices being sent to His Excellency, he appointed the next morning to receive him.

Accordingly Fuzullah was presented to the Vizier on the 3rd; at that meeting nothing passed but compliment. However, His Excellency afterwards addressed me thus:—

No. 52.

"I before wrote ye that if Fuzullah Khan would come in and meet us, a jaghir for ten lacks of rupees of the Rohilcund country should be conferred on him; that he should keep two or three thousand people with him as attendants and that of his effects half should be taken. Now that he has come in, in consideration of his coming, I will present him with two lacks more, and twelve lacks of the Rohilcund country including his former districts, shall be given as a jaghir, and of his effects half shall be taken. In this estate of twelve lacks Fuzullah Khan is at liberty to keep five persons or five thousand, but he must not keep one more than five thousand; and to content him, and the people with him, I will entertain in my own service from ten to fifteen thousand, and they shall be stationed where he chuses, and shall receive their pay from me."

No. 53.

I communicated the Vizier's pleasure to the Rohilla in the evening. He acknowledged the generosity of the offer, but remarked that twelve lacks would be insufficient for the maintenance of all his relations and dependants, and intreated I would request of the Vizier to increase the jaghir.

I said I would endeavour but gave him no hopes of success; and the following is the letter which I addressed to the Vizier on the subject:—

No. 52.

"I conversed with Fuzullah Khan last night on the subject of the jaghir, and told him ye had agreed to settle twelve lacks of rupees on him which it was advisable he accepted. He replied he did not desire a settlement for the troops with him, but that he had a great number of relations and dependants who had been with him from their births: and from whom he could not part, and that the twelve lacks of rupees ye had conferred would be small for the support of the whole. He therefore intreated ye would graciously bestow what would be sufficient for their maintenance: he hopes ye will be pleased to make some addition, and I also give you this trouble that if ye think it proper and advisable to comply that ye will do so: favor me however with your pleasure in reply."

4th October.
No. 54.

His Excellency replied "that he could not do more for Fuzullah Khan." Afterwards he sent his minister Elich Chan requesting to make enquiry concerning Fuzullah Khan's circumstances and desires.

This being done, Fuzullah gave in a statement specifying that he had in silver one lack fourteen thousand rupees and one lack seventeen thousand, three hundred and eighty-eight gold mohurs which he valued at 20 Burrelly rupees each, besides his jewels and other effects, of which he could not give an estimate without returning to his entrenchment. He solicited Elich Chan to intercede for him with His Excellency for an increase of the jaghir, and upon Elich Chan's report of these matters the Nabob addressed me thus:—

"Previous to this ye wrote me that Fuzullah Khan would not accept of a jaghir of twelve lacks of rupees; in reply it was written that if he would not accept of that sum, ye would return him to the entrenchment, as I would not give anything more: after that I sent Elich Chan to ye to learn the condition, &c., of Fuzullah Khan; and from his report I find that Fuzullah Khan desires

a jaghir of fourteen lacks and seventy-five thousand rupees. I therefore gave you this trouble to acquaint you that that sum is not very great; and in consideration of Fuzullah Khan's coming in, a jaghir for fourteen lacks and seventy-five thousand rupees shall be given him. Do ye bring Fuzullah Khan along with you hither to me to-morrow morning, and I will give a jaghir for fourteen lacks and seventy-five thousand rupees, and will take half of his effects. When ye come I will have further conversation with ye."

According to His Excellency's request I waited upon him on the morning of the 6th accompanied by Fuzullah Khan, when they settled the terms of accommodation.

On the 7th His Excellency visited me. Fuzullah Khan, being sent for, the mutual writings were framed by His Excellency, and the only amendment made at the desire of Fuzullah was, that he should be at liberty to correspond with the English.

I remarked that there was no mention made of the division of the effects, upon which His Excellency said he would be contented with the half whatever it might be.

It was afterwards found however that the omission was intentional, and with a view to squeeze Fuzullah Khan as much as possible. Accordingly from this time till the 14th the Nabob's Minister and Fuzullah Khan had daily conferences on that subject. The Rohilla advanced the equity of the Vizier's accepting half his effects of every kind. Conformable to His Excellency's original and repeated stipulation, Elich Chan insisted on receiving money only, and I also being willing to promote the Nabob's interest, Fuzullah was importuned so much that he was constrained to give fifteen lacks of rupees in order to satisfy the Vizier.

A dispute then arose concerning the species of rupees; Elich Chan was desired to go and settle that point, and he returned immediately saying that His Excellency agreed to receive Birrelly rupees, and had also signified his wishes to see Fuzullah Khan and me, as he intended to proceed next day towards Feizabad. I waited on him accordingly, and after some conversation we took leave.

His Excellency marched very early next morning. An altercation then ensued between Fuzullah Khan and Elich Chan regarding the value of the gold mohurs which was also compromised by me, and my decision referred to His Excellency who in the evening transmitted to me the following letter:—

"The pains and trouble you have taken in settling this business of Fuzullah Khan, is beyond the power of writing to express. In all respects you have acted to my satisfaction, and in no respect contrary to it. I esteem this as pure friendship in you."

No. 58.

Thus, gentlemen, I have given you a particular detail of the transactions of the campaign. All the correspondence which passed between Fuzullah Khan and me is before you. It appears that that carried on at Bissonly was duly communicated to the Vizier and to the Governor. That the proposition for renewing it came from the Nabob himself on the 12th of October,—that the continuation of it was at his express desire. That I did not take a single step from the beginning to the end of this business, but by his direction and approbation with which you find the whole is closed.

In the course of what has been promised, I have therefore already fully confuted the Vizier's calumnies, but I shall nevertheless glance over His Excellency's letter once more and take notice of such parts as may have hitherto escaped me.

"Consider, my friend," says His Excellency repeatedly to Mr. Hastings, "that it was my absolute determination to *extirpate the Rohillas*, and that I *requested the assistance of the English for that purpose*."

However well it is known that His Excellency is equal to the barbarous design for which he thus publicly and daringly avowes, he solicited the aid of the English. Is it possible we can believe that the respectable gentleman here traduced could have been privy to so horrid a purpose; could he have so entirely overcome the feelings of humanity? Could he have been so lost to every sense of

honor as to prostitute the English troops, and to stain the glory of the British name by subscribing to a preconcerted massacre? What is not His Excellency capable of advancing.

"If the Colonel had even consulted me on the occasion *it would not have been signified*; but when I gave him a clear answer, and absolutely refused my consent to the proposals for an accommodation, was it proper for him to continue the negotiation."

If I had not consulted him, gentlemen, how could he have refused his *consent*. I have already shown that the moment I was told that it could not be for the interest of the Company to receive three hundred thousand pounds for their influence as mediators in an honorable peace which would have brought four hundred thousand pounds annually into the coffers of the Vizier, I submitted to the authority with implicit obedience though I could not chime with the propriety or wisdom of the doctrine.

I should have thought myself excusable even if I had not consulted the Vizier on this occasion; the fact, however, is that I did communicate all country correspondence to him, but His Excellency seems to have an insuperable antipathy to truth.

"At last, perceiving that Fuzullah Khan encouraged by his correspondence with the English assembled his forces, and daily became more formidable, I determined, though it was in the height of the rains, of bringing him to punishment."

One part of this sentence, like the former, destroys and belies the other. After the setting in of the rains it was impossible Fuzullah Khan could get a reinforcement of men; it was impossible he could wish for them, because he could not even give them grain to feed upon.

But it is demonstrable that the Vizier himself did not believe what is written in that paragraph; he says the enemy were encouraged by the English, and yet he would make the very same English bring those whom he alledges they favored to punishment.

This would indeed be an extraordinary proof of his absolute power over us, but it would be to carry the idea too far. The Vizier is wiser than to have taken an expedition depending on the support of troops supposed to be attached to his enemies.

His Excellency knew perfectly that I was anxious to return to Calcutta and that I had determined to set off in a very few days; if he had entertained any suspicion of my fidelity, would he not have gladly concealed his intentions of moving till after my departure.

"You certainly have not a map of the country, &c." I remember informing both the Vizier and the Committee that I would march to Nigubgur, but that I did not think myself authorized to go further. His Excellency observed with an unbecoming air of ridicule, "if Nigibgur is on the other side of the Ganges or of the hills, no matter, the English troops shall not go thither."

Now, gentlemen, I had told him that I would go to Nigibgur; wherefore then such a wanton display of petulance; the impropriety of it neither escaped the notice of his "sincere well-wisher," Mr. Middleton, or of my interpreter. I pointed at it in my letter to the Committee, but they suffered themselves to overlook the disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief for getting or chusing to forget, that an indignity to him was in effect an insult to the Government.

"When we arrived afterwards at Duttugur and Fuzulla Khan was at the distance of 15 coss from us at the foot of the mountains, I determined to march forward and attack him; the Colonel again delayed, &c."

I have clearly established by His Excellency's own letters, &c., in a regular chain that the overtures of accommodation made on the 13th August and the subsequent intercourse on that subject was at his express desire; the truth is that he never had an idea of attacking the enemy; he had declared originally and invariably that his resolution was "*to starve them*."

It was agreed on the 24th to approach nearer them; on the 26th I went twelve miles to look for ground; 27th, a body of his troops were sent forward by my desire; on the 28th the whole army advanced; 29th, I rode twenty-eight miles examining the country; 30th, the Quartermaster-General pitched on ground for the Brigade to advance, to which they did on the 31st in order completely to environ the enemy.

2nd September, I found that His Excellency was treating with the enemy that he had received a Vakeel, and you see him busied in the same manner during the remainder of the campaign; after I had offered him the service of the troops to storm the enemies' entrenchments, you find he denied me even the liberty of reconnoitring.

No. 34.

"For four or five days after this, the 24th August, the conferences were broke off; after which Omar Cawn and two other Sidars came from Fuzullah to me with proposals of peace. I asked them why they had taken such measures as to oblige me to march against them in the rainy season; they replied we remained peaceably at the extremity of the country without any force; but when a correspondence was set on foot by means of the English Chiefs, they wrote to Fuzullah Khan to take some step that might make it appear that he was in a situation to oppose the army of the Vizier by which means his affairs would be settled. Encouraged by the advice of the English Chiefs, Fuzullah Khan assembled this number of troops and sent them to Nigibabad; otherwise how would he have taken such a step."

No. 38.

From the 23rd August I had the least intercourse with the Rohillas till the 16th September,—that I wrote Fuzullah a letter by desire of the Vizier offering him the Collectorship of Rohilcund. It was about the 14th that Omar Cawn and Bahadur Cawn had come to His Excellency in consequence of Muteghim Cawn, Abdurchman Cawn, and Meer Moghul, and others having been repeatedly sent to the enemies' camp to prevail with Fuzullah to send out some Sirdar to temporize with His Excellency.

The story which he would put into their mouths is truly a knavish one, but forgeries of this kind generally detect themselves.

Amir Cawn is a soldier, who, it is well known, has ever held the Vizier's character in detestation. Bahadur Cawn is the brother-in-law of Fuzullah; can we suppose then that these gentlemen who had come entrusted with a negotiation for their friend and for their kindred should have talked to His Excellency in a manner so destitute of truth, so wide of their purpose, and, had the report been true, so ruinous to their interest with the English; most certainly we cannot believe it.

His Excellency makes these two Chiefs tell him "that they had no force," which was an absurdity too gross for them to have said; he makes them charge Fuzullah Khan with the folly of increasing his numbers at a time when he could not subsist the troops he already had. His Excellency concludes with making the Chiefs ask the question, "how could Fuzullah have taken such a step as sending his troops to Negubabad if he had not been encouraged to do it."

It would not be more preposterous in His Excellency to represent them ridiculous enough to have asked how it was possible that a people in want of food should be susceptible of hunger, the dreadful prospects of which had made them endeavour to collect all the grain they could before our near approach.

"Our joint forces marched near the encampment of Fuzullah, and prepared to attack it; but there was still a private intelligence between the Colonel and Fuzullah, encouraged by which Fuzullah rode out of his own encampment and came to the Colonel."

It is astonishing with what effrontery His Excellency advances these untruths. I have already, gentlemen, informed you of all the intercourse I ever had with the Rohillas. I did not write a letter to any native during the campaign but such as went through my interpreter. That gentleman had my Persian seals in his custody from the time I left Benaras in march till after my return to Calcutta; and I desire that he and my Secretary and every person who

may be supposed to have had any share of my confidence be called before you and interrogated whether they know or believe that I at any time carried on any sinister correspondence with the enemy.

"The day Fuzullah came out the English troops were ready to quarrel with mine, &c." It is the first time I ever heard of it.

Colonel Leslie and Major Hannay who commanded the advanced division of the army are in town, and will I am persuaded if called upon, satisfy you that this allegation is totally void of foundation. "I wrote to the Colonel that if Fuzullah would not agree to these offers, to send him away: I also sent Mohomed Elich Chan to *explain these particulars* more fully to the Colonel."

What explanation did so express a desire require. The Vizier's own letter of the 5th October best tells why he sent his Minister: "I sent him to enquire into Fuzulla's condition, &c. At last I saw that I would displease the Colonel by insisting on the former conditions. I was compelled to give fourteen lacks and seventy-five thousand rupees of country."

The conclusion of my letter of the 4th October speaks for itself,—how far I went in this matter. "He Fuzullah Khan hopes ye will be pleased to make some addition; and I also give ye this trouble that if ye think it proper and advisable to comply that ye will do so; favor me, however, with your pleasure in reply."

It was after Elich Chan intercession and report that His Excellency resolved to make a *seeming increase* of two lacks seventy-five thousand rupees to the twelve lacks formerly offered.

You will admire His Excellency's address and management in this business.

Instead of making a *real addition* to the jaghir he gave districts which had till then only paid twelve lacks forty-five thousand rupees, and obliged the Rohilla Chief to receive them at an increased valuation of fourteen lacks seventy-five thousand rupees: so that in fact His Excellency only made an addition of forty-five thousand rupees to the twelve lacks offered in his letter of the 3rd October, and in place of a settlement of fourteen lacks seventy-five thousand Fuzullah got only a jaghir of twelve lacks forty-five thousand rupees.

"Briefly, after a great deal of trouble and argument, this affair was thus settled, that Fuzullah Khan should give me fifteen lacks of rupees and take a country amounting to fourteen lacks seventy-five thousand rupees. You will consider that when these conferences were set on foot the Colonel observed to me that Fuzullah had one lack and some thousand gold mohurs, and one lack of rupees amounting to fifteen or sixteen lacks, of which I should take half; but afterwards when the affair was settled, Fuzullah Khan gave me fifteen lacks of rupees: consider, then, if Fuzullah was only possessed of this much, would he have given me all his property."

The first and only enquiry regarding the Rohilla Chief's riches was in consequence of the Nabob's own desire of the 5th October; and according to the account given in by Fuzullah Khan he had near 25 lacks in money besides his jewels and effects.

The argument to give the jaghir for the fourteen lacks seventy-five thousand rupees was signed on the 7th October, but the stipulation for the fifteen lacks in lieu of half of the effects did not take place till the 15th.

The Vizier purposely omitted mention of the effects to leave room for the after game, which he put in practice, insomuch that although the Rohilla repeatedly offered to deliver over half of his effects of every kind on oath, the Nabob declined to receive them; hence Fuzullah was necessitated to agree to give a sum of money nearly equal to two-thirds of all his fortune; for His Excellency not only took fifteen lacks, but the helpless Chief was obliged to pay away his gold mohurs at a great discount, the Vizier allowing only 16½ Berilly rupees for each, although I have been assured that they usually pass in that country for about twenty Berilly rupees. The Nabob therefore owes his getting so large a share of the unhappy Fuzullah's fortune to His Excellency's chicane not to his own justice.

After the conclusion of the peace; His Excellency says "then the following proposition was made to me that I should take twenty lacks from Fuzullah and give him the whole Rohilla country."

I never heard of such a proposition.

"Before I marched from Bissonly, Mr. Roberts came to me from the Colonel and informed me that conferences for an accommodation with Fuzullah were on foot and that it was advisable I should agree to them. My friend, this is 'called giving advice in Hindostan.' I think this is for the best you must do so. When the English Chiefs are continually sending me these messages, how could I refuse to satisfy them."

Why does His Excellency lead us back to Bissonly; we have seen the whole that passed there. We have seen that he rejected the overtures: nay in the very letter under consideration he says "*but when I gave him a clear answer and absolutely refused my consent, &c.,*" and yet in another place he has the modesty to ask "how could I refuse to satisfy the English Chiefs, &c." Strange incongruity endeavoring by a studied confusion of times and circumstances to make the effects of low cunning supply the want of truth and reason. "In the like manner the several letters which the Colonel caused me to write at the conclusion of this affair I gave out of respect to him."

I am greatly indebted to His Excellency for professions, but cannot say that I have ever had occasion to thank him for any real mark of respect. His Excellency in particular owed me no respect of the nature he mentions here: for although he applied to me at Bissonly, when his shameful conduct rendered him odious over all the country, when he was spoken of with irreverence even by his own slaves, for a letter or testimony under my hand in his vindication, I declined giving it.

Therefore it is improbable that His Excellency's politeness in repugnance to his conviction would carry him so far as to pay me a compliment which my regard for truth had made me deny to him.

7th July.

It was matter of no moment whether I had received the letter of the 15th of October or not; those which His Excellency addressed to me so frequently during the course of the negotiation being very sufficient to shew that I was guided by his pleasure.

I therefore owe nothing to His Excellency's respect for me, but I owe much to that part of the Board's instructions which directed me to do nothing material without requiring His Excellency's desire in writing; for if I had not got that "*necessary precaution,*" as it was emphatically called, by those who know His Excellency better than I did, it is probable I should have trusted too much to his word, and not have had these written authorities to produce in support of my conduct.

There cannot be a more striking instance of his meanness than the present, in order as he apprehends the better to gloss over the immemorable liberties he has taken with truth, he has laid aside all the dignity of a man, and condescended to subject himself to the opinion of being thought a dupe.

On the same system he might say that the letter which he addressed to Mr. Hastings promising the forty lacks to the Company was more matter of courtesy; indeed we have detected him in endeavoring to falsify that letter.

No. 23.

I foretold as early as April 1774, about the time we entered the Rohilla country, how His Excellency would act regarding that money.

17th April—Letter to the Governor.

With respect to the refusal of two Battalions to accompany him to his Subah, he asked for none; he desired the Brigade, or at least two Battalions, might be left at Sukertal, which I refused, but not without assigning reasons that appeared sufficient to His Excellency.

No. 57.

"An English gentleman plundered a Chief in my army of a palanquin and pair of looking glasses, &c."

The easy temper of this Chief in suffering himself to be robbed with impunity is not perfectly consistent with the character of heroism and independent spirit which His Excellency would elsewhere attribute to his Sirdars.

The Vizier would bring our troops even under a level with his own Banditti; and truly His Excellency has exemplified the depredations of the English by an instance worthy of himself. It is painful to follow him through his jumble of untruth and inconsistencies; but as this accusation is derogatory to the character of English officers, it becomes necessary to enquire into the story of the Chief of the Mirrors.

The palanquin alluded to was said to have been lost on the 23rd April on the field of battle.

Whilst His Excellency was exalting over the pale head of Hufez, whilst we should suppose that joy at his success had entirely occupied his mind, we find it susceptible of meanness; for the very next day after the action he complained of the loss his Sirdar had met with, and alleged that the articles taken from him were in the possession of some person belonging to the 10th Battalion of Sepoys.

In consequence of this representation I directed one of my Aide-de-Camp to write a note to Captain Bevan desiring the palanquin might be delivered up if it could be found.

No. 60.

CAPTAIN BEVAN addressed himself in answer to CAPTAIN ALLEN MACPHERSON, Aide-de-Camp.

SIR,—“ My Commandant yesterday took the shell of a palanquin cut in two in three places, from which circumstance I should imagine it is not the one meant; however I have ordered him to deliver it to the bearer agreeable to the Commander-in-Chief's orders, which you will please to acquaint him of.”

“ The Nabob's people kept the said shell: notwithstanding which His Excellency sent me another message concerning the palanquin, and my Aide-de-Camp wrote a second time to Captain Bevan.

“ The Nabob has again spoke to the Colonel upon the subject of the palanquin, I before wrote you about, and persists that it is in the possession of some one of your Battalion.”

No. 61.

The Commander-in-Chief therefore directs that you will be pleased to order it to be delivered up to the bearer, who is to have permission to go into the lines of your Battalion to show you where it is.”

CAPTAIN BEVAN replied :—

SIR,—“ You will please to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that I have given the Nabob's man permission to go through my lines; and if there is any palanquin there, that he can lay proper claim to. I will order it to be delivered to him; but at the same time must request that as the palanquin I formerly sent was not the one required, it may be returned to my Commandant whose property it is.”

No. 61.

I heard nothing more concerning any palanquin, excepting that a considerable time afterwards some of the Nabob's people impudently forced from a servant of Ensign Ramsay's a palanquin bamboo, which it was found belonged to that officer.

This is another circumstance that may well serve to illustrate the degree of insolence at which even the Nabob's menial servants had arrived.

“ Whenever the English army encamped they committed such violences in all the villages around them as to render them quite desolate, &c. My friend, these, these things were the wealth of these poor people”—poor people indeed who were unfortunate enough to come under the iron grasp of Soujah.

Though such a liberty with the discipline of the troops is one of those extravagancies which carries its own discredit along with it, yet it is such a reflection on the English army and on me as Commander-in-Chief, that I must request of you, gentlemen, to call upon Colonel Gailliez, Major Mackenzie, and other field officers of the 2nd Brigade, to give you a report upon honor of the behaviour of the troops during the Rohilla war.

It may not in the meantime be improper to observe that on our way from Shawbad to Pulibect, it was usual to send safeguards to the villages contiguous to head-quarters, to preserve them from destruction; but the moment the Sepoys were withdrawn to proceed on their march, the villages were set on flames by way of Bonfire for His Excellency.

Afterwards, when we were cantoned at Bissonly, many jemadars who resided at the distance of ten, twenty and thirty miles, very frequently sent to entreat for even one Sepoy to protect them; and though they could not always be supplied, it is sufficient to show the opinion which the natives entertained of our troops.

Besides my Aide-de-Camps, who had the charge of detaching these Sepoys, several other officers in town are perfectly acquainted with these circumstances.

The apprehensions with which His Excellency says his mind was agitated and the dreadful suppositions he has made in order to give an *ideal* proof of his fidelity to the English by an imaginary slaughter of thousands of his own troops is too chimerical to deserve any notice.

But we cannot forget that his people, after his own example, by an unpardonable arrogance of deportment, often put the temper and patience of the English to trial. A daring instance of which happened to Lieutenant Chas. Forbes, who in the presence of another gentleman and several of our Sepoys was told by an officer of the Nabob's that he would be the means of His Excellency's not only having his (Mr. Forbes') coat strip from his back, but his ears cut off.

Such insolence was well calculated to ferment the minds of our troops, and an officer of less discretion than Mr. Forbes would have cut down the miscreant, yet the Vizier never gave the least satisfaction for the indignity, and it is well known that my servants have been beat and my baggage thrown on the ground by the Nabob's people.

His Excellency is very unseasonable in his railling regarding the unfortunate family of Hafez: and there is a palpable impertinence towards me in his manner of expression, although he could not command the winds he had in his power to have treated the captives with tenderness; he could have ordered it so that these illustrious prisoners should not have been distressed for food or rayment; yet the truth is that they were covered with vermin, were reduced to the severe necessity of making supplications for private charities, and actually received alms from several gentlemen.

But the Minutes which my Aide-de-Camp took down from reports of trusty Harcarrahs stationed for the purpose of bringing faithful intelligence regarding the prisoners, will speak more plainly their miserable situation, and at the same time prove how moderate I was when under examination on these subjects, and how reluctant I have hitherto been to enlarge on the excess of the Nabob.*

No. 62-A.
No. 62-B.

* See also paper marked B.
See also a „ „ E.

His behaviour to the families of Mabulla Cawn, and his brother Fitte Ulah Cawn, who possessed a country of about 20 lacks of rupees per annum, was yet more criminal.

Before the commencement of the war he corresponded with them; and upon his assurances of protection and friendship they remained at peace in Bissonly, the capital of their district; he wrote to them on the 23rd of March in these words:—

“I have received your address, the particulars of which are clearly understood. *Ye are very dear to me*, and have been long impressed on my heart. I therefore write that ye

No. 63.

may remain in your own possessions in Bissonly in perfect security, and raise no commotions; to what I write hereafter you will act conformably, and you will soothe and satisfy all Rohillas who are disposed to obey me. By the favor of God no one shall receive injury; the families of Rohillas *I regard as my own*; * let all remain in their habitations."

* Such was the Vizier's regard for the Rohillas, and such his regard for humanity that he refused to give any assistance either in transporting their wounded to our hospitals or burying their dead.

On the 4th of April His Excellency addressed them as follows:—

No. 64. "Previous to this Murgolawn Mahomed Cawn will have arrived with you and made you acquainted with whatever was necessary. By the *blessing of God there is not the smallest difference between us, nay there is the firmest friendship*, and all will be well; regarding the devastation of your country, I have avoided marching through it, remain perfectly at ease where you are; whatever is befitting will be performed on my part, and all will be well. It is necessary you regard me as a friend in this affair: whatever Murgolawn Mahomed Cawn has engaged for, I will not depart from."

Subsequent to the above letter His Excellency sent a letter to the said Chiefs and to their mother, the Begum, in these terms:—

No. 65. "Your address is received; what you write that Murgolawn Cawn is arrived and has related all particulars; and that ye will act agreeably thereto *relying firmly on my friendship*, it is clearly understood, it is manifest that I have long had *true regard for your families*, and now that you renew our former union all will most certainly be well. Nothing shall be wanting on my part for your benefit, for I wish for your good and prosperity. I am now marching by your boundaries by way of Cundsoroon, &c. It behoves that you remain at home in perfect security and firm to your agreements."

Upon the faith of these letters the deduled Chiefs remained in their habitations in full confidence of being treated as friends by the Nabob and being left undisturbed in their possessions.

The moment he arrived at Bissonly, however, they were put into rigorous confinement, denied access to their families, robbed of their property, and themselves and their women treated not only with dishonor and indignity but even with cruelty.

The unhappy Chiefs preferred frequent complaints to me in the most moving terms, and sent the Nabob's original letters to prove how much he had deceived them.

No. 62.
27th May. "He has deprived us of our country of our riches and *even of our honor*, and not satisfied with that he is going to send us prisoners to Fizabad. We desire no country, no riches, no houses, but at Bissonly are the tombs of our noble ancestors; near them under some shade we beg permission to spend the remainder of our days as faqueers."

No. 66.
3rd June. "Relying on the Vizier's promises we remained in this country, otherwise we should have fled as the other Chiefs did and have preserved our characters and honors; these he has taken away with our effects, and *how he has dishonored us is known to all*."

It was this deceitful conduct, this inhuman treatment that filled the minds of all the fugitive Chiefs with such a distrust and detestation of the Nabob.

And although my representations of the distresses of the family of Hafez were ungraciously received, and I am sorry to say gave me but little encouragement to plead the cause of the unhappy, yet I regret exceedingly that I have so long suppressed my inclinations of endeavoring to alleviate the misfortunes of the much injured Chiefs to whom these letters were addressed, and who as well as the family of Hafez I have good reason to believe are even now stinted of

the necessities of life; and when I was on the way down I received the affecting accounts of the death of twenty-five of these ill-fated prisoners since their arrival at Allahabad for want of sustenance.

"Whoever has lost a father and brother in war, has fallen from the dignity of a throne, and, become a prisoner, will undoubtedly suffer much misery." The analogy between the stile of this paragraph and a letter which I received some time ago from another quarter on the same subject is worthy of observation.

We grant that the fall of a father, and of a brother, and the loss of a throne, were sufficient causes for impressing the souls of the family of Hafez with sorrow, but what shall we think of that unfeeling man who added cruelty to the burthen of their affections? What shall we say of him who in violation of all faith, in breach of every sacred tie under the artful mask of dissembled friendship, not only robbed the family of Doondy Cawn of their throne, but even dispoiled them of their honor, and not contented with depriving them of their liberty, has embittered the draught of their misfortunes by unexampled severity in their bondage.

You find these unhappy people in the utmost dread, lest the Nabob should hear of their complaint; let me, therefore, hope and entreat, gentlemen, that whatever it may be your pleasure to do in their favor may be so ordered and concerted as that they may not be exposed to the implacable resentment of Sujah.

Towards the conclusion of the Nabob's letter we find mention made of Colonel MacLean. I have been hitherto much at a loss to account for that gentleman's expedition to the army, and more so to divine the causes of his speedy return.

He quitted his budgerow at Buxar, and in fifteen days, including those he halted, arrived at our encampment in the extremity of the Rohilla country, having travelled about six hundred miles in nine days. He had hardly got to Camp when he talked of leaving it. If he had not been so much on wing, I should have supposed that he came up in the way of his duty; but deferring the controlling of accounts till some future opportunity he set off again in a very few days. In thirty-two hours he reached Bissonly, distant above 14 miles from our camp; but having overtaken the Nabob and Mr. Middleton there, he found it convenient to abate of his haste, made easy journies, and accompanied His Excellency to Lucknow.

It is not obvious what business Colonel MacLean, either in the character of Commissary-General of Stores or Controller-General of Accounts, could have with the Vizier; yet if His Excellency had said that he had been consulting Mr. Macleane on establishment of that nature or on subjects connected with his office, I should have been willing to have thought so.

But when he declares that he has been conversing with Colonel MacLean, who was an entire stranger to him, on matter totally foreign to that gentleman's department, when I consider that I received no intimation from the President regarding Colonel MacLean's expedition, that he did not trouble himself with the duties of his office, which was the only pretence he had for his journey, when I consider that the Governor had been solicitous to prevent the gentlemen of the army from having access to the Vizier, and that notwithstanding a positive prohibition against any officer's visiting the Nabob without my permission, Colonel MacLean had a particular and private introduction to him. In short, when his hurry to join the army, his abrupt departure, his rapid journey to Bissonly, his sudden and extraordinary intimacy with the Vizier, his private conferences with His Excellency as a bosom friend, his courteous jaunt to Lucknow, his posting from thence in ten days, and arriving at Calcutta nearly about the same time with the Vizier's letter, I say, when these and other circumstances are considered collectively, I cannot help thinking it impossible that all could be accident. It is not easy to develope transactions of this nature, but His Excellency was ill-advised when he wrote—"I have related all more particularly to Colonel MacLean, who will inform you of them"; this unguarded sentence reflects a great deal of light, and the veil is no longer more than a cobweb.

I am concerned that His Excellency took the liberty of treating Colonel MacLean so ungracefully as to make him the vehicle of such malevolence and calumny, and I am exceedingly surprized that the gentleman could condescend to become an agent in such a business. At all events it would have been no more than candid in Colonel MacLean when he did me the favor of desiring to audit my bills, before the resignation of his office, to have informed me of these manauvring.

"Mr. Middleton will also write you on these subjects. I consult him on all affairs."

Here His Excellency has removed the curtain entirely; and although he has not perhaps brought forth all the characters who were busied behind it, yet such hints have escaped him, as leave us very little at a loss for the complete *dramatis personæ*.

"I am very much pleased with Mr. Middleton's good conduct; he is a very sensible intelligent man, and a very sincere well-wisher of mine."

If I did not think favorably of Mr. Middleton, I should be induced from His Excellency's mode of expression to believe that the one had agreed to sound the elogium of the other.

"I have been spoken to on this subject by the Colonel, who says that Mr. Middleton was appointed to collect the money due to the Company; and that he has no business to interfere in any other matter."

This paragraph bears so little connection with the preceding parts of the letter that it seems rather introduced as a complaint of Mr. Middleton's than of His Excellency.

It is true I thought Mr. Middleton rather officious, and I repeatedly declared that he had no business with Military affairs; but as I afterwards had it, under a respectable signature, that the young gentleman did not concern himself in such matters, I was willing till now to have persuaded myself that I had been mistaken.

I would gladly suppose Mr. Middleton did not intend any disrespect to me by his interferences with the province of the Commander-in Chief, and although I am ignorant of what he has written on the subject which His Excellency mentions, I trust that it is perfectly consistent with his sentiments of the Vizier, of whom I must do Mr. Middleton the justice to say he entertains a very proper opinion.

"I have had so many proofs of His Excellency's deviating from truth, as well as violating his promise, that I know not how to believe his assurances."

No. 67.

With these sentiments of Mr. Middleton's I should close this address, gentlemen, but that I find it necessary to trouble you yet a little further.

Since my arrival in town I have been told that it was unfortunate the Rohilla war was not concluded "*a month earlier*." Whether this was intended as a supplement to the Vizier's letter I know not, but I consider the connection very strong.

When I left Calcutta to go on the late expedition the members of administration declared they would think it fortunate if the war could be finished "*in two years*." Observe what happened; seven-eighths of the Rohilla country was conquered and in the undisturbed possession of the Vizier, and the Company's engagements to His Excellency fully performed, in less than *three weeks* from the commencement of the war.

He was in the collection of three-eighths of the country more than it was necessary to put into his hands, in order to have entitled us to the 40 lakhs.

The second campaign, in which upon the authority of the late administration themselves, I deny the Company were under any obligation of being a party, was finished in two months.

In fine the articles of peace were signed in little more than five months from the beginning of the war, including a recess of three months, which we

had at Bissonly; yet the very same gentlemen who had allotted two years for this business, and these gentlemen only, are now dissatisfied that it was not concluded "*a month earlier.*"

"And why, because in that case these transactions might possibly have been less attended to, but wherefore slur over measures in this manner, or how could it be expected they should escape unnoticed: the public have for some time been very observant of, and very minute in their enquires regarding, the transactions in this country.

Whenever the administration of a commercial body takes upon themselves a military character they become responsible for their conduct not only to their immediate constituents but to the State.

The guardians of the glory of Britain are ever on the watch lest any stain should be brought on the honor of the Empire.

The principles upon which the Rohilla war was undertaken, the mode on which the Vizier chose to conduct it, could not pass unobserved.

We may well say of the British that they are the modern Romans: their Senate could never overlook the prostitution of the national honor in subjecting a British General to the command of an Infidel Prince.

If these measures were improper, the conclusion of the war sooner or later could not justify them.

I have in the preceding part of this address clearly shewn that there was no unnecessary delay on my part; and I must here beg leave to transcribe a letter which I wrote to the Governor under date the 11th October—

"Had there appeared any urgent necessity of pressing upon the Rohillas immediately after our arrival at Petergurr, it is probable that notwithstanding the scruples which I entertained with regard to the extent of my authority, I should not have been able to have overcome my inclinations of attacking. But as the Marattas supposing a certainty of their intentions to disturb the Vizier, could not reach the Doab earlier than December, as the Rohillas were shut up and could only receive scanty supplies from the country between the hills as a delay in the attack of course subjected them to greater distress, and tended to weaken and render them less capable of taking advantage of the strength of their situation, as it would have been highly imprudent to enter the jungle which surround them till after the heavy fall of rain usual at the equinox, as the attack, supposing it most successful, could have only made the enemy retire further into the countries between the hills, as this would have entirely defeated the Vizier's intentions of crushing or making the Rohillas his friends before any other power could make head against him, as the natural strength of the enemy's post would put the credit of the Company's arms to the test, as the small share of reputation which I have had the good fortune of acquiring in the course of long service was at stake, as I could not have assured myself of approbation in case I had risked the attack and had failed, as the Vizier very earnestly and from the most prudential motives wished to re-establish friendship with Fuzulla Khan, and as I was for some time ill of a severe indisposition; in short, Sir, as there did not appear a single reason in favor of an earlier advance than was made, and as on the contrary every consideration that could weigh with me, either as a General or in a political view, argued very strongly against any attack at all, I am perfectly satisfied with the issue which matters have had; and it is my firm hope and wish that the honorable and speedy conclusion to which the Rohilla war has been brought may give you sincere pleasure and add to that reputation which you have so justly acquired in your administration."

And I repeat it, gentlemen, that no occurrence brought more credit to that administration than the hon'ble period put to the Rohilla war, which has in some measure done away the reproach that so was wantonly brought upon the English name. I am confident that even a few of the reasons urged in the above letter would carry to any unprejudiced mind a conviction of the propriety of my conduct, but many others might be added.

The Engineer had informed me in his description of the road to Lalldang that there was no ground for encampment within less than 16 miles, and that there was not a drop of water nearer the enemy's post than 12 miles.

In a subsequent letter he observed, "the people we have been among are strong and robust, they seem not to be affected by their present situation, are of a haughty and independent temper, and consider their Sardars more as kinsmen than Commanders."

No. 68.

The gentlemen of the late administration may have been more able politicians, they must have known better than I could, how to make up the Company's investment, but it can be no compliment to myself to say that I was the best judge how to conduct military operations.

Very long experience had taught me to know that a close attack with sepoys ought if possible to be avoided, because it has hitherto been impracticable to make them keep their order, and preserve their fire.

I have very often been an eye-witness of their misconduct in that particular, and had a recent and remarkable proof of it on the 23rd of April, when one of the Battalions sent from the second line to drive off a body of the enemy who galled our right flank, fell into immediate disorder, and fired in the air twenty deep, although they had an European officer to every division, and were in an open plain, what then was to be expected in the jungles.

One should imagine too that a scarcity of ammunition might be admitted as a good reason why an officer should be cautious of engaging an enemy.

I carried a much larger quantity to the field than the regulations allowed carriage for, and yet we had no more than 45 rounds per man when we left Bissonly in the height of the rains. I had made indents to the several magazines for supplies to arrive with the army in due time for opening the campaign at the usual season; and on the 24th July in consequence of the resolution of taking the field in the rains, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Muir to forward 100,000 rounds of musket ammunition from Chunar to Ramgaut; and although that attentive officer took every possible measure to expedite its arrival, yet the ammunition did not reach the place of destination till the campaign was over, owing to the rapidity and force of the current.

No. 70.

I had applied to the Vizier very frequently, as Mr. Middleton* well knows for the loan of as much lead as would make a 100,000 musket balls; yet I never could get one ounce from His Excellency, so that we really had not ammunition enough for the attack, much less a provision for the event of a retreat.

No. 71.

* See also a paper marked M.

The troops had been neglected by the Vizier, and were greatly discontented; the consequence of disorder amongst them threatened destruction to us all. The Vizier's uniform plan was to have *starved* the enemy into terms; my inclinations to mercy were proportioned to that degree of odium which our concern in the Rohilla prosecution had brought upon us. The idea I had formed upon the faith of good intelligence of the strength of the enemy's post made me believe our success would be very precarious; and the opinions of the Engineers, which I afterwards took, will satisfy you, gentlemen, that it was fortunate we were not obliged to risk the reputation of our arms and all the advantages we had gained so unnecessarily.

Lieutenant Bruce, whose opinion of the spirit and disposition of the Rohillas you have seen, talking of their post, says:

No. 72.

"From this the road leads directly under the hills to a second passage over the Suvassa, where from the heights a *handfull of resolute men are capable of opposing a considerable army.*" To the southward of the river lies the spot where the families of the Rohillas resided; but before we could reach that it would have been absolutely necessary to have gained the summit of the surrounding hills: the slaughter that would have been the consequence of such an attempt if we consider that the Rohillas were fighting for their families must undoubtedly have been *dreadful*.

Captain Penman expresses himself thus—"In order to gain this post it is necessary to ford the river several times, and as the banks are very high and steep, and covered with trees and jungles, the passages might be disputed with great advantages to the Rohillas. The natural strength of this post is greater than can well be described, and I am confident that a handful of resolute men might baffle the attempts of the most daring assailants, nor could anything in my humble opinion be more dangerous than to lead a body of native troops to such an attack, as I have always understood, that it is almost impossible to prevent Sepoys from throwing away their fire, by which means they would of course fall a sacrifice."

No. 73.

For a further illustration of this subject, I produce copies of the plans taken by these two Engineers and of their opinions at large.

Even the fullest instructions from the Select Committee, which by the way let me observe, I did not receive till after the peace, did not authorize me to proceed into the hill country at all, and yet the enemy were actually entrenched between the hills.

The desire of satisfying the Vizier however, and my wishes of obliging those whom I knew supported His Excellency, had prevailed on me to go much greater lengths than perhaps I ought to have done.

I had acquainted the Committee on the 17th of August of the Vizier's being in possession of Petergurr, &c. "The main body of the Rohillas, said still to consist of about forty thousand, are penned up at Lalldang within sixteen coss of us, &c."

In answer the Committee were pleased to express themselves thus—

"The service being completed wherein the Brigade was engaged under your command, a repetition of our thanks is due to you, and to the troops who effected it, &c."

This, gentlemen, although they were advised of the enemy's being within so short a distance of us, they again pronounced the service completed.

I beg your attention to the situation in which the receipt of this letter placed me.

When it came to hand I was within six coss of the enemy; and let the event have been what it would, I must have pushed forward if the Rohillas had persisted in declining the Vizier's offers.

What would have been the consequence if the army had been repulsed or greatly thinned, which must have been the case even on the most favorable supposition. Would not the above paragraph been laid hold of to throw the whole upon my shoulders.

The Company would have had great reason to say, "our administration made a strange bargain with the Vizier, and our Commander-in-Chief has been obstinate in servility." "Our President stipulated that we should receive forty lacks if an agreement took place between Soujah and the Rohillas; we were to receive forty lacks if half the Rohilla country was conquered and we are to receive no more for subduing the whole."

"Our administration declared the forty lacks to be due in May; payment was demanded early in June, and yet a second expedition was undertaken, and approved of without any regard to our interest, or making any new stipulation for our advantage."

Not content with reducing the whole country, our Commander-in-Chief took upon himself, even after the administration had a second time declared the service to be completed, to embark in a dangerous undertaking; and without the shadow of advantage to us, has precipitated our army to destruction and endangered even our existence in Indostan; such would very naturally be the

language of the gentlemen in the direction; had their army been repelled, or had they even been victorious at the expence of a great number of lives unnecessarily thrown away; and I must confess that I think their highest indignation would be most justly excited.

Supposing, however, our success out of question, and that the Rohillas had all been cut off, what benefit would have derived, what profit to the Company.

The administration had declared the forty lacks due in May, and they were not to reap any further advantage, but admitting for a moment that the gentlemen in Leaden-Hall Street were of so forgiving a disposition as to overlook the neglect of the Company's interest, would they not be incensed at the wanton sacrifice of above one hundred thousand lives.

The language of the British Senate on such an occasion would be very serious. "We condescended to admit of your keeping a military force for the preservation of your factories and the protection of your trade; you have abused our indulgences, have entered into an unprovoked war, have hired out His Majesty's subjects for your private emolument, and to crown all have brought an undelible stain on your country by the massacre of an innocent people."

The Company would throw the blame upon their administration, and these gentlemen would endeavour to transfer it to the Commander-in-Chief.

I thank God that it is out of their power. I have often successfully fought the battles of the Company, and have acquired them riches and to myself renown. I have been the assertor of their neglected rights. I have been mercifully disposed towards a persecuted people, and I have endeavoured to alleviate the affliction of the miserable and unhappy. I have stood forth for the honor of humanity, and for the glory of my King and of my country.

If these are crimes, gentlemen, permit me to stand condemned, and worse than death let the sentence be dishonor. But if these are not crimes, let those beware who have wantonly accused me of their being so.

I should now, gentlemen, offer an apology for the prolixity of this address, but that would be to spin it out longer. I have an apology to make, but it is of a very different nature; it is for that implicit submission bordering I am afraid on extreme humility which I manifested towards the Vizier, and towards those who supported him.

Military men have in this country stood always in a disagreeable predicament. Lorded over by every young man who could scrawl a waste-book or post a ledger, the soldiers' fire was smothered, or if from any officer a spark of liberty broke forth, those gentlemen grown up to Councillors pronounced his fate,—dismission.

And although such a fate could not prevail on me to act in any manner inconsistent with honor, yet it must be allowed that such consideration would weigh much with every man of prudence who had dedicated his life to the service, and had been habituated to the obedience of many orders repugnant to his own feelings. I will not trespass longer on your patience, gentlemen. To conclude therefore.

It is an easy matter to accuse; but allegations unsupported as the Vizier's fall of themselves. Conscious that no man was ever more injuriously aspersed than I have been, and sensible of the disrepute into which His Excellency has irrecoverably plunged himself, it might perhaps be enough for me to have said I defy the slander, and it is not incumbent upon me to prove a negative.

It too frequently happens that the most irreproachable are thus maliciously accused; and though they cannot be formally condemned, yet I am afraid the generality of mankind are so prone to think ungenerously of their fellows, that innocent men often lay under the most unjust imputations; happy he who in such a situation can put his hand on his breast and say all is quiet, all is serenity within.

Fortunately for me however, gentlemen, on this occasion, I have been able to stand forth, I have bearded the calumniator, and have brought such a load of truth upon his back as shall make the burthen irksome.

• FORT WILLIAM, }
The 30th January 1775. }

A. CHAMPION.

Copy of a letter from the NABOB VIZIER.

The day I arrived at Pulibeet Harcarrahs brought me word that people of the English going into the city caused disturbances there; on this I sent a message by Shaich Shuffunlah that it was necessary to forbid this. Colonel Champion returned reply that he would place English troops on the gates. I rejoined that it was by no means necessary, and therefore to defer and forbid it. Colonel Champion, then coming to me, said the English gentlemen say there are four crore of rupees in the Fort, of which the troops must have some, and for this purpose is all this argument: therefore three English gentlemen and three persons on your part going into Pulibeet shall take an account of the effects.

I said that this was a new matter and which had not been agreed upon between us, to which the Colonel replied, if you will not comply with this proposal, there will be disturbance in the English camp.

On hearing this I discovered that Colonel Champion was forced into this measure, and that he could not help it; therefore from friendship to him, I said no more on the subject; but that weighing the matter, I would comply with it the next day. After this the Colonel wrote me that it was necessary to send the persons into the city. Then when I saw he was thus hasty, though in the heat of noon, I went to Colonel Champion, and asked him what gentlemen would go into Pulibeet. On which, calling Mr. Murray, Colonel Lesslie, and Major Hannay, before me, he said these are the three gentlemen who will go and take the account. I said between Mr. Hastings and me there is no agreement to this purport; and from the first there will be no more than four or five thousand rupees in *Pulibeet*; but supposing there should be treasure, what business have the gentlemen with it, for never was anything of this kind granted before; "to this Mr. Murray said to me, previous to this the war was with the Marrattas, in which no country, &c., was in question, on which account nothing of this kind was urged; but now if people from the English don't go into the Fort, the Sepoy will plunder the whole country." The Colonel hearing this reproved him, saying, "this discourse is not proper." After this I said "though this matter is not in my agreement it is of no consequence, give me the sum I am to pay to Mr. Hastings for this business, in lieu of which take what you say is in *Pulibeet*, and give me a receipt." To this no reply was returned, but they remained fixed in their resolution. After this I observed that if English people went now into *Pulibeet*, in future to whatever city or place we went the same debate would ensue. In reply they said that it should not be the case at any other place; it was for this place only they debated. On this, speaking to Major Hannay, I said, "this once is immaterial; to satisfy the gentlemen I will be silent; but this I declare if henceforward at any place similar demands are made I will quit the country as it is, and return to my own." Major Hannay telling what I said to Colonel Lesslie in English, Colonel Lesslie addressing himself to Colonel Champion said in English well, well, that is good, good, for though I do not understand English, I have particular reasons for saying I am right in this particular. I told the gentlemen that sending people could only be productive of acquiring a bad name, but that for their satisfaction I yielded. Finally these gentlemen went, but returned without success; and the truth is that originally there were not above four or five thousand rupees in *Pulibeet*; but if there had been, what business was it to the gentlemen, seeing that when this war was first concerted, between you and me, this circumstance was never mentioned. Moreover, I am entirely employed about the sum agreed to be paid, nor will I be neglectful.

Why did the gentlemen talk to me in this way. I was astonished, having never experienced from the English gentlemen before that the Chief was set aside; and I obliged to converse with other gentlemen. With you Sir, and other Governors as Lord Olive, &c., I have long had friendship, but never did the Chief sit by and every other speak separately. It is now above nine years that there has been strict friendship between the English and me, and every day increasing; but I never conceived from our friendship that there would be room for the breadth of a hair of dispute, and I have been beyond measure employed to prevent it. Till now, too, whatever is fit and proper has been shewn by the English gentlemen; except now this extraordinary argument is introduced. To you it is known how immense my expenses have been for the three past years; and for performance of the agreement between us, I am employed night and day; but if henceforward at whatever places there may be treasure, this sort of demand is to be made, I shall have difficulty therein. Yourself are judge whether or not what I write be true; but never had I this kind of argument with the English; that money in idea, and that was not agreed on, should be talked of, and a fresh business, and new discourse be begun, and the Chief being displaced, every man urge his own demand forcibly. Do you weigh this matter maturely and express your displeasure to the gentlemen, that this may not again occur; and this practice may not happen of setting the Chief aside; and every man being his own master, and doing whatever he will: in fact this never was the practice with the English Chiefs. You and I are now remote from each other; but my business is with you, who are the head of all affairs. Whomever you confirm as Chief he is so, and no other. Severe reprehension is requisite in this matter, that in future anything of a like nature may not happen, and that new matters contrary to agreements may not be spoken of. I am perfectly assured of your friendship; and to whatever agreements are between us, am I firm. It is proper you repair this, so that it will not again happen and our friendship will daily increase.

Regard what you say and do, and speedily send me a reply; for from you I am full of hope. Having related the whole distinctly to Mr. Middleton, he will write it.

R. E. ROBERTS,

Persian Interpreter.

Mr. Francis moves that immediate orders be sent to Mr. Bristow to enquire carefully into the present circumstances and situation of the surviving parts of the families of Hafez Rhamit and the other Rohilla Chiefs who were taken prisoners by the late Vizier; and to interpose his most urgent and strenuous good offices with the present Government of Oude to obtain for them freedom, united with some certain and honorable provision and maintenance, and to report the facts and the consequences of his solicitations, as soon as possible.

FORT WILLIAM,
The 14th February 1775. }

P. FRANCIS.

Fort William, the 24th February 1775.

AT A COUNCIL, PRESENT:

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, *Governor-General, President.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN CLAVERING.

THE HON'BLE GEORGE MONSON.

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

PHILIP FRANCIS, Esq.

Read and approved the Proceedings of the 14th instant.

The Governor-General further lays before the Board the following advices which he has received from Mr. George Bogle, and as they contain the first information of his meeting with the Teshoo Lama, he proposes, as they will not be included in the Proceedings sent by this despatch, that copies of them should be sent numbers in the Packet of the *Bute* for the satisfaction of the Court of *Directors*.

Mr. Bogle's Journal.

Agreed copies be accordingly transmitted by the *Bute*.

HON'BLE SIR,—I had the honor to advise you of my arrival on the frontier of Thibet in a short address of the 26th October. I left Paridrong next day accompanied by some Teshoo Lama's servants and arrived here on the 12th ultimo.

The Lama received your letter and presents very graciously, and I have every reason to be satisfied with his reception.

Having represented to him your desire of opening a free intercourse of trade between the inhabitants of Bengal and this country, he has given me assurance of his ready endeavours to bring it about; but as he intends in a few days to return to Teshoo Lombo, his capital, where he will have an opportunity of consulting with the merchants, he delays coming to any determination at present. In the meantime he has written to Lahassa on the subject, from which he expects the arrival of some officers to congratulate him on his return.

Teshoo Lama's character and abilities, his having discovered and placed the present Delay Lama in the chair at Potalo, his being favored by the Emperor of China, and his having obtained from him the appointment of Gesub Rambackay, the present Chief, give him great influence. The seat of Government, however, is at Lahassa. The Emperor of China is paramount sovereign and is represented by two Chinese officers, who are changed every three years. These men are to report to their Court the state of the country, but I am told seldom interfere in the management of it, which during Delay Lama's minority is intrusted to Gesub and four Ministers. Teshoo Lama has a number of villages and monasteries belonging to him, which are scattered over Thibet, and intermixed with those of the Delay Lama. To attempt to explain the nature of a Government where so many different interests are blended together would oblige me to enter into details, which, as my imperfect knowledge of the country might hardly justify, I at present would rather wish to avoid. I take the liberty of enclosing a memorandum of the trade of Thibet and have the honor to be, &c.

DESHEREFGAY,
Near Chamnamning,
The 5th December 1774. }

GEORGE BOGLE.

Memorandum by Mr. BOGLE on the Trade of Thibet.

The foreign trade of Thibet is very considerable. Being mountainous, Of the trade and productions of Thibet. naturally barren, and but thinly peopled, it requires large supplies from other countries and its valuable productions furnish it with the means of procuring them. It yields gold, musk, cowtails, wool, and salt; coarse woollen cloth and narrow serge are almost its only manufactures. It produces no iron, nor fruit, nor spices; the nature of

the soil and of the climate prevents the culture of silk, rice, and tobacco, of all which articles there is a great consumption; but the wants of the country will best appear from an account of its trade. In this sketch, however, I propose only to give the outlines, which I will beg leave afterwards to fill up and correct.

The genius of this Government, like that of most of the ancient kingdoms in Hindostan, is favorable to commerce; no duties are levied on goods, and trade is protected and free from exactions. Many foreign merchants, encouraged by these indulgences, or allured by the prospect of gain, have settled in Thibet. The natives of Cashmire, who like the Jews in Europe, or the Armenians in the Turkish Empire, scatter themselves over the Eastern Kingdoms of Asia and carry on an extensive traffick between the distant parts of it, have formed establishments at Lahassa and all the principal towns in this country. Their agents, stationed on the coast of Coromandel, in Bengal, Benares, Nephaul and Cashmire, furnish them with the commodities of these different countries, which they dispose of in Thibet or forward to their associates at Seling, a town on the borders of China. The Gossienes, the trading pilgrims of India, resort hither in great numbers. Their humble deportment and holy character, heightened by the merit of distant pilgrimages, their accounts of unknown countries and remote regions, and above all their professions of high veneration for the Lamas, procure them not only a ready admittance but great favors; though clad in the garb of poverty, there are many of them possessed of considerable wealth; their trade is confined chiefly to articles of great value and small bulk. It is carried on without noise or ostentation, and often by paths unfrequented by other merchants. The Tartars. The Calmacks, who with their wives and families annually repair in numerous tribes to pay their devotions at the Lama's shrines, bring their camels loaded with fur and other Siberian goods. The Bootecas and the other inhabitants of the mountains, which form the southern frontier of Thibet, are enabled by their situation to supply it as well with the commodities of Bengal as the productions of their own States. The people of Assam furnish it with the coarse manufactures of their kingdom. The Chineze, to whose empire this country is subject, have established themselves in great numbers at the capital, and by introducing the curious manufactures and merchandize of China, are engaged in an extended and lucrative commerce; and thus Lahassa, being at the same time the seat of Government and the place of the Delay Lama's residence, is the resort of strangers and the centre of communication between distant parts of the world.

The most considerable branch of commerce is with China; it is carried on by the natives of that kingdom, and by the Cashmirians and the Lama's agents who proceed to Seling, and sometimes even to Peking. The imports are coarse tea, of which the consumption is immense; flowered and brocaded sattins of various kinds, pelong, handkerchiefs, silk thread, furs, porcelain cups, glass, snuff boxes, knives and other cutlery, talents of silver, and some tobacco. The returns are made in gold, pearls, coral, chanks, broadcloth, and a trifling quantity of Bengal cloths. The productions of Siberia are imported chiefly by the Calmacks, or by the way of Seling. They consist of furs, red and black bulgar hides, cowtails, some dromedaries, bastard pearls and silver, and are bartered for broadcloth, coral and amber beads, spices and gold. The Cashmirians naturally engross the trade with their country. It is not considerable. The imports are chiefly sugar, dried raisins, and other fruits; the exports are goats, wool, and gold. The imports from Assam are spices and timber, mugga-dooties, and other coarse manufactures of silk and linen. The native productions of the Debe Rajah's country brought into Thibet are rice, wrought-iron, coarse woollen cloth, and some munjeck, which are exchanged for tea and other Chineze commodities, rock

salt, wool, sheep skins and narrow frizes for their home consumption. The productions imported from Nephaul are chiefly iron and rice; but as these two countries have been the principal channels of communication between Bengal and Thibet, it is necessary to give a more particular account of them.

With Nephaul.

While Nephaul was divided among the different States of Catmaund, Pattan, Badgaund, and Goorka, and remained under the Government of Rajahs independent of each

Ancient commercial state of Nephaul.

other's authority, every encouragement was given to trade. A very moderate duty was levied on goods; the country, populous and well cultivated, easily furnished the means of transporting them, and the merchants, free from spoil or exactions, settled in Nephaul and contributed to enrich it at the same time that they improved their own fortunes. Some disputes arose among these petty Chiefs. They went to war, and Perti Narrain, the Rajah of Goorka, was called in to take part in the quarrel; having subdued the enemy he turned his arms against his allies; and partly by treachery, partly by the exertion of superior abilities, has after a war of twenty-five years, made himself master of the whole of the country and united it under one Government.

Conquest of it by Goorka.

But although the wealth of Nephaul furnished Goorka with the means by which he rose, he neglected to cherish the source from whence it flowed. Mistrustful of subjects

Effect of this revolution.

disaffected to his Government he entertained a number of troops on regular pay. He disciplined them; he furnished them with firearms; he formed an artillery, and left nothing undone to render himself formidable; the stated revenue of countries where a standing army had hitherto been unknown was unequal to these extraordinary expences, and Goorka, among other expedients, had recourse to imposing high duties on trade in order to defray them. The merchants, subject to heavy and arbitrary fines upon the most frivolous pretence, or obliged to purchase the protection of a tyrannical Government by presents scarce less oppressive, quitted a country where they could no longer enjoy that freedom and security which is the life of commerce. The Gossienes, who had formerly very extensive establishments in Nephaul, having incurred Goorka's resentment by the assistance which they afforded his adversaries, were driven out of the kingdom; and many of the most wealthy inhabitants, being stripped of their possessions or exposed to the exactions of a conqueror, likewise deserted it. Two Cashmirian houses only remain, and the Rajah, afraid of their also abandoning him, obliges them to give security for the return of such agents as they have occasion to send without the boundaries of his dominions.

The trade between Bengal and Thibet through the Debe Rajah's country used

Trade with Bengal through the Debe Rajah's country.

formerly to be engrossed wholly by the Booteecas. Two of the Cashmirian houses however who fled from Nephaul, being unwilling to forego the gainful commerce in which they had hitherto been concerned, settled at Lahassa, and having obtained permission from the Debe Rajah to transport their goods through his territories established agents in Bengal; but as they are prohibited from trading in broadcloth and some other considerable articles, and as their traffick is carried on to no great extent, and all other merchants are excluded, it by no means compensates the loss which Bengal has sustained by the interruption of its commerce through Nephaul.

The commodities of Bengal used also to be conveyed into Thibet through

Through Morung.

Morung and a Province adjoining to it, which is subject to Lahassa, and governed by a Chief stiled Denro Jung. The facquiers when expelled Nephaul generally frequented this road, but being esteemed unhealthy it was not adopted by any creditable merchants. Goorka, however, having extended his conquests over the first of these countries, and having lately invaded the other, all intercourse is at present interrupted.

Besides these different communications, there is a road leading from

By way of Banaris.

Banaris and Mirzapoor through the Mustang country and the hills to the northward of Bulwang

Sing's territories, which are subject to Rajahs who still preserve their independence. The more valuable sorts of Bengal goods are sometimes imported into Thibet by this channel. But although the merchants travel in perfect security and receive every assistance from these petty Chiefs, the length of the way, the difficulty of the road, through a mountainous and in several places uninhabited country, and the intermediate profits upon the goods, render it far from eligible. Of late years it has become more frequented on account of its being almost the only means of communication.

The principal articles of merchandize between Bengal and Thibet are broad-cloth, attar, skins, neel (indigo), pearls, coral, amber, and other beads, chank, spices, tobacco, sugar, Malda striped sattins, and a few white cloths, chiefly coarse; the returns are made in gold dust, musk, and cowtails.

A knowledge of the current specie and of the proportional value of money in a country is of capital importance towards understanding the nature of its trade, but the intricacy of the subject and the variety of circumstances requisite in forming a just notion of it oblige me at present to mention it only briefly. There are no mints in Thibet. Payments are made in talents of China and Tartary in small bulses of gold dust or in the coin of the former Rajahs of Catmaund and Pattan, which is the established specie of the kingdom. The circulation of their rupees, which were of a base standard, proved very beneficial to these Chiefs, and Goorka, as soon as he had firmly established his authority in Nephaul, endeavoured to introduce his coin into Thibet. For this purpose he sent a deputation to Lahassa with a large sum in rupees struck in his name, and desired the sanction of Government to circulate them through the country. The merchants aware of Goorka's ill-faith refused to accept them, and the Government returned him this artful answer,—We are willing to receive your coin, provided that you take back all the money of Nephaul which is now in circulation. This condition was neither for Goorka's interest, nor in his power to comply with. Nothing since has been done in this important affair. The old specie continues to pass; but the channel by which it was introduced having been long stopped up, it has rose greatly above its former value, as well in proportion to the talents of silver as to the gold dust.

Copy of a letter to COLONEL CHAMPION, dated Fort William, the 16th February 1775.

SIR,—In the vindication of your conduct which you lately delivered to the Board, you have thought proper to advance several heavy accusations against me and the late Administration from which it is incumbent on me both to exculpate myself and them; but the short time remaining between the delivery of your vindication and the departure of the *Pacific*, and the load of other business which necessarily engages my time, will render it impossible for me to prepare my reply to your vindication before the departure of that ship on which you have taken your passage. I therefore think it necessary to inform you of my intention of replying fully to your vindication, not only in defence of my own and the conduct of the late Administration from your accusations, but also in examination of the charges which the late Vizier preferred against you, particularly that respecting the long inaction of the brigade before Lalldang. As these accusations were addressed to me by the Vizier in my capacity of the first Member of the Administration, it became the duty of my station to submit them to enquiry, and the method I preferred was to give them to your perusal, never doubting but your promised vindication would contain an ample refutation of them; but it does not appear to me that you have refuted them. I now acquaint you that I shall submit these matters to the examination and decision of the Board, and make a very free enquiry into such parts of your conduct as have been arraigned by the Vizier; and I give you this notice to prevent the supposition of my taking advantage of your absence in the prosecution of these enquiries, that you may, if you think it necessary, defer your departure for the opportunity, either of supporting the accusations you have brought against the late Administration

and me, or defending yourself from the charges which may appear against you. The delay which has taken place in this enquiry must be attributed to the length of time which has passed before the delivery of your vindication.

I am, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS,

True copy.

ROBERT PATTON,

Military Secretary.

Ordered that copies of the above letters be sent to the Court of Directors in the *Bute's* packet agreeable to the desire of the Governor-General.

The Governor-General delivers in the following Minutes containing his observations upon those given into the Board in Council the 23rd ultimo by the General, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, on which he then gave notice that he would make some remarks.

The General, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, in their letter of appeal to the Court of Directors, have declared that they meant not to see Mahomed Raza Cawn, and assigned their reasons for it; that his acquittal is not yet confirmed by the approbation of the Court of Directors; that they did not know the reasons on which it was founded; and that receiving and returning his visit might imply that they were satisfied of his innocence, they thought it therefore safer to decline it until the pleasure of the Court of Directors concerning him should be known that to commit themselves by demonstration of favor to him which they might afterwards be obliged to retract. Notwithstanding this declaration and these reasons, they now inform the Board that they have accepted the visit of Mahomed Raza Cawn.

I leave it to them to reconcile the contradiction in this behaviour, and shall make no other comment upon it than that it appears to me a pursuance of the plan which they have steadily adhered to from the beginning, to take every means and opportunity in their power to weaken and discredit my authority. Whether this was their real intention or not I am sure it can admit of no other interpretation in the minds of unbiassed persons, since Mahomed Raza Cawn's desire of paying his compliments to them and of visiting them was early and repeatedly notified to them by me at his instance, and their refusal for reasons which still remain in force had been conveyed to him through me; but on a subsequent application from Mahomed Raza Cawn, through other channels, it seems, they have not refused to receive his visit.

With regard to the communication which they received from him and which they mean to lay before the Board as far as relates to the interest of the Company, I must protest against their proceeding as a dangerous innovation and a particular indignity to me as head of this Government. For these gentlemen in a self-erected Committee, to the exclusion of the other members, to receive information relating to the Company's affairs, to deliberate upon them apart, and to deal them out to the Board at their pleasure, is to assume to themselves a right which I deem to be unconstitutional, derogatory to the rights of the Governor-General and Council, and which in its consequences may prove highly injurious to the Company's affairs.

WARREN HASTINGS.

